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Thesis Abstract 
Ethnic identity plays a fundamental role in the political processes, development strategies and 
functioning of the state in the Himalayan areas of Sikkim, Darjeeling and eastern Nepal, which are 
geographically contiguous but politically separate. The eastern Himalayan borderland is a 
geographical continuum interconnected by the history of migration from Nepal, colonisation, 
settlement and in recent times by the political upheaval on the basis of ethnicity. Each of these areas 
has experienced different facets of Nepali identity politics, a trans-border phenomenon which has not 
only had political repercussions on a regional level but also contributed to the history and identity 
formation of the entire region.  
The Nepali ethnic group is an ethno-linguistic category, a meta-identity which subsumes 
numerous ethnic groups under it. It is organized around the Hindu caste system and unified by the 
Nepali language. Controversial in its origins, this ethnic group is now undergoing an intense re-
definition leading to a variation in the political articulation of ethnicity. Based on qualitative data 
gathered in Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal the present research is a comparative analysis of the 
nexus between ethnicity and politics in South Asia.  This thesis contests the narrow, parochial and 
limited frameworks that have been used to study the region and highlights the enactment of politics in 
an area of high geo-political importance which is located at the periphery of the nation-state of both 
Nepal and India. The thesis narrates, discusses and analyses how Nepalis in Sikkim, Darjeeling and 
east Nepal use their ethnicity as a political resource, albeit in very different ways. The variety in 
political outcomes within a single ethnic group reveals the complex nature of ethnicity and the 
symbiotic relationship between ethnicity and politics. 
The case of the Nepalis of the eastern Himalayas is a study of the processes and manifestations 
of ethnic politics, the various structures and institutions that facilitate identity based politics but most 
importantly, the resurgence of ethnic politics in rapidly globalizing countries of South Asia. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a critical examination of the politics of a region whose analysis by outsiders has, 
more often than not, been mired in myths, stereotypes and generalizations. It is a study of the 
enactment of ethnic politics, its use and impact on the different groups and individuals who are 
located in the region. Whilst answering larger analytical questions regarding ethnic politics, 
this thesis engages in a comparative study of the Nepalis1 living in three different political units 
– Sikkim and Darjeeling District both in India and Ilam District in eastern Nepal. It aims to 
demonstrate the interaction between structures, processes and ethnic groups that promote the 
ethnic framework in the articulation of socio-economic grievances leading to variation in the 
manifestation of politics within a single ethnic group.  
 
The thesis focuses on the relationship between the state and ethnic groups in order to make two 
important points. Firstly; that the state and ethnic groups are interconnected through their 
mutual use of ethnic identity in politics and secondly, that there exists a broad structure for the 
re-distribution of economic and political goods, usually accessed through systems of patronage, 
which acts as the ultimate driving force behind ethnic politics. Taken together, these points 
suggest that ethnic politics is a culmination of interaction between the state and ethnic groups, 
primarily over control and access to economic and political resources. This has led to the 
emergence of new forms of political capital and to a change in the bases of political contention 
in the rapidly globalizing countries of South Asia.  
The case of the Nepalis of the eastern Himalaya establishes that ethnic politics is 
increasingly becoming a political norm in South Asia. This development has led to a change in 
the modes of self-representation of groups which is conceptualised and formed around 
essentialised markers established by the state. Through the study of the Nepalis of Sikkim, 
Darjeeling and east Nepal, this thesis contributes to existing literature on ethnic politics that 
focuses on the socially constructed and instrumental nature of ethnic groups and furthers the 
discussion by showing how the state and its incentive structures can bring about a variation in 
the articulation of ethnic politics. Emphasizing the Constructivist argument concerning the 
socially constructed nature of ethnicity the thesis shows that ethnic politics is dependent on the 
                                                          
1The citizens of the country Nepal are also known as Nepalis but in order to avoid confusion over the usage of the 
term, I will refer to the citizens of Nepal as Nepalese while Nepali will be used to denote a belonging to an ethno-
linguistic group, the membership of which originates in but is not limited to Nepal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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social construction and ethnic framing of powerful sentiments and grievances which have 
legitimacy and potency only during a particular period and in the presence of certain catalysts. 
Whilst acknowledging the impact of geographical factors on the development and enactment 
of identity, this thesis contends that the variation in ethnic articulation is a result of different 
political, economic and social factors that make one identity more beneficial as well as viable 
in particular contexts. This thesis uses a multi-dimensional approach to the study of ethnic 
politics in the eastern Himalaya and thus takes into account social, political, economic and 
cultural factors that affect identity choices and concomitantly identity politics.  
 
This thesis originated from my experiences as a student at Delhi University, India. It 
began with being viewed differently. My social identity was attached to my physical attributes 
with my Mongoloid face somehow not conforming to the idea of an ‘Indian’. Since unity in 
diversity is a national trope the problem did not lie in looking different. Despite the stereotypes 
of being a morally corrupt, dog-eating, tribal quota student, being labelled a ‘chinky’ was 
relatively tolerable compared to being asked if I was from Nepal. For me and millions of 
Indians with Nepali heritage, in spite of having been born and raised in India, the question, ‘are 
you from Nepal?’ had a particular sting to it. Not only did it question my nationality, my 
belonging to the Indian nation but it also raised questions about myself. Who was I? I was an 
Indian but not considered as one. I was not a citizen of Nepal but I could also not deny my 
cultural connections to it. It was at Delhi University that I started using the term ‘Sikkimese’ 
to answer questions about my identity and avoid lengthy, frustrating answers.  
 
I am from Sikkim, a tiny state bordering China, Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal. Previously 
an independent Himalayan kingdom, it became a part of India on the 16th May, 1975. In Sikkim 
there are three primary ethnic groups- the Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalis and the label 
‘Sikkimese’ has been appropriated by the Bhutia community who use it primarily to distinguish 
themselves from the Tibetans who settled in Sikkim after the Chinese takeover of Tibet in the 
1950s. Therefore, in Sikkim I belonged to the upper caste Nepali group, descendent of a 
migrant community who for generations have been held responsible for the abrogation of the 
monarchy and the loss of Sikkimese independence, a point of contention which will be 
discussed in the later chapters. Belonging to the larger group of Indian-Nepalis, I also had the 
option of identifying myself as a Gorkha. Although fluctuating between Sikkimese and Nepali, 
at no point have I ever identified myself as a ‘Gorkha’, despite the ‘identity crisis’ and 
confusion with the Nepalese citizens which this term is supposed to remedy. With no military 
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background or any sense of attachment to the term, I instead chose to oscillate between 
‘Sikkimese’ and ‘Nepali’ rather than use a term which would open me up to more curiosity and 
questions that I cannot satisfy. 
 
An undeniable fact, albeit one often considered politically inconvenient, is that the 
history of the Nepalis living in Sikkim and Darjeeling is obviously linked to Nepal. While an 
Indian passport might solve the existential and administrative queries in regard to my official, 
national identity, the diversity within the group I belonged to (Nepali) complicated these 
questions further. My personal identity flux and further experiences of ‘identity switching’ in 
Bhutan and Nepal have all finally become crystallised in this thesis which aims to understand 
ethnic politics in three geographically interconnected yet different political units. This thesis is 
based on my refusal to identify with a certain bounded category, thereby challenging the notion 
of ethnicity itself. I myself am a gamut of identities. This led me to question what the factors 
were that led me to choose one identity over another and even if there were no social or political 
repercussions, in what environments did I claim a particular identity and why did I feel it was 
important to do so?  
 
 
The geographical continuum of the eastern Himalaya hosts an intricate mosaic of 
peoples who, despite international and other political boundaries, share more similarities than 
differences. This thesis focuses on Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal, three small but 
geographically and historically interconnected areas. Not only do they share borders and 
histories with each other but, as the thesis will reveal, they also share some elements of 
contemporary politics, especially the use of ethnic identity in negotiations with the state.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
As a trans-border phenomenon, the Nepalis have contributed to the history of state formation 
in the entire Himalayan region, especially the eastern half which stretches from central Nepal 
to north-eastern India.  By adopting an approach that focuses on the political economy of the 
region, alongside its historical, geographical and anthropological aspects, this research aims to 
study how identity (especially ethnicity) underpins local, regional as well as national politics, 
governance and development.  
 
The research focuses on the use of ethnic identity as a political resource by the Nepalis 
of Sikkim, Darjeeling and eastern Nepal. Nepalis in each of these areas have encountered 
different adversaries, socio-political conditions and finally, political realities on the basis of 
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their ethnicity. The thesis does not take Nepali ethnic identity as a static given and rather than 
focus on the various modes of identity construction, it studies the usage of this identity for 
political negotiation with the state. In doing so, it concentrates on the processes and expressions 
of ethnic politics.  
 
One of the main themes of the thesis is to break the stereotypical frameworks of pre-
defined group boundaries, loyalties and simplistic understandings of the Nepalis and their 
relation with the wider socio-political structures. These perspectives abound in the literature, 
through which the Nepalis as well as the politics of the region have been constructed and 
reproduced- a process of historical reification. This thesis aims to elaborate the argument that 
the manner in which the Nepalis position themselves in relation to other ethnic groups or even 
within the same group, the state and other external structures is not monolithic but rather 
dynamic and that the socio-political evolution of the Nepalis has been influenced both by 
material as well as cultural elements in their surroundings. 
 
As will be discussed in the proceeding chapters, the creation of the Nepali ethnic group 
began as a project of political consolidation in the Kingdom of Gorkha through ritualistic 
incorporation of different ethnic groups within the Hindu caste system. Once this ritual and 
economic incorporation was institutionalised, the resulting political construction had a massive 
impact on determining the social life and economic status of the people incorporated within it. 
Ethnic solidarity was also accelerated by the production of a range of cultural symbols, such 
as clothes and religious practices mostly related to upper caste Hindu practices, first by the 
Gorkha rulers and more vehemently by the Rana Prime Ministers who  sought to eliminate 
cultural diversity. This led to the promotion of a set of markers that were distinct from other 
ethnic groups like the Bhutia, Sherpa and Lepcha living in the region.  
While cultural consolidation was essential for the continued hegemony of the ruling 
upper caste groups, the onset of migration out of Nepal and into Muglan2 led to the  interaction 
of these migrants with other indigenous and migrant Himalayan groups and classes (as in the 
case of Darjeeling). From amongst this migrating group, some were able to integrate relatively 
easily (for instance in Darjeeling and Sikkim), while those migrating to the north-eastern 
frontiers of the British Empire were less able to do so. Migration and inter-ethnic interaction 
                                                          
2 The Mughal sub-continent was known as Muglan.  
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necessitated further ethno-linguistic consolidation as political safeguards owing to the lower 
position of the migrating groups in the socio-economic hierarchy under the colonial and 
monarchichal administration in Darjeeling and Sikkim, respectively. Migration was thus a 
crucial historical factor in the creation of the Nepali identity and has been narrativised in novels 
like Basai (Chettri, 1989), Muluk Bahira (Bangdel, 1947) and Muglan (Bhattarai, 1988). 
Development of a single unifying language-Nepali, led to linguistic consolidation of the diverse 
ethnic groups, who then finally came to be known as Nepalis. The Nepali ethnic group is 
therefore an amalgamation of the numerous ethnic groups3, that had been incorporated into the 
Hindu ritual hierarchy and a certain set of ‘recognizable’ cultural attributes like language, 
clothes and cultural practices can be associated with this group. Nepalis live most 
predominantly across the western and eastern Himalayan region and are recognized as a 
separate ethnic group by those outside the group (like the Bhutias, Lepchas etc). This is a factor 
which is crucial in the recognition of this group in a multi-ethnic and diverse geographical 
space. ‘Nepali’ can therefore be deemed as a meta-identity, which is constructed and is made 
meaningful by the presence of other ethnic groups. While political imperatives of the Shah 
kings and Rana Prime Ministers had laid the foundations of the cultural attributes of the Nepali 
ethnic group, these sets of material markers are undergoing a process of change, renewal and 
revival in accordance to the changing economic and political demands of the people who 
comprise the Nepali ethnic group.  
Ethnic identity is one of the primary forms of identity that determine life chances of 
groups and individuals in the eastern Himalaya. One of the key functions of Nepali ethnic 
identity, historically, has been to ensure a better, social, economic and political position for at 
least a substantial section of this group. It is this function and aspect of ethnic identity in the 
contemporary context that the three case studies examine in detail. Always dynamic and 
responsive to changing political situations, contemporary politics in Sikkim, Darjeeling and 
east Nepal highlight how the persistence or disintegration of this category is influenced by 
politics, thereby reinforcing the inherent political nature of the Nepali ethnic group. Thus, this 
thesis shows how being Nepali (understood as sharing a distinct and common heritage despite 
political locations) has contributed to a certain political status within the political field in 
Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal. This in turn has proved either advantageous or 
                                                          
3 Major caste and ethnic groups subsumed under the Nepali category are :  
Parbatiyas (Nepali speaking): Brahmans, Thakuris, Chettris (formerly Khasas), Kami, Damai,  Sarki 
Other hill or mountain ethnic groups: Magar, Tamang, Newar, Rai, Gurung, Limbu, Sherpa, Sunuwar, Thakali, 
Thami.   
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disadvantageous for the Nepalis thereby leading to the exploitation of this identity in different 
ways in a bid to secure material as well as cultural prosperity.  
Re-distribution of economic and political goods has firmly been etched as the guiding 
framework, motivation and necessary end of all political activity in the Himalayan region and 
Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal are no exceptions to the trend. In this model of politics, the 
state has complete access to and control over these goods which are then re-distributed on the 
basis of certain (often subjective and politically influenced) criteria. In the eastern Himalaya, 
this re-distribution is affected by ethnic considerations leading to inequitable distribution or 
complete denial of these goods. The three cases from the eastern Himalaya represent the 
different ways in which sections of the Nepali ethnic group negotiate with their respective 
states. Modes of negotiation with the state differ on the basis of political and geographical 
location, as well as the various regional, national and international structures around them. 
However, political negotiation has taken a distinct ethnic character i.e. arguments over access 
and the right to public goods are presented as cases of denial of ethnic rights, thereby linking 
ethnicity to politics that is based on exploitation of socio-economic grievances. Thus, when 
denial, access and rights are articulated as being dependent on ethnic identity, political agency 
by the people is also expressed in ethnic terms.  
The three cases collectively highlight the immense transition that the Nepali ethnic 
group has undergone, as reflected in three different ways of political mobilization and 
articulation of ethnic identity. The three cases show that ethnic politics has completely altered 
the image and cultural attributes of the Nepali identity, but then again, this re-definition of the 
attributes and parameters of the Nepali identity are essential in the negotiation with the state 
that directly or indirectly supports ethnic politics. Ethnicity has thus become a political resource 
which is easily accessible to a collective. It has also come to be seen as a valid form of politics 
and one that is accepted, tolerated or courted by the state. 
 
As will be discussed, primarily in Section One of the thesis, the Nepali ethnic group 
emerges first as a product of the conscious political thought and action of the literati in 
Darjeeling whilst the notion of the Nepali nation-state arose at a later stage. Thus, the Nepali 
ethnic group can be considered as being socially constructed in an attempt to negotiate the 
ongoing social, economic and political exigencies at a given period in time. This also highlights 
the function and utility of this ethnic group as a political resource. This socially constructed 
nature of the Nepali ethnic group remains the premise on which this thesis is based and enables 
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a thorough investigation of the different manifestations of ethnic politics in Sikkim, Darjeeling 
and east Nepal.  
 
Flexible intra-ethnic boundaries and a plethora of tangible cultural markers enable re-
construction of the Nepali identity as per the demands of the political situation, thereby 
permitting a variation in the ways ethnic identity can be used as a political resource.  
Acknowledging the Constructivist argument that actors are shaped by the social milieu in 
which they live, identities and interests cannot be take for granted and the processes by which 
they originate and change is important (Finnemore and Skink, 2001:394), the thesis examines 
in detail the different ways in which ethnic identity and its markers have been used as a resource 
in a variety of ways in order to achieve political goals.  
 
Regional, national and international external institutions like the United Nations and 
International Non-governmental Organizations have legitimised the use of ethnicity as a 
political resource and provide the requisite channels through which to use them. Thus, it is not 
only the presence of grievances, ethnic activism, flexible intra-ethnic boundaries or tangible 
cultural markers that facilitate ethnic politics. It is the presence of ‘enabling structures’ that 
present an opportunity for the use of ethnic identity as a lucrative political resource. These 
structures provide the framework within which ethnic politics is played out.  
The case studies analyse the relationship between the structures that facilitate ethnic 
politics and the ethnic groups who use their identity instrumentally. Each case is a discussion 
of the use of ethnic identity in political negotiation with the state and what connects the three 
cases together is the use of Nepali identity, its symbols and markers, myth and history as a 
resource as well as a tool to negotiate with the state. The Nepali ethnic identity is a powerful 
idea with material consequences that are fundamental to the politics of who gets what when 
and how. Thus Nepali ethnic identity can be seen as a partly heuristic device with material 
consequences which can be used to understand how cultural items, myths and histories 
associated with a particular ethnic group can be used differently in order to facilitate the best 
outcome for that group. The thesis therefore places emphasis on the events, actors and 
mechanisms that either facilitate or hinder ethnic mobilization in politics and the use of tangible 
ethnic markers as a political resource for the attainment of goals set out by ethnic actors.  
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The existence of weak and porous boundaries between the different Nepali sub-groups 
have made this ethnic group highly susceptible to politicization4 as ethnic histories, symbolism 
and meaning can be easily used to fit different contexts. For most ethnic groups, the tradition 
of oral history or the lack of documented history has only accentuated this process further. 
Politicisation of ethnicity has become a recurrent phenomenon which, as this thesis will discuss, 
has taken numerous forms in the past as well as the present. The eastern Himalayan region has 
a rich history both of intense, mostly religious, cultural activity and of political activity, making 
each an inseparable part of the other. The relationship between culture and politics is made 
evident through a range of activities ranging from the celebration of non-Hindu festivals on a 
national scale to strategic ethnic voting. Thus, contemporary politics in the eastern Himalaya 
is marked by ethnic revivalism which is loaded with political meaning and intention. 
Apart from the celebration of cultural diversity, ethnic revivalism can also be deemed 
as a form of contention against the dominant political hegemony either of the state or an ethnic 
group (both usually tend to overlap). This is evident in Darjeeling and Nepal but as the Sikkim 
case study will reveal, ethnic politics has now increasingly become a reliable means to access 
the state. The Nepalis living in three geographically interconnected areas display diversity in 
the negotiation with their respective states, thereby qualifying as an interesting as well as 
important case in the study of ethnic politics. Whilst contributing to the study of ethnicity in 
general, identity politics in the eastern Himalaya also allows a general deduction about the 
nature of the Nepali ethnic group- that there is a shedding of the old, homogenous, assimilative 
Nepali identity and the adoption of a new identity which now has to make room for cultural 
heterogeneity in light of the political circumstances surrounding this group. This thesis focuses 
on this metamorphosis and asks the following questions- what are the visible forms of these 
changes? What is the impact on the Nepalis living in those areas and ultimately, what are the 
factors that have made the political assertion of one identity more viable than the other?  
This research also aims to expand our understanding of ethnicity by going beyond 
simplistic approaches which use cultural categories to homogenize groups into monolithic 
socio-political entities with limited internal diversity. The thesis contends that ethnic identity 
is one of the primary factors that influence the life chances of individuals and collective 
                                                          
4 Politicisation is an attempt to define the ethnic group and the markers of membership to it, which can then be 
used for the mobilisation of peoples in support of deliberately cultivated values and of representing them to the 
world according to a consciously created image (Dasgupta, 1999). 
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decisions of groups and that these identities are, at the same time in the process of construction 
by the state, its policies and the wider socio-economic environment.   
 
Thus, ethnic politics in the three areas varies in accordance to ways in which these 
identities are constructed and used by different groups, at different periods of time. Another 
contributing factor to this variation is the changing form of the state from monarchy to 
democracy (in Sikkim and Nepal) and in the case of Darjeeling, from colonial administration 
to a neo-colonial arrangement, which has a far reaching impact on the bases and forms of 
political articulation. The different perceptions of different groups of people, their political use 
of ethnic identity and the variety in the outcomes for different ethnic groups reveal the 
complexity as well as the symbiotic nature of the relationship between ethnicity and politics.   
Identity construction is a local process and thus, in spite of sharing cultural and 
historical similarities, one of the important factors that have led to a variation in political 
articulation amongst the Nepalis is their embeddedness in a distinct social, political, and 
economic system. Their reactions, actions, and representations of the self and of the other are 
bound to be different. Thus the political identity of a Nepali from east Nepal is not transferrable 
to a Nepali living in Darjeeling. Likewise the idea of a Gorkha, although familiar to all Nepalis, 
will not have the same political resonance amongst the Nepalis of Sikkim and the Nepalis of 
Nepal. Issues of nationality and citizenship aside, their grievances, meaning and resolution are 
derived from their economic, social and political surroundings. Consequently, a general 
observation of the politics of the region also raises some fundamental queries- why and how 
has ethnicity become such an important political resource, how has the state responded (e.g. by 
co-opting, challenging or resisting it) and who are the beneficiaries of this identity based 
politics? This thesis will attempt to answer these questions in order to uncover the rationale 
behind multiple identities that are available to and used by Nepalis that lead to multiple 
manifestations of ethnic politics.  
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Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is primarily divided into three parts: 
Part One-Contextualising ethnic politics in the eastern Himalayas 
The first chapter in Part One is a general introduction which discusses the research 
questions and the conceptual, theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the thesis. This 
introductory chapter will engage with the conceptual, theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of the thesis. It is broadly divided into three sections. Section One analyses the 
fundamental concept of ethnicity, the multiplicity of approaches to it and its inherent potency 
to facilitate politics. This section also discusses the literature on ethnicity, the relation between 
state and ethnicity as well as a diverse body of related literature including that emerging from 
the focus region. Section Two is a discussion on the influence of theoretical paradigms 
introduced by Pierre Bourdieu and Joel Migdal on the framework of the thesis. Finally Section 
Three focuses on the methods employed in data collection in the three areas. 
The second chapter, ‘Locating the Nepali’, traces the genesis of the Nepali ethnic 
group, starting with the formation of the Kingdom of Gorkha and ending with the important 
contribution of the cultural elites of Darjeeling and Benares. This chapter discusses the 
formation of the Nepali ethnic group outside of Nepal, its impact on Nepalese nationalism and 
the present situation of the Nepalis living in India. The chapter concludes with a brief historical 
introduction to the three areas- Sikkim, Nepal and Darjeeling district in order to further 
contextualise the case studies.  
 
Part Two: Ethnic Politics in east Nepal, Darjeeling and Sikkim 
Part Two is a discussion of the empirical evidence presented in this thesis. Each of the 
three chapters herein focuses on the politics of ethnic identity in one area: east Nepal, Sikkim 
and Darjeeling District. These case studies highlight the primacy of a particular factor that has 
contributed to the assertion of a particular identity, other than that of a Nepali. Each case study 
first analyses the social, economic and political situation that has promoted ethnic assertion in 
the first place and then focuses on the type of identity chosen. Despite their uniqueness the 
three case studies aim at answering the primary research question regarding the variation in 
articulation of Nepali ethnicity. 
 
Part Three: Understanding and analysing ethnicity 
Part Three begins with the analysis of the case studies. While the case studies establish 
the revelance and use of ethnicity, it is also imperative to bring the cases together to answer 
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why groups and individuals choose the identites that they do. This chapter recognizes four 
different factors as having an impact on the variation of ethnic identity and discusses each in 
reference to the case studies. Finally, Part Three and the thesis concludes with a final chapter 
which discusses the broader implications of studying ethnic politics in the eastern Himalayas. 
This chapter discusses how the case studies further the understanding of ethnic politics, the 
contribution it makes to Area Studies, the limitations of the study and finally the potential for 
further research 
 
Part Three is followed by an Annexe and Bibliography 
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Part One 
1. Contextualising ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya 
(i) Conceptual and theoretical framework 
Ethnicity and related concepts like ethnic groups, ethnic identities take their form and 
content from symbiotic relationships of human behaviour, from shaping action and being acted 
upon (Royce, 1982:17). This has lent ethnicity a sense of inherent dynamism and instability 
which make defining ethnicity and related concepts difficult. For example, Cohen (1993) 
describes ethnic identity as a mode of action which represents a certain cultural identity, 
thereby making ethnicity basically a politicised version of culture. Eriksen (1991), on the other 
hand, analyses ethnicity at an interpersonal level and refers to it as the social reproduction of 
basic classificatory differences between categories of people and to aspects of gains and losses 
in social interaction.  In a highly fluid and mobile world, the meaning of ethnicity is largely 
formulated by its presence in everyday interaction, experiences and exposure through the 
media. Thus this fluidity and adaptation of ethnicity in highly heterogeneous societies makes 
the definition of ethnicity even more ambivalent and as Comaroff and Comaroff (2009: 22) 
summarize ‘ethnicity = culture + identity, adjective and noun locked in indissoluble embrace, 
a taken for granted usage in the argot of everyday life’.   
Ethnicity (like gender, class and sexuality) is but one of the forms of identity that is 
accessible to an individual as well as collective. As Weeks (1990:88) writes, ‘Each of us live 
with a variety of contradictions. The list is infinite and so are our belongings. Which of them 
we focus on, bring to the fore, ‘‘identify’’ with depends on a host of factors. At the centre 
however are values we share or wish to share with others.’  Thus not only is there a range of 
belongings that one can identify with but there is also an element of choice and subjectivity 
over which belongings are made prominent, utilised or concealed. Identities cannot be 
constructed or understood in a vacuum. This also implies that identities derive their meaning 
in relation to the social, political and economic contexts making a specific identity relevant 
only under specific circumstances or in a particular environment (Campbell and Rew, 1999: 
10).  
An individual is a gamut of identities and no single identity may fully represent an 
individual. In this context, ethnicity can be considered as a cultural segment of society that may 
also intersect with other identities (like class) which may overlap and reinforce each other 
(Rudolph, 2006: 8). Thus making sense of people’s ethnic identities entails a broader 
understanding of identity per se as they are informed not only by race and ethnicity, but also 
by other axes of identification, such as gender, class, sexuality, age and religion (Song, 2003:1). 
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Identities are always in production, in a process which is never complete (Hall, 1990: 222) and 
therefore constantly evolving. This is evident in the constant evolution in the meaning and form 
of ethnic identity itself as a result of the change in the socio-political environment.5 
From a theoretical perspective, definitions of ethnicity have usually oscillated between 
the primordial school of thought, social constructivism and lately instrumentalism. Ethnicity, 
although an ambiguous term becomes easy to see and define by what it does, through its 
function in the facilitation of human interaction. The Primordial school of thought propounds 
that the function of ethnicity is that of satisfying the primordial socio-psychological need for 
security and survival (Harvey, 2000:40). 6  Primordial perspectives assert that people are 
naturally ethnocentric, exhibiting trust and preference for those of their own cultural group 
while feeling more distant from, and distrustful of, those of other cultural groups (Brown, 1994: 
xiii). Harold Isaacs (1975:30, 35) in his attempt to ‘sketch a portrait of basic group identity’ 
suggests that it is composed of primordial affinities and attachments. It is the identity made up 
of what a person is born with or acquires at birth. It is distinct from all other multiple and 
secondary identities people acquire and ‘an individual belongs to his basic group in the deepest 
and the most literal sense that he is not alone.’ However, Primordial understandings of ethnicity 
cannot explain the variation in political salience across different countries as well as 
communities and within countries. Also problematic for primordialist argument is the lack of 
explanation as to how people may redefine or choose different formulations of ethnicity for 
instrumental purposes (Fearon, 1999:3).   
Adding further complexity to the definition and understanding of ethnicity is the 
element of instrumentality in ethnic politics. An instrumental approach links ethnicity to 
motivation making ethnicity fluid, manipulable, variable, situationally expressed, subjectively 
                                                          
5 David Mosse (1999) presents an interesting example of the evolution of the socio-political usage of the identity 
of the Untouchable caste in South India. Beginning from the colonial times when these caste groups took on a 
religious identity (as Christians, Buddhists) Mosse traces how the changed political attitude and commitment of 
the state towards this group led to their metamorphosis into a bureaucratic and welfare category.  This change in 
the form and function of ethnic identity is also evident in the three cases discussed in the thesis. Like the case of 
South Indian Untouchable castes that Mosse discusses, the ethnic identity of the Nepalis is also undergoing a 
serious change. It is slowly evolving from an ethno-linguistic group to a ‘bureaucratic and welfare category’ with 
homogenizes cultural diversity into features that conform either to the national or international discourse on ethnic 
groups.  
6 Collier and Hoeffler (2000, cited in Sambanis, 2001:10) in their study of ethnic conflicts argue that ethnic kin 
groups facilitate within-group co-ordination and hinder cross-group co-ordination, thereby implying that groups 
based on kinship selections have a greater chance of survival or success compared to groups organized on other 
criteria. 
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defined and one possible type of affiliation among many that individuals and groups can 
identify themselves with. According to Joireman (2003) the individual will consciously or 
unconsciously calculate and negotiate all levels of encounters and make an identity choice 
which will offer maximum utility. Although the instrumental approach restores agency to the 
people as political actors, the framing of choices and activities in purely practical terms and the 
assumption that all collective action is directed towards realizing mutual interest is a rather 
limited approach. 
Combining elements of both approaches is Constructivism which recognizes ethnic 
identity as a synthesis of ascribed traits combined with social inputs like ancestral myths, 
subjective beliefs, religion, and language making ethnicity partly ascribed and partly volitional. 
The individual is free to choose his social context as well as the symbols which he chooses to 
make meaningful (Joireman, 2003). Following the Primordialists, Constructivism views ethnic 
identities as cultural endowments and in keeping with the Instrumentalists, it views ethnic 
identities as malleable. The distinguishing feature of the Constructivist position is the belief 
that while identities can be reshaped, they can only be altered at a significant cost (Bates, 2006: 
5).Thus, whether it be an umbrella concept to include groups differentiated by color, religion, 
language, nationalities or other symbolic features (Horowitz, 1985:3) the essential 
characteristic feature of ethnicity is its existence and relevance in a social context. 
  
The practical implications of ethnicity cannot be neatly compressed and 
compartmentalised as its political usage necessitates the blurring of these theoretical 
boundaries. Identity politics in the eastern Himalaya is based on the politicisation of ethnicity 
which in turn is based on revivalism and emphasis on essentialised notions of tangible aspects 
of ethnicity such as language, dress, food and religion. According to Wright (1998:7)7 there is 
an older version of looking at and understanding culture and there are new meanings of culture 
but in an age which Stuart Hall (1993:356 in Wright, 1998:9) calls the age of ‘dislocated 
histories and hybridised ethnicities’ there is a return to essentialism which supports 
instrumental motives of ethnic groups.  
 
                                                          
7 Wright gives a very interesting example of the Kayapo (an ethnic group indigenous to Brazil) who also use 
culture, which had earlier seemed like an impediment, as a resource to negotiate their co-existence with the 
dominant society. This shows that expressing ethnic identity is getting increasingly associated with highlighting 
the ‘cultural aspects’ (1998:12-14).  
 
15 
 
In this context Max Weber provides an important framework within which to 
understand and use ethnicity as a variable that facilitates politics in the eastern Himalaya. 
According to the Weberian tradtion, ethnicity is deemed to be a subjectively felt sense of 
belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry owing to similarities of 
physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration. 
Further, this belief must be important for the propogation of group formation especially in the 
political sphere; conversely it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship 
exists.  Ethnic subtypes of ethnicity can be further distinguished depending on the type of 
markers that are used to substantiate the belief in shared culture and ancestry, most importantly 
ethnoreligious, ethnoregional, and ethnolinguistic categories and groups (Weber, 1978: 389; 
Wimmer, 973:2008 emphasis mine). This definition places equal emphasis on the subjective 
nature of ethnicity, consisting of immutable cultural elements, and the rationale or purpose of 
ethnic identity (albeit an instrumental one). It thereby provides great flexibility in our 
understanding of ethnicity in the eastern Himalaya which is at once a historical product as well 
as one that is undergoing constant reproduction. Despite following different political 
trajectories, ethnicity remains the dominant variable in almost all the political processes in the 
eastern Himalaya thereby leading to ethnic politics wherein issues concerning ethnicity take 
primacy over others and/or where generic socio-economic issues are framed and contested as 
ethnic grievances. 
In agreement with Brubaker and Cooper (2000:10) this thesis contends that groups 
come to think of themselves as ethnic groups because of how their members think they 
originated, not because of how they actually originated and not because of what their members 
might actually be held to share (emphasis mine). Migration and lack of historically recorded 
data has rendered a major portion of the ethnic heritage and history of Sikkim, Darjeeling and 
east Nepal a modification if not entirely an ‘invention of tradition’8 (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
1983). However, lack of authenticity does not lower its credibility or its potency as a political 
resource. As Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 19) remind us, even those groups, sentiments and 
belongings that we deem as primordial may have recent historical creation. Thus the case 
studies in this thesis show how primordial elements like kinship, history and religion have been 
re-packaged to fit the mould and expectations of not only the members of the group but also 
the wider (national as well as international) institutions. This emphasizes both the existence of 
ethnic groups and their grievances as well as the role played by ‘frames’- especially the 
                                                          
8 These aspects will be discussed in greater detail in the later chapters.  
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nationalistic and the ethnic, which have become easily available, powerfully resonant and 
widely understood through the various forms of media, internet. Through stereotyping, 
influencing perceptions, individuals and groups are created, categorised and seen in a certain 
sense that did not exist before (Hacking, 2006:23). For example the creation of the category of 
a Scheduled Tribe in India comes with its well defined criteria of tangible as well as spiritual 
characteristics that a group deemed as a tribe must possess (language and script, animistic 
beliefs, non-Hindu rituals). This not only influences how a group might understand itself but 
also how it is viewed by others. Categories therefore affect the worldview of those who have 
been classified as well as those who have not been. Given the trend of affirmative action in 
India and Nepal, the classification may well lead to sentiments of relative deprivation amongst 
those not categorized as tribes.  
 
No group engaged in ethnic politics can maintain a viable identity without signs, 
symbols and underlying values that point towards a distinctive identity, but these are 
themselves products of interaction with other groups. Thus ethnic groups are located in a matrix 
of social relations and the viability of an identity is partly dependant upon the 
comprehensibility of the ethnic content by others in the social matrix and its effective 
manipulation (Royce, 1985: 5). It is this social, contested and constructed characteristic of 
ethnicity that provides the scope for effective political mobilization of ethnic sentiments, 
symbols and grievances by political leaders, cultural and political elites and other political 
agents in a bid to claim a stake in the wider political field of a region or country or what may 
be known as ethnic politics. As Brubaker and Cooper (2000:10) contend, concepts of ethnicity 
are not mere analytical categories but historically specific social descriptions. Thus the case 
studies and the general political environment in the eastern Himalaya bear similarity to what 
Hacking (2006: 23) calls the process of ‘making up people’ which requires enabling social 
conditions, resources on the part of those initiating the process and a corresponding lack of 
resources to resist from those who are the objects of this process. The analysis of ethnic politics 
requires an understanding and interrogation of the social and political structures in which an 
ethnic group is embedded.  
 
Ethnic politics cannot be understood just by analysing the group in question; and thus, 
as Carter and Fenton (2009:5) suggest, strong material and social contexts have to be taken into 
consideration in order to arrive at the beginning of a causal account of how actors make their 
choices in relation to ethnicity. Instrumentality is an important and blatantly evident aspect of 
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ethnic politics (as visible in the nature of grievances and their suggested remedies) in the 
eastern Himalaya. For example, demands for the preservation and development of ethnic 
culture and tradition are usually interspersed with demands for economic and political benefits. 
Once again elements like myths of origin, kinship and most importantly tangible aspects like 
clothes, food, and language scripts play an important role in the instrumental operation of 
ethnicity.  
While economic and political relief might form the primary component of the demands 
of ethnic groups, this does not mean that ethnic politics can be equated wholly with 
instrumental motives.  As the following chapters will discuss, non-instrumental motives also 
play an important role in the construction, maintenance and mobilisation of ethnic identity. 
Thus, data collection and analysis in this thesis has been influenced by what Jenkins (1997: 
169-70) calls a ‘re-thinking of ethnicity...which demands a balanced view of ethnic 
attachments, to appreciate that although it is imagined, it is not imaginary; to acknowledge its 
antiquity as well as its modernity.’ Ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya cannot be understood 
through a uni-dimensional approach and this thesis proceeds with a careful consideration of all 
the approaches discussed above, because all three-primordialism, constructivism and 
instrumentalism- make their own contributions to the understanding of ethnic politics.  
 
While the Nepali group itself is a product of social construction, the recent changes 
within the group and the modes taken to facilitate those changes highlights the relation between 
culture and political mobilisation.  The political and economic contexts in which an ethnic 
group is located cannot debar the instrumental motives that are explicable on the part of a group 
with experiences of poverty, discrimination and deprivation. This conflates economic problems 
with ethnicity thereby making ethnicity one of the most powerful bases for collective action. 
Royce (1985) elaborates this approach to emphasize that individuals within certain constraints 
will use ethnicity to their advantage, and this is contingent on their place in the larger inter-
ethnic matrix. Weber (1978:39) turns the notion of ethnicity as the basis of collective action on 
its head by saying that it is the political community or sphere, no matter how artificially 
organized, that inspires belief in common ethnicity, thereby making ethnicity one of the bases 
of political action. This approach has influenced the framing of the arguments in this thesis. 
The enactment of politics in the eastern Himalaya has not only made ethnicity a viable political 
resource (mostly for access to economic and political resources) but it has also led to the 
political mobilisation of those groups and identities which had previously remained dormant. 
Thus political structures (like political parties) as well as practices of democracy have, to a 
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very large extent, facilitated ethnic group formation in the region and the eventual 
establishment of identity based politics as a regional norm. Following Shrestha and Adhikari 
(2011: 43), for an act to be recognized as ‘political’ it is not sufficient that its primary aim is to 
engage in a contestation with the state or challenge dominant forms of power. It must also 
demonstrate a certain host of characteristics at the level of performance. Whether or not actions 
are seen as ‘political’ depends upon an evaluation, by the wider public, of the suitability of the 
setting for the performance, the appropriateness of the script, and the choice of actors for the 
performance in question.  
Like Weber, Brubaker and Cooper (2000:15) argue that it is politics which makes 
groups and a sociological account of group formation must necessarily precede discussions of 
why people choose to identify themselves in a particular way in particular circumstances.  
Understanding why members of a single ethnic group choose to emphasize a particular aspect 
of their identity over others in different locations is also a primary premise of the present thesis. 
Rather than simply studying ethnic movements in the eastern Himalayas, the thesis attempts to 
explain the political processes and institutional structures that influence how groups decide 
which identity to make politically relevant. This decision making process precedes and informs 
political action. The focus of the thesis is to compare and analyse ethnic politics ensueing from 
the interaction between ethnic identity, its related grievances and the institutional structures, 
represented largely by the state and international institutions like the UN. 
Mere existence of ethnic groups or their grievances does not result in political 
mobilization of these groups or issues. Writing in the context of Indian politics Chandra 
(2005:239) highlights the role of the state in encouraging ethnic politics through its policies 
and practices of the re-distribution of public goods mainly through networks of patronage. 
According to Chandra (ibid), in such political systems individuals get ahead either by becoming 
a part of the state themselves and then obtaining control over the flow of patronage or by 
cultivating ties with someone who controls the state and thus becoming consumers, if not 
distributors of patronage benefits. Madsen et al (2011) make a succinct connection between 
democracy (or the act of voting) and the immediate expectation of development. The vote can 
be seen as a part of “an exchange relation trans-substantiating the act of voting into the delivery 
of benefits” (ibid: 4). Thus development (understood as construction of roads, bridges, schools, 
social welfare, subsidies etc) has become the most important component of all political 
discourse (Mitra, 1995: 396) leading to the aggrandization of state power as it is the state that 
controls all aspects of material development of a region.  
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Patronage politics is also inherently linked to the imaginings and structural construction of the 
state. Rudolph and Rudolph (1987, 400-4001 in Mitra, 1991:396) present a concise illustration 
of the state as perceived in India. They write, ‘when in western Europe, the state behaves very 
much as the ‘executive committee’ of the bourgeoise, the state In India, like the avatars of 
Vishnu, reserved for itself a multiplicity of roles of accommodation, extraction, production and 
repression, stepping in as the inevitable intermediary whenever the conflict between social 
forces became threatening to public order’. Thus it is this multiplicity of roles that the state 
enacts and the wide web of institutional mechanisms that is needed to support it, that enables 
the use of ethnicity as a reasonable political resource.  
As an administrative apparatus, the state benefits from the mobilisation, formalisation 
and politicisation of the different ethnic segments but the desired outcome of this political 
investment is dependent on the nature and strength of the state. As Brown (1994) and Sambanis 
(2000) point out, if a state is unable to enforce its power or distribute resources amongst 
different ethnic groups equitably, it may only agitate and rupture the social order, thereby 
creating ethnic discord which was non-existent before. On the other hand, as a mediator and 
mobilizing mechanism of minority symbols and interests, the state, as a part of the larger 
political system, also relies on ethnic strategies to secure the most favourable outcome (Parenti, 
1967). For example, the study conducted by Micheluti (2004) on the Yadav caste group of 
Uttar Pradesh, India, presents a classic example of the political mobilisation of lower castes. 
Through effective ethnic mobilisation (based on caste) and maximum utilisation of the 
affirmative action policies provided by the State, the traditionally low to middle ranking 
Yadavs have become the most important political community of Uttar Pradesh. 
Kohli (1997: 327) makes an important link between the establishment of democracy and the 
re-generation of kinship ties in most developing countries where democracy comes as an 
imported idea. He reiterates that power devolution in most developing countries is fairly weak 
and lopsided leading to the development of ‘two-track polities’ with a democratic track in the 
sphere of electoral politics and a less democratic track in the state sphere, especially in the area 
of economic policy making thereby restricting the space and possibility of participation. This 
in turn widens the use of narrow frames of belonging (like ethnicity) and the articulation of 
grievances through an ethnic framework (ibid: 328).  This highlights the increasing importance 
of what Kanchan Chandra (2000:30) calls the ‘ethnic template’which is the principle guideline 
used by political parties to identify the population and to structure socio-economic grievances 
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or demands on an ethnic rationale as a result of which ‘ethnic politking is moving from the 
margins of the political arena to fight for center stage’ (ibid:26). 
Politics of identity lies in the construction, articulation and achievement of the goals set 
out by two primary agents of politics- ethnic groups and the state, united by their use of 
ethnicity in their political agenda. While the state uses ethnicity as a device to re-distribute 
resources, in effect creating and manipulating insecurities and structures of the society, ethnic 
groups and their representatives use arguments based on an ethnic rationale to bargain with the 
state for various concessions. As will be highlighted by the cases, the aim of ethnic activism is 
not to change the various structures that promote social, political and economic discrepancies 
but to enable better access to the state and public goods. This dialectic relationship between 
ethnicity and politics is sustained by an overarching structure that promises material as well as 
cultural benefits and at the same time promotes the use of ethnic identity as a resource for 
political patronage. This has had important ramifications for the idea of a homogenous Nepali 
identity, thereby revealing the contested, malleable nature of ethnic identity which makes it an 
opportune breeding ground for political mobilization.  
 
Ethnicity can thus be viewed as a focal point, facilitating the convergence of individual 
actions and demands, which is mutually consistent with that of the group thereby rendering the 
group ready for political mobilisation9 (Varshney 2003; Nagel and Olzak, 1982). Therefore in 
a situation in which there are limited participation resources and in which clear competitive 
advantages are attached to ethnic identity (as opposed to class, occupation or some other 
identity) the basis of political choice is neither ideology nor policies but rather, ethnic 
preferences  (Chandra, 2004; Nielsen, 1985; Olzak and Nagel, 1982).10  
 
The political nature of ethnic groups can only be fully comprehended by taking into 
account external factors like resource competition, immigration policies, political access etc. 
which play an important role in shaping individual and group choices, furthering the 
exploitation of ethnicity as a resource for political action. Therefore, the theoretical framework 
                                                          
9 Ethnic mobilisation is the process by which groups organise along ethnic lines in pursuit of collective ends and 
in politics it is group action not only in favour of one’s group but also against some other group (Varshney, 2003; 
Olzak and Nagel, 1982). 
 
10 In patronage democracies like India, voters make their choice on the basis of representation that has be given 
to their co-ethnics by a political party, as it ensures that they, as members of that ethnic group, have maximum 
access to the political and economic benefits (Chandra, 2004).Thus, ethnicity is a political resource, generated by 
the socio-political environment. 
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guiding this research emphasizes the socially constructed as well as flexible nature of ethnic 
identity. Concomitantly, the expansion and contraction of group boundaries, essentialisation as 
well as revivalism of ethnic culture can be contexutalised and understood as an instrumental 
response to changed political circumstance which aims to better facilitate their access to or 
control over resources that are controlled by the state. Ethnic politics can be seen as an interplay 
between institutional structures (at the local, regional and national level) and the mobilization 
of ethnicity as a political resource by ethnic groups for effective negotiation with the state for 
economic and political benefits as well as cultural recognition. This is a process which is guided 
by over-arching dominant and well established mechanisms of patronage.  
1.1(ii) Framing ethnic politics: literature on the eastern Himalaya 
Having acknowledged the complexities of ethnicity and its definitions and understandings 
within the larger framework, it is now imperative to investigate how ethnic politics has been 
understood and reproduced in the literature on the region. This is important not only because 
of the role that academic literature plays in the legitimization of political agency of ethnic 
groups but also to confirm its prevalence as a pre-dominant regional feature. The literature 
reviewed in this section pertains specifically to that relating to ethnic politics, of the Nepali 
ethnic group, in Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal. The aim of this thesis is to contribute 
further to discussions on ethnic politics in the eastern Himalayas that have already been 
inititated by the literature discussed below. 
In the context of Nepal, recent political transition has brought identity politics to the 
fore, where gender and caste have again been pushed to the sidelines by ethnic issues. Ethnic 
politics is usually analysed within the matrix of economic determinisim and discrimination 
towards other ethnic groups in the hills and plains of Nepal by upper caste hill groups (see 
Lawoti, 2007; Bhattachan, 2008, 1995; Gurung, 1997). This is a viewpoint supported by most 
academic literature from the region. Ethnic based organisations (both state and non-state) have 
produced numerous books, maps and surveys (Gurung et al, 2006; Sharma, 2008) attempting 
to map and quantify the ‘ethnic question’. In the context of eastern Nepal and the Limbu ethnic 
group which is the focus of this thesis, a thorough investigation of Limbu ethnic politics is 
restricted by limited literature on the region and on the Limbu ethnic group itself in English or 
Nepali. The most influential books based on research conducted in eastern Nepal are Land and 
Social Change in Nepal by Lionel Caplan (1970) and The Dozing Shaman by Phillipe Sagant 
(1996). Both are intensive anthropological accounts of the Limbu ethnic group and inter-ethnic 
social relations in the eastern hills. Although they remain highly relevant in familiarizing the 
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reader with the socio-historical setting of the eastern hills, they are set in a time which is 
markedly different to the present.  
A recent contribution by Ian Fitzpatrick (2012) entitled Cardamom and Class studies 
the political economy of a Limbu village and not only takes into account the impact of the 
global economic shifts on migration and local economy but also analyses the oft forgotten 
dimension of class. Much of the discussion in the aforementioned literature assumes ethnic 
identity as an unproblematic feature of a group or individual’s identity. This body of literature 
focuses on the usage of ethnic identity either in a social or in a political setting, thereby raising 
pertinent questions regarding the importance of identity construction itself, in terms of our 
understandings and perceptions of the social as well as the political world. More relevant to the 
themes of this thesis is the investigation on the inception of ethnic politics in the eastern hills 
by Susan Hangen. Her book The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal (2010) and other subsequent 
papers (2007) on the topic is an analysis of the Mongol National Organisation (MNO), one of 
the earliest proponents of ethnic politics in eastern Nepal. Her work remains an important 
source for a detailed analysis of the factors that led to political mobilization on the basis of a 
broad Mongol identity. Although the MNO does not hold the same political relevance that it 
did in the early 1990s, Hangen charts their success and eventual decline to show the potential 
of ethnicity as a potent political resource that can be utilised at an opportune juncture in time, 
which is one of the primary contentions of this thesis. Gregoire Schlemmer’s (2003/2004; 
2010) interesting articles on the re-invention of Kirat tradition is also highly relevant in the 
understanding of ethnic politics which has come to be associated with preservation and even 
re-invention of ethnic culture. Schlemmer establishes an important link between culture and 
rights and paves the way for a critical understanding of cultural production in eastern Nepal 
which is at the heart of Limbu ethnic politics.  
While excellent sources on ethnicity, religion, literature exist in English (generally, not 
specific to east Nepal), most of these are inaccessible to the majority of the local population 
outside of Kathmandu valley who are more adept at reading in the Nepali language than in 
English. A much larger section of the population have access to books and articles written in 
Nepali or those books that have been translated into Nepali.11 Thus it is usually books, novels 
                                                          
11 Lionel Caplan’s ‘Land and Social Change in East Nepal’ was translated into Nepali in 2010. However it was 
curiously titled as Purbi Nepalma Limbu Jatiko Kipat ra Samajik Pherbadal which when re-translated means ‘The 
kipat of the Limbus of east Nepal and social change’. This prompted speculations whether this was done to 
increase sales in east Nepal by tapping into the heightened ethnic sentiment which is strongly related to land.  
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and articles written in or translated into Nepali (and now also in Limbu) and therefore 
accessible to the majority of people in east Nepal, which are also the prime sources of history 
for the masses. Despite the lack of scientific enquiry regarding historical data and the tradition 
of oral history, books and novels hold great social and political value. This makes it imperative 
that we are aware of the resources which people have access to that favour or contribute to the 
formation of particular identities.  
The Limbu ethnic organization, Kirat Yakthung Chumulung (KYC), is at the forefront 
of the production of literature pertaining to Limbu history, culture and tradition. They publish 
books, newspapers and magazines that are related to Limbu history, culture and society. 
Amongst the easily available and popular books available in eastern Nepal was Iman Singh 
Chemjong’s (1948) Kirat Itihas (History of the Kirat people), Kirat Itihas ani Sanskriti 
(History and Culture of the Kirat people) (2003) and the recently published Limbuwanko 
Rajniti: Itihas, Bartaman ra Bhavishya (The politics of Limbuwan: History, Present and the 
Future) by Bhawani Baral and Kamal Tigela (2008). While these literary sources play an 
important role in instilling a sense of ethnic history and pride, they also act as reminders of 
ethnic subjugation at the hands of the state represented by upper caste groups and thereby 
strengthening ethnic activism and politics further. The historical literature (Chemjong, 2003; 
Pradhan, 1991) on the Limbu kingdom in east Nepal provides a very general idea about the 
relationship between the Gorkha kingdom and the Limbus. Limbu history has been constructed 
on the basis of Limbu opposition to the incursions of the Gorkha monarchy. While Kumar 
Pradhan’s (1991) The Gorkha Conquests provides a historical setting, other works discussed 
previously have more of an anthropological bent, focusing on the micro-level, everyday 
interaction of the Limbus with the state and other ethnic groups. On a macro level, the Limbu 
ethnic movement is also a key example of the ongoing contestation against the state-led 
discourse on ethnic and national identity. The movement for ethnic homeland or Limbuwan 
has therefore, been used as a source of statistics for violence and discrimination (Lawoti, 2007). 
However, this study of state-ethnic group relation at the macro level does not analyse 
sufficiently the role played by the state or its extensions (like the bureacracy) in the process of 
ethnic politics, thereby leaving a vacuum that this thesis hopes to fill.  
 
Moving further east, the Darjeeling hills have been subject to much academic scrutiny 
especially those aspects related to its flora, fauna and tea plantations (Khawas 2006, 2007; 
Sharma, 1997; Sarkar, 2008; Besky, 2008; Sarkar and Lama, 1986). Rhoderick Chalmer’s 
(2007) doctoral thesis We Nepalis: Language, Literature and the formation of a Nepali Public 
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Sphere in India, 1914-1940 is very pertinent to this research. Chalmers discusses the formation 
of the Nepali public sphere in Darjeeling. His thesis is a rich source of historical data on the 
development of Nepali language and literature which also traces the formation of the ethno-
linguistic category which eventually came to be known as Nepali. Local authors like Bomjan 
(2008) have also engaged in writing the history of Darjeeling which corroborates the colonial 
historiography of colonial officers like O’Maley (1907) whose District Gazetteer is often 
referred to as one of the primary sources of history of the Darjeeling hills. Following the 
regional pattern, the social history of Darjeeling is reduced to a narration rather than a 
discussion of political and other significant events. In these books colonial history and the 
political movement for a separate homeland called Gorkhaland is usually intertwined, leading 
to the reification of a colonial construction of the martial race of the Gorkha and a 
homogenisation of other groups (Lepcha, Tibetans and Marwaris) who live in the Darjeeling 
hills.  
Themes of Gorkha as a martial race, ethnic discrimination of the Nepalis and the violent 
Gorkhaland movement of 1986 have been the focus of Nepali scholars like T.B.Subba (1992, 
1999), Rajendra Dhakal (2009) as well as many non-Nepali scholars (Samanta, 2003; 
Chakraborty, 2000; Chattopadhyay, 2008). The majority of these articles take a descriptive, 
non-analytical approach to the Gorkha or the Gorkhaland movement and disappointingly 
indulge in and promote homogenisation, reification and stereotypes. Almost all the writers on 
Darjeeling’s history and politics see the Gorkha identity and its military origins as obvious and 
unproblematic, thereby promoting the image of the Gorkha as given, immutable and 
permanent. From an analytical perspective this link is not in conformity with the ground reality. 
Lexical problems and pejorative connotations aside, the number of people who joined the 
‘paltan’12 or the army is far less compared to those who were/are engaged in the tea industry, 
employed in other sectors or unemployed. This leads to a large vacuum in the actual 
engagement with the Gorkha identity and its political dynamism as there are no attempts to 
unpack and understand the constituents of this identity.  
Contributing to a more critical understanding of ethnic politics in Darjeeling are works 
by Bidhan Golay (2006) who discusses the ironies within the Gorkha identity and its 
concomitant ethnic politics and Chelsea Booth (2011) whose doctoral thesis discusses the finer 
nuances related to language and identity. Both of these works are instructive in the 
                                                          
12 Corrupt Nepali version of the English word platoon.  
25 
 
understanding of the Gorkha identity, the insecurities and rhetoric that supports this identity as 
well as the political movement that is dependent on this identity. This thesis continues on the 
same trajectory adopted by the two authors and attempts to present a critical, nuanced 
understanding of ethnic politics in Darjeeling that looks beyond the popular rhetoric of the 
Gorkha identity. Middleton (2011, 2013) and Shneiderman (2009) focus on different ethnic 
groups within the fold of the Gorkha category with work that concentrates more on the 
instrumental rationale of ethnic revivalism and interactions with the state which are also the 
core basis of the political movement around the Gorkha identity.  
In neighbouring Sikkim, while literature on Buddhism, mountains, flora and fauna, the 
indigenous Lepcha and the Bhutia rulers abound (Arora, 2006; Fonning, 1987; Little, 2008; 
Balicki, 2008; Mullard, 2011) there has been very little research published on the study of the 
Nepalis or their politics in Sikkim. Identity politics is primarily woven around inter-group 
boundaries but of late, the focus has shifted to intra-group boundaries. In comparison to other 
ethnic groups in Sikkim (primarily the Bhutias and Lepchas), the intra-ethnic boundaries of the 
Nepali group are highly liminal thereby making it vulnerable to political exploitation. Ethnicity 
is intrinsically related to politics which has been recognised by scholars who have written on 
Sikkimese politics, before and after the ‘merger’ with India in 1975 (Das, 1983; Hiltz, 2003; 
O’Maley, 1907; Rose, 1978). While shedding some light on the political situation in Sikkim, 
these historical accounts present each ethnic group as a homogenous, pre-determined entity 
prone to and ready for political action. These accounts have also made inter-ethnic boundaries 
(especially between the historically dominant but minority Lepcha-Bhutia and the majority 
Nepali bloc) more real than they might be in practice because inter-ethnic marriages and other 
civic relations are in fact (fairly) common in Sikkim.  
While McDuie-Ra (2009), Arora (2007) and Bentley (2007) discuss political 
negotiation between the state and the Lepcha ethnic group as well as the imperatives for cultural 
revivalism within this group, a small number of scholars like Shneiderman and Turin (2008), 
Vandenhelsken (2011), Gurung (2010), Phadnis (1980) and Sinha (2006, 2009) have engaged 
with contemporary Nepali ethnic politics from the perspective of development, anthropology, 
sociology and politics. These works contribute to a critical understanding of the, mostly 
cultural, mechanisms behind this resurgence of ethnic identity and point towards the different 
motivations that encourage this development. Mahendra P Lama’s (1994) edited text also tries 
to make a substantial contribution to research and analysis on topics pertaining to the political-
economy of Sikkim but its chapters fail to satisfy as they come across as mere descriptions or 
statements of facts and figures with little critical analysis of the topics discussed. In summation, 
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there is an absence of a rigorous analysis of ethnic politics generally and Nepali ethnic politics 
specifically.  
In Darjeeling and Sikkim, colonial records and accounts are regarded as important 
sources of history and although the state (whether it be the monarchy in Sikkim or the British 
administration in Darjeeling) is always mentioned, there is hardly any critical, analytical 
discussion of its role. Thus, it is not only the ethnic groups which are seen as monolithic but 
also the state. The importance of the state is acknowledged but the role it plays in the 
construction of identity is not discussed nor is the impact that perceptions of the state (negative 
or positive) have on framing grievances and strategies of action. For example- what are the 
policies implemented by the Sikkimese state that make it more favourable not only to its 
citizens but also to its neighbours in Nepal and Darjeeling where serious anti-state movements 
exist. In the eastern Himalaya ethnic politics is mostly based on emulation and shared notions 
of development, of what is good and right, thus a comparison of the attitudes and approaches 
towards the state can shed light on the generic nature of ethnic politics in the region. This 
comparison also reveals a general feature of ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya that 
political mobilisation is not really a challenge to uproot the political system but rather to use 
ethnicity as a strategic base to access it.  
However the dearth of literature focusing on this relationship means that different 
elements of the relationship between states and ethnic groups have to be sieved out of the 
existing literature. Also the fact that ethnic identity and the politics around it exploded into 
public imagination and politics fairly recently makes identity politics in the eastern Himalaya 
a contemporary issue that scholars have only very recently started exploring. For example, in 
Sikkim claims by different Nepali groups to be recognized within other socio-economic 
categories like Most Backward Class (MBC) and Other Backward Classes (OBC)13 emerged 
less than two decades ago. The recent nature of this phenomenon combined with the limited 
research on the area, means that there is a serious dearth of critical academic literature. Till 
very recently, these identities have been studied only in their capacity as cultural entities and 
there has been no linking of these identities to the economic and political environment around 
them. Of similar importance in the area is the changing nature of the state from monarchies 
(Sikkim, Nepal) or a colony (Darjeeling) to political units participating in democracy and 
                                                          
13 Both are socio-economic categories that have been created in order to permit affirmative action for those 
sections of the society who have been socially as well as economically marginalized. However, the definition as 
well as the groups that are encompassed within this group is highly fluid, aspects which will be discussed in 
greater detail later in the thesis.  
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electing heads of state. Thus in order to gain a comprehensive account of ethnic politics, this 
thesis proposes to take into account the history of the state and specifically its relationship with 
ethnic groups.                    
 
Although different forms of ‘everyday politics’ (pro-ethnic government, election 
propaganda, reservation politics) have made ethnicity an inevitable part of politics and a 
valuable resource, there is no critical engagement with it. This leads to methodological as well 
as theoretical questions of how to engage with, analyse and articulate ethnic politics in the 
eastern Himalaya.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings 
One of the most important and influential factors in the articulation and expression of 
ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya is the state14 and its bureaucratic extensions. The state 
does not determine ethnicity but it influences ethnic politics by its recognition or non-
recognition of ethnicity as a legitimate basis for political organisation. This renders prior ethnic 
divisions more permanent, promotes new mobilisations of formerly unrecognized groups and 
incites latent ethnic nationalism through increased social interactions (Nagel, 1995; Nagel, 
1979, in Neilsen, 1985: 135; Brown, 1994), thereby supporting Weber’s definition of ethnic 
groups which are seen as having an inherent potential for collective political action.  
Migdal (2001:16) proposes a definition of the state which has been instrumental to the 
positioning of the state in relation to ethnic groups in this thesis. He defines the state as a ‘field 
of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (i) the coherent, controlling 
organisation in a territory and (ii) the actual practices of its multiple parts. Migdal’s ‘state in 
society’ (ibid: 49) approach has been instructive in imagining as well as describing the 
activities of the state and the response to it in the eastern Himalaya. According to this concept, 
the society is depicted as a mélange of social organisations rather than a dichotomous structure 
of center and periphery. Society constrains the state and transforms it through internal forces 
but in the same process the society is also transformed by the state. Various formations, 
                                                          
14 According to Jessop (2007:7) the complexity of the state begins, like ethnicity, with its definition because there 
is no single theory or theoretical perspective that can encompass all its attributes. On the one hand the state is just 
one of the institutional emblems among others within a social formation and on the other hand it is peculiarly 
charged with the overall responsibility for maintaining the cohesion of the social formation of which it is merely 
a part.   
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including the idea of the state as well as many others singly or in tandem, offer individuals 
strategies of personal survival and for some strategies of upward mobility. An individual’s 
choice of strategy is based on the material incentives and coercion that organisations can bring 
to bear on this as well as on the organisation’s symbols and values concerning how social life 
should be ordered. This points towards the central theme of this thesis which is to establish a 
dialectic relation between the state and society. It also highlights the material aspect of the 
choices that groups and individuals make under the broad structure of incentives or 
disincentives that have been put forth by the state.  
Migdal (2001:17) raises pertinent questions regarding the relationship between state 
and society. According to him (ibid: 50, emphasis mine) societies are not static formations but 
are constantly becoming as a result of these struggles over social control. Although this thesis 
does not analyse identity politics from a statist perspective, the role played by the state directly 
(as evident in Sikkim) and indirectly (in Nepal and Darjeeling) cannot be overlooked. The 
interaction between an ethnic group and the different extensions of the state is crucial because 
it has an impact on everything, from the aim and agenda to the strategies of action by members 
of different ethnic groups. Thus, different aspects of the relationship between the state and 
ethnic groups are one of the focal points of this thesis. However, instead of focussing on the 
generic relationship between the two, the thesis focuses on the role of the state in abetting 
ethnic politics.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Apart from an analysis of the politics of being Nepali in a multi-ethnic environment, this thesis 
also highlights an interesting development in the politics of South Asia, namely- the 
strengthening of ethnic affiliations (whether it be caste, religion, language) over other means 
of political mobilization (class, political ideology). It posits that ethnic politics has enabled 
different groups of people (ranging from ethnic associations and cultural elites to ethnic 
leaders) to assert or express their political agency more freely and effectively.  This is well 
evidenced by the variety of political actors that emerge in the three sites. Apart from the 
diversity of political actors, the case studies also highlight a change in the resources which are 
now deemed valuable in the political domain. Although the cases confirm the control and 
authority of ethnic elites over the forms and articulation of ethnic culture, fluency in an ethnic 
language or traditional ritual is now considered an important asset in the claims to being 
recognized as an authentic group by the state. There is a seamless interchange of identities, 
people and resources between the cultural, political and the social realms thereby placing 
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groups and individuals in an intense matrix or ‘fields’, very much akin to that theorised by  
Pierre Bourdieu (1977). 
While Migdal’s ‘state in society’ approach is useful in locating the state and its 
interaction with different variables in the thesis, Bourdieu’s concept of ‘fields’ helps in 
constructing a framework through which to understand the dynamic relationship between 
ethnic groups, the state and the political environment in which they are ensconed. The thesis 
analyses the politics of contention between groups located in different social and class 
structures in different political locations and thus, the concept of ‘fields’ helps in understanding 
the actors, the structures of which they are a product, and their actions, which are a response to 
those same structures.  
As a conceptual tool, concepts of field15 and habitus provide a framework within which 
to understand identity politics in the eastern Himalaya which is complicated both by the 
multiplicity of actors and the roles that they play. The concept of ‘fields’ helps isolate political 
actors within their respective fields (political, economic, social) and then analyse their roles 
within that field as well as outside it. As the three case studies will demonstrate, the agency of 
the political actors extends and cuts across numerous fields as a result of the highly 
transferrable ‘social capital’ that they hold within a particular area. The case studies will show 
that not only do the various ‘fields’ of politics, culture and community interact and overlap at 
certain points but ethnic politics also enables people from different backgrounds to move back 
and forth between these ‘fields’. Multiple actors hold different types of capital which might be 
valued across a range of fields rather than simply in one, thus an actor is no longer bound to a 
particular field.  For example-ethnic politics has opened avenues for people ranging from civil 
servants to ethnic language teachers who now cross the liminal boundaries of politics and 
culture. This also shows that the boundaries of politics and culture have changed, thereby 
highlighting a dialectic relationship between the two as it is difficult to gauge regarding which 
of the two might have initiated these boundary changes.  
According to Bourdieu, social life can only be understood by incorporating objective, 
material social and cultural structures into the practices and experiences of individuals and 
groups, thereby endorsing a reflexive science of society (Postone et al, 1993:3). Ethnic politics 
                                                          
15 According to Bourdieu (in Reed-Danahay, 2005: 30), a ‘field’ may be defined as a ‘field of forces within which 
agents occupy positions that statistically determine the positions they take with respect to the field, their position 
taking being aimed either at conserving or transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive to 
the field…the concept of the ‘field’ is a research tool, the main aim of which is to enable the scientific construction 
of social objects’. 
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in the eastern Himalaya cannot be understood by neglecting the economic and political 
structures that surround and affect ethnic groups. While ethnic identity is important, it is 
nonetheless nested among other different identities, thereby necessitating the empirical 
analysis of the impact of exogenous factors on the ethnic politics. A comprehensive analysis 
requires a multi-dimensional approach that takes into account both the subjective as well the 
objective aspects of the socio-political structures around ethnic groups. The thesis aims to 
establish that the socio-political evolution of these groups has been influenced by both material 
as well as cultural elements in their surroundings and that ethnic identity is therefore dynamic, 
even though it may not be explicitly apparent.  Bourdieu emphasizes equally all the aspects of 
the social environment that might have an impact not only on the construction of an identity 
but also the relationships between ethnic groups and the state.  This caters well to the dominant 
themes of this thesis which are to challenge the notion of ethnic homogeneity, the stereotypical 
framework of pre-defined boundaries and loyalties and simplistic understandings of the 
relations between state and ethnic groups.   
Ethnic politics relies, to a very large extent, on the use of culture- not only as a means 
towards a tangible reward but also as the reward itself. Thus, the primary idea theorised by 
Bourdieu which connects action to culture, structure and power presents a framework which is 
applicable in the thesis (Swartz, 1997:9). For example, in Sikkim the existence of an ethnic 
language and a script is vital for the official recognition of that particular group by the state. 
While this recognition might bring tangible rewards and benefits, the very process of revival 
and preservation of culture can also have equal, if not greater significance for the ethnic group 
which is on the verge of assimilation with the dominant group. Culture and culturally symbolic 
goods (like festivals, language, and cultural practices) are therefore very important.  
This leads to further questions- what motivates human action? Are human beings 
simply homo economicus or is it just structures that dictate how groups and individuals act?  
As incentives for political action, Bourdieu’s theory imparts the same importance and relevance 
to both symbolic goods and material goods, unlike Marxism which gives primacy to objective 
economic factors or structuralism which understands human action as a response to the 
overarching structures of a society and thereby compromises the agency of the individual in 
the various forms of everyday politics. Analysis of this present research in simple Marxian or 
Structuralist terms becomes complicated because it is not possible to identify separate classes 
with a certain degree of cohesive class consciousness in a region where there has never been 
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intense class movements.16 It is also not possible to isolate simple structural relationships that 
influence life chances when groups and individuals are located in numerous cross-cutting 
social, economic, cultural and political relations.  
Although specific socio-historical and economic surroundings do have an impact on the 
individual’s choices and disposition, this thesis extends Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ to imagine a 
‘macro-habitus’. This is made up of their position in the world economic system, international 
regimes and of course their position within the nation. These factors are all socially reproduced 
over generations and inform people’s perception of their position and status in the political 
field. This thesis is a study of how groups and individuals have used their shared position in 
the field to stake political claims. It will show that rather than aiming to alter their position in 
the field, ethnic groups have used their position to alter the game itself, thereby changing the 
very nature of politics in the eastern Himalaya.   
 
3: Methodology 
I used qualitative methods of data collection aimed at highlighting the socially 
constructed nature of reality (Gray, 2004). The research draws its epistemological orientations 
from interpretivism (which views the subject matter of social sciences as different from natural 
science and thus the subjective understanding of the social world) and poses both descriptive 
as well as explanatory questions. Interpretivism is guided by the view that social phenomena 
and their meanings are continually being achieved by social actors and are in a constant state 
of revision (Bryman, 2004:17) and thus, Constructivism forms the basis of its theoretical 
considerations.  
Research triangulation provides a flexible approach which allows a combination of 
different research methods to obtain as well as cross-check data, thereby ensuring greater 
                                                          
16 This is however not to suggest that classes do not exist or do not impact the social and political choices of 
Nepalis but rather that despite the existence of some of the factors that could have facilitated class action 
(economic grievances, large demography) it failed to do so, even in Nepal where the Maoists had to equate class 
cleavages with ethnicity as a mobilization tactic. More specifically, eastern Nepal was one of the zones that 
emerged almost unscathed from the Maoist insurgency precisely because it is a relatively prosperous region 
without much grievance against the state or other ethnic groups. This therefore makes ethnic mobilization in 
eastern Nepal even more interesting. In Sikkim, the pro-democracy movement of 1975 can be deemed as a 
movement of disparate classes as it was not just the agriculturists or the working class that rose up against the 
monarchy. This movement was brought on by a very complicated mix of land owners, political opportunists, and 
the Indian administration. However, the democracy that this movement ushered brought with it politics that is 
dependent on ethnic sentiments and insecurities rather than class.  
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reliability of the data generated. Thus my primary methods were semi-structured individual as 
well as focus-group interviews. As opposed to questionnaire surveys or structured interviews, 
semi-structured interviews gave respondents greater flexibility whilst answering questions, 
especially those respondents who were not very articulate or those who felt it important to give 
extended background histories or personal opinions. This method permitted me to engage in 
dialogue and generate questions over topics which were not in the original interview schedule 
and to re-frame or investigate the question further without having to make drastic compromises 
with the research questions. The respondents for both semi-structured and focus group 
interviews were based on snowball (selecting a sample using networks) and convenience 
sampling (where the sample is selected from a location convenient to the researcher and 
whenever a person with relevant characteristics is seen). 
 
The guiding hypotheses for the fieldwork were derived from questions generated after 
assessing the literature. I sought to establish that there was a variation in the articulation of 
ethnicity and political identity within the Nepali group as a response to the state as well as the 
wider political economy and the main themes for the interviews were: 
1. What were the changes in the norms, attitudes and beliefs of the various ethnic groups, 
especially in the context of recent changes in the political structures? 
2. How did the social, political and economic background affect and alter the perception of the 
state as well as the changes that were wanted and expected? 
3. What were the motivations to either be a part of an ethnic group or political party or to 
abstain from active participation? 
 
I chose preliminary fieldwork sites on the basis of their centrality in the study of ethnic 
politics in the eastern Himalaya. Choices were guided by personal experience and knowledge 
of Sikkim and Darjeeling, while Ilam in eastern Nepal was chosen after extended research and 
interaction with people with prior research experience in Nepal.  
 
My field site was divided into three different areas and while I was able to spend over 
three months in east Nepal without travelling back to India, fieldwork in Darjeeling and Sikkim 
had to be flexible according to the political climate, especially in Darjeeling where the 
Gorkhaland movement was at its height. Fieldwork in Darjeeling was greatly hampered by 
strikes and road blocks that were called by leading political parties that curtailed my mobility 
to a great extent. However, strikes and demonstrations in Darjeeling as well as in east Nepal 
33 
 
presented an exciting opportunity to engage in participant observation. I was also able to 
conduct on the spot focus group interviews with leaders as well as other members of the 
protesting parties which allowed me to record the excitement and the spirit of the movement. 
Fieldwork was further complicated by the multiplicity of sites as in each site I had to 
position myself differently. My own personal background of having being brought up with 
strict Hindu codes of purity and pollution has taught me all too well the impact of my caste on 
every aspect of social intercourse. Thus, in Nepal, in spite of my Indian citizenship, my ethnic 
background as a (high caste) Hindu Nepali made it easier to find accommodation with a Newar 
family, be allowed into cooking areas and prevented social awkwardness with member of other 
groups. While being Nepali and speaking the Nepali language facilitated my entry into the field 
in general, my matwali background17 helped me integrate with members of other matwali 
communities (Rai, Limbu, Gurung) who were also my primary respondents.  
 
Almost as if to prove the malleability of identity from the outset, my Sikkimese identity 
helped me initiate numerous conversations with the Limbus of east Nepal, especially of the 
northern villages who had previously crossed over to Sikkim to work in cardamom fields. 
Gender was neither an impediment nor an asset during my fieldwork, especially in Nepal. 
Women in the eastern hills of Nepal, whether they be activists or agriculturalists, are very 
proactive, unlike in other parts of Nepal where the role of high caste women in the public sphere 
is restricted. Thus, I was able to forge friendships and gain entry into social circles fairly easily. 
However, in Darjeeling district it was not my ethnic identity but my Sikkimese identity which 
was most prominent for my respondents. Darjeeling has always experienced more ethnic 
intermingling than Sikkim and thus despite being a Nepali, it was my territorial identity that 
was seen as a mark of distinction. Being Sikkimese was somehow presumed to make me unable 
to understand poverty or economic hardships. The local imaginations of Sikkim, where cars 
were believed to outnumber humans and where no one went hungry implied that I would be 
unable to grasp the ‘real situation’ of poverty and discrimination in Darjeeling. 
Ironically, the most difficult field site was my own hometown of Gangtok, Sikkim, 
where not only was it difficult to meet respondents but I was also burdened with multiple social 
                                                          
17 In the caste hierarchy imposed by Jung Bahadur Rana, matwali was the alcohol drinking groups which were 
below the Brahmins and Kshatriyas but above the untouchable castes. In spite of being a Chettri, which is a high 
caste I have mixed ancestry with my paternal grandmother belonging to the Magar ethnic group and my mother 
belonging to the indigenous Lepcha ethnic group, thereby diluting any sharp ‘Aryan facial features’ (according to 
matwali friends in Nepal).  
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roles as a researcher, a Nepali and a representative of my family. Contacting civil servants, 
who were my primary respondents in Gangtok, was difficult not only because it involved a 
very formal, routinized process of knowing the ‘right people’ but also because of their sheer 
reluctance to impart any information. This was, however, understandable as their position as 
civil servants in a bureaucratic system which is controlled by political forces made their 
position precarious. Out of all the field sites it was only in Gangtok that my respondents either 
refused to give me interviews or did not want me to record interviews and asked me specifically 
to take notes. Instead of verbal interaction respondents in Gangtok provided me with secondary 
sources of data like books and other documents pertaining to their ethnic group. As frustrating 
as this was, I was able to conduct interviews with highly placed officers who were also 
executive members of most of the ethnic associations. 
 Moving out of Gangtok to west Sikkim however enabled me to enter a more relaxed 
atmosphere in which to conduct fieldwork. In West Sikkim I felt free as a researcher and the 
responses from my respondents, although still very measured in contrast to that in Darjeeling 
and Ilam, were more forthcoming and open. 
 
Fieldwork 
I conducted the first phase of my fieldwork in Ilam district of East Nepal between July 
and October 2010.  My primary aim was to collect data and analyse the ongoing Limbuwan 
movement which is a demand for a homeland for the Limbu ethnic group.  Ilam is one of 
Nepal’s seventy-five districts and is further sub-divided into forty-eight Village Development 
Committees (VDC). Ilam town is the largest VDC and is the administrative centre of the 
District. The town itself is small and has a highly mixed ethnic population, the majority being 
Rai rather than Limbus, who are populous further north in Panchthar and Taplejung districts. 
However, Ilam being the largest town in the district with accessible roads and communication, 
all major events take place there and all organizations- social as well as political- have their 
head offices there. The power of afno manchay (one’s own people), a phenomenon which the 
thesis discusses in great detail was crucial in almost all aspects of my fieldwork, from finding 
accommodation to travelling to remote villages. The power of informal networks was vital in 
gaining access to people, their perspectives and interpretations of events. Although not a 
barrier, language was an impediment during the early days because the Nepali spoken in 
Sikkim and Darjeeling varies considerably from that of eastern Nepal in the usage of words 
and expressions. However, with time and practice my Nepali improved and I was fluent in the 
language and also comfortable with the social etiquette, which at first had left me feeling 
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awkward and uncomfortable. I was also able to observe, as well as participate, in numerous 
cultural and political events like strikes, party elections, Limbu student union elections and 
cultural programmes which highlighted the liminal boundaries and the interconnectedness of 
different fields- whether they be cultural or political. For example, members of political parties 
would also be members of ethnic associations, would work in an NGO and could also support 
gender issues. Thus, identities and corresponding roles varied and were often contextual. 
Weekly haats or markets, especially in predominantly Limbu villages, were very interesting 
and informative sites on Limbu culture, at least the material aspects, as well as the general 
economic condition of the people.  
After spending over three months in Nepal and conducting more than sixty interviews, 
I started the second phase of my fieldwork in Gangtok in mid-October where the main aim of 
my work was to document and verify the growth of ethnic politics in the state after 1994, the 
year the present ruling government came to power. I wanted to analyze two important and inter-
related issues (i) the role of the State in the ethnicisation of local politics and (ii) the cultural 
repercussions within the Nepali ethnic group as a direct result of political action.  Dependency 
extends from the capital town to the districts and to the villages as even the average farmer is 
bound in a system where the state has become a supplier of free goods. Thus, in order to 
understand the nature and degree of dependency I chose to travel to the town of Soreng in West 
Sikkim. It is one of Sikkim’s more important towns and is well connected by road to other 
villages.  As a Limbu-Tamang stronghold it enabled me to analyse the connection between the 
ethnic associations in Gangtok and their rural counterparts. I conducted interviews with 
members of two ethnic groups (Rai and Tamang) in Soreng before going to the Limbu village 
of Hee Pechrek. Most of my respondents showed a general awareness of the political 
environment and their rights and benefits under one category or the other (the most popular 
being the Scheduled Tribe and the Other Backward Classes) and also acknowledged the role 
played by the state in supporting them.  
General information about ethnic associations (in urban, semi-urban and rural areas) 
depended entirely upon people’s interests and social networks. The further away they lived 
from town centers, the less they knew about the activities and the changes that were being 
introduced by the associations. They were not familiar with their ethnic dresses and festivals 
and relied completely upon their representatives in the towns and ultimately in Gangtok, to 
take decisions on their behalf. These latter in turn looked towards Nepal for support and 
collaboration. Again in Soreng, personal networks were of immense help to get access to the 
nearby villages and to the students of Soreng High School where I conducted a small survey 
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with school students (aged 15-18yrs). The aim of this survey was to examine the acceptance 
and use of ethnic languages amongst the younger generation. The result of the survey revealed 
that most spoke their respective ethnic languages at home, that they preferred English over all 
other languages and thought that after English, their ethnic languages would be most useful in 
the future, thereby eclipsing the popularity and utility of Nepali language. The data is thus a 
small example of a positive shift in the way ethnicity is viewed which can be attributed to 
governmental policies like introduction of regional languages, cultural events and the support 
which it lends to ethnic associations who work with their respective communities.  
I also visited Namchi, South Sikkim to observe the Namchi Mahautsav, a three day 
ethnic gala sponsored by the Government of Sikkim as an exhibition of the cultures of different 
ethnic groups. I was also able to visit Tharpu, a small town close to Soreng which boasts the 
only Limbu ethnographic museum.  
After gathering data in Sikkim (primary as well as secondary) I began my third and 
final fieldwork in Darjeeling in December 2010.  Here the movement for a separate state had 
been revived and tripartite talks for an Interim Setup, a form of administrative arrangement in 
place of a State of Gorkhaland were going on between the Central government, the State 
government and the Gorkha Jan Mukti Morcha (GJM)18 a political party representing the 
Nepalis/Gorkhas of India. I divided my fieldwork between two different geographical 
locations- the hills (where the majority are Nepalis) and the Duars (where the Nepalis are a 
minority) - in order to understand their impact on identity formation and the process of ethnic 
politics.  
My primary respondents in Darjeeling were intellectual elites, plantation workers, and 
members of ethnic associations and political parties. I prepared two sets of respondent 
questions keeping in mind the geographical and socio-economic variation of the two different 
areas and its impact on identity formation. As I was interested in collecting and comparing the 
different interpretations of the Gorkha identity, I relied on snowball and collective sampling to 
reach my respondents and conducted over thirty semi-structured interviews, engaged in 
informal conversations and was a participant observer in the strikes and rallies that took place. 
Research in Darjeeling was particularly challenging because it was easy to become subjective 
and side tracked by the ongoing movement instead of focusing on the manifestation and 
                                                          
18 Mobility during the fieldwork was considerably affected by the incessant strikes that were called by the Gorkha 
Janamukti Morcha, the leading political party, and I was unable to visit some areas that could have enhanced my 
data further.  
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articulation of identity. One of the primary questions that emerged at the outset was the process 
of the creation and internalization of the Gorkha identity. I had to rely on familial as well as 
other social networks for introductions to potential respondents. Living close to Happy Valley 
Tea Estate was rewarding in many ways as I was able to observe the social environment and 
the lifestyle of not only those who worked in the gardens but also life in Darjeeling generally. 
A visit to Makaibari TE, one of the very few tea gardens with a resident owner and community 
based co-operatives was helpful in making comparisons between different tea estates. 
Interaction with the residents of Happy Valley TE highlighted the fact that most lived in 
perennial insecurity as they owned no land, were completely dependent on the factory and had 
no alternate sources of employment. Owing to their large numbers not only was this 
environment conducive for a mass movement (with typically violent overtones that stressed 
the martial identity of the Gorkha) but it also enabled local leaders to emerge on the political 
forefront. Interaction with the workers and residents of tea gardens also provided insights into 
the emergence of local leaders who frequently crossed and acted in both the political and social 
field.  
I also conducted interviews in Mungpoo town, which was established by the British for 
the commercial production of Cinchona.19 I chose Mungpoo for two specific reasons; first to 
interrogate the social and economic conditions in rural and semi-rural areas outside of 
Darjeeling and second, to gauge the internalization of the Gorkha identity as small towns like 
Mungpoo are the support bases of the Gorkhaland movement. Respondents ranged from the 
Cinchona factory foreman and its present Director to individuals who were heavily invested 
(ideologically) in the movement. Finally, I conducted interviews in the Duars tea belt (Bagrakot 
and Banarhat) and Siliguri in the plains of northern West Bengal which is home to a minority 
Nepali population. Interviews here were instrumental in comparing the varying perspectives 
on the Gorkha as well as the movement. I finally concluded my fieldwork in New Delhi where 
I was able to interview two Nepalis, one from Dehradun and the other from Darjeeling, who 
had different but interesting approaches to the Gorkha.  
Fortunately, I was able to visit the field once again in August 2011 and conducted some 
new research on the history of Nepalis in Sikkim because the existing literature was insufficient 
to draw a comprehensive picture of what had happened to the Nepalis once they had migrated 
                                                          
19 The bark of the cinchona tree is utilised to make Quinine, an anti-malarial drug. Cinchona Plantation was first  
introduced in the Darjeeling hills in 1850 but it was not till 1874 that a Quinine factory was established in the 
Mungpoo hills which are 35 km east of Darjeeling. After India’s Independence in 1947, it was transferred to the 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce of Government of West Bengal (Sharma, 1997:27–50). 
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to Sikkim. In Gangtok I conducted interviews with members of Sikkim Sahitya Akademi and 
lecturers from Sikkim Government College, the findings of which are discussed in later 
chapters.  
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Part One: Contextualising ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya 
Chapter 2: Locating the Nepali 
2.1 Becoming Nepali 
(i) Socio-Political History of Nepal 
The ‘quasi-ethnic’ category (Hutt, 1997:102) ‘Nepali’ not only subsumes under it 
different ethnic groups but is also a cross border phenomenon because of the presence of 
Nepalis who migrated away from their mul desa (country of origin) to various parts of the 
eastern Himalayas.                       
 In the Indian sub-continent, the 17th century was marked by the decline of the Mughal 
empire and contrasted by the gradual advent of the European colonisers, especially the British 
who were successful in the conquests and annexations of numerous princely states, giving form 
to what would later be known as British India. During the same period, the Himalayan region 
was also passing through a similar phase of disintegration of empires and the rise of new ones. 
The western Himalayan monarchical principalities of the Karnali basin ruled by the Malla kings 
had existed from the early 12th century. Known as Khas- the inhabitants of the region spoke an 
Indo-European language and the social system was organised on the basis of a caste system 
which was oriented around war- the priests at the top, followed by the soldiers belonging to the 
Khas and Magar20 groups, the bell ringers (damai), blacksmith (kami) and cobblers (sarki) at 
the bottom. These groups maintained strict ritual hierarchy and came together only during war 
(Toffin, 2006: 226).21  Efficient agriculturists, the culture and tradition of the people of this 
region was deeply embedded in Hinduism and in the divine rights of the king as he was 
considered to be a part of Vishnu, Vishnu amsa, the protector of the universe in Hindu 
mythology. The Khas considered themselves as higher, purer Hindus than those in who lived 
in the land defiled by the Mughals, India or Muglan. 
                                                          
20 A mongoloid ethnic group speaking a complex Tibeto-Burmese language, originally inhabiting central-western 
Nepal.  
21 The ritual services of the different castes were predominantly war related functions which focussed upon the 
king. This ensemble was called upon each year to assist in the bloody sacrifices on behalf of the sovereign 
during the annual celebration of war. This cosmological order which exists today only in rituals was in the past 
evoked in ritualised warfare. Warfare was the only activity that brought the entire society together (Lecomte-
Tilouine and Gellner, 2004:14) 
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The Karnali state however disintegrated in the 14th century leading to the formation of 
numerous smaller states or principalities which came to be known as the caubisye rajya or the 
twenty four kingdoms and were constantly engaged in petty warfare and border raids. Amongst 
these states was the principality of Gorkha, led by Prithvi Narayan Shah, which by means of 
conquests, annexations and marriage was able to consolidate sixty principalities and with the 
final conquest of the Kathmandu valley in 1768, originally known as Nepal, gave a rudimentary 
shape to the present country of Nepal. The boundaries of this new kingdom of Gorkha were 
constantly shifting but between his ascension in 1743 and his death in 1775, the kingdom 
stretched to the Kangra valley in the west, all of east Nepal and a large portion of modern 
Sikkim (Whelpton: 2005:35). Burghart (1984) explains elaborately three indigenous territorial 
concepts of possession, realm and country and their respective sources of legitimation in 
proprietary, ritual and ancestral authority. The king maintained relationship with his subjects 
on numerous levels which transcended the level of the physical to that of the ritual and like the 
other rulers in the Ganges basin, claimed his sovereignty by exercising proprietary authority 
upon their possessions (muluk) and the ritual authority within their realm (desa). Included 
within the monarch’s possessions and realm were various countries (des) in which the king’s 
tenants or subjects were natives who claimed certain rights to their land and their way of life 
on the basis of certain ancestry.   
Although, foreign to the prevailing notion of statecraft and territory, the concept of 
territorial demarcation had been introduced and imposed by the British in 1814 after the Treaty 
of Segauli.  The boundaries of the Gorkha kingdom were finally drawn in the 19th century with 
its westward expansion being halted at the Sutlej by Ranjit Singh, the King of Punjab in 1809-
10, while its eastern boundaries were defined by its defeat in the Anglo-Gorkha war of 1814-
1816. Thus with the drawing up of the territorial boundaries these two realms finally coincided, 
giving a physical shape and form to all the realms ruled over by the King.  
In administration, the king saw himself as the landlord of all in his possession (muluk) 
and his relation with his subjects was based on an extensive patrimonial relationship where the 
tracts of land were organised on the basis of tenurial categories and then assigned, bestowed or 
auctioned to his subjects. Various tenurial categories like jagir were for military officers, 
nankirs for civil administrators, raikars for tenant cultivators’ defined different statuses of 
individuals in the society. The tenurial categories differed with respect to the specific rights 
and duties of the subjects’ vis-à-vis the king’s land as well as with respect to powers 
(inheritance, divisibility, transferability, and irrevocablity) which were accorded by the king 
(Burghart, 1984: 103). Thus, there was an elaborate network of patron-client relationship that 
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revolved around land that made the very nature of the state extractive and exploitative (Riaz 
and Basu, 2007:8).  
Lack of monetisation of economy meant that taxes from agricultural production formed 
the basis of the revenue of the Gorkha kingdom. The lack of hard currency and a centralized 
political bureaucracy led to the spread of the jagir system whereby the army and other 
government soldiers were allocated different lands from which they were allowed to collect 
taxes. This led to widespread absentee landlordism and a long hierarchical chain of command 
which gave rise to the growth of local elites as powerful middlemen thereby                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
increasing the burden of the peasants who had to pay taxes to their actual landlords as well as 
placate the local elites with tributes (See Regmi, 1984). Payment of government officials in 
land also meant that, over time, agricultural land became scarce which put undue pressure on 
the peasants who had no tenurial security. This led Stiller (1976: 289) to call the time between 
1816-1839 a period of the ‘silent cry...a cry of pain and a cry of protest against official 
indifference to the lot of village Nepal’.  
The kingdom of Gorkha, so formed by Prithvi Narayan and his descendents was a 
conglomeration of the conquered territory, created by a political elite, whose prime interest and 
motivation lay in the control over resources in order to fund its military expansion. This made 
the state not only the prime mover of the material forces of production but also of social 
organisation (Regmi, 1984:9). The Shah rulers (1769-1846) were faced with a challenging task 
of integrating various groups and communities with different cultures, modes of production, 
social relationships and patterns of loyalty. The power of the Gorkha rulers depended on how 
their relationship was perceived by the various groups which in turn depended on how these 
groups had been subjugated (through defeat in war or through reconciliation)22 and the level of 
difficulty in ruling these groups. Under the Shahs there was very little establishment of efficient 
administration or revenue collection owing not only to the topographical constraints which 
made it difficult but also because of lack of centralisation (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1991:234). Control 
was strongest near the seat of power in Kathmandu and in the central hills and became weaker 
towards the periphery of the kingdom, leading to situations where there was no identification 
with the Gorkha state in the Terai and in the eastern hills, which made Gorkhali rule almost 
colonial. 
                                                          
22 In the eastern hills, the Limbus had been incorporated into the Gorkha kingdom in 1772-4 after much war and 
a final reconciliation on the basis of which they were granted far reaching autonomy over their traditional lands. 
See Pradhan 1991.  
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Lack of centralization and expedient administration was compensated through religion. 
Hinduism provided the king with a rational basis and his popular legitimacy. As the head of 
the patrimonial state, the king’s relationship with his subjects was hierarchically and 
ascriptively defined and Hinduism stood as the foundation from his divine sanctions flowed. It 
was the king’s duty to maintain the moral order of his subjects and thus one of the fundamental 
objectives of the state was the creation of an Asal Hindustan (Land of Pure Hindus) in contrast 
to the Indian subcontinent which had been polluted by the Muslims as well as the British 
(Sharma, 1997: 476; Whelpton, 2007:56).  
The political testament or the Dibya Upadesh given by Prithvi Narayan in 1774 forms 
the basis of the Hindu kingdom where dharma was the ordering principle with a ruler who is 
entitled to enforce the socio-cosmic order (Burghart, 1996:268). This ideology formed the basis 
of the construction of a Hindu kingdom and the eventual social stratification which was 
codified by the Prime Minister Jung Bahadur Rana in the Muluki Ain (National Legal Code) of 
1854.  The main significance of the Muluki Ain was that it encompassed all people under the 
Gorkhali rule. The Ain placed all the groups in a ritual hierarchy with the Brahmin and Chettri 
at the top of the moral order, a position which usually also coincided with the economic order. 
The state had a more active role in the maintenance and even alteration of caste statuses in 
order to accommodate politico-economic powers (Gurung, 1997:502). 23 
However as Pfaff-Czarnecka (1991: 255) says, ‘even when talking of Nepal as a true 
Hindu kingdom...it was far too difficult to legitimize themselves (i.e. kingship) by way of 
cultural concepts alien to the conquered population, while maintaining and establishing cultural 
cleavages served their purpose’. Thus apart from the protection of cows the Shahs did not 
proselytize the non-Hindu population (Michaels, 1997:86).24 What emerged as more important 
and powerful in the spread of Hinduism amongst the non-Hindu population was the preferential 
treatment in the division of labour where all the important positions in the central 
administration- dignitaries and army officers’ were held by high caste Hindus leading to the 
                                                          
23 During the Rana regime the society was ordered according to orthodox Hindu notions. In the Muluki Ain all 
groups were equally called jat but the key distinctions, supported by law and the judicial system, were between 
the wearers of the sacred thread, the Tagadhari who were also the elite of the society and the rest who were known 
as Matwali or alcohol consuming class. The subordinate groups were themselves divided into enslaveable and 
non-enslaveable categories and into ‘clean castes’ and ‘untouchable castes’ (Gellner, 2007:1823).  
24 According to Michaels (1997:80, 82) in Hindu South Asia, the protection of the cow was often connected with 
Hinduism. As for the Shah dynasty, the very name of their ancestral seat Gorkha or Goraksa in Sanskrit literally 
meant the protector of cows and in a secondary meaning it meant the ‘protector of the earth’ which is believed to 
be as nourishing as the cow.  
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co-option of the local elites in the system, who found it beneficial to either imitate or accept 
Hindu rituals and traditions (especially the festival of Dasain)25 in order to find favour with the 
Hindu overlords leading to an eventual sanskritization26 of the entire group.  
However after Prithvi Narayan’s death in 1775, none of his descendants could 
command complete control over the kingdom and its administration owing to numerous 
factional politics in the court (see Rose, 1971; Whelpton, 2007). This unstable situation finally 
culminated in the Kot Massacre of 184627 which catapulted the influential political-elite family 
of Jung Bahadur Kunwar (who later adopted the title Rana and claimed Rajput ancestry) to 
power. In 1857, Jung Bahadur formalised an arrangement whereby the king acted as the head 
of the state but all powers were effectively in the hands of the Prime-Minister and the Rana 
family ruled over Nepal for over a hundred years till 1951.  
During this period Hinduization became an important state agenda and was strictly 
enforced by Jung Bahadur Rana who, unlike Prithvi Nararyan, did not want to achieve a real 
Hindusthan but sought to protect the only kingdom in the world which was ruled by Hindus. 
In doing so, the state became more involved and more aggressive in promoting as well as 
legitimising itself through religion (Burghart, 1996:271-72). Following the precedence of the 
Shah rulers, the Ranas kept the kingdom isolated from influences from the southern border. 
Despite the burgeoning power of the British imperialists in India and the eventual establishment 
of a Resident Officer in Kathmandu after the Anglo-Gurkha war (1814-16), a ‘closed door’ 
policy was maintained by Jung Bahadur who was aware of the political repercussions of British 
interference in domestic politics as exemplified by the colonisation of India (Whelpton, 2007: 
43, 47; Gurung, 1997: 501).  
                                                          
25 Dasain is one of the most important Hindu festivals which after the conquest by Prithvi Narayan also became a 
cultural symbol of Hindu domination. The ritual involves accepting tika on the forehead (vermillion coloured rice 
mixed with curd) which came to be associated with a sign of inferiority to and dependency on the one giving the 
tika. Headmen throughout Nepal were required to travel to their district center to receive tika from the 
representative of the king thereby using cultural symbols for state consolidation (Forbes, 1999:114).  
26 A process by which the lower caste or non-Hindu groups adopt the ideology or parts of ideology of Hinduism 
in order to raise its economic, political or social status in the caste hierarchy of a given area. This term was made 
popular by M.N.Srinivas’s (1952) seminal research amongst the Coorgs in South India.  
27 It was one of the most important royal intrigues in the Gorkha durbar which was orchestrated by the Queen 
regent Rajya Lakshmi Devi to oust the reigning King Rajendra and her step-sons in order to install her son 
Prince Ranendra as the heir to the throne. Almost all the ministers supporting the King were either killed or 
exiled (Panday, 1973: 50).  
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The Muluki Ain which was enforced in 1854 framed the caste hierarchy in such a way 
that ‘diversity was translated to inequality’ and positions were increasingly ascribed to different 
ranks that corresponded with caste/ethnic divisions (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997: 425). The 
organization of the social structure on the basis of the Civil Code not only incorporated the 
tribal hill groups into a Hindu ritual hierarchy but was another measure of consolidating 
internal division and diversity and re-affirming the position of the Hindu ruler. However, the 
impact of the Ain on the local social structure, especially of the peripheral areas, cannot be 
measured or assessed as its effectiveness depended on its enforcement in a country which was 
spread across a vast geographical terrain with limited modes of communication (Onta, 1996).  
One of the most potent forces that contributed to the gradual process of Hinduization 
was the migration of Hindu groups from the west and central Nepal to the eastern hills. These 
groups themselves might have been migrating to escape the oppressive central elites but their 
movement eastward had a great impact on the displacement of various Kiranti groups from the 
kingdom of Gorkha to British India, Sikkim and Bhutan. 
 
(ii) Going to Muglan: Emigration from the Kingdom of Gorkha to India  
The Gorkha kingdom had been created not only on the basis of conquest but also 
through compromise, especially in the east where Prithvi Narayan had met substantial 
resistance from the Limbu kings. Even though the Limbus had been incorporated into the 
kingdom in 1772 they had been given privileges regarding their communal land holding pattern 
or the kipat system and a degree of autonomy owing to their strategic position on the border 
with Sikkim. This status quo changed with the increasing demand by the Gorkhali rulers for 
land and resources in order to support their military expeditions and the migration of the upper 
caste Bahuns and Chettris into Kirat (hill tribes of the eastern hills) territory. The west to east 
movement of the Parbatiya groups disrupted one of the most fundamental aspects of the groups 
living in the eastern hills, their kipat system, where land could be used exclusively by an 
individual on the basis of his membership of the tribe that communally owned the land.  
This system was in direct contrast to the raikar or state landlordism under which the 
rights of an individual to utilization and transfer of the land are recognised by the state as long 
as the taxes are paid (Regmi, 1963 in Caplan, 1970:3). In order to support their growing military 
conquests and administrative growth the Gorkhali rulers had to create an economic 
infrastructure for the extraction of raw material and labour needed to provision their armies. 
Despite granting corporate claims to the Limbus on lands based on membership the Parbatiyas 
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were allowed to settle within Kiranti holdings. Initially the local Rai or Limbu headmen 
profited from the new cultivation methods as well as the tribute (cash, agricultural produce, 
corvee services) paid by the Parbatiya migrants but in time they were able to dominate the 
indigenous population, politically as well as economically. They were able to achieve this 
through methods of exclusion embedded in the social relations of the indigenous groups and 
the discrimination perpetuated through the judicial relations imposed by the centralized Hindu 
monarchy from Kathmandu (English, 1982:39-40). 
The socio-economic conditions of the Kiratas altered with the migration of the ritually 
superior Parbatiyas (upper caste hill Hindus) who were familiar with the legal system, rules of 
land ownership and monetised economy (Joshi and Rose, 1966: 6). The kipat system was not 
only considered as economically inadequate but the continuation of this cultural practice was 
seen as a resistance to national integration (Forbes, 1999: 116). Through numerous 
legislations,28 the kipat lands were converted to raikar which prompted mass alienation of kipat 
land and an eastward migration towards Sikkim, Darjeeling and Bhutan.  
 
Another important element that had a pervasive effect on the social identity of those 
groups living in the eastern hills was sanskritization. As a result of the promulgation of the 
Muluki Ain,29 the non-Hindu groups were inducted from a horizontal clan and kinship system 
or jati to a hierarchichal system of jat (caste) and associated norms (Gurung, 1997:502). The 
Muluki Ain placed various groups in different positions but at the same time provided some 
mobility and flexibility. Sanskritization was linked to change in the economic pattern that had 
been introduced by the Gorkha rulers. The new economic system imposed by the Gorkha rulers 
changed the economy from a communal to a tributary mode of production. Loss of kipat to the 
incoming Parbatiyas altered the social dynamics as Rais and Limbus turned towards the Hindu 
creditors for political leadership as well as patronage. This process was finally complete with 
the increasing influence and frequency in the usage of the Parbatiya language, dresses and 
                                                          
28 In 1886, the Nepalese government made it legal for non-Limbus (especially Bahuns and Chettris) to convert all 
kipat land that had been mortgaged to them, to raikar, which could not be reverted to kipat once the mortgage was 
paid off. After widespread dissent over this law, the state banned further transfers of kipat land to raikar, but those 
which had already been transferred were not reversed (Subba, 1999:40). 
29 At the same time the Muluki Ain or the Legal Code allowed for social mobility of certain groups who were more 
amenable to the economic as well as religious systems of the government (English, 1982:90). For example, 
Fournier (1974:63 in English, 1982:86) states that status of the Sunwar group was raised to the class occupied by 
the Magar and Gurung as a result of their petition to Jung Bahadur Rana to permit them to practice Hinduism and 
offer settlements to Brahmins and Chettris.  
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incorporation of Hindu rituals, most specifically amongst the economically better off Limbus 
(Jones, 1976; see Sagant, 1996 for an extended discussion). 
In this dual process of land alienation and sanskritization the local elite played a highly 
important role. Taxes had been essential for the upkeep of the expansionary activities of the 
state. Once the boundaries were drawn, they were used for the consolidation of the territory 
annexed and then finally with the rise of the Ranas, taxes were raised to support the 
unproductive elites (Subba, 2002: 122-23). Thus, heavy taxation and mass alienation of land 
to the advantage of the incoming Hindu migrants led to the first wave of migration from Nepal 
in the 18th century (Gaenszle, 2002: 334; English, 1982: 36). Seasonal/ temporary migration 
and extended kinship networks through marriage have and till very recently long remained a 
regularized feature between ethnic groups, especially Limbus, living on either side of the 
border. However, migration owing to growing indebtedness and loss of land, was on a very 
large scale and most of the time, permanent. By the end of the Rana rule in 1951, only a third 
of the land in eastern Nepal remained under kipat (Caplan, 1970:58 in Subba, 1999:40) and it 
is estimated that between 1840-1860, 12-15 percent of Nepal’s Kiranti population moved 
across the border (Pradhan, 1991:192). 
Apart from the internal problems of economic suppression external factors were also 
important in the out-migration from eastern Nepal. Barring its northern borders, all the 
neighbouring regions around Nepal were under the influence of the British colonisers, whose 
commercial and military ventures created opportunities for those who had been alienated from 
their land or wanted to escape exploitation.  Establishment of tea plantations (1856 onwards) 
in the hills of Darjeeling and Assam had proven to be a commercially successful venture for 
the British and thus with stories of ‘chiyako botma paisa phalcha’ i.e. ‘money grows on tea 
bushes’, migrating further eastwards to Darjeeling projected itself as a better alternative to open 
revolt against the state, which would have been futile (Whelpton, 2007:57; Golay, 2006: 82).  
Another important factor that prompted migration was the recruitment in the British 
army as Gurkhas,30 which had started after the Anglo-Gorkha war of 1814-16. Although the 
recruitment of soldiers from the Kingdom of Gorkha into Ranjit Singh’s army had begun in as 
early as 1824 (by 1830, his army had a special Gurkha Corp) (Hutt, 1997:113), recruitment in 
the British army was prohibited by Jung Bahadur and his successors. This prompted the British 
                                                          
30 Caplan (1990:132; 2006) attributes the labelling and recruitment of some ethnic groups, especially from the 
Gorkha district in central Nepal as ‘martial tribes’ or Gurkha to Brian Hodgson who was the British Resident in 
Kathmandu (1833-43).   
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to set up recruitment centres in the Indian border towns of Gorakhpur in 1886 and Darjeeling 
town in 1902, which was then moved to nearby Ghoom (Farwell, 1984:75, 76).  One of the 
major incentives for joining the army was the payment which was made in cash rather than in 
kind. Thus began the exodus of migrants from Nepal into the hills and plains of British India 
as agriculturists, labourers and army recruits.  
Migration to the neighbouring kingdom of Sikkim had begun during the period of 
Gorkhali expansion when the Gorkhas overran a large part of Sikkim in 1788-89 and annexed 
the Darjeeling tract for a period of over thirty years. This enabled the movement and settlement 
of people from both west Sikkim and eastern Nepal31 which continued even after the territorial 
demarcation by the Treaty of Sigauli in 1816 (O’Maley, 1907:629). However, large scale 
migration began in 1871 encouraged by the British Political Officer in Sikkim, J.C.White, with 
the co-operation of the local Kazi elites and the rich Nepali merchant community, the Newars 
(Shrestha, 2005). Settling new tenants and labourers, in spite of the royal decree against it, was 
a lucrative investment and eventually established Nepalis as the majority ethnic group (Das, 
1983:66;  Rose, 1978).  
Sporadic migration into Bhutan had also begun in the 18th century but mass migration 
towards southern Bhutan began after the after the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1865. Nepalis were 
engaged in clearing forests, agriculture and eventually became Bhutan’s main producers of 
food and source of cash income (Hutt, 2005: 45). Migrants from Nepal settled first in Samchi 
and Sibsu in the south western corner of Bhutan and then in the east (further movement into 
Bhutan did not take place until the government of Bhutan implemented resettlement programs 
during the 1960s) (Joseph, 1999).  
Migration to the north-eastern areas of British-India also began after the Anglo-
Burmese war of 1824-25 brought the present day north eastern India (except Sikkim)32 under 
British control. After the end of the Anglo-Gorkha war in 1816, the British formally started 
                                                          
31 During this period there were no political demarcations of territory and thus there was free movement of people, 
especially Limbus, between what would be demarcated as Sikkim and Nepal after the Treaty of Sigauli (1816). 
32 The eastern Himalaya and Brahmaputra valley of the Indo-Myanmar frontier comprising the states of Assam, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland, Meghalaya and now Sikkim is identified as a single 
geographic and socio-economic identity. However as Shimray (2004: 4637) points out the term ‘north-east India’ 
is of recent origin. The expansion of British colonies in the eastern frontier began with the conquest of Bengal in 
1757. The eastward expansion of the East India Company brought the Brahmaputra Valley and the surrounding 
hills into the folds of the empire. This region was however also interspersed with princely states (viz. Manipur, 
Tripura, Khasi states) each of which had a discrete treaty relation with the East India Company (Lacina, 
2009:1001). Thus, early Nepali migration was through British territories that were constantly being brought into 
the imperial political economy rather than just the passage through north-east India as we know it today.  
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recruiting Nepalis into their army and in 1817, the Gurkha regiment was first deployed in the 
Sylhet operation as a part of the Cuttack Legion (later known as the Assam Light Infantry) 
which eventually led to permanent Gurkha settlement in the northeast beginning in 1824 (Sinha, 
2008). Recruitment as well as settlement in the north-east was actively encouraged by the 
British as the ‘Gurkhas’ were considered ‘proverbially brave, active and capable of enduring 
fatigue both in the hills and jungles and free from the prejudices which the Hindus of the regular 
troops were invariably accustomed,’ (Hussain, 2003:69). The first generation of migrants who 
came as members of the regiment and the police provided impetus for the others to follow. By 
the early 19th century service in the military was not the only attraction as migrants came as 
graziers and herders, to work in the tea and sugarcane plantations and in the construction of 
road and railway lines (Subba, 2003:61). They were also regularly hired as labour and a large 
number were periodically brought from Nepal to serve in transport or as carrier units in 
numerous frontier expeditions carried out by the British. However, another major reason that 
prompted migration was also what Enloe (1980:27) calls the ‘Gurkha syndrome’ where the 
characteristic features of the Gurkha (bravery and loyalty) were to be found only in certain 
ethnic groups, ‘so embedded in its blood’ and that those born in the cantonment areas were not 
of the same quality as those who came from the hills of Nepal. The ‘line boys’ born in the 
provinces did not have the required attributes to make a good soldier and thus, the procurement 
and the eventual settlement of first generation Gurkhas was actively pursued by the British 
(Caplan, 1991:585; Hussain, 2003: 71).  
The most prominent migration however was to Darjeeling that had been directly settled 
and colonised by the British. While Darjeeling had been ‘granted’ to the British in 1835 by the 
Raja of Sikkim in return for some concessions and a yearly grant of Rs.3000, the Kalimpong 
subdivision had first been lost by the Raja of Sikkim to the Bhutanese after the war in 1706. 
This area was later annexed, along with the Duars (originally a part of Sikkim) by the British 
in 1865 and included in the present Darjeeling district in 1866. Till 1874 Darjeeling was a Non-
Regulated Area, from 1874-1919 it was a Scheduled Area and from 1919-1935 it was a 
Backward Tract. Thereafter and until Indian Independence it was a Partially Excluded Area. 
Hence, till 1947, Darjeeling was administratively not fully integrated with West Bengal 
although it had been nominally a part of the state since 1866 itself (Subba, 1992:29-36; Dash, 
1947: 37-47).  
Darjeeling had been initially developed for the purpose of building a sanatorium for the 
British army but the success of tea and cinchona plantations and other industries played an 
important role in attracting migrants from the region, especially from eastern Nepal. 
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Establishment of Gurkha recruitment centre in Ghoom in 1902 also encouraged migration and 
settlement as there was a marked tendency for the retired Gurkha soldiers to settle in India after 
leaving military service (only about 1/3 of the 11, 000 Gurkhas discharged from the British 
army after the first world war chose to return to Nepal) (Blaike et al, 1980:37 in Hutt, 1997:113).  
However, these migrants moved from one form of oppression to the other, from the exploitative 
Gorkha state to either the colonial empire of the British or the highly feudalistic kingdoms of 
Sikkim and Bhutan, all of which were exploitative in their own ways. Thus, in these new lands, 
common exigencies arising out of migration and economic subservience dissolved differences 
of ethnicity or ritual hierarchy and facilitated the formation of a homogenous ethnic group. 
Most of the areas that they migrated to had already been settled by other groups and their 
reception in these areas was either hostile, like in Sikkim, or they were welcomed and quickly 
assimilated with the local population like in the north-east. Thus, in a true Barthian sense, the 
self-identification of this migrant group as ‘Nepali’ began when it came to be considered as the 
‘Other’ by members of the pre-existing groups who had drawn their boundaries on the basis of 
language or religion.  
 
(iii)  Formation of an Identity- Benares-Darjeeling-Nepal 
Different ethnic groups migrating to Darjeeling were not confronted by any other ethnic 
group as it was largely uninhabited except for a few Lepcha and Magar hamlets. However they 
were bound to another variety of servitude in the colonial empire as occupants of the lowest 
strata in the economic hierarchy. This led to the formation of an underpaid, impoverished 
working class majority subservient to the wealthy tea estate owners who were mostly British.  
In between these two classes was the administrative class, which usually comprised of the 
educated babus from mainland India, especially Bengal. The low price of land acted as an 
incentive to acquire estates in the hills and thus, there was a simultaneous migration from the 
plains to the hills also (Dhakal, 2009:53).   
This migrant population of agriculturists was not confronted with just another ethnic 
community but with a technologically advanced and economically thriving class. Thus, while 
the migrants in other areas were confronted with other groups, ethnic identity formation in 
Darjeeling was a product of differentiation not on the basis of ethnicity but of economic class 
(which also coincided with ethnicity). Although the majority of the migrants spoke various 
Tibeto-Burman languages and shared Mongoloid features, there were also those groups which 
had been in the fold of the Hindu caste system (Bahun, Chettris, Kami, Damai, Sarkis) prior to 
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migration. Until the 1920s these were the only groups who identified themselves as ‘Nepalis’ 
while the rest maintained their own ethnic languages and customs, identifying themselves as 
Limbus, Magars, Tamangs etc. Thus while social interaction with different ethnic groups led 
to the formation of the identification of the Nepali, it was only with the development of an 
educated and culturally conscious elite that the Tibeto-Burmese speakers began to identify 
themselves as ‘Nepalis’ on the basis of the common denominator amongst all- language.  This 
was used to identify and distinguish Others who did not belong to the ‘linguistic confederacy’ 
called Nepalis33 (Subba, 1992:38).  
British-India in the early 20th century was in the grip of a political and cultural 
revolution. Against this background, the construction of an ethnic identity by a coterie of 
educated men in Darjeeling was a result of a direct response to colonization. As Onta (1996:198) 
says, ‘this class experienced colonial modernity not so much as a direct consequence of 
colonization but because they felt that they were lagging behind their Indian colonized 
counterparts’. Thus, the making of the ethno-linguistic community called ‘Nepali’ was a result 
of a conscious effort by the growing literati represented by prominent literary figures like 
Parasmani Pradhan, Suryabikram Gyawali and Dharnidhar Koirala. This process first began in 
Benares and gradually shifted to Darjeeling which became and still remains the centre of Nepali 
literary movement in India. 
As one of the most holy Hindu cities, Benares or Varanasi had long been a site of 
pilgrimage and patronage for Hindu rulers as well as one of the highest centres of Vedic 
learning.  Attracting learned scholars and young minds, Benares also became an important 
centre for language and literature with the growth of secular education which had its roots in 
the post-Enlightenment Western rationalism and utilitarianism, invariably leading to the 
growth of printing and publishing houses (Chalmers, 2003:65). In stark contrast to Darjeeling, 
language and literature was strictly controlled by the Rana regime in Nepal which did not 
promote education, free expression or political education. Thus apart from government 
handbills, notices and books of religious nature printed from the Giddhe (vulture) press which 
had been established by Jung Bahadur after his belayat yatra (travel to the United Kingdom in 
1850),  nothing else was printed or published in Nepal. Autocratic in nature, the Rana regime 
vehemently opposed any form of mass education and cultivated illiteracy as a measure to 
                                                          
33 Gorkha, Gorkhali and Nepali were used interchangeably but since the word functions as a marker of distinction 
from the Nepalese, the term Gorkha has gained popularity in recent years. 
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prevent the growth of political consciousness, ‘lest they should be awakened and conscious of 
their rights’ (Shakya, 1977:19 in Caddell, 2007:4, Amatya, 2004:38).  
Owing to the regime’s complete monopoly over publishing inside Nepal until the 1930s, 
poets and writers published from Banaras and later Darjeeling. A large number of students also 
made their way to Benares where they were exposed to the influences of Indian cultural and 
political activists, which itself was undergoing a period of cultural reawakening (Pradhan, 
1984). In 1901 the Gorkhapatra, a periodical was published in Nepal under the direct 
supervision of the state (it remained the only periodical for the next thirty years) and in 1913 
in an attempt to promote Nepali literature, the Rana administration established the Gorkha 
Bhasa Prakashini Samiti (Gorkha Language Publication Committee). This committee had a 
dual role acting as a publishing house for books which met its approval and as a censor on 
everything else that was produced. Consequently, for a long time Benares remained the centre 
of free literary activity and publications of books in the Parbatiya (later renamed as Nepali) 
language (Pradhan, 1984:45; Hutt, 1991:7).  
The sixty years between 1880-1940 marked an important era when the  Gorkhali/Nepali 
language forged ahead in a new direction in India which was witnessing a socio-religious 
regeneration and a political movement against British colonization. During this time the 
migrant Gorkha population had started seeing itself as a part of the larger Indian community. 
The formation of the All India Gorkha League in 1924 in Dehradun34 was hailed as a ‘political 
party of the Indian Gorkhas, by the Indian Gorkhas’, so as to supplement and complement the 
struggle for India’s independence (Bomjan, 2008:86) and journals like Gorkha Sathi were 
published from Calcutta in 1907 with the aim of fostering patriotism amongst the Indian-
Nepalis. One of the most prominent figures to emerge in Benares was Moti Ram Bhatta35 
(1866-1896) who pioneered the growth and development of the Gorkha language. Having spent 
most of his formative years in Benares, Bhatta was greatly influenced by the cultural 
                                                          
34 Settlement of the Gorkha armies in the western Himalayas dates back to 1793 where they conquered Kumaon 
in present day Uttarakhand. Dehradun, which is in the state of Uttarakhand as well as the Garhwal hills in the 
western Himalayas are well known cantonment area of the Gorkha Regiment. The oldest known Gorkha 
association was the Himachal Punjab Gorkha Association established in 1916 and the Gorkhali Sudhar Sabha 
established in 1928. These associations became the foundation for political mobilization and formation of the 
Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League in 1943 by Damber Singh Gurung.   
Source: http://www.gorkhaparisangh.com/pdf/Gorkhas_in_Paschimanchal.pdf (Accessed: 21/02/2012). 
35 Bhatta was one of the most prominent literary figures after Bhanu Bhakta. He also wrote the biography of 
Bhanubhakta and composed the first ghazals in Nepali (See Pradhan, 1984 for a discussion on the history of Nepali 
literature).  
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renaissance of the Khariboli movement.36 He organized a group called the ‘Rasik Samaj’ for 
the development of Nepali literature and established the Bharat Jivan Press, which printed a 
number of important Nepali works, including Bhanubhakta’s Ramayan in 1887. He also 
founded the first Gorkha journal called the Gorkha Bharat Jivan, a monthly published from 
Benares in 1886 (Pradhan, 1984:46).  
Along with Upanyas Tarangini (1902), Sundari (1906) and Candra (1914) Gorkhali 
(1916), the first Nepali weekly, was also published from Benaras. Owing to the lack of public 
readership the majority of these publications had a short life span. However, these publications 
emphasized the need for the standardization and development of language, eliminating the 
influence of Hindi. Apart from the poetry and prose that featured, they also carried articles that 
expressed frustration over illiteracy and lack of public interest in literature, as compared to 
other Indian communities and thus advocated social reforms and the spread of education 
amongst the Gorkha jati37 (Pradhan, 1984). Once again, British colonialism had an important 
role to play in the construction of the Nepali identity. The second half of the nineteenth century 
was an important period in the definition and shaping of modern Indian languages through the 
increase in publication as well as the transformation of these languages as new usages were 
introduced through newspapers, pamphlets, fiction and poetry as well as political, 
philosophical and historical non-fiction (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006:123).  
According to Chalmers (2002:31), in spite of Benares’ centrality to language, literature 
and political activism, the start of the 20th century saw an increase in the significance of 
Darjeeling where the community differed from that of Benares in its ethnic composition. Most 
of the working population in Darjeeling belonged to the Tibeto-Burman language group which 
was in contrast to the Nepali-speaking upper caste Hindus who travelled to Benares. Thus there 
                                                          
36One of the earliest dialects of Hindi and the basis of Hindustani language, which evolved as a link language to 
facilitate interaction between the locals and the different Persian speaking groups that migrated after the 
establishment of the Mughal dynasty. Both Hindi and Urdu are believed to have derived their grammar from 
‘Khari Boli’, which was widely spoken in north India with close affinities to such local variations as Dehalvi, 
Hayani and Hindavi. Formation of the two nations of India and Pakistan can be attributed to religious as well as 
linguistic divisions between Hindi and Urdu (Aneesh, 2010:94). The Khariboli movement was located within this 
period of nation-building, patronised by eminent literary figures like Bharatendu Harischandra who were involved 
in raising Hindi to its current prestigious position in India (Pradhan, 1984:46). For further discussion see Orsini, 
1999 and Lelyveld, 1993. 
37 Nepali has no single term which conveys the meaning of the English term ‘race’. Jati is commonly used in the 
same context as race but its basic meaning is species or type as distinct from jat, which is caste. In the Nepali 
context, therefore, caste is the same as ethnic group. However, these terms are almost interchangeably used (Hutt, 
1997:116). 
53 
 
were few ancestral Nepali speakers in Darjeeling. While the writers in Benares managed to 
cater to popular tastes, there was no ‘democratisation of the literary world allowing self-
expression of lower groups’ and nor was the Nepali population in Benares structured in the 
same way as the much larger Indian-Nepali community. Since many political activists from 
Nepal took refuge in Benares, most of their writing engaged with politics related to Nepal and 
were often removed from issues such as education, employment and administration which 
faced the settled Nepali community of Darjeeling.  
Early 20th century brought important literary figures like Parasmani Pradhan, 
Suryabikram Gyawali and Dharnidhar Koirala to the forefront of the development of the Nepali 
language in Darjeeling.  Language development was greatly influenced by the Benares literati 
whose access to the hills was increased by the arrival of the Darjeeling Himalayan Railways 
and who eventually became the buddhi jeevi or intelligentsia of the hills. One of the key factors 
that propelled the advancement of language was the pervasiveness of the notion of 
backwardness of the Gorkha jati in comparison to the other communities in India (Onta, 
1996:150). Since majority of the population were employed in the tea estates as daily wage 
laborers or as Gurkha soldiers, literacy was a privilege which they could not afford.  Thus, for 
the Darjeeling literati, influenced and inspired by Benares, language development became the 
root of societal progress and a recurrent theme in most of the journals published during the 
early twentieth century (Chalmers, 2003). 
Two other factors that advanced the development of the Nepali language were its 
necessity as a link language between the different ethnic groups who were recruited as Gurkhas 
as well as for the propagation of Christianity by the Scottish Mission Churches in Darjeeling. 
While J.A.Ayton published the first Nepali grammar in 1820 which contains an ‘elementary 
description of the language’, Reverend Turnbull published Nepali grammar with extensive 
vocabularies. Finally in 1923 An English- Nepali dictionary was published by Reverend 
H.C.Duncan with the assistance of Gangaprasad Pradhan (Turner, 1926:365-66). Participation 
in the early Nepali public sphere in Darjeeling was limited to a tiny literate circle, as 
exemplified in the relationship between Parasmani Pradhan 38  and Reverend Gangaprasad 
Pradhan, who published a monthly called the Gorkhe Khabar Kagat from 1901-1932, the 
second Gorkhali/Nepali journal to be published in India in Nepali but with what Parasmani 
                                                          
38 Parasmani Pradhan (1898-1986) played a very important role in the standardization and development of the 
Nepali language. He published Chandrika from 1918 to 1920 and Bharati from 1948 to 1957. See Chalmers, 2003 
for an in-depth discussion on the development of a Nepali public sphere in Darjeeling.  
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called a ‘Darjeeling slant.’39 Gangaprasad’s language reflected the way in which the Parbatiya 
language had been adopted by the masses. He was accused by Parasmani of writing in the way 
spoken by the Tibeto-Burman speakers and thus of being grammatically incorrect as opposed 
to the way it was spoken in Benares in its ‘pure’ form. Owing to this difference in lexicon as 
well as religion, Gangaprasad was not considered a part of the elites leading the language 
movement (Pradhan, 1984:48). 
 Nonetheless, the elites involved in the language development project continued to 
strive and one of their earliest achievements was the recognition of Nepali (or Parbatiya, Khas 
Kura or Gorkha bhasa as it was earlier called) as a vernacular medium of education by Calcutta 
University in 1918 (Bomjan, 2008:52). Although it was a joint effort by scholars from Benares, 
Kathmandu and Darjeeling, the renaming of Khas Kura as Nepali and its identification and 
association with a community of diverse tongues, was one of the first formal steps towards the 
creation of a homogenous Nepali identity (Chalmers, 2003).  
According to Hutt (1997:113-14) the emergence of a cohesive ‘Nepali’ identity among 
Nepalis in India dates back no further than 1924 with the founding of the Nepali Sahitya 
Sammelan (Nepali Literature Association). The Association formally adopted the name Nepali 
for the language over other different names which were used and as the chairperson of the 
inaugural meeting said, 
‘...the word ‘Nepali’ has a broad meaning. It refers to all races 
(jati) of Nepal-Magar, Gurung, Kirati, Newar, Limbu and so on- and 
indicates that these and all the other races here are parts of a great 
Nepali nation (rastra)..Nepali nowadays is like a lingua franca in the 
Himalayan region (prades). Although the people living in this region 
speak different tongues (boli), there is no one who does not understand 
Nepali..and no race can claim that this language (bhasa) belongs to it 
alone’ 
(Pradhan, 1982:37-9 in Hutt, 1997:117).   
Through the initiative of the Association the language also gained an orderliness in spelling and 
grammar in the early 20th century with publications of dictionaries and other books (Pradhan, 1984). 
                                                          
39 His vocabulary shows words derived from Sanskrit which are still spoken by common people. His spellings 
reflected colloquial pronunciation For example- ‘hirday’ for hridaya (heart), ‘sor’ for svar (voice). His 
contributions laid foundations for later work. He translated the Bible into Nepali as well Hans Christen Anderson 
stories for children (Pradhan, 1984:49). 
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The role of Suryabikram Gyawali in the construction of the Nepali jati cannot be overlooked as he gave 
the Nepali jati its first literary icon-Bhanubhakta Acharya,  a brahmin poet from Nepal honoured as 
adi-kavi (first-poet) specifically for his ‘rendering of the Ramayana epic into simple, idiomatic, rhyming 
Nepali’ which had no known precedent in the language’. Bhanubhakta’s Ramayana was the first 
example of Hindu epic which had not merely been translated into the Nepali language but had been 
‘Nepali-ised’ in every other aspect as well (Hutt, 1991:6).  
Gyawali was successful in projecting Bhanubhakta as one of the bir purush (brave man) of the 
Nepali jati, who was placed alongside other brave figures (most of whom were Gorkha kings and 
warriors like Amar Singh Thapa and Bir Balbhadra from the Nepal unification era) in what Onta 
(1996:192) calls the bir pantheon (brave pantheon). These biographical accounts of ‘bir’ figures written 
by Gyawali in the 1930s and 1940s which were originally supposed to provide historical depth to the 
identity of the free Nepali jati, would later be used to recreate and portray the history of Nepalis as that 
of the bir jati and used as the basis of Nepalese nationalism. The cultural discourse which had been 
developed in Benares and Darjeeling by a small group of people as a part of variously localised projects 
of the jati self-improvement later became available to larger groups of Nepalese nationalists situated in 
numerous locations in India and Nepal (ibid: 151).   
The development of language and literature in Darjeeling has to be understood in conjunction 
with the political environment within which it was ensconced. The political demarcation of the 
Darjeeling hills on the basis of ethnicity had been put forward two years before the Morley-Minto 
Reforms in 1907. The period after the First World War once again gave signs of reform in the 
constitution and by this time numerous groups had emerged that were lobbying for a severance from 
West Bengal administration. Fearing that the interest of the district would be sidelined in the reforms, 
the Hillmen’s Association, a conglomeration of the representatives of the Nepali, Bhutia and the Lepcha 
communities, presented a memorandum before the Montague-Chelmsford Reform Commission in 1917. 
The lobby for rights as a single Nepali community was dependent on their unifying as a common 
community and thus the process of making the Nepali jati more visible to the colonial administrators 
was an initiative taken by the growing literati who headed numerous organisations like the Hillmen’s 
Association, Kalimpong Samiti, Nepali-Bhutia-Lepcha Association, Gorkha Dukkha Nibarak Samiti 
etc (Bagahi and Danda, 1982: 340-44). These organisations could not achieve solid concessions but 
were highly instrumental in building and solidifying a Nepali identity based on the idea of kinship of a 
common jat, a pluralist synthesis of myriad groups to constitute a jati and thus, the construction of the 
Nepali.  
While the notion of a Nepali jati had taken roots in the Darjeeling hills since the early twentieth 
century, the Nepalis who had migrated to Sikkim were living under a Bhutia monarchy and thus, the 
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proliferation of Nepali language and literature was limited. Nonetheless Sikkim has made important 
contributions to the development and popularity of Nepali language and literature in general and most 
specifically through the institutional recognition that it brought to the language in India.40 Although 
poetic works like Santabir Limbu’s Adriat Darshan (1940) was published in Uday, the Benares based 
journal, it was only after the formation of the Apatan Shitya Parishad 41 in 1947 that language and 
literature took an organized form in Sikkim (Chettri, 1999:22). The Parishad’s first literary contribution 
was Indrakil Pushpanjali (collection of poems) in 1950 and the Parishad had association with famous 
literary figures from Nepal like Laxmi Prasad Devkota and Bal Krishna Sama. It was an apolitical and 
non-communal organization, formed by people of different ethnic groups united through literature. 
Other literary associations arose after the establishment of the Apatan Sahitya Parishad like the Akhil 
Sikkim Chattra/Vidyarthi Sammelan (All Sikkim Students Association) (around 1956-57) which 
published a journal called ‘The Pole Star’. There were other journals like the ‘Triveni’ and 
‘Kanchenjunga’ published in 1957 which later became the newsletter of the Sikkim State Congress 
Party. In 1963 the Sikkim Sahityakar Sampark Samiti was established which published Sunakhari in 
which prominent literary figures like I.B.Rai,42 Agam Singh Giri43 published their work. The Yuva 
Pustalaya Sikkim (Youth Library Sikkim) was established in 1964 with its journal called Nav Jyoti and 
was a leading organizer of the birth anniversary of Adikavi Bhanu Bhakta in Sikkim. In 1981 the Nepali 
Sahitya Sammelan Sikkim was established which later became Sikkim Sahitya Parishad. It published 
the journal Kanka and in 1985 also established the coveted ‘Bhanu Puraskar’, a literary award given for 
contributions to Nepali literature. The Parishad also made immense contributions to what is known as 
bhasa andolan or the agitation for the recognition of Nepali as one of the official languages of India 
which was awarded in 1992 (ibid: 22-58). Thus, along with Darjeeling, Sikkim also made important 
contributions to establishment of the political legitimacy of the Nepalis of India.  
 
                                                          
40 While Hindi and English were used as a medium of instruction in schools, Nepali steadily became the bridge 
language between different communities and slowly the lingua franca of the kingdom (Hiltz, 2003:76). 
41 APATAN was an acronym for the founders of this literary organisation-Agam Singh Tamang, Padam Singh 
Subba, Tulsi Bahadur Chettri and Nima Wangdi.  
42 Indra Bahadur Rai (b.1928) is one of the most influential Nepali writers. Based in Darjeeling, questions of 
cultural identity are prominent in his work. He was the first recipient of the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1976 
(Poddar and Prasad, 2009).  
43 Agam Singh Giri (1928-1971) is considered as one of the most important poets representing the Indian-Nepalis. 
According to Rai (1994:153) Giri gave expression through his poems to the feeling of frustration prevalent among 
his people and dealt with issues of identity of the Indian Nepalis.  
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(iv) Language and the formation of the Nepali nation-state 
Language not only played an important role in the construction of the Nepali outside of 
Nepal but it was also instrumental in forging the concept of Nepali nationalism of a country 
which till 1930 officially identified itself as the Kingdom of Gorkha. Benares proved an 
important breeding ground for anti-Rana activities and fostered the birth and formation of 
numerous political parties that finally ended the regime in 1951(Gaenszle, 2002:75). Although 
democracy was introduced in Nepal in 1951, almost all the powers actually resided in the 
monarch which enabled King Mahendra to implement his Panchayat democracy in 1960-62 as 
an indigenous alternative to western and Indian parliamentarism and a ‘uniquely Nepali’ form 
of government (Whelpton, 1997:47; Burghart, 1984:102). With constitutional monarchy and 
regional influence of Indian independence came the commitment towards progress and bikas 
(development) which was seen as parallel to the expansion of education especially during the 
Panchayat period (1960-1990). One of the main features of the Panchayat period was the 
emphasis on building national consciousness which revolved around the King, Hinduism and 
the Nepali language (recognized as the official language of Nepal by the Constitution of 1959, 
thereby marginalizing all other indigenous languages). This was vital for the internal 
cohesiveness of the ethnically and linguistically diverse population as well as for the upkeep 
of the image of the ‘only Hindu kingdom in the world’ as a tactical measure to safeguard its 
sovereignty against its two neighbours, India and China.  
The modern nation state is able to accelerate the process of accepting and identifying 
with a national identity through mass education and in particular by teaching history in a way 
that encourages citizens to think of the state’s past achievement as their own (Whelpton, 
1997:48).  In the construction of Nepali nationalism, it was language which once again played 
a primary role. In a directive issued by the Nepal National Education Planning Commission in 
1952, the Nepali language was to be the exclusive medium of education, from the third grade 
on at the cost of all other regional languages. No other language was to be taught even 
optionally in an aim to promote homogeneity and national unity (Hacchethu, 2003:224).  
The conscious use and categorisation of a community as ‘Nepali’ was first experienced 
outside of Nepal and provided the Nepali state with a concept with which to mould Nepali 
nationalism. In spite of being headed by an elite group, development of Nepali as the lingua 
franca in Darjeeling completed the process of internal homogenisation amongst the diverse 
ethnic groups, thereby creating the Nepali jati, an identity which all could claim to belong to. 
On the other hand construction of the Nepali nation was a state oriented project which was 
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conducted by subjugating the language and culture of numerous ethnic groups. However, these 
developments, which were crucial to the development of the Nepali identity, have also ossified 
the discourse and analysis of the Nepalis as a monolithic, homogenous entity, which the 
following section will reveal as contrary to contemporary reality.  
 
The grand narrative of Nepali history had its foundations in the literature and history 
that had been written in British-India by a small group of variously expatriated Nepalis who 
built a historical genealogy backed by the state apparatus and systematically disseminated to 
the nation. Figures like Bhanu Bhakta, Amar Singh Thapa from Gyawali’s pantheon of bir 
purush were resurrected as Nepal’s national heroes in order to create a brave history of the 
Nepali nation (Onta, 1996). Nepali national history was written from the corpus of Panchayat 
sponsored Nepali national culture and with the standardization of the national education system 
which promoted the culture of the dominant Parbatiya groups rather than of other groups within 
the population. This lead to a greater identification with the promulgated national culture, 
which was actually Parbatiya culture (Whelpton, 1997:48).  By 1980s, over half the population 
in Nepal spoke Nepali as their mother tongue with close to four-fifths being able to converse 
in the language (Hutt, 1988:2).  
 
 
SECTION TWO- BEING NEPALI 
2.1 Identifying the Nepali-the regional context  
The social construction of the Nepali jati that had been initiated by the literary elites of 
Darjeeling, who were either first or second generation migrants from Nepal, also played an 
important role in the creation of the national identity of Nepal itself. However, this historical 
and cultural connection between India and Nepal has altered with the changing political 
landscape.  In the broad South Asian context, especially in India, ‘Nepalis’ are perceived as a 
single, homogenous group, undifferentiated from Nepalese citizens. While ethnic and cultural 
identity might be a cross-border phenomenon, a crucial aspect of political identity is that of 
belonging to a certain political unit or a state.  Thus, the Nepali identity, which exists in two 
different political units at the same time, has led to problems of citizenship and social 
acceptance for Nepalis living in India. As identities come to be strictly defined and 
compartmentalized by political boundaries the Nepali identity finds itself incompatible with 
the larger Indian identity. The cultural bridges which once joined the migrants to their home, 
Nepal, are now seen as impediments to their complete integration and acceptance as Indians.  
59 
 
The relationship between India and Nepal is based on cultural similarity owing to 
migration and the eventual diffusion as well as assimilation of the various aspects of culture 
(religion, caste system), in the modern context. At the same time, Nepal’s economic 
dependency and India’s geopolitical interests are the basis on which the relationship between 
the two countries is established and negotiated. Ethnic homogeneity has been extended to 
political homogeneity as expressed by the Indian state through the Indo-Nepal border, which 
prior to 1947 had remained as a border of regimes rather than nations (Gaenszle, 2002:86) but 
since has been transformed by the Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950.  The Treaty 
defined and institutionalized the relationship between two nations whereby ‘non-
discriminatory national treatment of the citizens of both the sides in economic and cultural 
affairs’ has been established’.  However, this Treaty, especially Article 7 which has provisions 
for the citizens of both the countries to travel, work and live freely in both has been criticized 
by Nepalis living on either side of the border. The Nepalese citizens see the Treaty as 
symbolising India’s hegemony and an infringement of their political sovereignty, Indian-
Nepalis remain resentful of the Treaty (as evidenced by the symbolic burning of the Treaty in 
Darjeeling in 1986 and more recently in 2007) because it entitles them to all the rights ‘like’ 
Indian citizens (which Nepalis from Nepal are also entitled to) and not ‘as’ Indian citizens. 
This eventually ‘relegates them to a cul-de-sac’ and justifies them being treated as foreigners 
in their own country (Subba, 2007:200).  
However, for the thousands of people who cross the Indo-Nepal border at various points, 
demarcation of political boundaries might have regulated their movements, but in no way has 
it hampered cross-border movement as the international border remain porous and easily 
accessible. Migration is a familiar and accepted part of the Indian-Nepali community which is 
well documented in historical records as well as poetry and prose. In the context of Indo-Nepal 
migration, the movement is almost uni-directional with more people crossing the border over 
to India than to Nepal. Outbound migration from Nepal has escalated in the past decade owing 
to the Maoist insurgency and while the number of people migrating to the Gulf or other Asian 
countries has increased, 85 percent of those migrating to other countries make their way to 
India looking for employment in India’s urban centers (Seddon et al, 2002:23). 
In the contemporary context accurate data on the number of people crossing over from 
Nepal is not possible owing to the free border but most studies estimate around 3 million 
Nepalese citizens migrate to India (Thieme, 2006 in Kollmair et al, 2006: 153) out of which 
more than 200,000 are estimated to be working in the capital city of Delhi alone and an equally 
significant proportion working as sex workers in the various Indian cities. Majority of the 
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migrants are engaged in menial, low income services which are usually ‘difficult, dirty and 
dangerous’ (Seddon et al, 2002:26; Thieme and Boker, 2003:343-346). Another set of migrants 
are the retired Indian Gurkhas soldiers who pursue various forms of wage labour, usually as 
watchmen or security guards. Known as bahadur (brave) in these Indian cities, employment of 
Nepalis as watchmen is not only ‘fashionable’ and ‘desirable’ (Dixit, 1997; Sinha, 2007:361) 
but also has come to form serious stereotypes about the Nepalis and are often used as a common 
anti-Nepali slander. Reproduced in Hindi cinema, where Nepalis are portrayed as ‘awkward 
and comical’, being a Nepali is also often equated with being a prostitute, a guard or a servant 
(Shersthova, 2010:313).  
Thus, in spite of the large number of Nepalese citizens as well as Indian-Nepalis who 
migrate to urban Indian cities for education or professional employment, it is the Nepali momo 
(dumpling) seller or the bahadur outside homes and offices who become the first point of 
contact and information for the average Indian. The stereotype of the Nepali that is prevalent 
in the national imagery has no room for a distinction between Nepalis from Nepal and Indian-
Nepalis, of whom the majority are Indian-Nepalis for whom Nepal forms a background to the 
stories of their ancestors but in terms of political connection or attachment, Nepal is as distant 
as Bangladesh or Bhutan (Subba, 2002: 120).  
Another key aspect that promotes the notion of homogeneity is the degree of 
geographical ignorance of the areas in which the Indian-Nepalis live, namely the north-eastern 
region of the country. Apart from the Garhwal Hills, which is located in the western Himalaya, 
the majority of the Indian-Nepali population is distributed in the various states of the eastern 
Himalaya. Here in varying numbers the Indian-Nepalis are engaged in different occupations 
ranging from labourers in the coal mines of Meghalaya to dairymen in Assam. While they form 
the dominant community in areas like Sikkim and Darjeeling, Indian-Nepalis are considered 
as one of the minority groups in the other north eastern states like Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, 
regions which are at best unfamiliar to the majority of Indians and at worst subject to extreme 
exotification. When examined from a centre-periphery equation of the nation-state, it is the 
Hindu, Hindi speaking central and northern India which is identified as the core or mainstream 
India, while the north-eastern states appear as vague, distant and amorphous peripheries (Sinha, 
2007:33). Thus, for an average Indian, this region is ‘on the map, but off the mind’ (Baruah, 
2007:4). This situation is further complicated for the Indian-Nepali whose citizenship and 
hence, loyalty to the nation is always suspect and who finds himself constantly battling what 
Nath (2005:28) calls the ‘myth of a double homeland’ and being a ‘privileged nation’ (Subba, 
2007:202) as they are apparently beneficiaries of privileges from both India and Nepal. Either 
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mixed with other groups from the north-east or harassed for being Nepalese, the average 
Indian-Nepali is still treated as a member of a diasporic community and has not yet received 
acceptance for being who he/she is, an Indian of Nepali origin. Thus, stereotypes coupled with 
a lack of information can be cited as one of the factors that promote a homogenous discourse 
evident in social as well as political imagery in India. 
While social acceptance is highly subjective and difficult to gauge, recognition of 
Nepali/Gorkhali as one of the national languages of India in 1992 is probably the only signifier 
of recognition at the national level.  Since language has become an instrument which validates 
the Indian-Nepalis’ nationality, subtle distinctions which were otherwise not evident, have 
become issues of grave concern evidenced by the controversy over Bhanubhakta that arose in 
the height of the Gorkhaland agitation. In 1986 the leading political outfit in Darjeeling, the 
Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) launched the Gorkhaland movement which saw the 
desecration of the statues of adikavi (first poet) Bhaubhakta as a sign of rejection of cultural 
connections with Nepal and replacing him with Agam Singh Giri as the true adikavi of the 
Gorkhas (Mitra, 1986).  Although the vandalised Bhanubhakta bust has been replaced with a 
full length statue in Chowrasta, Darjeeling, this episode was an expression of the politicisation 
of the insecurity faced by Indian-Nepalis over their identity.  
Notions of homogeneity that prevail at the macro level have important consequences 
for Indian-Nepalis living in India as they fuel insecurity, which is amply represented by the 
movement for Gorkhaland as well as the implicit fear in the Nepalis of Sikkim. The assumption 
of the Nepali as a homogenous and a stagnant entity can no longer be held as true and the 
analysis of Nepalis living in three different areas reveals how Nepali identity has become 
multilayered and acquired great variety and depth in its articulation and manifestation.  
The following section presents a brief political history of Nepal, Darjeeling and Sikkim 
and a summary of the contemporary political situation based on primary as well as secondary 
evidence. Different themes and issues discussed in this section will be elaborated on and 
analysed in greater detail in Part Two of the thesis. The aim of the following section is to set 
the background for each case study as well as to highlight links between the three cases.  
Sikkim, east Nepal and Darjeeling experienced immigration and settlement at different times 
and under different socio-economic conditions which has had an impact on the expressions of 
ethnic identity. The Nepalis living in these three areas highlight how members of the same 
ethnic group-Nepali, which was constructed in India and indoctrinated through education in 
Nepal, use their ethnic identity differently in order to attain different socio-politico goals.  
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2.2 Identifying the Nepalis- the local context, background to the case studies 
(a) Darjeeling 
The present district of Darjeeling (inclusive of the sub-divisions of Kalimpong and 
Kurseong) was carved out of territories previously belonging to the kingdoms of Sikkim and 
Bhutan. Darjeeling was initially developed as a sanatorium for the British army but the success 
of tea and cinchona plantations made it an important British investment also.  
The demand for a separate administrative unit comprising of the Darjeeling  hills   
and a section of the Jalpaiguri district, which had been annexed from Bhutan in 1865 was first 
placed by a small congregation of the educated elites of the hills called the Hillmen’s 
Association in 1917. The demand for a separate system of administration has passed through 
many stages, stirrings of which can be located in the literary movements as well as the active 
participation of elites that inspired and promoted amity amongst the hill community. The period 
from 1907-1935 can be seen as the first phase of political initiative by the elites albeit without 
the formal formation of any political organisation and simply by submitting requests and 
memoranda to the British.  
However, social integration of the hill communities weakened with the introduction of 
Nepali as the medium of instruction, which was seen as a cultural threat and the start of Nepali 
domination over the Bhutia and Lepcha communities (Bomjan, 2008:83). This relation was 
weakened further when the first elections that were conducted pursuant to the Government of 
India Act, 1935. This saw greater integration of Nepali communities as opposed to the Bhutia 
and Lepcha communities leading to a fracture of the hill community on the basis of ethnic 
affiliation. In 1943, the All India Gorkha League (AIGL) was formed which demanded the 
separation of Darjeeling District from Bengal, specifically on the basis of history as well as 
culture (ibid: 86).44 Thus, in 1980, when new political parties, the Pranta Parishad and the 
Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) came into existence with the objective of 
demanding a separate statehood on the basis of Article 345 of the Indian Constitution, there was 
already an ethnic base ready to be mobilized.  
                                                          
44 By 1967, the League had changed their political goal and adopted a resolution on the autonomous district 
council within West Bengal itself.  This was a damaging phase for the demand for a separate state (Moktan, 
2004:140-142). 
 
45 Article 3 of the Indian Constitution deals with the formation of new states and alteration of areas, boundaries 
or names of existing State. According to this Article, the Parliament, upon the recommendation of the President 
may:  
(a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts 
of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State; 
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The political scene in the Darjeeling hills was dominated primarily by the Gorkha 
National Liberation Front (GNLF) and the Communist Party India (CPI) (Marxist) which, had 
managed to establish support in the tea estates after the decline of the AIGL.  In 1986, the 
GNLF officially launched a mass movement for the separate state of Gorkhaland as a guarantee 
for legitimacy of Gorkhas as bona fide citizens of India as well as an assertion of the cultural, 
linguistic, difference from the people of West Bengal. It was a demand for self-determination 
which translated to control over the resources that were being ‘drained’ out of the hills to the 
coffers of the State of West Bengal, ethnically represented by the Bengalis. This was however 
opposed by members of the CPI (M) and what started as small skirmishes between the two 
factions, quickly escalated to full-fledged violence that evolved into a major anti-government 
agitation (Subba, 1992; Dasgupta, 1999:66). 
This situation was further intensified by the treatment of a political problem as a law 
and order issue by the state leading to the escalation of violence (Banerji, 1986:1721). The 
agitation finally ended in 1988 with the creation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council 
(DGHC), the first autonomous council outside of northeast India, and the recognition of Nepali 
as the co-official language (with Bengali) of the three hill sub-divisions. The DGHC however 
was unsuccessful in eradicating the malaise of unemployment, underdevelopment and poverty. 
Failure emanated from political infighting and the leadership of Subash Ghising who as the 
Chairman of the DGHC had no real power or authority as all the crucial decisions were still 
made in Calcutta.  Thus, in 2007, Ghising was ousted by the Gorkha Jana Mukti Morcha (GJM) 
led by Bimal Gurung, who have since revived the demand for Gorkhaland. They put forth a 
multi-pronged approach to achieve Gorkhaland; to highlight the cultural difference of the 
Gorkhas, stage non-violent non-co-operation against the State (for example  refusal to pay taxes, 
hunger strikes )46 and gain institutional support in the Parliament.  
The idea of a Gorkhaland serves the dual purpose of promising development to the 
Darjeeling hills and legitimacy to the hundreds of thousands of Nepalis living all over India. 
                                                          
(b) increase the area of any State; 
(c) diminish the area of any State; 
(d) alter the boundaries of any State; 
(e) alter the name of any State: 
Source: http://www.legalserviceindia.com/constitution/const_india.htm (Accessed: 22/12/09). 
46 However, in spite of their attempts at Gandhian techniques of resistance, there have been a number of violent 
outbreaks in the plains of Siliguri and the Duars which are also being demanded as a part of Gorkhaland 
(Benedikter, 2009). 
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Nonetheless, the failure of the DGHC raises important questions not only about the failure of 
the administrative structure of the state but also of the failure of those at the helm to harness 
the potential. It begs the question as to whether the system failed the people or whether the 
people failed themselves.   
After a series of negotiations with the central government and the new state 
government,47 a political and administrative compromise was reached in July 2011 with the 
formation of the Gorkha Territorial Administration (GTA) which is similar to the earlier DGHC 
that it replaces in form and content, except that it is empowered with certain administrative, 
financial and executive powers. It is an autonomous self-governing body established to 
administer the socio-economic, infrastructural, educational, cultural and linguistic 
development of the Gorkhas living in the hills.  
Gorkha as a socio-political construction exists on many levels as does the identity crisis 
that it seeks to remedy. Experiences and perceptions of ‘identity crisis’ are central to the 
formation of the Gorkha identity. These experiences are highly contextual thereby making it 
imperative to analyse ethnic politics through the varied negotiations of people with the state 
and other economic structures.  
The Darjeeling hills never had the chance to make the transition from a colonial to a 
post-colonial state because in spite of a change in governance, the administrative and class 
structures remained constant. The majority of the people were, and still are engaged in the tea 
plantations. Resources are still not utilized for the benefit of the local population and even 
though education and living standards might have risen, the infrastructure and the services 
provided by the government remain archaic and inadequate.  
Development in Darjeeling hills has remained stagnant owing to ineffective policies 
and even worse management. Population growth is not matched by the increase in the existing 
facilities nor the development of newer ones. Tourism and the tea industry form the backbone 
of the economy and both have been experiencing severe slump for the past two decades. More 
than seventy per cent of the population are involved, directly or indirectly, in the agricultural 
sector, especially tea. Therefore the closing down of tea gardens or even temporary shut downs 
of factories affect a very large section of the population. Apart from employment generated by 
small businesses especially, during the tourist season, there is no private investment in the hills. 
This contributes to widespread unemployment and poverty amongst the educated and 
                                                          
47 All India Trinamool Congress led by Mamata Banerjee defeated the Left government in the 2011 West 
Bengal General Elections. The CPI (M) had held power in the state for thirty-four years.  
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uneducated. While the main town of Darjeeling is over-populated, aggravating problems 
related to water and waste disposal, the rural areas face problems of connectivity and 
communication along with lack of other civic amenities.  
The state is conspicuous by its absence especially in the Kaman or tea estates which 
have become a breeding ground for ‘estate culture’ promoted through a psyche of subservience 
and dependency on the factory for livelihood, health, education and food. This is related 
directly to low wages (even though recent negotiations have increased this to Rs90/day, this is 
still not calculated on the basis of inflation) and with the majority of the total hill population 
living within the folds of an estate culture, understanding and analysing the tea gardens 
becomes essential as they are the most important sites of the construction and mobilisation of 
identity. It is in these environments where resources are scare but the demand and desire for 
consumption goods is high that political jargon finds maximum support. 
Plantation culture extends from the hills to the plains in the terai region or the duars, 
which is also being demanded as a part of Gorkhaland. The socio-economic problems faced by 
the plantation population, whether Nepali or Adivasi in the tea belt of Duars are similar (low 
wages, housing, security etc) but it is through ethnicity that the solutions for these problems 
are sought. Nepalis in the Duars live in a new found fear of ethnic backlash and social boycott 
which has been brought about by the Gorkhaland movement. Interaction with the Nepali 
residents of the Bargakot tea estate in the Duars revealed that above all, it was that of their 
Indian citizenship that they were most concerned about, especially given the expulsion of the 
Nepalis from the bordering areas of Bhutan and Meghalaya. Insecurity about being driven from 
homes persists but so does the fear of cultural dilution. Thus, in the Duars, there is a genuine 
sense of identity crisis because of the constant presence of the ‘Other’ against whom ethnic 
boundaries have to be drawn and negotiated, leading people to reinforce the Gorkha identity.  
The Indian state 
The pertinent question that thus arises is the role that the state plays in the use of this 
identity. Although social integration of the people from the hills and the plains has been 
difficult, the West Bengal government has always considered Darjeeling to be an integral part 
of the state and taken a strong stand against its separation from West Bengal. Lack of 
development is seen as symptomatic of the non-acceptance of the community by the state. This 
has been the key ingredient of all political propaganda of the majority of the hill based political 
parties and is highly internalised by the community. The state is seen as supporting the forces 
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that maintain status quo and ‘promoting alcohol and not education’. 48 In the contemporary 
political scenario Gorkha and Gorkhaland may have found new significance but this is also 
accompanied by a greater sense of disillusionment because of the lack of tangible results as 
well as the autocratic attitude of the GJM. For example, public meetings and processions held 
by the GJM had to be attended by at least one member of each family and although political 
participation has increased, whether this is forced or voluntary it is difficult to discern. Here, 
the local, village level organisation or the samaj have become sites of political enforcement as 
non-conformists are socially boycotted or publicly shamed (while the reverse happens in the 
Duars).  
As identity becomes increasingly attached to or synonymous with territory, claims and 
counter claims over it are bound to emerge. Emerging cities like Siliguri which is at the foothill 
of Darjeeling are claimed by both the Nepalis and the Bengalis. Thus, the Gorkha identity, in 
spite of the numerous criticisms and contradictions attached to it, is a powerful evocation of 
culture in order to seek benefits from the state, the relation with which has always remained 
volatile. Thus antagonism towards the state is linked to ethnicity as social and economic 
discrimination is seen as directly related to ethnicity. The Gorkha identity also aims to remedy 
a larger question of the Indian citizenship of the Nepalis living in India and thus also derives 
its potency from anxieties related to it.  
 
(b) Sikkim 
In contrast to the apparent as well as perceived state apathy in the Darjeeling Hills, 
Sikkim represents a case of extreme intrusion by the state in the cultural lives of its citizens. 
The state is dominant, over-arching and powerful. It controls all aspects of its citizen’s lives 
especially though its role as the largest employer in the state. Prior to the 1975 ‘merger’, Sikkim 
was an independent kingdom inhabited by the Lepcha, Bhutia, Tsong and later Nepali ethnic 
groups and ruled by the Namgyal dynasty from 1642-1975. The political and administrative 
structure revolved around the Chogyal and his council which was drawn from the 
representatives of the main Bhutia, Lepcha and Tsong clans. The members of the Council were 
compensated for their services through land grants, making them land owing nobility or Kazis, 
which eventually set the stage for the feudal system in Sikkim (Rose, 1978:206; Das, 1983:7). 
Sikkim’s strategic location as the portal for trans-Himalayan trade in the 18th century and later 
                                                          
48 Khadga Bajay, retired journalist, interviewed by the author on 14th January, 2011, Banarhat, West Bengal.  
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as the buffer zone between India and China has played an important role in its history. In 1861 
Sikkim was made a British Protectorate and after Indian independence in 1947, it became an 
Associate State of India in 1950. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 however elevated its position as 
an important frontier state, instigating India to impose a constitution in early 1970s leading to 
its eventual merger in 1975 (Das, 1983).  
Prior to migration from Nepal in the late 17th and early 18th century, large parts of 
Sikkim were uninhabited and its lands uncultivated. Owing to the initiative of the British 
Resident J.C.White and the local Kazi and Newar elites who profited from settling new tenants 
and labourers, the Nepalis had established themselves as the majority ethnic group by the early 
18th century (Rose: 1978; Das, 1983:66). The feudalistic arrangement of the society, however, 
ensured that the agriculturalists and labourers remained the poorest. Thus irrespective of their 
ethnicity, the majority were either landless or owned poor lands and their rights overruled by 
those with authority (Ling, 1985; Nakane: 1966). A powerful minority thus controlled 
economic and political power thereby institutionalising ethnic differences most effectively.  
This sense of disparity finally manifested itself in the emergence of organized party 
politics in 1940, with the birth of the Sikkim National Congress (SNC), the leaders of which 
were influenced by the Indian struggle for independence. Most of the members of the SNC as 
well as its leaders were Nepalis of Sikkimese origin giving the contest against the feudal system 
a definite ethnic tinge (Chakravarthi, 1994:97; Gupta, 1975). Finally, after many negotiations 
and a radical political movement in 1975, the monarchy was dissolved and Sikkim was declared 
as a constituent state of India. Democracy however ushered in more political instability and 
ethnic insecurity as leadership quickly changed hands from Kazi Lhendup Dorji, the first Chief 
Minister, to N.B.Bhandari in 1979, resting finally in the hands of P.K.Chamling in 1994, whose 
break-away party, the Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF) has been at the helm of state since their 
electoral victory in 1994. 
 Although difference in culture and ethnicity has played an important role in the 
political history of Sikkim, it has emerged as a central feature of Sikkimese politics since 1994 
as the state has been increasingly intrusive in the cultural life of its citizens. Built on the 
foundation of ethnic politics, the SDF was skilfully able to take advantage of the unrest that 
had been caused by the non-implementation of the recommendations of the Mandal 
Commission, a scheme for positive discrimination that was introduced by the Indian 
government in 1991.  
The eventual implementation of the Mandal Commission in Sikkim in 1994 after the 
downfall of the Bhandari government was historically significant. It added a new dimension to 
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the identity of the Sikkimese-Nepali people as they were now divided into different categories 
that had been devised and approved by the Central government (OBC, MBC) which also 
marked the beginning of an internal division within the Nepali ethnic group itself. Because 
‘Nepalis’ were the largest ethnic group with the most flexible internal socio-cultural boundaries, 
the ethnic groups which have been subsumed under the Nepali category were easily able to 
associate with or disassociate themselves from this category. The political nature of these 
categories is made explicit by the fluctuation of the members who comprise these groups. For 
example, ethnic groups that belonged to the OBC category could be easily moved to the MBC 
category en masse and those belonging to the upper caste groups were moved into the OBC 
category. The creation and promotion of these categories highlight the shift in the enactment 
and facilitation of identity politics from speeches and propaganda to governmental policies and 
activities that encourage and support ethnic diversity.  
While the ST, SC, MBC or OBC category may be useful and creative ways of 
distributing public goods, this mode of ethnic identification has facilitated the creation of vote 
banks which can be accessed and mobilised by different political agents. On the other hand it 
has also led to the exploration, discovery and essentialisation of identity, which usually implies 
the revival or creation of the tangible aspects of culture. With each ethnic group undergoing a 
degree of new found curiosity and interest in reconstruction of their cultures,  politics in Sikkim 
is unabashedly organised around ethnicity, a system which is dependent on the nexus of 
bureaucrats and most importantly, ethnic associations (See Vandenhelsken, 2011; 
Shneiderman and Turin, 2008). 
Although some genuine demand for cultural preservation does exist, in the face of 
increasing urbanisation and ‘westernization’ as well as ‘Indianization’ of values, instrumental 
aspects like reservations and concessions that come with embracing and enacting ethnic 
practices cannot be understated or ignored. Thus, the state as the political agent has led to the 
creation of a political framework which is receptive and encouraging of ethnic diversity and 
has thus placed political agency in the hands of ethnic associations who have now become the 
gatekeepers to ethnic culture. The primary problems faced by the state revolve around two 
issues, which are almost historical in nature-the dilution of the rights of the Sikkimese through 
the influx of migrants, and second the insecurity over employment prospects. These two 
insecurities highlight very important points about Sikkimese politics and resolving these issues 
is at the heart of political stability and success, which the state accomplishes by creating a 
structure of material dependency extending from the towns to the villages.  Sarkarle palkayo, 
‘the government has made them dependent’ is a phrase which is often heard in rural Sikkim. 
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Complementing economic dependency is the use of culture as a tool, especially by fostering 
ethnic assertion amongst the largest section of the electorate as a means to greater access to 
resources, which ultimately leaves the electorate open to manipulation by the state. 
In Sikkim, ethnic groups belonging to the Nepali category, unlike in Nepal, have never 
faced any external pressures to give up their culture and practices. Their history of migration 
and the prior presence of other groups in the area of migration enabled cultural fusion and the 
creation of the Sikkimese-Nepali identity.  Thus, in the present context the revival of different 
Nepali sub-ethnic groups heralds a drastic change to the Nepali integration that was 
experienced and represented in the past. However, this change can also be attributed to the 
mechanism of the state and the different policies or the creation of socio-economic categories. 
Thus, as the state pushes forth its agenda of creating vote banks, discovery and essentialisation 
of culture will take place. 
This also poses bigger questions of identity not only to those trying to analyse the 
situation but also to those who are in centre of it all. Unsure of the cultural insignia that one 
should support in a time which is truly transitional, the individual is confronted with 
contradictory trends which represent ‘going back’ to cultural roots but at the same time are 
seen as progressive. However, in the social matrix of being ‘Sikkimese’ which is represented 
by three ethnic groups, Bhutia, Lepchas and Nepalis, the traditional view of the Nepali as the 
immigrant has always persisted. Thus, in spite of the fragmentation of the Nepali ethnic group 
into different sub-groups, in the presence of other groups like the Bhutias or the Lepchas they 
will always identify and be identified as Nepalis.   
While some lament the fragmentation of the Nepali group, others call it a new form of 
ethnic unification. However, whether positive or negative, the state is viewed as the primary 
agent which has brought about the growth in cultural awareness to the masses. Of all the 
tangible aspects of culture, language are the most emphasized as it is one of the key cultural 
traits that is required by the state as well as the central government.  
  Sikkim, like Nepal and in contrast to Darjeeling presents a case of the cohesive Nepali 
ethnicity being fragmented to its separate units. The state wilfully exploits the socio-economic 
insecurities of the people and channels it through ethnic politics in order to ensure its political 
security, thereby revealing not only the malleability of Nepali ethnic groups but also their 
potential for politicization.  
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(c) Nepal 
Sikkim and Darjeeling highlight two different trajectories of ethnic politics in the 
eastern Himalaya. In comparison, ethnic politics in Nepal is reminiscent of certain aspects 
which are visible both in Sikkim and Darjeeling.49 Similarities with Sikkim can be drawn 
through the over-arching presence of the state in the cultural life of its citizens. While it is a 
contemporary affair in Sikkim, it was most prominent in Nepal though the nation-building 
process of the early 1950s that had been crafted around the upper caste hill Hindu groups. Also 
known as Nepalization among its tribal, non-Hindu population this process comprised of the 
promotion and intense internalization of the values and culture (language, food, dress and 
festivals) of the Parbatiyas.  
On another level, ethnic politics in Nepal also reflects the exploitative and extractive 
nature of the ‘centre-periphery’ politics which is experienced in the Darjeeling hills. Political 
and economic discrimination towards non-Chettri or Bahun ethnic groups has been a historical 
fact which began with the installation of the Hindu monarchy and became increasingly 
institutionalised with the spread of bureaucracy and a centralised administrative system. This 
system was further entrenched by the implantation of the caste system in the social structure of 
a disparate group of people and it is this institutionalised discrimination that is sought to being 
remedied through the re-organization of the country on the basis of ethnic federalism.  
From 1950-51 Nepal was in the grip of an intense anti-Rana movements which was a 
combined outcome of three factors-armed revolution led by the Nepali Congress, efforts made 
by the incumbent King Tribhuvan and the alignment of independent India with anti-Rana forces 
in India (Hachetthu, 2009:28, 29). 50 Following political instability after the fall of the Rana 
regime in 1951, King Mahendra assumed complete control of the country, banned all political 
parties and enforced the Partyless Panchayat system in 1960, thereby controlling all aspects of 
Nepali administration.     
                                                          
49 Given the geographical, historical and cultural interconnectedness of Sikkim, Darjeeling and Nepal it becomes 
rather difficult to locate the point of origin of a particular political phenomenon. Thus, while it might be fair to 
say that ethnic politics in Nepal incorporates those aspects seen in Sikkim and Darjeeling, it would be equally fair 
to consider Nepal as the origin of political turbulence which is then manifested in Sikkim and Darjeeling.  
50 Indian influence was acutely important in Nepali Congress’s 1950-51 uprising against the Ranas which was 
launched from India. The movement depended on Indian support for its success and had to be terminated because 
of Indian pressure to reach a compromise agreement rather than continue fighting for an immediate and total 
transfer of state power (Whelpton, 1997:45).  
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In 1967 King Mahendra launched the ‘Back to the Village National Campaign’ (BVNC) 
which drew heavily on the concepts underlying China’s Cultural Revolution and was aimed at 
instilling national fervour and unity amongst all participants as well as ensuring the deep 
entrenchment of the Panchayat system (Brown, 1996:47). The political ideology of pre-1990 
Nepali polity revolved around certain specific themes, primary amongst which were state-
backed Hinduism and the dissemination of Nepali language. State backed Hinduism involved 
provisions of the Muluki Ain of 185451 which contained a five-tier national caste hierarchy.  
This led to greater centralisation of politics and administration with the eventual aim of 
cultural and hence national homogenization. Position on this caste hierarchy provided the basis 
for a forceful Hinduization of the polity in which the state guaranteed inequality based on one’s 
caste in various sectors of society. Consequently this formed the basis of the discrimination 
against matwalis and dalits. King Mahendra introduced a new Muluki Ain in 1963 where caste 
and ethnicity were no longer significant legal categories although they continued to remain 
socially relevant (Pradhan, 2002:11-12). This intensified during the Panchayat period52 (1960-
1990) which was marked by numerous state strategies that promoted a hill, upper-caste Hindu 
version of  national integration encapsulated in the Panchayati slogan of “Ek bhasa, ek bhesh, 
ek desh” (one language, one style of dress, one country) (Gaige, 1975: 23; Whelpton, 2005). 
On the other hand, the promotion of the Nepali language was done at the cost of other 
indigenous languages and Nepali became the language of dominance and discrimination 
against those who were speakers of other languages (Onta, 2006:305-306).  
The Partyless Panchayat however faced serious opposition from the Nepali Congress 
as well as the different factions of the Communist Party in Nepal. This opposition against the 
system manifested itself in the form of student agitation in 1979 first in the Kathmandu valley 
which then spread to other towns. This led to the suspension of the BVNC and the 
                                                          
51 According to Gurung (1997: 501) Jung Bahadur who is associated with the promulgation of Muluki Ain in 1854 
was not the first to introduce the caste system in Nepal as the Ain was merely the culmination of a long standing 
tradition which goes back to the Licchavi period (approximately 400-750 CE). A prominent one was that of Jaya 
Sthithi Malla (1382-95) which categorized Newars into sixty-four castes and again during the reign of Mahendra 
Malla (1506-75). This Hindu social code was later introduced in Gorkha by Ram Shah (1603-36).  
52 This system provided for directly elected village or town councils (Panchayats), their members forming an 
electoral college to choose district level representatives, who in turn selected from amongst themselves the 
majority of members of the national legislature or the Rashtriya Panchayat, the remainder being either 
representatives of government sponsored class organisations or royal nominees. And the system proclaimed to 
give impetus to local leadership and popular participation, advocated decentralisation of administrative authority 
and political responsibility (Lohani, 1973:26; Whelpton, 2005:101).  
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announcement of a referendum to decide upon the future of the Panchayat system (Brown, 
1996:91).  Although fifty-five per cent of the masses voted for the Panchayat system, it was 
however neither able to alleviate the country’s economic position nor provide political stability. 
On another level this system also lost credibility due to its increasing exclusivity and 
unaccountability as it was unable to deliver the bikas or development that it had promised  and 
partly also because of the manner in which it tried to suppress dissent (Hutt, 2004:3). While 
these factors posed as serious threat to the regime itself, another source of opposition was from 
the civil society. An accumulative impact of the progressive measures taken during the 
Panchayat period was that there had come to being a ‘critical mass’ of people who supported 
democracy (Hacchethu, 2009: 32). Thus dis-satisfaction with the Panchayat system was being 
expressed from a wide section of the public. 
 In a bid to garner support, the government started loosening restraint on political 
activities leading to the proliferation of numerous ethnic organizations, some of which were 
supported by the government itself in an attempt to enlist ethnic and low caste groups to support 
the Panchayat regime. This was instrumental in the mobilization of ethnic minorities in 
opposition to bahunvad or brahmanocracy (Lecomte-Tilouine and Dollfuss, 2003:6). However 
political discontent continued which eventually led to the first Jana Andolan (People’s 
Movement) in 1990 that brought an end to the Panchayat system and absolute monarchy.  
In July 1990 Nepal Janajati Mahasangh53 (Nepal Federation of Nationalities)-which in 
2004 became the Nepal Adibasi Janajati Mahasangha (Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities, NEFIN) - came into existence. These along with the emergence of ethnically 
oriented parties like the Mongol National Organization in the eastern hills and the Sadbhavana 
Party in the Terai, marks the onset of minority politics in Nepal. The indigenous movement 
which had begun organizing in 1950s, gathered momentum with the establishment of 
democracy in 1990 giving these parties the freedom to articulate their concerns and grievances 
against the State (Whelpton, 2005; Fisher, 2001). Ethnic mobilization, in terms of activism for 
identity and recognition, began to flourish through their ethnic organizations owing to the open 
democratic environment. The principles of popular sovereignty, equality, freedom and cultural 
rights which the newly democratic country claimed to espouse combined with the  expansion 
of the international human rights regime led to the articulation of marginalized and excluded 
voices (Hacchethu, 2003:233).   
                                                          
53  Janajati is a term to denote a community which is outside the fold of the Hindu caste system, previously known 
as the Matwalis ( Tamang, 2005:6 cited in Hangen, 2007:19) 
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However, the new democratic political system and the stability of the state was 
constantly challenged by the inter-party and intra-party conflicts, corruption and manipulation 
of constitutional loopholes. This is exemplified by the fact that the government changed fifteen 
times in fifteen years between 1990 and the coup in 2005. This situation was aggravated further 
by the declaration of the ‘peoples war’ by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) in 1996, 
which came to a formal end in 2006. This decade long insurgency changed the socio-political 
dynamics of Nepal. Although it gave voice to frustrated groups within the country, it also 
brought destruction and large scale displacement, furthered poverty and fractured communities. 
The year 2006 also saw Jan Andolan II, one of the most powerful anti-establishment struggles 
in the history of Nepal headed by the Seven Party Alliance (SPA)54 and the Unified Communist 
Party Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN-M) which marked the end of monarchy and the declaration of 
Nepal as a Democratic Republic. In 2008 the monarchy was abolished and the drafting of a 
new constitution is underway which will guide the re-organization of Nepal. However, there is 
little clarity over the specific mechanisms through which this massive change will be achieved 
(Middelton and Shneiderman, 2008). 
Explicit political demands (separate ethnic states, federalism, political representation, 
linguistic freedom) as opposed to the earlier demands of cultural preservation and the violent 
articulation of these demands (a trend spearheaded by the Maoists) marks a change in the 
political scenario itself (Lawoti, 2007). While local autonomy and federal framework had been 
raised as political demands by various regional groups in 1950 and again in 1990, it became a 
specific program for the Maoist rebels and thus gained currency with ethnic activists. These 
are explicit demands with implicit claims. Every ‘homeland’ would become one of the states 
of federal Nepal and thus with the decentralization of power that comes with federalism, control 
over and distribution of resources would be in the hands of those who head the federal state.  
Ethnic groups categorised under the broad terminology of Adivasi/Janajatis 
(indigenous/ethnic) are entitled to positive discrimination through reservation in employment 
and education. Although these groups are not barred from applying for various concessions 
and positions but factors like ethnic nepotism and a bureaucratic system dominated by the 
upper caste discourages people from applying for employment or other benefits at the very 
outset. Thus, given the negligible number of ethnic minorities (in proportion to their population) 
who are employed in the government sector, access to information and ease of application in 
                                                          
54 The Seven Party Alliance comprised of the Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist 
Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist), Nepal Workers and Peasant Party, Nepal Goodwill Party, United Left 
Front and the People’s Front.  
74 
 
the public sector is missing.  Although recruitment to the civil service should be based only on 
merit, the nature of social stratification only allows those in the higher Parbatiya castes to gain 
access to the required education and necessary information and thus obtain the necessary 
qualifications to enter the civil services. This may be referred to as hereditary meritocracy 
whereby people belonging to the upper strata, such as Brahmins, have an enormous advantage 
over other groups in the society. This advantage is reflected in recruitment to the civil services 
which selects large numbers of those belonging to the upper caste (Jamil and Dangil, 2009:202). 
Thus, the Nepalese Public Service Commission is highly unrepresentative not only in terms of 
gender, religion, and caste but also in terms of ethnicity, region and class.55 
 
The eastern frontier- Limbuwan 
It is within the ambit of transitional politics that the borders of the homeland for the 
Limbu ethnic community-Limbuwan- have been drawn by different political parties and ethnic 
organizations despite the lack of consensus between all those involved. One of the most 
important aspects of this movement is the lead taken by ethnic associations rather than the 
national political parties. In comparison to past, where concerted but isolated events for 
Limbuwan have taken place, the present movement was initiated by the foremost ethnic 
organisation for the Limbus’- the Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (KYC). 
 Nepal, surprisingly, still enlists political participation from its citizens in spite of the 
low credibility and accountability of its political representatives (exemplified by their failure 
to draft the new constitution four years after being elected as members of the Constituent 
Assembly). The contemporary political scene with its fuzzy boundaries between political 
parties, interest groups and ethnic associations represents a complex maze, confusing and 
contradictory at times with similar actors performing different roles and the same actor 
performing multiple roles. Layers of roles are nested within each other, all of which test and 
strain social relations. However, analysis of changes and development is made easier by 
accepting the political nature of the social actors and by understanding that political parties 
demand immense loyalty, making them members of political parties first and then of other 
social associations. However, this not to doubt the ethnic allegiance but rather to assert the 
                                                          
55 For example, the participation of different castes and ethnic groups in the government bureacracy is far from 
equal. The recruitment of gazetted officers from Dalits, Janajatis, Terai Castes, and Muslims did not improve 
during the decade post-1990 while that of the Brahman-Chettri group actually increased from 67 to 87 per cent 
during that period. Among higher level police officers, 79 percent come from Brahman/Chettri group, 13 per cent 
from the Janajati group, 11 per cent from Newar and 0.5 per cent from the Dalit category (Tiwari, 2008:42). 
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level of control that political parties still hold in the construction of the framework of ethnic 
articulation.  
Inefficient bureaucracy, nepotism, partiality and corruption were all seen as the 
characteristic features of the state by the masses yet the demand for Limbuwan, a federal state, 
still finds resonance and is successful in mobilising people politically. This can be attributed to 
its actual historical existence in the past, ethnic attachments with kipat as well as the lure of 
developmental benefits that will come with the federal state of Limbuwan. Participation in 
workshops, ethnic rallies (which have strong political connotations) as well as events organised 
by political parties is indicative of a rajneetik chaso (interest in politics) which is not matched 
by an equal measure of rajneetik gyan (political knowledge), highlighted by the lack of 
information, in rural as well as semi-urban areas,  
In this situation where ethnic issues are not directly articulated by the major political 
parties, ethnic associations like the KYC, which act at the interface between the state and the 
people, have started playing important political roles, at least within the Limbu community. 
The demand for Limbuwan has also found strength in the present scenario because it falls 
within the realm of national as well as international discourse on the rights of the indigenous, 
manifested in the evocation of the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 16956 
(which pertains to the Rights of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples), at every event organised 
by any ethnic association. This has generated many problems as there is no clarification about 
the components of the Convention and thus, when identification of the indigenous itself is 
highly problematic and politicised, confusion regarding rights or agra-adhikar (prior 
rights)57over resources between the indigenous and other ethnic communities is only but 
inevitable. However, these are issues and discussions at an organisational level, usually ending 
in stalemate, which are yet to percolate down to the grass-roots and affect social interaction.  
Lack of state accountability and the inconsistency of the major political parties in their 
commitment towards the Limbuwan agenda (which is also an indirect indication of their stand 
                                                          
56 Mounting pressure from the janajati (indigenous peoples) movement in Nepal which was in tandem with the 
international emphasis on indigenous rights, the Government of Nepal signed the ratified the ILO Convention 169 
in 2007, making Nepal the first South Asian country to do so.  
57 Agra-adhikar means prior or first rights, especially in the political sphere. Under this scheme every ethnic 
homeland would democratically elect, for a total of two terms, the governing Minister from the ethnic group after 
which the homeland was named. Thus, in Limbuwan only a Limbu could be the Chief Minister for the first ten 
years. Agra-adhikar was also proposed in arena of affirmative action with Limbu candidates being given first 
priority over other ethnic groups.  
 
76 
 
on ethnic federalism) have created ample space for the rise of regional parties. Ethnic politics 
has thus finally created an opportunity for the members of ethnic groups to engage at the highest 
political level, a position which has not often been possible before. This situation thus provides 
hope and incentive for the younger generation to become members of political parties as new 
opportunities of political mobility and advancement are opened up by the regional parties. 
Given the prevalence of favouritism (especially ethnic) being politically active is almost a 
necessity in Nepal and this phase of political transition, where even the major parties are 
making concessions to ethnic demands within their parties as there is a proliferation of regional 
parties, is the opportune moment to be a political participant.  
Thus, the political promotion of the Limbu identity shows the use of ethnicity in 
confronting the state or at least those at the helm of the state to demand equal political access 
and opportunity as well as equitable distribution of resources.  
 
The case studies of eastern Nepal, Sikkim and Darjeeling present the variation in the 
manifestation, articulation and use of ethnic identity as a political resource. These three cases 
highlight how the ‘Nepali’ identity has been reworked and re-moulded in order to fit the 
political, economic and social exigencies in which these groups are located. While the Sikkim 
and Darjeeling cases discuss the variation in the expressions and use of ethnic identity, the case 
of the Limbus is a telling example of how the Limbu identity is constructed against this very 
idea of a homogenous ‘Nepali’ identity.  The three cases thus exemplify the politics of being 
Nepali in the eastern Himalaya and establish that understanding and being a Nepali is very far 
removed from the homogeneity that was once imagined. 
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Part Two: Ethnic Politics in east Nepal, Darjeeling and Sikkim 
General Introduction 
One of the most outstanding developments in three cases discussed in this thesis is that 
of the variation in the manifestation and use of Nepali identity as a political resource at the 
local and regional level. All three case studies show the emergence and assertion of different 
identities as a reaction to the idea of a homogenous Nepali that was constructed by the literary 
elites in Darjeeling as discussed in the preceding section.  
The second section of this thesis takes this construction of the homogenous Nepali to 
three different areas and analyses the politics of being a Nepali in Sikkim, Darjeeling and east 
Nepal. The three case studies are based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted over a period of 
seven months (July 2010-February 2011) in the hills and plains of the eastern Himalaya. The 
three cases, whilst distinct in their social, economic and political contexts as well as the 
incentives and modes of political mobilization, are linked together by the simultaneous 
existence of politics on the basis of Nepali ethnic identity. The three cases show the dialectic 
relationship between ethnicity and politics. While on the one hand, ethnicity is the basis of 
political contention and negotiation between states and ethnic groups, on the other hand the 
state and the existing political structures determine the form and content of ethnic identity. The 
three cases illustrate this relationship whilst also highlighting the instrumental rationale that 
determines which aspect of identity needs to be emphazised politically in order to gain the most 
beneficial outcome. This is also an outcome of instutionalization of ethnic cleavages by the 
state as well as the ethnic groups themselves which has led to an attachment of routinized, 
within system payoffs to political mobilization based on ethnicity (Chandra, 2005: 236). Ethnic 
politics in Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal is analysed against the structural mechanism of 
patronage politics and re-distributive politics which makes ethnicity the most viable resource 
for political mobilization, thereby providing an understanding of how and why groups choose 
to assert one identity over another. The wide framework through which to study and analyse 
the three cases is based on the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups which enables their 
politicisation by ethnic elites as well as the state in a bid to access or control public goods or 
what Laitin (1999:5) calls ‘political pork’. Ethnic groups thus represent coalitions which have 
been formed as a part of rational effort to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization 
and those which are desired but scarce (Bates 1983:152 in Fearon, 1999: 3). As a result, 
motivation or demands determine the shape and form of ethnic groups. The role of the state is 
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crucial in determining the course of ethnic politics and the choice of identity that groups seek 
to make meaningful. Thus, the relationship of ethnic groups with the state becomes the 
structural basis of political processes in the three cases. The three cases are a study in the use 
of ethnic identity as a political resource in order to engage in or get greater access to the political 
patronage, which in turn controls access to essential goods (political, material and cultural). 
This is enabled by the existence of an overarching institutional framework that has legitimised 
ethnic politics.  
The Sikkim case study highlights the gradual conversion of an ethnic category to what 
Mosse (1991:64) calls a ‘welfare and bureaucratic category’ thereby changing the form as well 
as the function of Nepali ethnic group in Sikkim. The Darjeeling case study reveals two 
contradictory processes that the Nepali identity is undergoing. The first being the on-going 
processes of homogenization of the Nepalis which defines and essentializes group identity and 
the second is the alteration in the different groups that this terminology now encapsulates. The 
case study on the Limbus of east Nepal, on the other hand discusses how identity construction 
and its articulation in east Nepal is built against the idea of a Nepali that was propagated by the 
Nepali state after the downfall of the Rana regime in 1951. Thus in all the three cases, the 
emergence of ethnic politics and the variation in its manifestations is built on or against the 
idea of a homogenous, culturally defined Nepali.  
Being a Nepali in India or in Nepal is not value neutral. Ethnic identification carries 
with it numerous advantages as well as impediments, which are the focus of much discussion 
in the three cases. Nepalis of Sikkim bear a different set of social and political identity from 
Nepalis in the Darjeeling hills which are again different to that of the Limbus of east Nepal and 
it is these differences that the thesis sets out to establish. Whilst acknowledging the existence 
of separate national policies and discourses both in India and Nepal, the thesis considers the 
Nepali identity as a cross-border phenomenon in order to discuss the politics of being a Nepali. 
The bearers of this identity in all the three cases have had different experiences which have 
influenced their life chances as well as their politics. Thus, all the three case studies pay 
attention to the benefits as well as the disabilities associated with being a Nepali 
 The Nepali identity is located in a wider matrix of social, economic and political 
relationships with other ethnic groups and most importantly with the state which then influence 
the form of identity which is emphasized. Thus, the assertion of tribal category in Sikkim, the 
Gorkha in Darjeeling and the Adivasi/Janajati in Nepal is influenced by wider discourse and 
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interaction with the political-economic structures. Each case study is representative of a form 
of localised politics with its own particular frames of reference, social and economic structures. 
Yet at the same time the case studies as a whole emphasize the reconstruction and the 
concomitant use of this identity in the regional politics of the eastern Himalaya.  
N.B. Psuedonyms have been used in all the three cases to protect the identity of repsondents.  
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Ilam and Panchthar Districts in east Nepal 
 
Source: ncthakur.itgo.com 
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Chapter Three: Changing structures in Naya Nepal and the resurgence of the Limbu 
identity 
Introduction 
The first case study focuses on the structures that have restricted the participation of the 
Limbu ethnic group in the wider economic and political processes. This has led to an ethnic 
response which has been facilitated by the change in the opportunity structures at the national 
and international level thereby enabling us to understand the relation between ethnicity, politics 
and Limbu identity. 
If politics, as defined by Weber (in Gerth and Mills, 1948:78) is the struggle between 
men to influence the distribution of power, either amongst states or groups within a state, then 
Nepalese politics can be used as a prime example. Nepalese politics gives evidence to how 
power cannot be attained without circumventing the power of others, making oppositional 
politics its permanent hallmark.  The political history of Nepal has been demarcated into 
different stages/periods 58  (Pradhan, 2002:19) which have all emphasized a tradition of 
oppositional politics. Every stage, whether it be the period of Rana oligarchy, the Panchayat 
period or the post 1990 democratic era, has brought forth new players and a re-positioning of 
the old. Political parties in Nepal had arisen out of the oppositional politics against the Ranas 
and according to Baral (1995: 430-31) this has had a lasting impact on the overall development 
of political parties in general. Born out of an oppositional socio-political movement and 
therefore with extra-parliamentary origins without a long democratic process, political parties 
in the systemic and institutionalized sense could only exist for a short window between 1951-
60. After a decade of Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) and even longer political instability 
starting with the onset of multi-party democracy in the 1990s, Nepal is on a path of political 
transition, from the only Hindu kingdom in the world to a secular republic that recognizes 
ethnic and religious diversity of the country.  
                                                          
58 According to Pradhan (2002:19) in Nepal there have been three models of society as reflected in the laws 
enacted by different political regimes. In the first model representing the Gorkhali and Rana regimes, cultural 
pluralism was recognized but differences were translated into hierarchy and institutionalized through the caste 
system. The anti-thesis to this model was the Panchayat model of the nation state which did not recognize cultural 
differences and instead envisioned a society where all subjects were equal and assimilated into one homogenous 
category; ethnicity was not a basis for a legal category. The synthesis of these two models is the plural and non-
hierarchical model envisioned by the Constitution of 1990 where the dominant culture remains status quo. 
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In this present process of creating a naya (new) Nepal, federal re-organization of the 
administrative units of the country as opposed to the present unitary system has emerged as 
one of the primary demands. This has however turned into a bone of contention with no 
unanimity over the basis of decentralisation. The country is now facing a deadlock between 
ethnic groups, who through their ethnic associations demand state re-organization on the basis 
of ethnicity and the major political parties who have remained ambivalent over these issues. 
While the political situation in Nepal remains unresolved, the aim of this chapter is to 
understand the dynamic identity based politics existing in Nepal with special reference to the 
eastern district of Ilam.  
The chapter analyses the assertion of the Limbu identity over other forms of ethnic 
identity (Kirata, Mongol) as well as that of a Nepali as promoted by the nation-state. This 
chapter focuses on the political re-positioning of the Limbus in the context of changes in 
domestic politics as well as the international discourse on indigenous groups.  
Minorities in Nepal are organised on the basis of caste, ethnicity and religion (all of 
which tend to overlap at some level). Ethnic groups identify themselves as ‘Janajati’59 a term 
adopted in 1990 under the leadership of the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh. The term applies to 
peoples with a distinct language, culture, social structure, oral or written history and 
horizontally distributed territory in contrast to ‘caste’ groups which are a social group stratified 
vertically on the basis of ritual hierarchy (Gurung et al, 2006:1). In 2004 this organization 
renamed itself as the Nepal Adivasi Janajati Mahasangha (Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities or NEFIN) which along with a proliferation of ethnic political parties marked the 
formal onset of ethnic identity politics in Nepal. In spite of persistent demands by ethnic and 
minority groups it was only in 2002, that the National Foundation for Development of 
Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) was established to address the grievances of ethnic groups 
against state-led social, economic and political discrimination.  
For the Limbus in the eastern hills of Nepal, being a Nepali has come at the cost of their 
ethnic and indigenous identity. While this has benefitted a few, the vast majority have been 
subjected to socio-economic discrimination thereby propelling a movement against an identity 
                                                          
59  Janajati is a term to denote a community which is outside the fold of the Hindu caste system, previously known 
as the Matwalis (Tamang, 2005:6 in Hangen 2007:19).  
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imposed by the state in order to reclaim their ethnic and indigenous identity. Whilst this 
movement can be seen as a form of contention against the state, a closer inspection reveals that 
it does not aim to dislodge the political or economic structures but rather to gain more access 
to them. Given the international discussion on indigenous rights, it is quite natural that for those 
who have been historically repressed and marginalized on the basis of their ethnic identity, the 
tide has turned in their favour.  
  This chapter locates the emergence and assertion of Limbu ethnic politics against these 
important structural changes and aims to highlight the role played by external structures in 
ethnic politics. Thus, this chapter looks at the impact of ‘enabling’ structures that have (i) 
contributed to a heightened sense of ethnic discrimination (through the ethnically biased 
bureaucracy) and (ii) the impact of internal factors like the Maoist insurgency and the 
international Indigenous Rights discourse which have shaped the movement. While these 
‘enabling’ structures have not had a direct impact on ethnic politics, they have nonetheless 
influenced the form and course of ethnic politics in the eastern hills of Nepal.  
This chapter does not question the motivation or existence of ethnic grievances against 
the state but rather seeks to explain the changes in the ‘enabling structures’ that have facilitated 
the political articulation of ethnic identity. The chapter argues that while the Maoist insurgency 
and the adoption of the international Indigenous Rights regime might have opened the area for 
debate and political mobilization of ethnic sentiments, ethnic politics is eventually played out 
on the ground by a new range of actors, who now include ethnic activists and identity based 
political parties. Another important factor is also of the ‘macro-habitus’ which supports the 
demand for an ethnic resolution to social, economic and political grievances. This ‘macro-
habitus’ is composed of the position of the Limbus in the social and economic hierarchy in 
Nepal as well as their historical background as the indigenous group of Limbuwan. Both these 
factors coalesce to construct a certain imagery of how the Limbus perceive themselves as well 
as the world around them, which then affects identity construction and political mobilization.  
Nepal is undergoing a period of political transition which has opened up opportunities 
for ethnic politics but the changes that the movement seeks to bring can only be understood by 
analysing the cause for discontent. Thus, Section 1 of this chapter discusses the institutional 
structures and their historical origin that have led to the routinization of ethnic bias leading to 
intense frustration amongst those who have been systematically left out. Against this 
background Section 2 discusses identity politics in eastern Nepal which is based on the demand 
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for Limbuwan, a homeland for the Limbu ethnic group. Whilst discussing the role of the 
‘enabling structures’ this section focuses on the enactment of identity politics by the leading 
Limbu ethnic association and upcoming regional parties. This section highlights the importance 
of the reconstruction and presentation of the Limbu ethnic group as the indigenous people of 
the area which therefore justifies their demand for Limbuwan. However Limbuwan is not 
merely a demand for mere cultural emancipation but also for access to the resources that are 
controlled by the state which is dominated by the upper caste Chettri and Bahun groups. Thus, 
this chapter discusses the mutually reinforcing role played by ethnic identity and socio-
economic deprivation in the eastern hills of Nepal.  
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in the districts of Ilam and Panchthar in 
east Nepal from July 2010-October 2010. 
 
3.1 Institutionalizing ethnic inequality 
The end of the Maoist insurgency and the second Jan Andolan (People’s Movement) in 
2006 marks the beginning of a new political era in the history of Nepal, where unlike previous 
times ethnic identity has become central to national debate and discussions. The ‘ethnic 
question’ has become so important that lack of political unanimity over it led to the dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly in May 2012, which had been specially elected in 2008 for the 
formulation of the new Constitution. In this context the second Jan Andolan can be deemed to 
be an important turning point in the history of Nepal, a culmination of the political stagnation 
accumulating since the first Jan Andolan in 1990 but most importantly against the royal coup 
by King Gyanendra in 2005.  
 From the perspective of the Adivasi/Janajati groups ethnic discrimination has a 
systemic and institutional foundation (See Bhattachan, 2008; Hacchethu, 2003; Lawoti, 2007).  
For example the Constitution of 1990 was drafted by a committee handpicked by King Birendra 
and other political elites. Out of the nine members of the Constitution Recommendation 
Committee, six members belonged to the upper caste Bahun/Chettri community, while the 
remaining three60 belonged to other groups which effectively ensured upper caste control over 
the final outcome of the Constitution. In spite of seeking to gauge the views of the widest 
possible range of Nepalis, the Constitution Recommendation Committee (CRC) described 
                                                          
60They were Nirmal Lama (Tamang), Pradyumna Lal Raj Bhandari (Newar) and Ramananda Prasad Singh (Tharu) 
(Malagodi, 2007:3).  
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ninety per cent of the public recommendations on religion, caste and ethnicity submitted to it 
as minor and communal for a democratic Nepal. Thus the suggestions provided by the various 
ethnic leaders, organizations and political parties of secularism, reservation of seats to regional 
and administrative authority, federal structure of the government and equal status for all 
languages were disregarded by the CRC (Bhattachan, 1995: 130; Hachhethu, 2009: 35; Kumar, 
2010: 28). The new leadership failed to make any significant break from the past and in spite 
of the slight alterations in the national debate with the coming of democracy and the change in 
the political system, the traditional structures of power remained the same. 
Apart from the declaration of multi-party democracy the Constitution of 1990 declared 
the state to be multi-ethnic and multi-lingual and gave emphasis to the fundamental rights 
through Article 3. However, the idea of maintaining a distinct identity and safeguarding 
national interests (especially against India) resulted in the Constitution maintaining the three 
pillars of the Panchayat era- Hinduism, the Nepali language and the Shah monarchy (Malagodi, 
2007). Unsurprisingly, these elements, in turn, maintained the status quo of the dominant 
groups and the Constitution of 1990 was seen as another attempt to impose a national identity 
based on the cultural and linguistic heritage of the upper caste minority (Fisher, 2009).  Thus 
institutional mechanisms like the Constitution provided support to other elements like the 
bureaucracy and judiciary and also sustained the social, political and economic domination of 
certain ethnic groups over others.  
While these constitutional mechanisms were a source of frustration for those belonging 
to the Adivasi/Janajati groups who were under-represented in all sphere of political and 
economic activity,61 the general political climate of the country took a turn for the worse with 
the decade long Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) 62 and the second Jan Andolan in 2006. This 
                                                          
61 According to Bhattachan (2008:44), prior to its dissolution in 2002, in the Nepalese Parliament, about sixty 
percent of the total sixty members of the National Assembly (Upper House) and 205 members of the House of 
Representatives (Lower House) were Bahun-Chettris. Apart from the low representation of Adivasi/Janajati 
groups, there was not even a single representation from the Dalit community in the House of Representatives who 
comprise about one-fifth of the total population of Nepal.  
62  As Chaitanya Mishra (2007:81,100) points out, ‘the identification of causes and effects (of the insurgency)-
and the specification of their interconnection- is a difficult task.’ He proposes that what can be achieved is the 
identification of various factors that are necessary but not necessarily sufficient, for the insurgency. Most analysts 
locate the movement in the wider political economy of poverty, illiteracy, low level of educational attainment, 
unemployment and underemployment, economic inequalities in terms of land ownership and income, caste, ethnic, 
regional and gender oppression. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) locate these structural conditions in the 
processes of capitalist imperialism, Indian expansionism and the associated conditions of underdevelopment 
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eventually led to the abrogation of the monarchy on 20th May, 2008 and the attempt to construct 
a naya (new) Nepal has been underway since then.  
 
A sense of bewildering normality prevails in Nepal in the face of massive political 
instability, economic regression, insurgencies, inflation, strikes and power cuts. Despite these 
problems, the country seems to function on a basic level thereby highlighting the important 
role played by the karmacari tantra or the bureaucracy in maintaining this administrative and 
functional status quo of the country. However, the political transition in Nepal has been unable 
to change and/or dislodge this important and ironically, disabling structure which along with 
administration of the state has also perpetuated ethnic discrimination.  
The power of bureaucracy is well acknowledged by those who have always been 
recipients of the state’s rules and policies but never had the chance to partake in the construction 
of it. Despite the change in the political organization of the state, the bureaucracy is still 
dominated by upper caste Bahun and Chettri caste groups making one of the largest extensions 
of the state highly unrepresentative of the ethnic diversity of the country. According to Gupta 
(2006:212) the state is a translocal institution that is made visible in localized practices. The 
bureaucracy and civil servants then become the ‘face’ of the state thereby making ethnic 
discrimination starkly apparent. Thus when Upendra Jabegu 63 pointed out that in Nepal, ‘more 
powerful than the politicians is the karmacari tantra (bureaucracy) and even within that you 
will find only Bahuns and Chettris’, he was only voicing the thoughts of numerous 
Adivasi/Janajatis like him that I had often heard during my fieldwork.  
The unitary and centralised nature of the state is represented by the well-entrenched 
bureaucratic structure which radiate out of Kathmandu, spreading towards the seventy-five 
districts. These districts are divided into fourteen zones and grouped in five development 
regions; each district is further divided into Village Development Committee (VDC) and each 
VDC into wards. Power and resources are allocated from Kathmandu thereby not only 
complicating re-distribution but also compromising accountability. This also evidences to the 
role played by the bureaucracy in providing the logistical and technical framework in 
                                                          
characterized by ‘semi-colonialism’ and ‘semi-feudalism’. For further discussion on the probable causes that 
triggered the insurgency see Thapa (2002); Fujikura (2003); Hutt (2004). 
63 Senior member of a national party and the Limbu ethnic association in Panchthar, interviewed by the author on 
7th September, 2010, Panchthar Disrtict, Nepal.  
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maintaining the functions of the state. However as Acharya (2012) 64 points out, the problem 
lies not so much with the unitary nature of the state but with the absence of devolution of power 
from the centre to the provinces which has exacerbated experiences of economic and political 
deprivation in the peripheries of the country.  
While the domain of Nepali politics has always been highly unstable, the bureaucracy 
on the other hand has not only provided stability but has also expanded, especially after the Jan 
Andolan of 1990. The position of the bureaucracy was further strengthened during the period 
of the first Jan Andolan (1990) which made it the only source of public goods and services, 
especially in remote places and therefore of interest and importance to politicians and 
entrepreneurs. During this period the state became the largest supplier of public goods and the 
civil services represented the largest employment sector (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1993: 177). 
Unfortunately this vast bureaucratic mechanism was one of the important sites of the 
institutionalization of ethnic discrimination in Nepal as the elite caste group which occupied 
ninety-eight percent of the top positions in 1854 still occupied ninety-two percent of the top 
administration positions in the mid-1990s. In 1999 the members of upper caste hill Hindu 
groups occupied around seventy percent of the positions in the legislature, judiciary and 
administration (Lawoti, 2007:23). Thus, instead of being neutral and impartial, one of the most 
important and pervasive extensions of the state is ethnically biased.  
According to Lawoti (ibid) high caste, hill Hindu elites who represent thirty-one percent 
of the population dominate the state, politics, economy and society. This overwhelming under-
representation of most ethnic groups is bound to generate a negative reaction, a sentiment 
which is emphasized by the General Secretary of NEFIN65 who says, ‘the Chettri and Brahmins 
got the cream of the country when the Ranas were ruling, they got the cream of the country 
when the King was ruling and now they want the cream of the country when it is a Republic. 
This is the trick of the Chettri and Bahuns’. Thus, real as well as perceived ethnic discrimination 
is an important sentiment that facilitates the political mobilization of the Limbus.  
Because a close relationship between the societal and administrative culture exists in 
Nepal where structures like the caste system, family and other belief structures are reflected in 
                                                          
64Source: http://www.nepalnews.com/home/index.php/guest-column/18315-state-restructuring-inserting-
economic-agenda.html (Accessed: 09/10/2012). 
65 Angben Sherpa, executive member of NEFIN, interviewed by the author 22nd September 2010, Kathmandu 
Nepal. 
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the administrative structure, it becomes imperative to understand the origins not only of 
bureaucracy but also the ethnic bias which has always been inherent in it. 
3.1 (i) Origins of the karmacari tantra (bureaucracy) in Nepal 
The Rana period (1846-1951) marks the distinct formation of a bureaucratic 
organization of the kingdom through the gradual codification of governmental rule. According 
to Agarwal (1976 in Shrestha, 2005:177-78) the period of ‘his (Jung Bahdur’s) rule was a 
period of remedy and a period of seed time. The remedy lay in ending lawlessness and anarchy 
in the country; the sowing was of a system which could stand the test of time for more than a 
century.’ Thus the administration fulfilled two purposes- the first being the maintenance of law 
and order and the second, revenue collection. This period also saw the centralization of power 
in the authority of the Prime Minister who scrutinised every administrative decision and 
oversaw the appointments of all the top officials.  
This has been elaborately described by Caplan (1975:33) who writes that the spatial 
distance between Kathmandu and the different outposts gave the Rana Governors more 
autonomy, centralisation of power replicated itself as the Governors and their families became 
the source of power and authority themselves. Practices like that of pajani, whereby all 
appointments were regarded as valid for only one year and could be then renewed or terminated 
emphasized the power of authority and therefore winning the personal favour of a high official 
became more crucial in determining tenure than the demonstration of any ability. Also, since 
there were no other formal mechanisms through which appointments could be made, suitability 
for government positions rested on subjective factors. This encouraged the system of chakari 
whereby the members of public seeking government service sought to place the governor under 
an obligation by attending to him regularly, giving presents, running errands etc till the 
Governor would take notice (ibid). Caplan (1975) further describes another system that evolved 
for those who did not have afno-manchay/ i.e someone in the administration to recommend 
them, or did not have the time to engage in chakari. The alternative would then be to give ghus 
or bribe. Thus, some of the systems that were institutionalised during this time were: the 
chakari system, the salami system (presenting cash to the PM and Chief Saheb by the 
government servants during Dasain), the Najaranan system (presenting some gifts in cash or 
kind to the Ranas on the occasion of their marriage, festivals) and darshan bhet (presenting 
cash to the Prime Minister by the new recruits in accordance to their payscale).   
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According to Poudyal (1984:69-70) these practices were initially based on tradition but 
by the time Chandra Samsher took office as the fifth Prime Minister (1901-1929), they had 
been formalised with separate desks being set up in offices of personnel records to collect the 
amount. The post Rana-administrative structure underwent considerable expansion and 
reorganization. The Civil Service Act of 1956 which created a Public Service Commission 
signalled the state’s intention to replace the ‘personalised administration’ of the Rana period 
with an impersonal bureaucracy. The centralisation of power in the king and the royal palace 
was aided by the control over the widely expanding bureaucracy both before and after the 
Panchayati period (1962-90) which was an improvisation of the Rana administration, only 
bigger with many more specific departments. Theoretically it meant that the administration 
conformed to modern bureaucratic processes but in practice such actions were decided 
informally by making administrative rules and regulations discretionary (Baral, 1995:35).  
The introduction of Panchayat democracy66 in 1962 under ‘the active leadership of the 
king’ as an indigenous alternative to western and Indian parliamentarism (Whelpton, 1997:47) 
was accompanied by a re-organisation of the kingdom into seventy-five development districts 
and fourteen development zones. This led to an increase in the bureaucratization of 
administration which had both positive as well as negative repercussions. While it enabled 
people in the outlying areas to apply for government positions without having to travel to 
Kathmandu, at the same time it created the conditions of security and permanency that enabled 
relationships and attendant patterns of obligation to develop both among administrators and 
members of the public. It represented aspects of Weber’s definition of bureaucracy that 
includes highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long term career rewards which create 
commitment and a sense of corporate coherence. At the same time unlike Weber’s notion of 
bureaucracy it was embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bound the state to society and 
provided institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals 
and practices (Evans, 1992: 12). Of those hired after the Rana period, approximately four out 
                                                          
66 This system provided for directly elected village or town councils (Panchayats), their members forming an 
electoral college to choose district level representatives. These representatives in turn selected from amongst 
themselves the majority of members of the national legislature or the Rashtriya Panchayat, the remainder being 
either representatives of government sponsored class organisations or royal nominees. The system proclaimed to 
give impetus to local leadership and popular participation, advocated decentralisation of administrative authority 
and political responsibility (Lohani, 1977:26; Whelpton, 2005:101).  
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of five attribute their success to personal links, direct or indirect, to the source of appointment 
(Caplan, 1975: 35-48).  The present system relies (in the preliminary stages at least) on the 
utilization of existing personalised links to those responsible for appointment. Thus, the initial 
conferment of posts is incorporated into traditional patterns of exchange and becomes part of 
an ongoing system of obligations and paradoxically it is the growth of bureaucratization of 
administration that has enabled these nepotistic practices to expand (ibid: 52).  
Moving away from the traditional patrimonial system, the Nepalese bureaucracy is a 
representation of a neo-patrimonial system, which is a modern form of the patrimonial system. 
In a neo-patrimonial system power is not vested in a single person but is rather spread across 
the bureaucratic structure in personnel who hold important positions. In this system there is a 
clear link between traditional patrimonialism as well as rational-bureaucratic domination. The 
essence of neo-patrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favours, both within 
the state and in society; and the clients in return mobilize political support and acknowledge 
the chain of authority (Bratton and de Walle, 1994:458). 
According to 2012 World Bank report,67 with a population of twenty-seven million 
people and a per capita income of less than $650, Nepal remains one of the poorest countries 
in the world, ranking 157 out of 187 countries. This is a figure supported by the Nepal Living 
Standards Survey (2011) which reported that 25.16 percent of the Nepalese population lived 
below the poverty line.68 Against this economic background, the administrative structure of 
Nepal exhibits features of a neo-patrimonial bureaucracy which is the administrative 
instrument of an under-developed, agrarian economy. Thus, in spite of a veneer of modernity 
in the Kathmandu valley, in its intrinsic functioning Nepal remains a traditional state that does 
not govern but simply functions as a rent-seeking state. 
                                                          
67 Source: The World Bank 
http://www.worldbank.org.np/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/NEPALEXTN/0,,conte
ntMDK:22147453~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:223555,00.html (Accessed: 25/10/2012). 
 
68 The Nepal Living Standards Survey uses 2,200 calorie consumption by a person a day and access to non-food 
items as the index to measure poverty. Thus, based on market prices in 2011, a person earning less than Rs.14,430 
per year was deemed below the poverty line. Eastern Nepal has the lowest poverty level (21.44 percent) while 
western Nepal had the highest (46 percent). 
Source: Kathmandu Post, 20/10/2011 
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2011/10/20/money/third-nepal-living-standards-survey-25.16-
percent-nepalis-below-poverty-line/227426.html (Acessed: 17/11/2012). 
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Under these circumstances the role of the state has increased with the expansion of 
developmental activities which are complemented with a burgeoning presence of international 
aid organizations. As Pigg (1993: 497) puts it, ‘for Nepal, development –rather than the 
residues of and scars of imperialism- is the overt link between it and the west… Nepal now 
identifies itself as an underdeveloped country in relation to the developed world’. Aid accounts 
for 22 per cent of the government budget and half of government’s capital expenditure. Total 
foreign aid is estimated to be around $1 billion per year and rising (The Economist, 2011),69 
thereby promoting what has come to be known as a ‘donor regime’ which also replicates the 
patriarchal networks in the recruitment, promotion and disbursement of aid.70  A study by 
Dangal (2005) reveals that the Nepalese administration is guided by particularism rather than 
universalism, ascription rather than achievement, and authoritarian rather than participatory 
values. Common administrative norms include slow decision making process, maintaining high 
levels of secrecy, ritualised official work and shifting responsibility to others and the influence 
of informal sources rather than formal rules in decision making.  In addition, spatial as well as 
power distances between superior and sub-ordinates, centralised and non-participatory decision 
making processes are also the basic features of Nepalese administration. The roots of this 
clientalist structure can be traced back to the formation of the kingdom itself as Nepal has been 
administered through a complex tenurial system of state landlordism (Riaz and Basu, 
2007:133). While patrimonialism was pervasive in bureaucracy, it made inroads into other 
political processes of the country. The culture of patrimonialism did not alter with the coming 
of democracy with sycophancy becoming the prime criterion for political selection and the 
multiparty polity reinforced this embedded social structure rather than discourage it (Kumar, 
2003:169). 
All of this has led to the enhancement of the patron-client network and enabled the 
functionaries of the government from the highest civil servant to the clerk, to establish 
themselves as the focal point in the matrix of distribution of resources (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 
2008:90). This position is further accentuated by the fact that in most parts of Nepal, 
governmental agencies remain the only providers of such goods and service. Thus, while the 
state as a provider reinforced its focal role, the officials created or reinforced semi-clientalist 
                                                          
69 Source: The Economist  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/05/aid-and-corruption-nepal (Accessed: 15/12/2012). 
70 Source: http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/institutions/grassroot_governance.htm (Accessed; 15/08/2012). 
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structures in which informal networks bind clients to them (Fox, 1994 in Pfaff-Czarnecka, 
1993: 177).  The state is the largest provider of goods and services but it is also effectively 
cordoned against non Bahun and Chettri groups. Lack of access is exacerbated by the inability 
to even be able to build patronage ties as this is also dominated by ethnic considerations, 
thereby leaving majority of the Adivasi/Janajati groups completely out of the system of re-
distribution.  
Nepal ko kanun, Pashupati lay Janun (only Pashupati [Shiva] knows what Nepal’s laws 
are) was a common perception held by many respondents towards the state and its legal system. 
In Nepal the most efficient way of getting work done is through afno manche (nepotism) 
bribery and (since the bureaucracy lacks political neutrality) political connections. The 
implication of this link between the social and the administrative structure is that the majority 
of the lower caste and Adivasi/Janajati groups have not been able to access the very limited 
benefits and facilities that are intended for them. This can be attributed to the fact that they 
have not been able to enter into a patron-client relationship on the account of factors which are 
discussed below.  
3.1 (ii) On the periphery- ethnicity and the state 
Lack of access to resources (political as well as economic) might be a condition 
prevalent in all parts of Nepal but the eastern periphery of Nepal is a case which exemplifies 
how these issues have come to be seen not only in economic but ethnic terms as well thereby 
enhancing the value of ethnic identity as a political resource in an effective negotiation with 
the state.   
The districts of Ilam and Panchthar are in eastern Nepal and border Darjeeling and 
Sikkim which are in India. Historically these areas were a part of the kingdom of Limbuwan 
which enjoyed a fair measure of autonomy even under the Shah dynasty. The location of these 
two districts places them on the periphery of the nation-state thereby reducing the presence of 
the state. ‘Kathmandu does not understand our problems’71 is an oft repeated sentiment in the 
rural hills of east Nepal (more than 250 kms away from Kathmandu), which highlights the 
perception of the capital city as not only being geographically distant but also far removed from 
the problems of its rural citizens.  
                                                          
71  Maila Limbu, agriculturist interviewed by the author on 3rd September, 2010, Yangnam VDC, Panchthar 
District, Nepal.  
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According to Sharma (2006: 1243) poverty also takes the form of horizontal inequality 
(rural-urban) and is evident through the limited access to public goods and services. For 
example, in urban areas a health post was accessible within a few minutes as opposed to over 
an hour in the rural areas and access to market, bank and reliable road networks were worse in 
the rural areas. This has led to twin problems of under-development and unemployment which 
are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.  
As will be discussed in the Sikkim case study, the deeper the entrenchment of the state 
in the life of the citizens, the higher the dependency on it. This is however, lacking in Nepal as 
the presence of the government (through infrastructure or social security measures) is 
increasingly negligible especially in areas away from the sadar-mukam (main towns) thereby 
leading people to feel continually sidelined, neglected and ignored by the state. Personal 
observation in the remote areas of the eastern hills revealed the complete absence of 
infrastructure like roads, electricity and services like healthcare, education, security in some 
places while in other areas they were poorly serviced.72 This placed additional burden on the 
local citizens who then resolve these exigencies through collective action.  
Areas in the periphery also suffer from regional disparity in information, access and 
control over issues thereby increasing the level of transition that one will have to make in order 
to be a complete participant in the political process. Political interest is not matched by an equal 
amount of political knowledge, which is characteristic of belonging to the periphery. As 
expressed by Maila Limbu, ‘we are dependent on the radio. It takes quite a while for the 
newspaper to reach us from the main town. Lack of infrastructure hampers effective 
communication of news. The quantity as well as quality of information regarding the issues 
that are being discussed at the regional as well as national level is poor and often belated.’ 
Maila Limbu is an agriculturist from Yangnam village73 and shares his opinion on the lack of 
governmental assistance to the farmers quite openly. He says, ‘we work all year round but we 
do not have enough to eat. They send small quantities of seeds during ‘off season’ but even 
that I think only five out of hundred must have received even that. We get no assistance from 
                                                          
72 One of the most unfortunate examples of the lack of infrastructure and services was during my visit to 
Yangnam village in Panchthar district. En route to the village we came across a small boy who had been bitten 
by a snake whilst harvesting cardamom. He was being carried to the nearest medical center in the sadar mukam 
of Phidim, which was almost three hours walk away. Had there been a medical center or even a motorable road, 
the likelihood of immediate and probably life-saving medical attention would have been greater. 
73 Yangnam village is in Panchthar District. It is connected by road to the sadar mukam of Phidim by motorable 
road which is only functional in the dry season. Agriculture (paddy, cardamom) is the main source of income.   
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the state, we are atma-nirbhar (self-reliant). We have heard that people in other places like 
Sikkim get many things but we get nothing from the state…No matter which government 
comes, the condition of the village remains the same.  There are no benefits and development 
has lagged behind. Maybe it is our weakness that we cannot force the state to do anything for 
us.’ Their position on the periphery of the nation-state makes them distant from the Kathmandu 
based administration but their geographical proximity with neighbouring Sikkim fosters 
comparison on the living and working conditions, thereby promoting a sense of relative 
deprivation of economic goods.  
 
                    Enroute to Yangnam village which lay behind the monsoon clouds 
 
                             
 
         
While the rural agriculturists complain about the lack of governmental assistance, 
Bishal Limbu74 is a typical representative of the youth in the eastern hills who are faced with 
situations where education has brought no drastic improvement to their quality of life. Bishal 
is demoralised by the afno-manchay pratha (the tradition of nepotism) and the immense 
sycophancy that is involved in securing even a menial post at the local VDC. He believes that 
it makes them vulnerable to the machinations of political parties and that ‘one of the biggest 
problems is that the youth have just been reduced to a weapon by political parties.’  
Involvement of young people with political parties even as volunteers, either part-time or full-
                                                          
74 Young Limbu student, active member of the local Limbu party, interviewed by the author on 17 th September, 
2010, Ilam, Nepal.  
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time, is thus attractive to those who are either illiterate, unemployed or  have suffered setbacks 
in life. Not only do the hunger-strikes, demonstrations or road blocks keep them engaged, it 
also gives them some form of power and control that comes with being affiliated to a political 
party. Political parties in the east as well as in the terai (in the same likeness as the Maoist 
People’s Liberation Army), maintain small armies for the safety of its members as well as 
‘muscle-power’. Usually known as volunteers, they have a notorious reputation amongst the 
people, especially those owning businesses or plying public transport (Carter Centre, 2011).  
The majority of the people in the eastern hills are engaged in agriculture or small 
businesses as getting a sarakri jagir (government employment) is difficult, as emphasized by 
Passang Limbu,75 a teacher at the local primary school. He says that people used to go to lahur 
(Gorkha regiment) but even that has become difficult owing to tough competition and a 
difficult recruitment process. Thus finding employment had become a sangharsh (struggle) 
now. One of the most serious repercussions of this has been the out-migration of young men 
from villages to either the bigger towns or Kathmandu, India and the Middle East. The absence 
of young men in village was one of the most striking things that I observed in Yangnam village 
where women, children and old men were the primary residents.  
 
However, problems of economic redistribution which are usually linked to a disjunction 
between centre and periphery have also taken on a very ethnic form in different parts of Nepal, 
the exception being West Nepal where political action has been class based.   Bahunvad or 
brahmanocracy is an openly recognised and acknowledged cultural feature whereby resources 
(public or private) are captured or controlled by the two upper caste groups, thereby limiting 
the representation of other groups and severely affecting their life chances (Lecomte-Tilouine 
and Dollfuss, 2003:6). Correspondingly the administrative system is seen as an extension of 
this high caste monopoly, designed to control or prohibit access to other groups. This forms 
one of the most important bases of grievances against the state in Nepal, thereby making state-
led ethnic discrimination the root of under-development and poverty and its corresponding 
cycles of illiteracy and unemployment.  
While the unitary system with its well documented lack of accountability (Adhikari, 
2007:145) is seen as promoting inefficiency; bureaucracy and corruption are at the heart of 
underdevelopment. When combined with unemployment, socio-cultural factors like ‘afno-
                                                          
75 Interviewed by the author on 30th September, 2010, Ilam, Nepal. 
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manchay’ and ‘chakari’ are thus deemed as important factors contributing to illiteracy, socio-
economic backwardness, unemployment etc as not only do they act as filters for the upward 
movement of the different sections of the society, they also act as impediments to the access of 
public goods. This has led Adivasi/Janajati activists to proclaim that their backwardness in 
political and economic fields was not a result of their lack of kshamata (capacity/capability) 
but because of the exploitative state.  
 
The inability to make useful patronage ties and partake in the re-distribution of goods 
and services has a real and serious impact on the lives of the people and while this should 
necessarily be pointed as a failure of the state, it is instead seen as an extension of ethnic 
discrimination by the state. Most Adivasi/Janajati activists that I interacted with during the 
course of my fieldwork liked to point out that it was not that they were not lagging socially or 
politically behind other groups because of their own shortcomings (pachadiyeko) but that they 
had been relegated to that position by the state (pachadi pariyeko).76 
While economic deprivation of the periphery and other concomitant class based issues 
were seen as providing a fertile ground for the Maoist movement in west and central Nepal, it 
is issues of ethnic discrimination and social backwardness that have led to identity based 
politics in the relatively prosperous eastern Nepal. Ethnicity and socio-economic deprivation 
are seen as directly interlinked, a topic that was openly discussed in the eastern hills even with 
outsiders like me. The reason for uninhibited interaction could be attributed to the changed 
social and political environment where discussions on caste and ethnicity would not be deemed 
anti-social or anti-national. The other possible reason could also be who I was and where I was 
placed. While I was viewed as an outsider with interest in Limbu politics for my own personal 
benefit, I was also based in an institution in a foreign country which made it easy for them also 
to have their voices, opinions and politics heard to the outside world.  
These sentiments of ethnic discrimination and its open articulation were also evident in a group 
conversation with the youth of Yangnam village.77 They said ‘unemployment is the biggest 
problem but the bureaucratic structure cannot be negotiated nor understood without afno 
                                                          
76 Executive member of NEFIN, Illam chapter, interviewed by the author on 28th July, 2010, Ilam, Nepal. 
77  Group interview conducted by the author on 4th September, 2010. Most of the respondents were young 
Limbu men, high-school educated but unemployed.  
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manchay who will look out for the interests of a particular group’.78 Thus, even the bureaucracy 
has an ethnic character which has prevented the career growth of many aspirants as circulation 
of information regarding openings and trainings is either tightly controlled, sometimes it is not 
relayed at all or the circumstances for application are made difficult. This particular aspect of 
the inner workings of the bureaucracy was confirmed by an official from the VDC in Ilam who 
felt that apart from other social and economic factors, the chances of Adivasi/Janajati students 
were also hampered by the lack of information that they received owing to their lack of afno 
manchay in an office or institution.79 
Hemant Jabegu (Phidim, 2010) 80  expressing his opinion explicitly on ethnic 
discrimination said, ‘the country should belong to all citizens but in this country there is only 
one jat which has everything. They are the ones who get all government jobs, they are the ones 
                                                          
78Table 1. Distribution of Dominant Castes (Chettri-Bahuns) and Minorities in key positions in 1999 
Positions Percentage of Chettri-
Bahuns 
Percentage of 
Minorities 
Total Number of 
Positions 
Civil Servants    
Secretary and Joint 
Secretary at the Royal 
Palace 
71.4 28.6 28 
Secretary of Equivalent in 
the Government 
74.3 25.7 39 
Inspector General of 
Police 
75.0 25.0 4 
Chief District 
Administrator 
86.1 13.9 72 
President of District 
Development Committee  
66.6 33.4 75 
Mayor and Deputy Mayor 
of Municipalities  
49.1 50.9 116 
Source: Bhattachan (2008:43).  
79 Shekhar Yonzon, employee at the Ilam, VDC, interviewed by the author on 30th September, 2010, Ilam, Nepal. 
80 Local entrepreneur, member of the KYC, Panchtar interviewed by the author on 9th September, 2010, Phidim, 
Panchthar, Nepal.  
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who go to America to study, and all ministerial posts go to them. They are in all the fields so 
if they are going to be the only beneficiaries, then members of the other groups will not have 
the incentive to live and sweat in this country. A bahun’s son may get the chance to be an 
accountant whether by paying bribe, chakari or through political connections but the adivasi’s 
son has no chance and thus he is forced to go to other countries to work and suffer.’  
Personal testimonies of state supported ethnic discrimination and the resultant 
economic discrimination offered further evidence of the intense feeling of neglect and therefore 
the obvious contempt against the state. Respondents from the group interview in Yangnam 
were vocal about the unfair recruitment practices of the Nepal army. They relayed how the 
Nepali army recruitment rules were against them (the Adivasis of Nepal) because the required 
height for the army was a little more than the height of the average Adivasi, who belonged to 
the Mongoloid group, thereby tilting the balance in favour of the Chettri-Bahun groups. 
Discrimination and perceptions of it are therefore not only based on distance from Kathmandu 
but most importantly the ethnic framework which has given an ethnic form to social, economic 
and political grievances.  
Kumar Sunwar,81 President of one of the important ethnic associations in Ilam related how his 
multiple attempts to clear the civil exams ended in failure and frustration. He believed his 
failure could be attributed to the particular, ethnically biased nature of the exam papers. He 
recollected how there would always be questions on different elements of Hinduism or Hindu 
culture that were completely alien to him and to be answered in Nepali, a language which was 
not his mother tongue, leading to problems of writing the correct answers. His daughter now 
faces the challenge of getting a place in a medical school and he laments the lack of specific 
reservation for the Sunwar ethnic group, thereby immediately linking ethnicity to material 
benefits.  
Like Kumar Sunwar’s daughter, most of the respondents also sought solutions to their 
existential problems through their ethnic identity rather than other forms of identity (like class 
or gender). Economic and political deprivation of the Limbus was thus attributed to the ‘ethnic 
nature’ of the state that restricted patronage ties to them and thereby increased the value of 
ethnicity as a political resource as it is through this identity that they sought to remedy their 
situation.  
                                                          
81 Interviewed by the author on 28th August, 2010,  Ilam , Nepal  
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According to the Census of 2001 upper castes constitute 35.4 percent of the total 
economically active population dominating professional (62.2), legislative/administrative 
(58.3) and clerical positions (53.6) (Gurung, 2006:3). The upper caste groups as the most 
populous in all the echelons of administration which has given it a definite ethnic character 
thereby supporting allegations of ethnic discrimination by the state. The youth group in 
Yangnam illustrate this point further by complaining that in their VDC there was not a single 
Limbu hakim (officer). This may not be have been exaggerated given that I personally observed 
that even in Ilam VDC there were only four members of staff who were from the 
adivasi/janajati category while the rest were upper caste Hindus. This was confirmed by 
Shekhar Yonzon who worked in Ilam VDC where out of thirty-seven employees there were 
only four who belonged to Adivasi/Janajati group (two were from the Rai group, one Tamang 
and one Newar). Shekhar Yonzon believes that one of the primary reasons for the 
backwardness of the matwali groups in the employment arena include the lack of perseverance 
and preparation as well as the inability to engage in chaplusi (sycophancy) which is important, 
whether profusely or otherwise, in order to attain the desired result.  
This analysis of the eastern hills reflects how jati (ethnicity) and varg (class) often cut 
across each other, thereby leading political activists to assert that ‘this movement (for 
Limbuwan) is for the emancipation of both class and jati’ (Kumar Sunwar, Ilam, 2010) and 
‘for those who are have been left behind by the development process’ (Pradeep Limbu, 2010).82 
The state has been pronounced guilty, of soshan (exploitation),for treating its ethnic minorities 
as second class citizens (Pradeep Limbu, Ilam, 2010) making them feel like a pahuna (guest) 
in their own country without the freedom to practise and preserve their culture (Upendra 
Jabegu, Phidim, 2010) therefore making it easier for ethnic elites to frame as well as mobilize 
political activity on the basis of ethnicity.  
Since discrimination is based on ethnicity, redemption is also sought on the basis of 
ethnic identity specifically through the re-organisation of the state and the formation of ethnic 
homelands. This also highlights that the demand is not for a complete overhaul of the system 
but for the opening up of access to people who have been traditionally left out of the power 
structure. Thus, it is against the background of an ethnically biased bureaucracy and explicit, 
raging sentiments of ethnic discrimination that the changes in identity based politics in Nepal 
                                                          
82 Executive member of the KYC, Ilam, interviewed by the author on 3rd August, 2010, Ilam, Nepal. 
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has to be understood. Observation and interaction at the grass-root level therefore highlights 
that when the political opportunity structures changed in favour of the Adivasi/Janajati groups, 
their ethnic identity became the most important political resource as well as political resource. 
This could be attributed to the fact that owing to the changes in external political structures, 
the state started could no longer afford to ignore and sideline ethnic demands and at the same 
time, ethnic elites found the ‘ethnic template’ an easy resource to mine in order to gain a 
foothold in the political process. The next section discusses this particular development in 
greater detail.  
3.2 Structural changes and identity based politics 
(i) International indigenous discourse and Limbu identity politics 
Ethnic politics in the eastern hills can be deemed to be a product of the collision of a 
static, ethnically biased bureaucracy on the one side and the larger, international discourses on 
the ‘Rights of the Indigenous’83 during a crucial moment in the political history of Nepal. These 
developments have had a serious impact on the framing of grievances, reconstruction of the 
Limbu identity as well as the re-positioning of an ethnic group in the wider matrix of local 
politics.  
The end of the Maoist insurgency in 2006, the declaration of a democratic republic and 
the promise of a new Constitution brought fundamental changes in the articulation of ethnic 
grievances against the state. However, the impact of the Maoist insurgency goes far and beyond 
just the regime change that Maoists were eventually able to achieve. As one of their 
mobilization strategies the Maoists had utilized pre-existing ethnic discontent in order to recruit 
and garner support for their movement (Lecomte-Tiluione, 2004). The Maoists served the 
cause of the ethnic groups by demanding a secular state, campaigning against Sanskrit 
education, demanding autonomy for the indigenous peoples and openly articulating the social, 
political and economic inequalities that were prevalent in the Nepalese society (Fisher, 2009). 
This brought ethnic grievances and proposals for ethnic federalism directly under the ambit of 
national debate, a victory for ethnic activists which had never been achieved before.  
                                                          
83 The state-led cultural assimilation projects after the Second World War and de-colonisation of states 
encouraged and supported by the UN, specifically the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Article 2.9 of 
Convention 107, 1957) gave rise to the Indigenous Peoples Movement in the early 1970s (Cowan et al, 2001).  
An important achievement of this movement was the revised declaration of the 1989 ILO Convention 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which recognized their cultural distinctiveness from national communities. 
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The political transition that began with the end of the Maoist insurgency also 
represented a historical opportunity to replace Bahunvad with Adivasi- vad in an attempt to 
rectify the ethnic discrimination meted out by the state. Pradeep Limbu’s (Ilam, 2010) opinion 
is a clear indication of this. He says, ‘this is a historical moment and we must take advantage 
of it. The country can either go backwards or forward. We have to do something.’ Echoing this 
sense of change and dynamism, Upendra Jabegu was hopeful that the new Constitution would 
eradicate the domination that the Adivasi/Janajati had suffered. He felt that, ‘only one jati has 
been dominating and we as Adivasi/Janajati feel that only one jati, one language, one culture 
has been ruling over us. Even though the Constitution says its secular we still find that the 
Muluki Ain, in effect, promotes only one language, one religion and one culture but we are now 
hopeful that things will change.’  
I met many individuals like Rajendra Jabegu who felt they had experienced the cultural 
domination of the state which denied ethnic diversity through the promotion of its homogenous 
Nepali identity. Keshav Raj Chemjong,84 member of the KYC, Vidyarthi Manch (Student’s 
Forum) recounted a personal incident where he was not allowed to speak in Limbu at a 
government office which led to an altercation and eventually an apology from the government 
official. Keshav Raj also felt that partiality on the basis of ‘jati and nose’85 was prevalent in all 
government offices as well as organisations, albeit in a covert fashion. Another respondent, 
Passang Limbu86 also reiterated that the language and culture of the Adivasi/Janajatis was 
being neglected by the state. He felt that the emphasis on just the Nepali language and ethnic 
partiality especially when in the area of recruitment made him question, ‘are we (Limbus) also 
not Nepalis?’ He says, ‘there are still talks about declaring this nation as a Hindu rajya, there 
is still this pressure and we do feel upset about it’.   
                                                          
84   Member of the Kirat Yakthung Chumlung, Student wing and a student at the Panchtar Multicampus. 
Interviewed by the author on 7th September, 2010, Phidim, Nepal. 
85  The upper caste Chettri and Bahuns are usually associated with features like high cheekbones and a sharp nose 
as compared to the Adivasi/Janajati, majority of who belong to the Mongoloid group and therefore have softer 
features-small eyes, flat noses.  
 
86 Resident of Ilam VDC and teacher at a local primary school. Interviewed by the author on 20th September, 2010, 
Ilam, Nepal.  
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Almost all of my respondents shared a sense of gradual extinction of Limbu language and 
culture. Oral transmission of knowledge, culture and history is one of the most prominent 
features of the Limbu ethnic group. Limbu practices of worship is based on the Mundhum, a 
collection of spiritual revelations, which is interpreted and revealed by the Mudhumsba and the 
Fedangba (shamans) who act as the conduits of the various spirits.  Religion is linked to 
language as the Mundhum, which is full of metaphors and a source of the classical form of 
Limbu language, 87  has not been entirely translated into Nepali and thus an endangered 
language is an endangered religion. Leela Jabegu88 says that the contemporary period is marked 
by a flux wherein there are people who are keen on learning the language and at the same time 
there are those who are not interested. I asked her whether dhaan-naach 89 was still popular 
amongst Limbu men and women, to which she responded, ‘they hold hands and dance but they 
don’t sing the palam. Rather they sing pop songs, Nepali songs.’ Leela herself had never sung 
the palam but spoke the Limbu language.  She pointed out to me that one important cause of 
linguistic decline was that most young people were too embarrassed or ashamed to speak the 
language especially in a multi-ethnic context and against the prevalence of Nepali pop-culture, 
visible even in remote villages like Yangnam.90 Interaction with other older agriculturists91 in 
Chok Magu village also reinforced the general opinion that Limbu language and culture was 
gradually disappearing. One of the respondents in the group said, ‘my children don’t speak the 
language. What our ancestors wore, nobody wears them today, now only international clothes. 
Our ancestors used to weave and wear their own clothes but people don’t even recognize the 
mekhle (traditional female attire), dhan-naach has also disappeared. Children today don’t even 
know the Limbu names for the parts of the body.’ Thus there was an overwhelming sense of 
cultural erosion in the eastern hills which was once again indirectly related to the actions and 
                                                          
87  A Mundhum consists of legends, folklores, pre-historic accounts, sermons and moral or philosophical 
exhortations in poetic language (Edingo, 2007: 165). For detailed description and accounts of the use of the 
Mundhum in the lives of the Limbus see Sagant (1996).  
 
88 Resident of Yangnam village, Panchthar, interviewed by the author on 4th September, 2010, Yangnam, Nepal.  
89  Literal translation is wheat dance, usually danced during festivals, harvests and even fairs. Men and women 
hold hands and dance in a circle to the beat of the chyabrung, a drum used by Limbu men while the women sing 
the palam, songs describing stories of the harvest, life cycle etc.  
90 The influence of Nepali pop culture was also very prominent in Ilam which shares close border with Darjeeling 
as well as the terai in the south. While fashionable, ‘western’ clothes, make-up, hair straighteners were readily 
available for girls, peroxide tinted, Korean hairstyles were very popular amongst boys at the time of fieldwork.  
91 Group interview conducted by the author on 10th September, 2010, Chok Magu, Phidim, Nepal.  
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policies of the state which for decades had promoted only one language, one religion and one 
culture. 
In the eastern hills these grievances against the homogenous construction and cultural 
domination (which also amounted to economic domination) by the state had found articulation 
through a homeland movement for the reinstatement of the historical kingdom of Limbuwan. 
Although championed by the Maobadi during the decade long insurgency, the demand for 
ethnic homelands and autonomous regions had been voiced as early as 1992 by the Karnali 
Liberation Front which published a booklet on its programmes and objectives on the basis of 
the historical legend of King Bali’s kingdom. 92  Likewise the demand for an independent 
Magarant in central Nepal was made in 1993 by the Magarant Liberation Front and in the east 
the demand for the restoration of the historical kingdom of Limbuwan was led by the 
Limbuwan Mukti Morcha formed in 1986. 
 
CDs and DVDs promoting ethno-nationalism were freely available throughout east Nepal 
 
 
                                       
In the eastern hills, the traditional opposition to the state focused on the claims to kipat, 
has been a strong hallmark of the relationship between Limbus and the Nepali state (de Sales, 
2000:50). This is evidenced by the anti-Bahun movement in the 1950s and through the 
                                                          
92  Karnali is located in the mid-western development region of Nepal. It is one of the poorest and most remote 
regions of Nepal. According to local myth King Bali Hang was a Kirata king with an extensive kingdom from 
Pokhara to Gorkahpur (Vansittart in Chemjong, 2003: 143). 
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activities of the Mongol National Organization (MNO) in the early 1990s, which was even 
successful in winning the regional elections in 1992.93 Despite their earlier streak of success, 
the MNO has been losing ground steadily, unable to regain their position even in the 
contemporary era of ethnic politics. This can be attributed to the overall political atmosphere 
that was not conducive to ethnic politics as well as the generality of their agenda which was to 
unite all the ‘Mongols’ against the upper caste Hindus (see Hangen, 2010). In stark contrast, 
today the demands of indigenous/ethnic population have a specific target group and territory 
which makes it easier to focus claims and activities. This also makes it easier to mobilize ethnic 
actors in politics with examples from history of the bravado and tenacity of the Limbus against 
Prithvi Narayan.    
Apart from the opening of the political domain to ethnic grievances by the Maoists, the 
other most important factor in the emergence of ethnic politics in Nepal is the influence of the 
international indigenous discourse which is firmly entrenched in the Adivasi/Janajati 
movement. Nepal as one of the poorest countries in the world has had to orient its national 
politics in accordance with the guidelines set out by its international donors. Even before the 
second Jan Andolan, international agencies like the United Nations had already made inroads 
into Nepalese politics. For example the celebration of the UN Year of Indigenous Peoples in 
1993 renewed ethnic activism amongst different nascent ethnic organizations. In the same year 
debate on ethno-politics of language intensified as the government formed a commission to 
make recommendations about the national language policy (Bhattachan, 1995:128). The 
presence of international humanitarian agencies has led to greater awareness of 
ethnic/indigenous rights amongst ethnic elites, which when combined with their potential to 
disrupt life through strikes and sit-ins, especially in the semi-urban and border areas, has made 
them formidable political agents.   
However, one of the most important developments in the Adivasi/Janajati movement 
was when Nepal became the first country in South Asia to ratify the ILO Convention 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 2007 recognizing over fifty groups as ethnic/indigenous. The 
ILO 169 (as it its popularly known) recognizes the cultural distinctiveness of ethnic/indigenous 
                                                          
93 The MNO was more successful in winning local rather than national elections, particularly in Ilam where in 
1992 the MNO candidates won 24 out of 47 VDCs and won the majority of the posts including the chair and vice 
chairman. In 1997, MNO candidates were however elected in only 19 VDCs (Hangen, 2007: 182) and the number 
has declined steadily over the past years. 
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groups and is aimed at promoting full cultural rights for indigenous and tribal people who it 
said had been progressively marginalised and dispossessed from their sources of livelihood and 
rendered vulnerable to cultural shock and loss of cultural identity (Xaxa,1999). 94  This 
Convention defines self-identification as indigenous or tribal as a fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply with a qualification 
that this does not entail the rights that may be attached to this term under international law 
(Bijoy et al, 2010:57). According to this Convention, qualification as an indigenous group 
entails descent from the original inhabitants of a region prior to the arrival of settlers leading 
to poverty and political marginality, limited access to services and absence of protection from 
unwanted development (Cowan et al, 2001:19, emphasis mine). However, in spite of its origins 
in conditions which were different to those of Nepal and the ideological contestations 
surrounding its applicability in the post-colonial states of Asia and Africa, Nepal’s ethnic 
groups and their representative associations have accepted the global indigenous discourse 
whole-heartedly as it finally provides them with a platform through which they can engage in 
productive negotiation with the state for the re-distribution of resources.  
The impact of this international indigenous discourse on the articulation of ethnic 
grievances was evident in the speech given by Bhardoj Gurung,95 executive member of NEFIN 
(Ilam chapter), at the World Indigenous Day celebrations. He reminded everyone present there 
of the economic discrimination and cultural suppression by the migrant Hindus who not only 
robbed them of their lands but also their indigenous identity. He insisted that state re-
construction had to be all inclusive, by which he meant that only a Gurung had the right to 
represent a Gurung, the Limbus had to be represented by someone from their community and 
so forth. This is an argument which emanates from NEFIN, Kathmandu whose General 
Secretary, Angben Sherpa,96 whilst defending ethnic federalism and agra adhikar (prior rights) 
says, ‘there are seventy-five districts in Nepal, some districts belong to Tamang, some belong 
to Rai but who is representing from all these districts? All Brahmins. For example, 
                                                          
94  The full version of the Convention has been attached as Annexe. 
 
95  This speech was given on 24th July, 2010 in a public forum to celebrate World Indigenous Day amidst members 
of other ethnic groups who were also dressed in their ethnic attire. The author was a participant observant on this 
present occasion.  
 
96 Interview conducted by the author on 22nd September, 2010, Kathmandu, Nepal.  
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Sindhuphulchok district 97  belongs to Tamangs but who is representing them? Pashupati 
Shumshere Rana. Maybe he is the only Rana living in the district and he has been representing 
from Sindhupalchok for over fifteen-twenty years. This is not really justifiable’.  Thus, without 
mincing their words the ethnic elites established a direct link between ethnicity and material 
ends (political, economic) as well as asserting that only ethnic identity could resolve all their 
problems, even those related to culture. Political instability, inefficient bureaucracy and lack 
of developmental benefits has led to severe political apathy. On being asked, which party he 
votes for Maila Limbu (Yangnam, 2010) jokingly replied, ‘whoever gives me the bottle (i.e. 
alcohol)’.  Although said in jest, this captures the residual sentiment and attitude towards the 
political system and governance which does not ensure health, education, sustenance nor 
security to its citizens.98 Thus, the idea of Limbuwan, a separate state in a federal organization 
presents itself as an alternative and maybe an opportunity for some either to reclaim lost land 
or even just the increased presence of the state. 
 
                      Contesting the state: Welcome to Limbuwan 
 
                      2 
                                                          
97 Sindhupalchok district is located in the Central Development Region of Nepal.  
98 While the fieldwork was limited to just the eastern hills and the Adivasi/Janajati groups in particular, it is 
quite probable that this is a common sentiment felt across the country. As Kanak Mani Dixit (2011) writes, 
‘what rankles the people is not so much that yet another constitution-writing deadline has lapsed, but the 
seemingly never-ending shortages of power, fuel, water, jobs, food and even passport.                                
Source: http://www.ccd.org.np/resources/wcms_100897[1].pdf  (Accessed: 22/12/2012). 
The 2012 annual survey conducted by Himal Magazine expands on these themes of inefficiency, corruption 
further. (Source: http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/nepalitimes/pdf/Nepali_Times_604.pdf). 
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2.3 Regional Repercussions 
2.3 (i) Kirat Yakthung Chumlung:  Ethnic association and political activism 
Taking the lead and capitalising on this situation are ethnic associations which are 
important bridges between the political and the social realm as they function as effective 
mobilizers of the grass-root communities. However, the boundaries between the social and 
political fields are highly blurred as ethnic activists engage and support activities that are 
explicitly political. Whether it be the display of clothes and culture during the celebration of 
World Indigenous Day or articulating simultaneously their demands for ethnic federalism and 
indigenous rights reveals how cultural rights are seen as a natural component of economic and 
political rights and vice versa.  
The importance of this political juncture has been well captured by Kirat Yakthung 
Chumlung (KYC, henceforth the Chumlung), the foremost Limbu ethnic association which 
was also one of the earliest advocates for the state of Limbuwan, at least from an organisational 
level. Founded in 1989 it is organised on a pyramidal framework, with Kathmandu once again 
at the top and its regional network expanding down to the rural areas. All Limbus are members 
by default and there are elected committees both at the district and the central level who act as 
representatives for the community in different gatherings and liaise between the authorities and 
the community members. As a firm proponent of ethnic homelands, the Chumlung believes 
that ethnic language and culture can only be preserved in a homeland 99 and that without 
political rights, there can be no cultural rights100 The Chumlung’ plays an important role in the 
creation and maintenance of Limbu identity, which fuels the demand for the social and political 
recognition of the Limbus. As its primary function the Chumlung organizes Limbu language 
and cultural dance classes in all the areas where it has a functional office, especially in eastern 
Nepal, with an aim to popularize Limbu culture amongst the younger generation.  However, its 
activities are not just limited to conducting language classes or performing cultural dances. As 
the sole representative organisation it has also moulded its social objectives to accommodate 
political rights which it manifests by organising multi-party meetings demanding cultural 
                                                          
99  Executive member of the KYC, Central Committee, interviewed by the author on 22th September, 2010, 
Kathmandu, Nepal. 
100  Pradeep Limbu, executive member of the KYC, Ilam chapter, interviewed by the author on 3rdSeptember, 
2010, Ilam, Nepal.  
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freedom and equality (which used to be its primary demand) and to now also agitating 
politically as a pressure group for a Limbu state thereby highlighting the impact of political 
opportunities on social organisations. Thus, the Chumlung has been at the forefront of the 
development of Limbu language and script (the Sirijonga script, made popular by the Limbu 
scholar Iman Singh Chemjong) by raising awareness about the language, conducting adult 
literacy classes and developing books and other reading materials in Limbu. It also publishes a 
monthly newsletter ‘Tanchoppa’ (Rising Star) which is aimed not only at discussing and 
providing information about the different issues but also at standardizing the Limbu language 
and script.  
The Chumlung has also played a leading role in introducing Limbu language classes 
into primary school education and by providing human resources to the centrally-based 
Curriculum Development Centre and since 1994 helped produce text books for classes one to 
five (Subba and Subba, 2003:4). In 1993 to mark World Indigenous Day, the KYC initiated the 
‘Literacy in Mother Tongue’ project, a non-formal education program with the aim of 
promoting literacy in the Limbu language. This project also aimed at disseminating information 
on topics like gender equality, drug abuse as well as human and indigenous rights, especially 
those related to the ILO 169 (ibid).  
Language development and linguistic rights have also been taken forth by the Limbu 
Language Development Association (LiLDA), a community based organization established in 
2000 which also works in the preservation of indigenous crafts and skills. They have published 
numerous books in Limbu which is used in both formal as well as non-formal education, 
organize Limbu Language and Script Learning Class for speakers as well as non-speakers of 
the language, a workshop which is gaining popularity even amongst the non-Limbu speakers. 
The workshop was being conducted at the time of fieldwork and I observed that a large number 
of students were non-matwalis (upper caste Hindus) and were seated right in the front of the 
class. Deependra  Kurumba,101 co-ordinator of the language class saw attending the language 
class as an investment, ‘we publicised that there would be only seventy seats for the course but 
were so inundated with applicants that we had to conduct two classes simultaneously. People 
are aware that tomorrow if there is a Limbuwan then Limbu will be the official language, 
thereby making it useful to learn when they have the chance.’ Deependra Kurumba however 
also complains that owing to the increasing popularity of English and the traditional dominance 
                                                          
101 Interviewed by the author on 6th  September, 2010, Phidim, Panchthar, Nepal 
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of Nepali, a large number of Limbus, especially the young ones, consider the Limbu language 
to be a ‘useless language’. This not only highlights a threat faced by most regional languages 
across the Himalaya but also shows that the influence of Chumlung might not be as pervasive 
as its members might want outsiders to believe. Indeed, the limited applicability of Limbu 
language in day to day living was also acknowledged by Bairagi Kaila,102 a noted literary figure 
in Nepal who blames it on the rashtriyata ko lahar (wave of Nepali nationalism) which favours 
Nepali over other languages and it is exactly this wave that the indigenous movement has been 
trying to challenge. 
                                    
Limbu language class underway in Phidim 
 
                         
 
Keeping with the criteria and the guideline set out by the ILO 169 the indigenous 
movement in Nepal defines its ethnic identity through its emphasis on non-Hindu practices and 
its history of socio-cultural subjugation through the state sponsored process of Nepalization of 
their ethnic values. Thus, one of KYC’s many agendas is to sensitise people about their 
religious and cultural practices. Most active in the bigger towns, the impact of their activities 
and ideologies is slightly weakened by the time it reaches their rural members but an effective 
way of mobilization is through the youth who come to the sadar mukam for education or 
                                                          
102Bairagi Kaila is the non de plume used by Til Bikram Nembang who was born in Panchtar District in 1940. An 
eminent Limbu poet and scholar, Bairagi Kaila was educated in Darjeeling and is famous in Nepali literary world 
for his collaborative work with Ishwor Ballav and Indra Bahadur Rai known as the Tesro Ayam (Third Dimension) 
movement in 1963. In 1974 he published a collection of his poems titled Bairagi Kaila ka Kavitaharu (Poems of 
Bairagi Kaila). Bairagi Kaila was interviewed by the author on 25th September 2010, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
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employment. The larger towns are thus a catchment area for the Chumlung as they have 
branches in most of the colleges and its activities are publicized through an extensive social 
network amongst most Limbu students who also publish a monthly Limbu journal called Sema 
which has articles in both Limbu and Nepali.   
The impact of youth participation in cultural activities has been slowly percolating to 
the villages. For example, on the topic of festivals, most of the respondents from Yangnam 
village (2010) indicated that there had been alterations in practice of festivals with the younger 
ones being more reluctant to celebrate Hindu festivals like Dasain and trying to revive Limbu 
festivals like Chasok Tongnam. As recounted by Maya Jabegu in Ilam103 even Diwali which 
was known as Balihang Tongnam, had taken on a different meaning in being associated with 
the story of King Balihang, the Kirata king, rather than the Hindu version of the return of King 
Rama from exile  
Apart from cultural preservation, the Chumlung has made steps towards the social 
development of the community (Ram Sherma, Phidim, 2010)104 in an attempt to alleviate the 
economic problems of the Limbus who are beset by expensive rituals and ceremonies. 
However, before the formation of KYC social reformation and unity was brought about by an 
organized sect called the Satya Hangma Panth, a puritanical, organized form of Kirati religion 
developed by Guru Phalgunanda. This religious sect worked towards bringing social 
reformation within the Limbu community and at the same time began the construction of 
manghims/ temples as areas of communal worship.  
Chumlung is heavily involved and invested in the movement for Limbuwan and was 
one of the first organizations to openly demand it. As an ethnic organization they feel that it is 
their responsibility to preserve their culture in order to be able to stake political claims based 
on it. Ganga Jabegu,105 highlighting the role of Chumlung in the Limbuwan movement says, 
‘Chumlung has played a central role in the movement for Limbuwan. During its sixth Annual 
                                                          
103 Primary respondent and Limboo activist, intererviewed by the author on 30th September, 2010, Ilam, Nepal.  
104 Primarily engaged in the translation of the Mundhum, interviewed by the author 7th September, 2010, Phidim, 
Nepal 
105  Central committee member of the KYC and the only respondent to have returned a short questionnaire on the 
role of the KYC in the cultural and political life of the Limbus. The quote was in response to a question that asked 
about the role of the KYC in the Limbuwan movement.  
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Convention in 2007 the main agenda of the Convention was the demand for Limbuwan and it 
is only after the Convention that a political party for this specific purpose was formed. 
However, this party split into numerous parties and Chumlung has been at the forefront in 
providing a common platform to these parties’. Thus, in spite of being a community based 
organization, it was one of the earliest proponents of a political movement for an ethnic 
homeland as well as to promote the rights of the Adivasi/Janajati as enunciated by the ILO 169.  
The KYC has made rapid contributions not only towards sensitizing Limbus about their 
religion, language but also by providing a common platform for political parties on which to 
discuss issues pertaining to the creation of Limbuwan. Embedded within the discourse of 
indigenous rights guiding the ethnic movement in Nepal, the Chumlung is a founding member 
of NEFIN and while they support the activities of NEFIN by participating actively in the 
various chakka-jam (motor vehicle strikes), demonstrations and raakay julus (fire-torch 
processions) they propagate the issues of rights of all the indigenous groups over resources. 
However at same time talk they also about the ‘agra-adhikar’ or special rights of the Limbus 
as the original indigenous population of Limbuwan which positions them in an awkward 
relationship with the members of other communities.  
Owing to the non-aggressive nature of its programs (like talks, workshops) Chumlung 
has often been equated with a ‘dog with no bite’ by Limbu members of different political 
parties. However its contribution in framing as well as propagating Limbu cultural practices 
within the Limbu community is appreciated by most. In Panchthar, which is the bastion of 
Limbus (with more than forty-eight per cent of the total population being Limbus) Chumlung 
has been upfront about its politics.  One of the most tangible examples of this is the construction 
of the gate that welcomes visitors to the state of Limbuwan and where it is mandatory for all 
vehicles to have Limbuwan number plates.106 Speaking on the significance of the gate, a 
prominent member of the Panchthar Chumlung, Upendra Jabegu (Panchthar, 2010) was proud 
of their bold political statement and that they could call their land ‘Limbuwan’ freely. When 
asked whether the government officials said anything? He responded, ‘policy is on one side, 
power is on the other side. Limbus of all parties support Limbuwan so they (i.e. state) cannot 
do anything.’ 
                                                          
106 This was also a strategy that was seen in the recent Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling where all vehicles had 
to change their number plates from West Bengal (WB) to Gorkhaland (GL). This act may be deemed as a display 
of territorial authority and a challenge to the state.  
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Thus, numerical strength has enabled the forceful assertion of the idea of the homeland 
of the Limbus and the amalgamation of culture and politics which is right in line with the 
national demand for the re-organization of the state on the basis of ethnicity. Transitional 
politics and the international indigenous discourse has catapulted the Chumlung to a dimension 
where it can now be vocal about the political rights of the people that they represent and take 
concrete actions that favour the image as well as identification of the community. For example, 
during the last census in 2010, it was one of Chumlung’s main aims to educate people on the 
religion that they should choose during the census. They instructed people to fill in ‘Kirat’ as 
their religion and ‘Limbu’ as their language as opposed to Hinduism as their religion and Nepali 
as their language and according to respondents from a group interview in Chok Magu, being 
able to talk openly about their culture and religion has given them an immense sense of 
freedom. The respondents felt that, ‘during the Panchayat era we were not allowed to talk of 
our religion, we had to write Hindu in our citizenship but now we write Kirat. There is no 
prohibition to writing our language, earlier we would have been caught by the police, cultural 
domination was definitely there during that period but now that we can talk openly about it we 
feel intense freedom.’107 Thus, it is moments of cultural freedom like these (brought about by 
important, structural changes in the political symmetry of the country) that the Chumulung has 
capitalised on and strengthened its arguments against the ethnic hegemony of the state. At the 
same time it is also engaged in actively reviving Limbu culture in order to increase its cultural 
value which they hope can then be translated to political capital which might then enable 
Limbus to get better access and control over the scarce public goods.  
Chumlung’s activites have a wide ranging impact on the modes of identification of the 
people as it presents them with an identity, which may be parallel if not alternate to their 
national identity. Chumlung may not directly challenge the bureaucratic system but it works to 
generate interest and awareness amongst the Limbus as indigenous people of Limbuwan. This 
presents an alternative political narrative (as opposed to that promoted by the state) as it 
positions the state as encroaching upon the rights of not only its citizens but its indigenous 
people, the original people of the land, thereby immediately making all its actions tyrannical 
and unjustified.  
The social, economic and political inequality that is predominant in Nepal is a result 
not only of lack of resources. The network of bureaucracy and its various social dimensions 
                                                          
107 The respondents comprised of Limbu agriculturists, interviewed by the author on 10th September, 2010, 
Phidim, Nepal.  
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like chakari, afno-manchay and bribery are equally, if not more responsible for this situation. 
Thus, political revival of ethnic identity presents itself as a chance to reclaim lost opportunities 
and in this the Chumlung plays a crucial role as not only does it preserve and popularize Limbu 
culture, it also reminds the people and the state of all that has been lost, which needs to be 
redeemed both in terms of material (like kipat) as well as cultural heritage. Chumlung plays an 
important role in formulating a positive imagery as well as highlighting the political potential 
of the Limbu ethnic group, thereby making individuals make the ‘ethnic choice’ i.e. to choose 
ethnicity in its specific representation as their political identity. This is accomplished through 
the revival of Limbu language and culture and linking cultural erosion to discriminatory state 
policies, thereby framing and articulating pre-existing grievances in explicit political terms. 
Demands for Limbuwan and agra-adhikar are directly linked to material demands of the 
Limbus thereby highlighting the instrumental rational that is inherent in cultural revival as well 
as the potential of ethnicity as political resource.  
Aiding and complementing this process to a certain extent and going beyond the 
boundaries of ethnic associations are the regional ethnic parties who have been able to take 
advantage of the favourable political conditions and public sentiments. 
 
2.3 (ii) Emergence of regional parties 
 
                                            One of the many ‘Limbuwan’ parties 
                                 
 
                   
The emerging regional parties of the eastern hills are almost a reflection of the national 
parties through the innumerable splintering that they have endured and persisted, with some 
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like the Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad (Federal Limbuwan State Council) emerging as 
one of the leading Limbuwan parties (as they are locally know). Working in a coalition called 
the Sanghiya Loktantrik Rashtriya Manch (Federal Republic National Front), a coalition of 
twelve different ethnic political parties; it was successful in getting two representatives elected 
to the Constituent Assembly on the basis of Proportional Representation (PR) in 2008. 
Formed in the aftermath of the Jan Andolan II, regional parties of the eastern hills are 
a curious mix of contradictions. While shrinking away from the label of a purely ethnic party, 
these groups draw most of their cadres from particular ethnic groups. The names of the parties 
(for example-Sanghiya Limbuwan Rashtriya Morcha) is a clear indicator of the purpose, aims 
and the ethnic demography that they seek to attract but they nonetheless claim to be multi-
ethnic entities. These groups strive to claim a sajha (‘common’ or ‘shared’) Limbuwan where 
the Limbus will enjoy a degree of agra-adhikar or prior rights from amongst all the other ethnic 
groups living in that area (Krishna Shrestha, Ilam, 2010).108 This is seen as the most effective 
measure to ensure democracy and safeguard minority rights.  In spite of the apparent 
‘intellectual vaccum’ (as accused of by intellectuals from within the community itself) these 
regional parties have been successful in identifying and articulating the grievances of the 
members of the ethnic communities.109  This was aptly summarised by Madhav Chettri,110 a 
senior UML leader who says, ‘using jatiya (ethnic) cover and jatiya slogans the shoshak varg 
(exploiter class) has equated the deprived class with an ethnic category. In contemporary Nepal 
it is jatiya politics that has become more important than class based politics.’ While some 
equation between class and ethnicity is possible, it is however an idea which has been taken to 
the extreme and used in the political domain, conveniently ignoring the ground reality that 
there are rich Limbus as well as poor Bahun/Chettri groups.  
The combined indigenous/ethnic population of Nepal represents over thirty-eight 
percent of the national population, thereby making ethnic groups the largest section of the 
electorate too. While discussing the scale of movement the numbers and figures of the 
Adivasi/Janajati population is an important factor and given their population, the ethnic 
                                                          
108 Central committee member of the Sanghiya Limbuwan Rashtriya Manch, interviewed by the author on 22nd 
July, Ilam, Nepal. 
109  This was an oft-repeated opinion by most of the Limbu intellectuals and mainstream party members both in 
Ilam and Kathmandu.  
110 Interviewed by the author on 2nd August, 2010, Ilam , Nepal. 
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movement is thus not a marginal one which can be easily reconciled (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009: 
292).  Demographic majority which when translated to the regional context, converts 
numerically dominant ethnic groups into dependable vote banks. Thus, in the proposed 
Limbuwan, the Limbu majority holds great value leading to dependence on ethnicity for the 
credibility or even longevity of any political party.  
The political assertion of ethnicity owes its foundation to the work of ethnic 
associations at the central as well as regional level. Especially in urban areas, this has revived 
curiosity amongst the young and instilled jatiya pride in the old as people no longer find it 
embarrassing to wear traditional dresses or speak in their native languages. This has also led to 
an increased participation in cultural activities. This wider acceptance of culture socially as 
well as politically, has also created an opportunity for ethnic elites to make a foray into local 
level politics. Ethnic elites whose sole identification was previously through their political 
affiliation were now renewing and asserting their ethnic ties and culture in order to take 
advantage of the political situation which has now become receptive towards ethnicity (Kumar 
Sunwar, Ilam, 2010). Thus, this situation has given rise to a new layer of elites who are 
influential probably not because of their standing in the political party but rather because of 
their influence and social standing within their community. While transitional politics and state 
re-structuring may have created the opportunity for the growth of regional parties, the attitude 
of the national parties has still not been able to convince ethnic groups of the sincerity of their 
intent and in spite of all the claims of inclusiveness, thau ajhai sanguro cha,  ‘the space is still 
narrow’ for the Adivasi/Janajatis. 
Political efficacy now depends upon the efficiency with which a political party is able 
to tap into local grievances and issues, something which can only be detrimental to the gains 
of the party if ignored. Ethnicity may not be the only factor that the electorate takes into 
consideration but it is emerging as one of the most important factors by which a party is now 
judged. People may not move across party lines but there is a growing demand within the 
national parties to address ethnic issues. For example, according to Upendra Jabegu, the poor 
performance of the UML in the 2008 Constituent Assembly election (UML came in third after 
the Maoists and Nepali Congress) was a direct consequence of its non-commital attitude 
towards the Limbuwan issue. The major national parties are still dominated by upper caste 
elites and thus the holders of the proverbial ‘whip’ which with they control their members. This 
therefore demonstrates that ethnic politics is still played within the leeway that the political 
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parties are willing to allow. This is contrasted by the blatant expression of ethnic demands by 
the smaller regional parties who present themelves as the true representative of ethnic interests 
and thus position themselves as important stakeholders in the direction of the politics of the 
eastern hills. The emergence of these regional parties directs towards the opening of the 
political space which is making the democractic agenda more inclusive. Despite their limited 
success, the very existence of these parties offers a platform for direct political negotiation with 
the state, thereby making Limbu ethnic identity more attractive as a political choice, especially 
for those who have been unable to scale the hierarchy of the major political parties. On the 
other hand, blatant demand for Limbuwan and exclusive rights for the Limbus has an appealing 
tone to it and thus the emergence of regional parties exemplifies the instrumental use of ethnic 
identity as a political resource in order to gain more political control over public goods through 
the establishment of new lines of patronage and connections for the Limbus. This in turn has 
been facilitated by change in the power structure of the country that has opened some space for 
regionalism as well the international discourse on indigenous rights that has been adopted and 
localised by ethnic associations. Using real as well as perceived sense of ethnic discrimination, 
Chumlung and regional Limbuwan parties have been successful in producing a collective 
Limbu consciousness that is directed at reclaiming lost cultural identity as well as seeking 
economic retribution from the state through a Limbu homeland. This highlights the potential 
of the Limbu ethnic identity that is now being harnassed by groups and individuals to partake 
as distributors or recipients of resources that are held by the state. 
Conclusion 
This case study is a regional representation of the transitional politics that is underway 
on a national level in Nepal. It is a discussion of the multiple strands of political processes that 
are involved in the expression of ethnicity as a political identity. Whilst discussing the 
important nexus between socio-economic failure of the state, their ethnic manifestations and 
the emergence of new political actors, the case study highlights the important role played by 
external structure in the articulation of social, economic and political grievances. The existence 
of systemic ethnic bias has been a handicap for generations of those not belonging to hill, high 
Hindu caste groups and it was the re-alignment of political structures that enabled mobilisation 
and articulation of ethnic issues. As discussed in the sections above, the change in political 
structure has facilitated the emergence of new political actors in the form of activists and 
regional parties who have made Limbu ethnic identity and its symbols the focus of political 
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action. This has led to the assertion of an indigenous identity over other larger or more common 
identities, especially the Nepali identity promoted by the state.  
This case highlights how bonds of culture, kinship and tradition can be successfully 
utilised to forge political bonds in order to engage in contestation with the state for complete 
control or better access to it. In the larger context of the thesis, this case of the Limbu identity 
helps unravel the usefulness of an ethnic identity as a resource that can be mobilised to achieve 
political outcomes. Thrust into the arena of ethnic politics, the case of the Limbus shows that 
identity construction and the politics around it can have multiple bases which can be mobilised 
only during a particular window of opportunity. As will also be discussed in the following case 
studies, institutions and structures play an important role in the choice of identity manifestation 
and it is this negotiation between structures and political agents that bring about a variation in 
the articulation of ethnic identity.  
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Darjeeling District and the Duars 
 
 
 
Source: Himalnews.wordpress.com 
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Chapter 4: Choosing the Gorkha: Ethnicity and Politics in the Darjeeling Hills 
Introduction 
Towards the end of my interview with I.B. Rai,111 one of the most eminent Nepali 
writers, I asked if he felt there were any differences between Nepalis of Sikkim and Nepalis of 
Darjeeling. In that question I was asking him to verbalize the subtle distinction that Nepalis in 
Sikkim and Darjeeling have always felt but have been unable to articulate clearly. In response 
to my question he said, ‘since the time of the Chogyals, the Nepalis of Sikkim have remained 
isolated. They were not allowed to mingle with Nepalis from other parts of India. Maybe 
because of this, the Nepalis of Sikkim will never look out for Nepalis living in other parts of 
India. If something happens to Nepalis living in Assam, the Nepalis of Darjeeling will feel hurt 
and angry but Nepalis from Sikkim remain immune to it. They might give donations sometimes 
but that is about it.’ Thus, according to him it was this feeling of afnopan (affinity) that 
distinguished the Nepalis of Sikkim from those in Darjeeling.  
While empathy and moral solidarity within the Indian-Nepalis should have remained a 
private, subjective matter, a closer inspection of the Nepalis living in Sikkim and Darjeeling 
highlights the political nature of this relationship. Why do the Nepalis of Sikkim not share this 
afnopan (affinity)? Why do they not identify themselves as Gorkhas? Despite a shared history 
of migration why has this identity not found expression in the political vocabulary of the 
Nepalis in Sikkim? These are the questions that are at the heart of this chapter. While a common 
culture and language binds Nepalis in Sikkim and Darjeeling, the political articulation of 
ethnicity as well as ethnic politics is different in the two areas. The aim of this chapter is thus 
to resolve these questions. This can only be done by understanding the social and political 
construction, implication and the territorial nature of the Gorkha identity which at once joins 
Darjeeling to millions of Nepalis living in India but at the same establishes distance from 
Sikkim.  
‘Gorkha’ is one of the multiple identities that are available to the Nepalis living in 
Darjeeling district in northern West Bengal. They can choose to either simply identify 
themselves as Nepalis or choose the specific ethnic group/jat (Limbu, Rai, Magar etc) that they 
                                                          
111 Indra Bahadur Rai is one of the leading writers and critics of modern Nepali language and literature. His literary 
creations depict different aspects of the life and existential experiences of Indian-Nepalis.  
Interviewed by the author on 21st January, 2011, Siliguri, West Bengal. 
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belong to as their primary identity in social and political interactions. However, it is the Gorkha 
identity which has been used for political mobilisation and contestation against the West 
Bengal government for a separate state called Gorkhaland.  The demand for Gorkhaland bears 
close resemblance to demands for ethnic homelands in Nepal as a remedy to the social and 
economic discrimination meted out by the state. However the idea of Gorkhaland is in contrast 
to that of Limbuwan because Gorkha as an ethnic category has emerged more out of the 
common social, political and economic exigencies rather than simply homogenous cultural 
features, kinship systems or other primordial understandings of ethnic groups (like the Limbus). 
The Gorkha is an ethnic group as far as it satisfies a sense of common belonging; a sense of 
shared history and most importantly acts as a base for political action. In this context, following 
David Brown (1994:1) ethnicity is interpreted as an ideology which individuals employ to 
resolve the insecurities arising from the power structures within which they are located. The 
Gorkha identity, despite its colonial and military connotations was an identity borne out of 
political necessity for legitimacy as bonafide Indian citizens. This demand for political 
recognition has been sustained through long standing grievance about economic discrimination 
and neglect by the state which is controlled and dominated by the ethnic ‘Other’- the Bengalis. 
The Gorkha is not only socially constructed but is also a representation of the demands for 
greater control and access to resources, economic and political, which have been restricted (or 
at least perceived to be restricted) by the state on account of ethnic differences. Despite 
appealing to emotive issues of citizenship and belonging to the Indian nation-state, the demands 
for Gorkhaland, a smaller state, have a distinct instrumental aspect to it. Once again, as seen in 
Nepal, the inherent potential for political mobilization of ethnicity has been well harnassed in 
the Darjeeling hills. However, state structures and other institutional mechanisms lead to a 
difference in how and which aspect of the Nepali identity is articulated politically thereby 
leading to a variation in ethnic politics in the eastern Himalayas.  
The aim of this chapter is less to analyze the origins of the Gorkha identity or the 
Gorkhaland movement and more to resolve the primary research question-why do groups and 
individuals choose one form of ethnic identity over another- this chapter looks at the socio-
economic processes that have sustained the political and moral viability of this identity. This 
chapter thus engages with the role played by British colonization and experiences with neo-
colonization as a part of India in the creation and support of the Gorkha identity.  
This chapter once again discusses a similar set of questions that had been raised in the 
previous chapter. The case study of the Gorkha identity engages in the analysis of the social, 
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political and economic costs of being a Nepali in the Darjeeling hills and at the same time looks 
at the macro habitus that has promoted this identity. This macro-habitus is inadvertently linked 
to position that the Nepalis of Darjeeling occupy in the wider socio-economic hierarchy, their 
insecurity as a cultural minority in West Bengal and their ambiguous socio-political position 
as Indian citizens.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 discusses the historical origins of the 
colonization of Darjeeling, the migration that colonial industries attracted, societal relations 
and the ‘habitus’ that colonization fostered but most importantly the impact it had on the 
worldview of the residents. It then discusses the role of trade unions and political mobilization 
in the tea estates which are crucial sites of identity construction and political activity before 
focusing on the persistent economic impoverishment of Darjeeling which was at the heart of 
the colonial enterprise in the eastern hills and now the vortex of the Gorkhaland movement.  
Section 2 discusses the utilisation of the Gorkha identity as a political resource for mobilization 
that is aimed at change the prevailing status-quo. Instead of engaging in a political analysis of 
the Gorkhaland movement, this section analyses its contribution to the process of identity 
formation. This section aims to resolve questions regarding the necessity of creating the Gorkha 
as an ethnic category, its use as a political identity, and the changes that it is undergoing as a 
response to the changing demography of the Darjeeling hills. This chapter will show that the 
Gorkha as an ethnic category is chosen for political representation as it satisfies not only the 
question of ethnic distinction from the majority population of West Bengal as well as from 
Nepalis of Nepal, legitimizes the demand for a separate state and hence control over the 
resources that it generates but its construction as bir (brave) and a martyr reinstates a sense of 
pride and belonging to the Indian nation. However the state is seen as engaging in 
discriminatory practices and hence influencing the form and content of political mobilization.  
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in the hills of Darjeeling District 
(Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Mungpoo) and in the plains of northern West Bengal (Siliguri, 
Bagrakot, Banarhat) from December 2010-January, 2011. 
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4.1 Politics of Economy, Politics of Identity 
4.1(i) Social and Political History 
In 2007 the Gorkha Jan Mukti Morcha (GJM, Gorkha Peoples Liberation Front) 
declared the renewal of the demand for a separate state for Nepalis living in India. Their 
immediate demand was the separation of Darjeeling District and parts of the Duars in the 
Jalpaiguri District from West Bengal and the formation of Gorkhaland on the basis of Article 
3 of the Indian Constitution.  
The booklet ‘Why Gorkhaland’ published in 2009 by the GJM states,  
‘the demand for Gorkhaland is basically a question of the Gorkha Indian political 
identity ... as the spectre of “alien-ness”, “foreigners” and “evictions” continues to hunt 
(sic) the Indian Gorkhas even today. Why is there this ‘identity crisis’ for the Gorkhas 
despite their being Indian citizens for centuries, having either come with the territory 
that became British India under various treaties or as a part of the population movement 
over the centuries? Why is the Indian-Gorkha-ness so loosely received across the 
country that they have to emphasize their nationality by compounding their identity 
with their nationality? The Gorkhas must be recognised as equal stake-holders in the 
governance of the country and its future. Recognition of the Gorkha identity will signify 
their assimilation into the mainstream of Indian life and thereby further the process of 
nation building. A separate state will reiterate their “Indian political identity” and their 
Indianess.’ 
 
The excerpt above highlights a complex interaction of cultural identity, citizenship, 
discrimination, power and the desire for its final resolution through a separate administrative 
setup for a ‘homeland’. In addition, the Darjeeling hills have also become representative of the 
plight of the Nepalis of India112 in general, carrying the onus of discrimination, identity crisis 
and therefore leading the cause for its resolution through Gorkhaland.113 
                                                          
112 In a recent unpublished paper T.B.Subba makes a useful distinction between Nepalis of India, who are born in 
India and are Indian citizens and Nepalis in India who usually migrate to India for employment or education.  
113 The primary intention of my fieldwork in the Darjeeling hills and the Duars was to try and understand the 
Gorkha and the multiple interpretations of that identity. I was aware of the stories and the stereotypes surrounding 
the Gorkha and was interested in understanding how they had been imbibed by a community as a source of 
political inspiration. This made it important to understand the physical, social and economic space (without any 
romanticism) in which the bir Gorkha existed.  
123 
 
Darjeeling is a colonized space where deprivation and discrimination have a historical 
precedent in the plantation estates that were established in the hills and the plains of north-east 
India. From a sparsely populated hillock occupied by local Lepcha, Magar and Limbu villages 
to one of the famous hills stations in India, Darjeeling’s origins are steeped in the history of the 
British Raj. It was initially developed as a sanatorium in 1837, a respite from the heat and dust 
of the Indian plains but suitable climate and geographical relief quickly led to it being exploited 
for commercial tea plantations. With the expansion and diversification of British trade in the 
late 18th century, tea from India became one of the most profitable trading commodities. Thus, 
after the initial establishment of tea plantations in Assam, the successful British experiment 
with tea encouraged extensive venture capital and the development of the tea industry, 
especially after 1856 when new varieties of tea started thriving and could be grown on a 
commercial scale.114 The tea industry is one of the largest employers in the state and is based 
on a very high fixed land-labour ratio, with 3.5 workers per hectare which implies intensive 
farming of land and provides employment for approximately seventy percent of the total 
population of Darjeeling, directly as well as indirectly (Datta, 2010:145).115 
Plantation agriculture, although a representation of modernity and western 
industrialization, was and still is labour intensive. Since the ideal locations for these plantations 
were heavily forested and scantily inhabited areas, recruitment of low paid migrant labour 
became a characteristic feature of plantation agriculture.116 The wages of the labourers known 
                                                          
 
114 By the end of 1866, there were about 39 gardens with 10,000 acres under cultivation which expanded to 18,888 
acres and 156 gardens and by 1914 there were 156 gardens employing over 30,000 permanent workers and 12,141 
temporary workers (Sarkar and Lama, 1984:88; Griffiths, 1967:88). Presently there are eighty-seven functional 
tea gardens in the Darjeeling hills alone, majority of which are owned by private companies and a few by the West 
Bengal Tea Development Board. 
 
115 According to the Economic Review (2011-12: 112) published by the Finance Department, Government of 
West Bengal, a large percentage of the working population (75.20 percent) in Darjeeling district is engaged in 
non-agricultural work (including tea-estate workers) while only 14.59 percent of the working population are 
engaged as cultivators while an even lower percentage (10.21 percent) were working as agricultural labourers. 
Also see Dekens (2005:83, 84).  
 
116 Labourers for tea plantations in Darjeeling, Terai and the Duars areas of present day North Bengal were 
recruited from eastern Nepal and tribal areas of Jharkhand by sardars, who received commission upon successful 
recruitment and establishment of the labourers in different dhuras/blocks (Sharma, 1997:5). 
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as ‘coolies’ or ‘mazdoor’ was lower than the wages of other agricultural labourers 117 and this 
acted as a major disincentive for the local agriculturists to join the plantation which prompted 
the recruitment of labour from other areas. The wage structure which had been introduced in 
1891 had remained intact till independence (Xaxa, 1985: 1662). Living inside barricaded 
enclosures, usually in rows of poorly constructed quarters called coolie lines, every action of 
the laborer was monitored by the plantation police. Forcible capture of absconding coolies and 
corporal punishment were seen as the right of the sahib planters, while flogging and other kinds 
of coercion were considered the most effective ways of dealing with the recalcitrant labor 
(Gupta, 1992:182). The North Bengal Mounted Rifles maintained discipline in the Darjeeling 
plantations and it was only in 1947 that it was officially disbanded. Another form of control 
over the labourers was through land. In order to supplement their cripplingly low wages, the 
labourers were allotted plots of land, but with no tenancy rights. Working also as subsistence 
agriculturists, the laborers relied on the mercy and goodwill of the managers as they could be 
evicted anytime and under any trivial pretext. The land constrained the freedom and movement 
of the laborers and was thus the invisible shackles that bound the laborer to the plantation 
(Gupta, 1985:2). Representing a capitalist mode of production, there was segregation on the 
basis of class which also corresponded to difference in ethnic attributes. Managers and 
assistants were Europeans and Anglo-Indians, skilled workers were Bengalis and unskilled 
workers were either tribals from Jharkhand or different ethnic groups from eastern Nepal 
(Xaxa, 1985:1659).  
Racial hierarchy was visible in the administrative structure and was strictly enforced. 
On one side were the Managers (burra/ big) sahib and the assistant managers/ chota (small) 
sahib and on the other were the large number of plantation workers, collectively known as 
coolies but divided into marad (man), aurat (woman) and chokra (adolescent) on the basis of 
the work done in the factory (ibid). The colonial plantations had legal and extra-legal sanctions 
and given the support of the colonial state, the class of burra sahib and his assistants (usually 
Bengalis) were laws unto themselves. The captive, uneducated labor living in isolation and in 
the absence of any legal protection was placed in a position of total dependence on the 
plantation, which fostered disempowerment and the establishment of a patron-client, mai-baap 
(mother-father) (Bhowmik, 1980:1525; Chatterjee, 2001: 5) relationship with the plantation 
managers.  
                                                          
117 The 1906 Labour Investigation Committee conceded that labourers earned insufficient wages but it was argued 
that insufficiency had no relation to the wage rate or the wage system but it was rather the fault of the labourer 
who spent it frivolously (Gupta, 1985:4).  
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This had a major impact on the world-view of generations of those living in the 
plantations and is reflected even today in the despondent attitude of plantation workers like 
Vishu Bhujel118 a bagan (garden) worker in the Duncan TE, Duars. He calls the plantation life 
a daas-pratha (slavery) and that the plantations as one of the most backward places, kept 
deliberately so in order to retain the labourers in the garden as no educated person, aware of 
their rights would ever engage in plantation labour. This sense of injustice and helplessness 
can also be attributed to the hierarchical class system which has been inherited and internalized 
by generations of workers. Historically, hierarchy at the work place coincided with the social 
world. Difference in physical features of the British planters, the Bengali administrators and 
the multi-ethnic, Mongoloid group was used successfully to homogenize different ethnic 
groups into different classes. However, this very segregation was successful in the eventual 
construction of a meta-identity of the Gorkha.  
The position of the plantation workers in the socio-economic hierarchy has a direct 
implication for the quality of life of the labourers and their dependents. Walking around 
plantation estates both in the hills as well as in Darjeeling, what struck me the most was how 
congested the living areas in the estates were, with houses adjacent to one another and small 
vegetable patches next to tea bushes. While workers in the hills had small plots for vegetable 
gardens, workers in the Duars lived in congested spaces with their Adivasi neighbours. 
However in both the areas, the plot of land on which they lived was not theirs to own. Even in 
the Cinchona plantations in Mungpoo, despite the relatively large cultivation areas that were 
available to the factory workers, they still had no ownership of the land which was a major 
source of anxiety for them.  
Interaction with Bishnu Prasad Sharma,119  one of the labourers at the Duncan TE 
revealed a palpable sense of insecurity which I had also heard and seen in other estates. Bishnu 
Prasad was nervous about his impending retirement as that would mean eviction from the estate 
where he has lived all his life. In spite of having worked in the bagan for thirty seven years, 
his economic insecurity loomed large. He said, ‘the day I retire I will get a letter from the 
manager saying thank you for working so hard for us but please evacuate the quarter in six 
months. I have given my sweat and blood to this bagan but I have nothing. Where will I go? 
                                                          
118 Worker at Duncan TE and an active member of the Labour Union, interviewed by the author on 13 th January, 
2011, Bagrakot, West Bengal. 
119 Plantation worker, interviewed by the author on 13th January, 2011, Duncan Tea Estate, Bagrakot, West 
Bengal. 
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Describing his life of poverty Bishnu Prasad said that life on the plantation reflects the Nepali 
proverb kuti lyayo, bhuti khayo (thresh the wheat and eat it immediately), basically to earn only 
enough to eat, lead a hand to mouth existence as minimum government assistance has left them 
at the mercy of the tea estates. These people faced existential issues that really affected every 
single aspect of their lives. Economic problems were severe, real and seemed to be a cycle that 
the workers could not break away from. 
 
            Living in Happy Valley Estate, Darjeeling 
               
Bishnu Prasad’s insecurity is further exacerbated by the unstable status of the Indian-Nepalis 
and the fear of being evicted like the Lhotsampas. Citing lack of political agency of those 
attached to plantation he said, ‘we are territorially bound to the plantation and thus our politics 
is limited and because we are in Bengal, very little of our grievances are heard. This is Bengal 
and there will be Bengali-ism, isn’t it? Our mano-bal (mental strength) has been weakened 
considerably. It is only when a person is educated and strong mentally as well as physically 
that he can think of doing anything but here we are weak and feel inferior.’ Bishnu Prasad’s 
statement is loaded with references to the different types of constraints that are preventing the 
economic and political development of the Nepalis living in the hills and terai of West Bengal. 
While forces of capitalism have reduced them to powerless labourers, the state and its ethnic 
biases have made them politically inconsequential thereby leading to a decline in their mano-
bal.  
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Daily life in Bagrakot and Banarhat, West Bengal 
 
Apart from class hierarchy and economic subservience, dependency on the tea estates 
can also be deemed as one of the important factors that has had a serious impact on the 
worldview of those living on the plantations. After the exit of the British planters in 1947 the 
tea plantations were taken over by their Indian counterparts and the years following 
Independence saw a decline in tea production owing to a number of factors, of which constant 
changes in the management and excessive trade-unionism were primary. This led to factory 
lock downs, exposing the dependency and poverty of the labourers as they were completely 
dependent on the tea factories not just for their livelihoods but even the provision of basic 
necessities. This was due to the Plantation Labour Act, 1951120 which holds the tea companies 
responsible for the welfare of the labourers and their dependents.  
In spite of the guidelines provided by the Act a comparative study conducted in 1996 
on the tea growing states of Assam, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu revealed that housing 
facilities in West Bengal tea estates were either inadequate or sub-standard (twenty-five percent 
of the houses were temporary (kuttcha) made of bamboo and mud and the roofs made of thatch) 
and that the sanitary facilities were deplorable along with inadequate water supplies (Bhowmik 
in Bhowmik et al 1996: 54-55). Except for Makaibari TE, most of the plantations are owned 
by absentee landlords and the gardens often change hands between different companies who 
are more interested in the extraction of profit over a short period of time (Tirkey, 2005). This 
                                                          
120 The Plantation Labour Act, 1951 was enacted to provide for the welfare of the labour and to regulate the 
conditions of work in plantations. It came to force in 1954 and has been amended four times, the last being in 
1986. In principle the tea companies are supposed to provide a wide range of facilities to the labourers, ranging 
from health, education, ration etc. However, education, housing, ration, firewood all comprise a consolidated 
wage and therefore helps sustain the argument of low monetary wage in the tea estates. For detailed description 
of the provisions under this Act, see 
http://www.teaboard.gov.in/pdf/policy/Plantations%20Labour%20Act_amended.pdf 
128 
 
dependency on the tea estates has led to what Naren Chettri121 calls a ‘culture of poverty and 
dependency’ in the estates owing to the lack of human, social and economic capital, a trend 
that extends beyond the boundaries of the tea gardens and spreads across the Darjeeling hills. 
According to Naren Chettri, land is either leased by the government to private tea companies, 
owned by the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Private (at least the stretch from Siliguri to 
Darjeeling) or is under the West Bengal Forest Department. Thus, ownership of non-estate land 
is highly rare in the District especially in Darjeeling and Kurseong sub-districts which have 
major tea and cinchona plantations.122 This dependency on the tea estate is matched by their 
inability to exercise their rights as workers, which abets further frustration and helplessness. 
Workers of the Happy Valley TE123 complained, ‘the malik (owner) is taking advantage. If we 
go on a strike demanding pay revision, he can shut the factory down for the week and we lose 
all our wages or he can shut the factory down completely. They even deliberately declare a 
garden sick so that we are paid lower bonuses and increments. There are hardly any general or 
educational facilities provided.’ Some like Mahesh Kumar Pradhan124 even look at the British 
era favourably saying, ‘according to the agreement with the trade union they are supposed to 
give us blankets, slippers, firewood but they don’t even give ration on time. The malik these 
days act as if they wished they didn’t have to pay us…in certain bagans some of the things that 
the British used to give, they have not been able to give us even that much. Thus, if there is a 
Gorkhaland tomorrow we will establish exemplary standards in the tea gardens within 
Gorkhaland’.  
However, tea garden closures and lower tea production means that gardens are unable 
to generate additional employment.125 In an uncanny similarity to what was practiced during 
                                                          
121 Social entrepreneur and activist interviewed by the author on 30th December, 2011, Kalimpong, West Bengal.  
122 Kalimpong sub-division on the other hand could not be developed as a plantation due to the inability of 
connecting it on the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway line, which facilitated the private ownership of land. This has 
enabled the locals to engage in agriculture, floriculture who thus represent an amorphous and varied class rather 
than a homogenous class of plantation workers.  
123 Group interview conducted by the author on 22nd December, 2010, Darjeeling, West Bengal.  
124 Former employee at the Duncan TE, interviewed by the author on 13th January, 2011, Duncan T.E. Bagrakot, 
West Bengal. 
 
125 According to the West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation Annual Report (2009-10) the tea industry 
in West Bengal is going through a crisis due to lack of investment in the maintenance of gardens, rising costs of 
inputs, lower yield rate and fall in prices. The report attributes the present crisis mainly to the negligence of the 
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the colonial era, all the tea grown in Darjeeling or Duars is taken to auction houses in Calcutta 
where it is branded, auctioned and sold leaving the tea labourers as mere mazdoors (labourers) 
with no stake in any other level of tea production apart from plucking and processing the leaves 
in the factories. With limited chances of growth, the labourer can play no other role in tea 
production in the capitalist enterprise that began with the British Raj. The tea gardens which 
are managed by the West Bengal Tea Development Corporation have become leading 
examples in the denial of the statutory rights of the workers and of non-compliance of the 
provisions of the Plantation Labour Act and therefore a model for private tea companies 
(Bomjan, 2008:21).  Thus, economic deprivation has become a way of life and can be attributed 
to neo-capitalistic structures that are at work in Darjeeling.  
The continuing discrimination and neglect of the labourers has also been well described 
by Bomjan (2008:20). He writes, ‘the incident126 and occurrence of the suicide and lock out of 
Orange Valley tea garden was carried out by the daily newspapers of Nepali language only. 
The daily papers except one in other language published from the district of Darjeeling did not 
consider the happenings worth reporting. But on the same day the death of six pigeons and 
approaching monsoon and clearing of drains by Siliguri Municipal Corporation had four 
column(s) of news in the national dailies published from the region.’  The state of neglect that 
exists in the gardens and of the people living there has enhanced sentiments of being ignored 
and deprived by the state, which has leased the land as well as the labour living on it to the tea 
companies who are driven by profit only.  
This feeling of neglect and abandonment by the state has become an intrinsic part of 
the justification for the sustenance and political use of the Gorkha identity. Thus, insecurity 
over land, lack of control over resources and the general apathy of the state administration has 
found voice through an ethnic movement rather than one based on class owing to the existence 
of powerful ethnic frameworks and socio-political figures like the bir Gorkha which are more 
potent in galvanizing popular support than any class based identity. This may seem as a 
                                                          
garden owners as the profits generated have not been ploughed back into the gardens. The Report further states 
that the repeated negligence of the gardens over the years has resulted in growing sickness of the tea gardens, 
especially in Darjeeling. In 2009-10, tea production declined by 7.3 per cent in Darjeeling District.  
Source: http://www.wbidc.com/images/pdf/annual_report/annual_report-09-10/Tea-Industry.pdf (Accessed 
17/09/2011).  
126 The incident refers to the suicide committed by one of the workers at the Orange Valley TE, Darjeeling on 26th 
April, 2007.  
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surprising trend given the history of class based mobilization in the tea estates under the 
influence of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in the early 1940s by prominent Communist 
figures like Ratanlal Brahmin.127 On the 15th of September 1945, the first union in the tea 
gardens was established by the CPI- Darjeeling Tea Garden Worker’s Union which was soon 
followed by the Darjeeling District Chia Kaman Shramik Sangha (Darjeeling District Tea 
Gardens Labor Union) affiliated to the regional political party, Gorkha League. 128  This 
eventually led to the formation of the National Union of Plantation Workers affiliated with the 
Indian National Congress (Sarkar and Lama, 1986:14-16). 
By 1977, the CPI (M) had already made the tea belt its bastion when it was voted to 
power in the West Bengal General Elections. Their close competitors were the Akhil Bharatiya 
Gorkha League whose popularity subsequently declined after the death of its charismatic leader 
Deo Prakash Rai as well as due to intra-party factionalism. This enabled new parties like Pranta 
Parishad and the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), both formed in the early 1980s as 
well as the CPI (M) to infiltrate and consolidate their hold over the tea gardens. With large 
sections of the population living on tea estates, tea gardens gradually evolved into important 
sites of political mobilization, recruitment and conflict (see Subba, 1992).  
However, this mobilization did not remain as a class movement for long as it was 
infiltrated by ethnicity in the form of the Gorkha, an identity which was more potent in 
generating collective action. The political history of Darjeeling gives evidence of the repeated 
resurrection of the Gorkha identity as a political resource to negotiate, primarily with the state. 
Since the inception of political consciousness in the hills, the image and idea of the Gorkha has 
been utilized by all the political parties- whether it be the All India Gorkha League, Gorkha 
National Liberation Front and even the CPM-they all have had to orient their agenda around 
                                                          
127 One of the early pioneers of Communism in Bengal who along with Jyoti Basu and Rup Narayan Roy were 
the navratnas/nine gems of the first Politburo of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1964. He was also the 
CPI member of the Legislative Assembly from Darjeeling from 1947-52. The CPI (M) was formed at the Seventh 
Congress of the Communist Party of India in 1964 as a revolt against revisionism and sectarianism in the 
Communist movement in India.  
128 Commonly known as Gorkha League, the All India Gorkha League (AIGL)/ Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League 
was formed in 1943 in Darjeeling with the explicit aim of securing a separate administrative set up on the basis 
of ethnic and cultural differences. its predecessor the All India Gorkha League was formed in 1924 in Dehradun, 
hailed as a ‘political party of the Indian Gorkhas, by the Indian Gorkhas,’ so as to supplement and complement 
the struggle for India’s Independence (Bomjan, 2008:86).  
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the attainment of Gorkhaland, using images and language commonly attached to the imagery 
of the Gorkha. As Subba (1992:90) remarks, the early pioneers of communism in Darjeeling, 
Ratanlan Brahmin and Ganeshlal Subba, ‘knew what would sell in Darjeeling- not Marxism, 
Leninsm but Gorkhalism’ as it had stronger emotive potential than any other form of 
representation. Thus, in the tea estates of Darjeeling, class conflates with ethnicity and of the 
two identities it is ethnicity that has been chosen as the means through which to negotiate with 
the state for greater control over resources.  
4.1 (ii) Living, working and existing in Darjeeling 
While the tea estates might be an important site of political activity, the economic deterioration 
of Darjeeling district itself is a primary cause for the political frustration of the people of 
Darjeeling District making it the vortex of an ethnic movement which supports and sustains 
the Gorkha identity.  
Darjeeling features in the Indian Planning Commission’s ‘100 most backward Districts’ 
(Aiyar 2003: 21) where 18.1 percent of the population live below the poverty line and 5.3 
percent of the households go hungry (Debroy and Bhandari, 2003: Annexe).  However, the 
West Bengal Human Development Report (HDR) 2004 ranks Darjeeling district with the 
second highest per capita income (Rs. 18,529) after Kolkata. This irony can be attributed to the 
increase in the trade commerce and real estate investment in Siliguri129 and the profits of the 
tea industry which does not trickle down to the large majority of workers who are unemployed 
and live in poverty (rural poverty ratio is 19.66 per cent and urban poverty ratio is 15.21 per 
cent) (HDR 2004:80).   
Travel brochures promote Darjeeling as the ‘Queen of the Hills’ with images of lush tea 
plantations set against the background of the scenic Mt. Kanchendzonga. However, tea gardens 
not only dominate the popular imagery of Darjeeling but also the physical landscape thereby 
reducing the total amount of land available for the development of other industries in the hills 
(Tirkey, 2005:92). Tourism is another source of employment for the local people of the 
Darjeeling hills but because it is restricted to only a number of areas, its impact on local 
                                                          
129 Siliguri is strategically located on the border of Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. It connects the Indian mainland 
to north-eastern India. Apart from being one of the fastest growing commercial cities in West Bengal, Siliguri has 
also historically been a center of both official as well as black-market trade in various foreign consumer goods 
from Thailand via Bangladesh and from Nepal (Ganguly-Scarse and Scarse, 1999: 267).  
 
132 
 
employment opportunities is limited.130 Albeit limited to a small area, tourism is one of the 
most important sources of employment for the local population. This thriving industry has also 
taken a setback as a result of the political agitation with tourists choosing nearby Sikkim or 
Bhutan over Darjeeling. While political agitation has effectively kept the tourists away there 
has been severe over exploitation of natural resources like timber. For example in 1951 about 
45 percent of the total area of Darjeeling was under forest cover but by 1986 the number had 
fallen to 23 percent (Ganguly, 2005: 474). Thus, in Darjeeling it is generally perceived that not 
only is the state not contributing to eradicating unemployment but it is robbing them of their 
natural resources as profits from these resources never make their way back to the hills.  
Apart from low wages in the tea estates, unemployment is one of the biggest problems 
plaguing Darjeeling District as there are no employment avenues that remain unexploited. This 
situation is compounded by the fact that Darjeeling District has the highest literacy rate (72.9 
per cent) in West Bengal after Kolkata (HDR, 2004:148). With over 24, 313 students appearing 
for the Madhyamik/ higher secondary exams in 2011 alone (The Telegraph, 2011)131 Darjeeling 
faces a serious problem of the educated unemployed. This prompts men as well as women to 
migrate either to neighbouring Sikkim132 or to other Indian cities in search for employment in 
call centres if educated or as domestic servants, nannies and assistants in beauty parlours if 
uneducated. While government jobs are difficult to find in general, top administrative positions 
are occupied by officers from the Indian Civil Services and the West Bengal Civil Services, 
who are often recruited from different parts of the country. Barring a handful of ST/SC 
candidates there are very few non-Bengali civil servants or those occupying high positions in 
the government (Bomjan, 2008:33). 
All these socio-economic grievances are strongly presented and understood through an 
ethnic framework which has become more persistent and prominent owing to the recent 
Gorkhaland movement. Ringit Lepcha 133  describes the out-migration of the young and 
                                                          
130 Kalimpong sub-division is also promoted as one of the tourist destinations but apart from tourism small cottage 
industries like cheese, hand-made paper, floriculture, noodles etc provide means of subsistence thereby limiting 
the reliance on government employment, which offers only very limited opportunities.  
 
131 Source: The Telegraph, West Bengal, 22/02/2011. (Accessed 03/10/2011). 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110223/jsp/siliguri/story_13621955.jsp 
 
132  Which then in turn causes tensions relating to the ‘outsider, non-Sikkimese’ status of the people coming in to 
work in the state.  
133 A member of the Youth wing of the GJM, resident of the area surrounding Happy Valley TE, interviewed by 
the author on 26th December, 2010.  
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educated to different Indian cities in order to work in call centers as a ‘brain-drain of the 
society’. He complains of the lack of new positions or the appointment to the vacant ones as 
being ridden with systemic impediments that have been put in place by the Bengali state. 
According to Ringit, positions which demanded high educational qualifications were either 
declared vacant or interviews were conducted either in Siliguri or Kolkata even for positions 
within Darjeeling District. Writing in the context of tourism, which is one of the most important 
sources of income, T.B Subba (1989:312) says, ‘the majority of the employees and almost all 
the top ranking officers in the West Bengal Tourism Development Corporation134 being the 
Bengalis, the sense  of  participation among the locals in the promotion of tourism is not up to 
the expectation. The locals generally get employment as photographers, or as taxi and bus 
drivers.’ Thus according to the generally accepted narrative, the state is seen as practicing 
exclusionary policies that are designed to sideline the hill people. While there might be an 
element of truth in this, the importance of this narrative lies in its potency as a basis for political 
mobilization.  
This exclusion of locals was also a common phenomenon in the tea gardens where local 
managers are a rarity, much to the annoyance of the local workers. Members of the Happy 
Valley TE union135 were vocal about the lack of opportunities for career advancement, ‘the 
auction houses are in Kolkata and thus the people working in Kolkata get bigger posts while 
we remain labourers forever. Thulo thulo manchey haru (big, well placed people) sit in those 
auction houses but they have never even seen a tea bush in their lives while we who are born 
and brought up here never get a chance’. These voices of frustration and anger also revealed 
that issues around employment went beyond simple demand for greater investment in human 
resources encompassing the sons of the soil- the Gorkhas. 
 Frustration over unemployment as well as under employment is rampant in Darjeeling 
district and as Ram Mukhia 136 explained to me, ‘even if I am educated all I can do is just cut 
grass (fodder) there is nothing else to do’. Ram linked rampant unemployment to the 
                                                          
134 West Bengal Tourism Development Corporation was established in 1975 in order to streamline the tourism 
industry.  
 
135 Group interview conducted by the author on 22nd December, 2010, Darjeeling, West Bengal. 
 
136 Worker at the Cinchona factory, interviewed by the author on the 5th January, 2011 at Mungpoo, Darjeeling 
District, West Bengal 
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infrastructural underdevelopment of the region and compared that to the prosperity of Sikkim. 
In doing this he highlighted the relationship between the economy, polity and development all 
of which could be, apparently, accomplished in a new state. This relationship was also evident 
in an interview with Maya Dahal,137 a health worker and an active member of the Nari Morcha 
of the GJM (Women’s Front). Maya Dahal had a long list of grievances ranging from lack of 
employment, infrastructure to unaccountability of the politicians. I asked her if she felt all of 
these problems would be resolved with a new state to which she replied, ‘I am sure that things 
will change if Gorkhaland is created. If there is a state tomorrow then it will be a small state 
and it will be democratic. Before when the DGHC was in place we were not aware of anything. 
The public did not even know that Ghising had gone ahead and accepted the DGHC. Things 
have changed now. Janta sachet bhayo (the public are aware now) and if there is Gorkhaland, 
the public will be more aware because we all know we need to develop. Look at Sikkim, Pawan 
Chamling has started so many projects and other beautification projects. Thus, state is related 
to identity as well as development.’ By extension, it can be said that the Gorkha as an ethnic 
identity is evoked to fulfill instrumental purposes of securing a platform through which to 
negotiate with a state that is accused of engaging in discriminatory ethnic politics. 
The sense of ethnic discrimination by the West Bengal state was persistent in almost 
all the interviews conducted during the fieldwork. The economic and administrative failures of 
the government were translated as ethnic discrimination which necessitated the demand for a 
new state. An example of administrative inefficiency was recounted by Kunga Tamang138 who 
talked of his experiences of strikes and agitation even as a student demanding for a full time 
Principal at the Government College. It was only after eight years of general action that the 
government college got a full time Principal. His frustration was however articulated as 
resentment against the state which is controlled administratively by the Bengalis. -‘Bengal is 
responsible for our situation today. The way they see us is different, they look at Darjeeling 
and say amar sonar Bengal (my golden Bengal) but they do not embrace us as their own.’ 
Elaborating this sentiment of ethnic discrimination, Mahesh Kumar Pradhan (Bagrakot, 2011) 
says that from Bagrakot there are over two hundred young men who have joined the army, the 
Border Security Force and even the Bihar and Jharkhand police. When asked if there were any 
                                                          
137 Leading member of the GJM’s local women’s wing, interview conducted by the author on  
3rd January, 2011, Mungpoo, Darjeeling.  
 
138 Self-employed youth who ran a taxi service to Siliguri. Both his father and grandfather had worked on the 
estate. Interviewed by the author on 21st of December, 2010, Darjeeling, West Bengal. 
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in West Bengal police he replied, ‘we cannot think of getting employed in West Bengal services 
because of ethnic discrimination. Even if we are five foot tall, they will write we are only four 
foot ten inches and debar us.’ Thus, while unemployment and underdevelopment were the 
recurring themes that emerged from the conversations in the hills, they were understood only 
in the framework of ethnic discrimination.   
Language has remained an important bone of contention in Darjeeling District. In 1958 
the West Bengal government moved a resolution that proposed to make Bengali the only 
language for all administrative and official purposes in the state. This resolution was followed 
by an attempt to remove the Nepali language course from Calcutta University ignoring its 
earlier recognition for study up to graduation level. This resolution was enacted in 1961 as the 
‘Official Languages Bill’ but massive protests compelled the state legislature to accept Nepali 
as an additional language for the hill divisions of Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong (Lama, 
2008: 247-48). This however not only raised emotional concerns about the status of the Nepalis 
in West Bengal but also prompted logistical concerns as candidates from the hill areas of 
Darjeeling have to be conversant in written as well as spoken Bengali. It is compulsory for 
WBCS (executive) officers to pass a paper in Bengali if they want their yearly increments 
sanctioned (Bomjan, 2008:34). While every Nepali speaking candidate has to be well versed 
in Bengali the reverse is not true for those Bengali candidates who are posted to the Nepali 
speaking Darjeeling hills. Darjeeling district is the farthest district from Kolkata and thus 
administrative problems abound, which are amplified by a division between the administrative 
staff who are primarily Bengali and the clients who are Nepalis, thus as Kunga Tamang 
(Darjeeling, 2010) said, ‘If we want to enquire about our pension or gratuity we have to either 
go to Kolkata or Siliguri where we are defeated by the Bengali language in the offices.’ Thus 
ethnicity was seen as being directly linked to the inability to access scarce resources.  
The conspicuous absence of the state is marked by the problems that the people have to 
face on a daily basis. Investment in social services like health and infrastructural development 
is negligible. While small health posts are scattered on the hillside, there are a handful of 
hospitals in the major towns which are not equipped to handle complicated cases thereby 
necessitating any medical emergencies to be transferred down to private nursing homes in 
Siliguri, for at least those who can afford it.  For example, the travelogue of a German surgeon 
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travelling through different parts of India, often volunteering at hospitals is quite insightful in 
its description of the medical facilities. Dr.Elias Engelking139 writes (in 2005): 
‘... the Sadar hospital is in the lower, poorer part of the town. Officially there are 300 beds and 
unofficially 500 beds. The conditions are so indescribable that I lack the words to describe it. 
The absolute basic necessities are missing: hygiene, running water, medicines, diagnostic 
devices etc. The missing diagnostic devices are replaced by clinical investigation as far as 
possible. The language of the physicians amongst themselves is Bengali and that of the nurses 
and most of the patients is Nepali. The patients represent the poor and poorest caste of the 
population. They cannot afford to invest larger sums of money for additional medical treatment. 
The average income of a family is 1-2 euro per day, far less for some others. You must imagine 
the basic condition as follows- no running water...normal bulbs are the source of light and 
should these not be sufficient, a flashlight, an autoclave (sterilisation equipment) that is run on 
the gas-burner and perhaps one or two patients lying in the entrance area lying on the ground 
waiting in queue for their turn’.  
Scarcity of water is another major problem in almost all the areas of the District which 
do not have a natural source of running water or lakes nearby. The main town of Darjeeling 
epitomizes this problem. Dependent on the water reservoirs that were built by the British in 
1910 and 1932 for a town with a population of ten thousand, Darjeeling town with a population 
of over 120, 414 (2011 census) suffers major water shortages throughout the year and more 
severely during the summer season. Projects to bring water to Darjeeling from the river Balasan 
were proposed but never took off owing to lack of funds as well as initiative and the Neora 
Valley Project in Kalimpong drawn up in 1978-79 and completed in 1995 does not provide 
sufficient water to the sub-District (Bomjan 2008: 44-45).  
Thus, as Janmal (2009:35) writes, if the long reign of the GNLF in the DGHC was 
characterised as ‘Contractor Raj’, the urban water supply system in Kalimpong can likewise 
be described as ‘Fitter Raj’ where “unscrupulous pipe-fitters of the water works with the 
connivance of the department babus” to provide illegal water connections to those who can 
bribe them thereby making access to the scarce public goods even more scarce. A common 
perception remains that distance from Kolkata is associated with some degree of neglect by the 
state and the need to develop these institutions requires the intervention of the state (HDR, 
                                                          
139 ‘A medical journey through India’ http://india2005.org/462.html (Accessed:1/10/2011) 
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2008:198-99). The Kolkata based government has always been deemed as remote, opaque and 
unaccountable to the local people and experiences of expulsion from party and Parliamentary 
position [as experienced by members of Parliament R.B. Rai and Dawa Lama, representatives 
of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha respectively from the CPI (M)] has led to a ‘syndrome of 
inhibition’ (Ganguly, 2005: 475; Bomjan, 2008: 25).  
Nonetheless, the underdevelopment of the hills has to be understood in the context of 
the performance of West Bengal as a whole. The Communist Party of India (Marxists) had 
been at the helm of the state from 1977 till 2011 and while there seemed to be an apparent 
political stability but a close inspection of the standard measurements of economic 
development highlights that West Bengal was an average performing state owing to excessive 
unionisation and poor labour relations (Banerjee et al, 2002:1). While it has achieved many 
significant milestones in land reforms and agricultural growth since the 1980s, in contrast to 
these impressive achievements in the country-side, the state of industries, education 
infrastructure or fiscal discipline has progressively deteriorated (ibid).  
Within West Bengal a significant part of the state is relatively more economically 
backward and also tends to be less advanced in terms of human development indices. A 
comparative analysis of various indicators (education, health) places Darjeeling at a better 
position than other districts like Nadia or even neighbouring Jalpaiguri.  
Table2: Comparing Human Development Index in West Bengal 
 Health Index Income 
Index 
Education 
Index 
Human Development  
Index 
West Bengal 07.0 0.43 0.69 0.69 
Kolkata 0.82 0.73 0.80 0.78 
Darjeeling 0.73 0.49 0.72 0.65 
Jalpaiguri 0.61 0.38 0.60 0.53 
Malda 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.44 
Fig. 1 Source West Bengal Human Development Report, 2004:13140 
Thus arguments of relative depravation would not suffice because when measured 
against other districts in the state, poverty and underdevelopment is almost equally distributed. 
                                                          
140 For details of methodology and nature of calculations of the indices see Guha-Roy, 2003.  
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While the dearth of infrastructure and development may be a common feature in developing 
societies but as T.B. Subba (1992: 43) points out, ‘the criteria of judging whether a particular 
region or ethnic group is economically advanced, stagnant or retarded are many…What matters 
more is how a particular ethnic group perceives its economic status.’ 
 The poverty and socio-political backwardness of the hills of Darjeeling district is seen 
as symptomatic of the ethnic prejudice of the Bengali dominated administrative structure 
against the Nepalis who also comprise the largest ethnic group in the District. The relationship 
between Kolkata and Darjeeling is viewed as an unequal one between a centre and periphery, 
based not only on economic deprivation but also ethnic discrimination, which is perceived as 
a reflection of the national prejudice against Nepalis in India. While the flight of Nepalis from 
Meghalaya and Assam141  are offered as evidence of the position of Nepalis in India, the 
expulsion of the Bhutanese-Nepalis/ Lhotsampas is cited as a case example of the condition of 
the Nepalis outside of Nepal, thereby breeding fear and insecurity amongst the Indian-Nepalis 
who are rightful citizens of India. Unresolved socio-economic problems and political aspiration 
have resulted in the emergence of politics based on the Gorkha identity in North Bengal, which 
is supported by an overwhelming majority of Indian-Nepalis living in different parts of the 
country. The rationale behind this resonance with the Gorkha identity and its utility as a 
political resource will be discussed in the following section.  
4.2: Politics and the Gorkha 
4.2 (i) Of socio-economic issues and ethnic frames 
Yo bhoomi ko laadai ho (this is a fight for the land)’142 is a sentiment which reverberates 
amongst the Nepali community whether it be in the hills or the Duars and has a literal 
implication also. Under the colonial system private ownership of land by the local residents 
was highly restricted and limited only to the Khasmal area.143 Consequent lack of ownership 
of land and the access to its resources has fostered a culture of landlessness, poverty and 
                                                          
141 See Wagle, 2010 and Parajuli, 2006 for further discussion on these topics.  
142 Former employee at the Cinchona factories and one of the earliest supporters of the GJM in the Cinchona 
plantation interviewed by the author on 5th of January, 2011, Mungpoo, District Darjeeling, West Bengal. 
143 Every tea estate will have a Khasmal area where private property can be held.  
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dependency. This culture is characteristic of the tea industry in the north-east and exacerbated 
by the negligent attitude of the state towards its ethnic minorities.  
While the deteriorating economic condition of the hills has played an important role in 
instilling a sense of discrimination and therefore catalyzed the demands for change, what 
remains important and interesting is the use of the Gorkha identity in this political movement. 
While the observation of the physical space can be an indicator of the grievances common to 
an area and maybe even motivations for political participation, the persistence and use of the 
Gorkha identity raised questions of why did people choose the Gorkha as a symbol of their 
frustration against the state and other capitalistic forces? However, before analyzing whether 
the Gorkha identity was a political choice or a deeply ingrained and institutionalized way of 
life, the primary question revolved around recognizing the Gorkha itself. 
 The political as well as social mobilization of the Gorkha identity owes much to the 
earlier literary elites as much as to Subhash Ghising, the leader of the GNLF and the 
Gorkhaland movement of 1986. What had begun as a demand made by Pranta Parishad, a local 
political party, in the early 80s evolved into a mass movement for a separate state under the 
leadership of Subhash Ghising and the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF). It was 
particularly instrumental in establishing the idea of a homeland as a measure to prevent the 
Gorkhas from being treated as foreigners or domiciled Nepali citizens along with the powerful 
imagery of the brave, khukuri brandishing Gorkha (Ganguly, 2005: 478). 
 Although the demand for a homeland might have remained dormant after the formation 
of the DGHC in 1986 the ‘Prashant Tamang phenomenon’ of 2007 showed that although 
subdued, the Gorkha was not forgotten. As a participant in ‘Indian Idol’, a national pop-idol 
contest, Prashant, a Nepali from Darjeeling, immediately became the representative for 
millions of Nepalis and their aspirations of acceptance and assimilation with the Indian nation, 
as well as a symbol of solidarity of Nepalis living in different parts of the world. Campaign for 
‘votes’ through text messages and phone calls for Prashant was undertaken on a war footing 
and ranged from signature campaigns, planting trees, processions, pamphlet distribution and 
picketing mobile service producers to warning power suppliers (as Darjeeling is notorious for 
power cuts).144  Leading this was not Subhas Ghising but one of his former aides, Bimal 
                                                          
144 Source: http://prasanttamang.blogspot.co.uk/2007/06/sikkim-and-darjeeling-in-integrated.html (Accessed 
20/03/2012). 
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Gurung. The euphoria and support led not only to Prashant winning the competition but also 
led to the ousting of Ghising and the formation of the GJM by Bimal Gurung. Capitalizing on 
the movement the GJM immediately renewed the demand for Gorkhaland and in 2011, after 
three years of ‘non-violent, Gandhian’145 agitation, signed the Tripartite Treaty which led to 
the formation of the Gorkha Territorial Authority. In the context of this research, the 
Gorkhaland movement played an important role in reviving the Gorkha identity as well as in 
its re-construction in a bid to incorporate all the ethnic groups living in Darjeeling. As the 
movement progressed, the understanding of the term ‘Gorkha’ also altered. This highlights 
how the Gorkha identity itself is a product of the social as well as political construction of 
literary elites as well as other political agents and is flexible enough to include new ethnic 
groups that might be politically beneficial.  
There was a strange, ambivalent politics of identity going on in the hills of Darjeeling 
at the time of fieldwork in 2010 which made the Gorkha identity more elusive than ever. The 
identity of the Gorkha had changed over the years- from a khukuri wielding Nepali man to now 
an ethnic group following Gandhian principles and inclusive of other ethnic groups (Bhutia, 
Lepchas, Tibetans and even Marwaris) who lived in the hill regions. 
 
                   Bhutia, Lepcha or Nepali, we are all Gorkhali 
                 
                                                          
145 Although the 2007 Gorkhaland movement did not replicate the violence of the 1986 agitation, there were 
numerous instances of violent skirmishes between the Nepali and Bengali ethnic groups, especially in the foothills 
of Darjeeling where the majority population is ethnically Bengali. In the hills, the assassination of Madan Tamang, 
leader of the ABGL, in the middle of Darjeeling town on 21st of May, 2010 was one of the most shocking and 
violent instances of the homeland movement. Although implicated, the GJM was never proven guilty of the crime 
nor was the motive made clear. Madan Tamang and the ABGL were opposed to the momentum and direction of 
the Gorkhland movement. His death raises questions of democratic practices within the Gorkhland movement and 
the prevalence of impunity in politics.  
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While previously, the term was directly representative of the Nepalis living in 
Darjeeling most specifically and of the Nepalis living in India more generally, the boundaries 
of the term ‘Gorkha’ have now widened. It now incorporates members of other ethnic groups 
like Tibetans, Lepchas living in Darjeeling hills, who do not have any similarity, historical or 
cultural with the Nepali population included in the fold of the ‘Gorkha’ category. This is a 
progression which is not very difficult to understand as it is one of political necessity for those 
living in the Darjeeling hills to present a united front to the West Bengal government. 
Defending this move by the GJM, Sunil Rai,146 Central Committee member of the GJM, says, 
‘we have changed the concept of the Gorkha a bit. Now everybody (Bhutia, Lepcha, Marwari 
and Bihari) is a Gorkha. Although other groups may not have an identity crisis like us (i.e. 
Nepalis), they only have economic crisis but we have to fight together. Other communities are 
with us and call themselves Gorkhas.’ This points towards the constructed nature of the Gorkha 
identity, which was responsive to changes in the wider political scenario and made adjustments 
to its membership as well as cultural content accordingly. Perceptions of discrimination by the 
state were crucial in constructing the imagery as well as the grievances of the Gorkha.  
Because the Darjeeling hills is a multi-ethnic space where people belonging to different 
ethnic groups have lived and suffered similar economic hardships, these factors have thus led 
to the formation of a cohesive Gorkha identity despite the multiplicity of ethnic affiliations. 
Kamal Tamang147 executive member of the Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh (BGP)148 however 
feels that even right from the outset, no thought has really gone into defining who the Gorkha 
is and draws a line at what he calls ‘hill-people’ which even includes groups like Bhutias and 
Lepchas. However, the important question that arose was- why identify as a Gorkha and not as 
a Nepali? Was Gorkha just a replacement term for Nepali? I sought answers to these questions 
from various individuals in the hills as well as the Duars and their responses showed the 
                                                          
146 Interviewed by the author on 24th December, 2010 in Darjeeling, West Bengal. 
147 Academic, activist and member of the Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh, interviewed by the author on 13th February. 
2011, New Delhi, India.  
148 One of the leading socio-political organizations demanding the separate state of Gorkhaland. Unlike the 
GJM, the BGP has refrained from participation in elections in the hills. According to their official website, the 
Bharatiya Gorkha Parissangh is committed to the vision of a Gorkha society in India, recognized and accepted 
as a dignified, cultured and patriotic society at par with any other civilized modern Indian society enjoying the 
full rights and privileges enshrined in the Indian Constitution (emphasis mine). 
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different ways in which the Gorkha was seen and understood. The following is an excerpt from 
my conversation with I.B.Rai (Siliguri, 2011) on the identification of the Gorkha. 
I: What is the difference between a Nepali and a Gorkha? Do both refer to the same group of 
people? 
R: It is fear that has led to the adoption of the term Gorkha. The Nepalis of India fear that if 
they say that I am a Nepali, then they might be asked to go back to Nepal or be discriminated 
against by other Indians. Thus it is because of this fear and an attempt to hide from such 
questions and situations that the term Gorkha has been used by the Nepali jati.  
I: How well founded are these fears? 
R: There is a Nepali proverb, ‘the tiger outside might not eat you but the tiger in your mind has 
already eaten you,’ The Indian Constitution is very clear on the position of the Nepalis. We are 
Indian citizens. We don’t need to hide but I don’t think we trust the Constitution and maybe 
have not studied it well enough.  
I: Can Gorkha be called a jati? 
R: Land, population, common language are required to be a jati. The most important being a 
homeland…Nepali jati needs bhoomi (land) to survive. We need land where we can live 
together, speak our language and celebrate our culture.  
I: Do you have any reservations about the use of the term ‘Gorkha’? 
R: I have no problem with the word Gorkha. It used to have a military history but a word keeps 
changing its meaning so even the word Gorkha has now changed.  
I: What do you call yourself- Gorkha or Nepali? 
R: I call myself Nepali. 
The fear that I.B.Rai refers to is also what has become an overused, cliché term in ethnic 
politics-‘identity crisis.’ Another respondent Maya Dahal149 explained her need for the Gorkha 
in order to safeguard her Indian identity which she felt that I as a Sikkimese did not need. I 
                                                          
149 Leading member of the GJM’s local women’s wing, interview conducted by the author on 3rd January, 2011, 
Mungpoo, Darjeeling.  
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asked her what does the Gorkha actually mean, is it a martial class or did it represent only the 
Nepalis of Darjeeling? She responded, ‘to talk of Gorkha is to talk of astitva (identity). No 
matter where we go in India we are looked at as foreigners. I am sure you have been asked the 
same question but at least you can say you are Sikkimese. We just want to be known as 
Indians.150 
 Most anecdotes of ‘identity crisis’ usually begin on a train or bus journey where Indian-
Nepalis are confused with Nepalese citizens or are taunted by the Bengalis as foreigners or 
immigrants. Taking the same train ‘identity crisis’ situation, I asked Ringit Lepcha (Darjeeling, 
2010): 
I: How would you explain to a South Indian who a Gorkha is? 
R: I would say that there is a jati in north-east India which lives under the domination of West 
Bengal. That jati is called the Gorkha. 
This definition not only describes the Gorkha as a jati but the identity is also derived 
from an unequal relationship of control and domination of one by the other, thereby 
externalising the understanding of the Gorkha itself. Despite the difference in method and 
political aspirations, members of the BGP also held a similar perspective on the issue of identity 
which conflated race and nationality. Sushil Moktan151 is one of the executive members of the 
BGP and a highly respected leader in the Duars. I asked him if Gorkhaland was aimed at 
resolving the problem of ‘identity-crisis’ faced by the Indian-Nepalis. His response was a 
resolute yes and he said, ‘when we go to Delhi, they ask have you come from Bhutan. Whether 
it be Bhandari or Chamling (former and present Chief Ministers of Sikkim), they say the same. 
If they ask a Naga or a Manipuri, with whom we share similar physical features, where they 
have come from and they say Nagaland or Manipur then people don’t ask any other questions. 
Gorkhaland might not solve the economic problems of millions of Indian-Nepalis but if there 
is a state then they can at least say they are from Gorkhaland. Just give us the label “Made in 
India” we don’t want anything else.’ 
                                                          
 
 
 
151 Former member of the Labour Union at Duncan TE, member of the BGP, interviewed by the author on 12th 
January, 2011, Bagrakot, West Bengal.   
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Approaches to understanding the Gorkha range from intense internalisation (mostly 
amongst the garden residents) to one of ambivalence amongst the urban section of the 
population who are more comfortable and attached with the idea of ‘Darjeeling-ness’ than with 
an identity as Gorkhas. Although a miniscule proportion represent this divergence from the 
mass attachment to Gorkhaland, it nonetheless reflects an important aspect of the socio-
economic stratification of Darjeeling and the corresponding relationship between class and an 
ethnic category. It also highlights the efficacy of the Gorkha identity as a political resource for 
mass mobilization in front of which all alternative forms of identity are politically impotent.  
For those who have never made the social as well as the physical crossover to the 
estates, there might be room for debate and deliberation over the Gorkha identity but the bir 
Gorkha as a symbol of bravery and power has been deeply internalized by those living on the 
estates. Despite the fact that half of the labour force on the tea estates is composed of women152 
and images of women plucking tea are used for promotion of the hill station, it is the image of 
the bir and loyal Gorkha which persistent in public imagination and used for political 
mobilization.  
However, increasing popularity and acceptance of the term has also lent a territorial 
nature to the identity itself by building a conceptual boundary between the Nepalis living in 
Darjeeling and those in Sikkim, who have always been accused of being indifferent to the 
Gorkhaland cause. For example in 2009, Bimal Gurung in one of his speeches in Darjeeling 
was quoted as saying, ‘the Sikkim government has been filing legal suits153 one after the other 
on us. I will however not let them sit in peace. Sikkim has not spoken on behalf of Gorkhaland. 
                                                          
152 According to a study conducted by Sarkar and Bhowmik (1999) in Darjeeling district and Duars the 
large number of female workers in the plantations did not necessarily translate to the 
participation in the trade unions owing to low levels of literacy, inferior status in the household 
as well as workplace which eventually lowered political consciousness.  
 
153 The National Highway 31A is the only road that connects Sikkim to other parts of the country and thus as a 
tactical measure to exert pressure on Sikkim to support the Gorkhaland movement, the GJM had been calling 
strikes frequently along the NH31A against which the Sikkim government had to get a judicial order from the 
Supreme Court of India. On 29thof March, 2011 the Sikkim Legislative Assembly passed a resolution in favour 
of the creation of Gorkhaland saying that a separate state was a genuine and a legitimate demand of the people 
of Darjeeling hills. The Chief Minister of Sikkim indirectly hinted that along with the moral support that Sikkim 
was lending, Gorkhaland was needed to ensure peace and development of Sikkim and uninterrupted traffic on 
NH31A .  
Source:The Telegraph, 20/03/ 2011  
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110330/jsp/siliguri/story_13784068.jsp).  
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The Sikkim Chief Minister should realize that he too suffers from an identity crisis in this 
country which can only be negated with the formation of a separate state for the Gorkhas’ (Talk 
Sikkim, 2011:12). This territorial boundary of the Gorkha identity has complicated the 
relationship further because in spite of sharing similar ethnic affiliation the Nepalis of Sikkim 
are treated on par with others (Bengali, Marwaris) from outside the hills.  This is best 
exemplified by the incessant strikes, blockades and threats of violence along the national 
highway that connects Sikkim to the outside world as they belong to a different political 
territory.  
Ethnic politics depends, to a very large extent, upon the will of the state, which through 
its recognition or non-recognition of an ethnic group, can grant legitimacy, render prior ethnic 
divisions more permanent and promote mobilisation of formerly un-recognised groups (Nagel, 
1995; Nagel, 1979 in Neilsen, 1985:135; Brown, 1994). Thus, when confronted with a state 
which considers Nepali ethnic nationalism a threat to its territorial integrity and refuses to 
officially recognize the ethnic distinction of the Nepalis (as this would legitimize the demand 
for secession), the GJM chose a strategy of cultural symbolism to accentuate the obvious ethnic 
boundaries and present Gorkha culture as distinct and deserving of institutional privileges.  
Culture is a publicly available platform dependent on symbols that facilitate an 
understanding of the world. Symbolic forms of culture are the means though which behaviour 
and outlook is shared within a community as well as with other groups (Hannerz, 1969 cited in 
Swidler, 1986: 275; Cohen, 1993).  The success of disseminating and distinguishing Gorkha 
culture is heavily dependent on identity symbols, mostly tangible aspects like clothes, customs, 
and music as representatives of identity. Most of the symbols which are politically significant 
are overtly non-political, their political efficacy being indirectly proportional to their political 
forms (Swidler, 1986). Thus as one of the most important identity symbol, clothes act as a non-
verbal means of communication and represent cultural values and distinct identities of groups 
(Sarkar, 2008).  
As much as the Gorkha identity is supposed to reflect the culture and tradition of the 
Nepalis of India, the tangible aspects of this identity is also constructed in response to the 
Bengali ethnic group. Visible differentiation from the Bengali population is an important 
source of recognizing co-members of this ethnic group. Once again, it was the GJM which was 
instrumental in establishing the culture of the Gorkha, which is slightly controversial 
considering that the Gorkha is an amalgamation of different ethnic groups. Nonetheless, the 
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Nepali ensemble of chubandi (wrapper) and cholo (blouse) for women of a particular pattern 
and daura suruwal were chosen by the GJM as the clothes of the Gorkha people. Ironically, 
these dresses were exactly the same as those worn in Nepal but nonetheless, different from 
Bengali clothes and as Kamal Tamang (New Delhi, 2011) points out, by initiating cultural 
propaganda the GJM got their identity politics mixed up. He feels that the Gorkhaland 
movement is an assertion of ‘Indian-ness’ of the Nepalis rather than that of Nepali ethnicity as 
it is not ethnicity under threat but the political identity of the Indian-Nepalis. While this 
perspective does hold logical sway, it has nonetheless been overshadowed by the popular 
movement which emphasizes more the material aspects of Nepali ethnicity. For example, as a 
strategy to institutionalise the ethnic difference between the Gorkhas and the Bengalis, the GJM 
issued a directive in the summer of 2008, popularly known as the ‘Dress Code’154 making it 
mandatory for all the ethnic groups to wear their traditional clothes during the month long 
festival period, which is also the busiest tourist season. This made the hills an active cultural 
museum and the GJM selected signifiers of Gorkha culture highly visible to anyone who visited 
the hills. This visual propaganda has proved effective not only in institutionalizing the obvious 
cultural differences but also in instilling a sense of ethnic bonding that could be instrumental 
in furthering the homeland movement. 
Sunil Rai (Darjeeling, 2010) has an interesting explanation for the ‘culture of the 
Gorkha’. Acknowledging the multiplicity of ethnic groups that are subsumed into the category 
of Nepalis, he says, ‘the Gorkha culture is an amalgamation of all the other Nepali ethnic 
groups. All these different ethnic groups are the roots of the tree which is the Gorkha’. He 
further elaborates the necessity for visual symbols, ‘If I go to South India, because of how we 
look, our Mongoloid features, we might be mistaken for Chinese or they might call us Manipuri 
bhaiyas (brothers) but if I say I am a Gorkha then I should be recognizable/distinct visually 
through my clothes also’.  
The Gorkhaland movement spearheaded by the GJM, like most ethnic movements, also 
utilised pre-existing identities which may be re-imagined and reintegrated in order to solidify 
the collective identity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001:297). The present day Gorkha unity and 
identity is a product not only of the collective memory of home and migration but also of the 
                                                          
154 Refusal to wear the dress resulted in their faces being blackened by GJM activists.   
Source: The Telegraph, 15th September, 2008  
 http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081015/jsp/siliguri/story_9968368.jsp 
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internalisation of the colonial construct of the ‘bir’ Gorkha. Thus, the clothes, traditional 
dances and the cultural processions performed two parallel functions, ethnic distinction from 
the majority Bengali as well as portrayal of unyielding patriotism towards the Indian state. The 
Gorkhaland movement captures the essence of what Laswell (1927) defines as the functions of 
a cultural propaganda, which is the presentation of a culture in a manner that generates favour, 
converts the hostile, attracts the indifferent and prevents negative assumption, in effect, these 
were attempts to increase the value of the Gorkha as a valid ethnic resource capable of bringing 
changes in the lives of the Nepalis of Darjeeling.  
Nonetheless, in spite of its merit and de-merits the visible representation of Nepali 
identity performed the latent function of reviving and instilling a sense of ethnic pride in the 
community, which is evident in the currency the word Gorkha has gained amongst Indian-
Nepalis all over India as a means of identification and differentiation from the citizens of Nepal. 
Thus, attempts to change the perception of others, can also lead to the change in the perception 
of the self, transform cultural representation, leading to a change in collective identity itself 
and stronger inter-group boundaries than prior to the movement (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).  
4.2 (ii) Choosing the Gorkha 
A product of imperialism, the construction of the Gorkha can be attributed to the process of 
‘making up people’(Hacking, 2006:23) whereby through stereotyping, influencing perceptions 
etc people and their identities are created and seen in a certain sense that did not exist before. 
As Pemble (2009: 371, 375) says, the Gurkha was neither invented nor discovered by the 
British, he was nevertheless an invention or a discovery of imperialism. He would not have 
existed without the Empire and by the time the British Empire in India came to an end the 
legend of the Gurkha was fully grown.  According to Kishore Pradhan,155 editor of a leading 
Nepali daily and a noted historian, ‘we (Nepalis) are originally a peasant community but the 
British never knew us as agriculturists. They saw us only as fighters. Thus whatever identity 
was given by the British, we have adopted that as our only identification, defined ourselves by 
it and by calling ourselves Gorkha we are reinforcing that identity.’  While some may see the 
martial legacy of the bir Gorkha as making Calibans out of Indian-Nepalis- ruthless, without 
sense or sensibility and just out to fight (Kamal Tamang, 2011), the idea of a martial race has 
been not only accepted and imbibed by the Nepali community in India but has also been put to 
                                                          
155 Interview conducted by the author on 20th January, 2011, Siliguri, West Bengal.  
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political use. The demand for Gorkhaland has thereby completed the process of reification of 
a colonial construct. The Gorkha is thus forever, ‘a hostage to a racial discourse, a 
representation of the ambivalent, unequal relationship that the people of Darjeeling share with 
their colonial masters.’156   
This ambivalence is reflected in the term Gorkha itself as the answer to who or what 
the Gorkha is can be different, depending on the epistemological background of the question 
asked. The answer also varies according to the reference point and in the contemporary context, 
the emphasis is not on what the Gorkha is but on what it is not. Thus, the Gorkha is not a 
Bengali or a citizen of Nepal but is a construction which calls for the ironic acceptance of a 
term which is associated with Nepal. Owing to this unequal relationship, the imagery and the 
concomitant identity which was given by the colonizers has never been challenged but rather 
been imbibed and strengthened.  
However, like the larger Nepali identity which was formed under the leadership of the 
urban, educated elite157 the ‘Gorkha’ also took shape and form in the imagination of the masses 
through the language and literature of the elites.  Apart from Indra Bahadur Rai’s ‘Aaja Ramita 
Cha (Today there is a spectacle)’ published in 1961 there are no other major Nepali literary 
works that engage with life and society in the plantations while on the other hand those 
representing different aspects of colonization, the bir Gorkha or urban Darjeeling run into 
hundreds. This lacuna in literature from the plantations and the importance in the struggle for 
identity was also acknowledged by the Sahitya Akademi (National Academy of Letters), New 
Delhi, the foremost association for the development of Nepali language and literature. The 
Academy organized the first ever seminar on literature on tea estates where the participants 
emphasized the importance of the tea estates in the fight for the recognition of the Gorkha 
identity in India and thus deserving place as a special genre in Nepali literature.158 Apart from 
their actual interaction with those who had joined the British and later Indian army, the majority 
of those living in the plantations, so crucial to the sustenance of this identity had no actual 
contribution in the construction of this identity. However, even in spite of lack of any active 
                                                          
156 Bhaskar Golay, Nepali scholar, interview conducted by the author, 22nd January, 2011, Siliguri, West Bengal.  
157 See Chalmers, 2003. 
 
158 Source: Himalaya Darpan, 24/09/2012. 
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contribution to the creation of the Gorkha identity, the plantation society has received and 
embraced it completely. 
4.2 (iii) Sightings of the Gorkha 
The theory of  ‘martial races’ might have evolved in the battlefields of the East India 
Company but it has persisted as an ethnic group and acquired political significance in 
Darjeeling, where the majority of supporters belong to the working class in the tea gardens.  As 
this imagery of the brave, loyal, patriotic Gorkha took hold of the masses, the elites were further 
instrumental in giving political direction to this identity through repeated demands for the rights 
of the Gorkha to the British authorities.  It is in the plantations, an imperial legacy, where the 
achievements in war and recognition as bir have surprisingly become representative of a 
community which is agricultural in its occupation. 159  Amongst these the most prominent 
proponents of this are Subhash Ghising and Bimal Gurung, leaders of the Gorkhland movement 
(both have their origins in the kamans) who have been effective in evoking the bir (brave) 
Gorkha as the basis for a separate state.  
Musing on the Gorkha identity, one of the editors of the recently published Gorkhas 
Imagined: Indra Bahadur Rai in Translation 160  says that the imagery of the Gorkha is 
inscribed in the mindsets of the people from one generation to another. He points towards the 
inter-generational quality of the Gorkha identity where the same symbols, the same ‘repertoire 
of contention’ is performed one generation after another. Apart from literature, the symbolic 
reproduction of this identity takes place on a daily basis, for example through miniature khukuri 
which are worn as brooches by men or on the Nepali topi (cap), as insignia of the local police, 
political parties and as graffiti on public spaces but probably most effectively through popular 
                                                          
159 Excerpts of a speech by Bimal Gurung, the leader of the GJM on 21/ 03/2009 in Kamlimpong highlight that 
bravery and sacrifice, the ultimate trait of the Gorkha is deeply internalized  and reproduced- ‘we are not 
Pakistanis, we are not Chinese, we are Hindustani..the media should cast (sic) our news fairly…we have given 
blood for this country..when different countries have attacked this country Ashok babu (former member of the 
Legislative Assembly and staunch opponent of the movement) have you held an AK47 and gone into the 
battlefield? Were you even able to hold your chest out (for the bullets)? We have already given proof of that by 
letting our chests shatter into pieces in order to save this country…what is your proof?....We have been dedicating 
and sacrificing our lives for this country. The state must remember this, it must remember that we have shed blood 
for this country, not water.’                                     
 Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pI5fYUNs_Ck, (Accessed 21/20/2012). 
160 Gorkhas Imagined: Indra Bahadur Rai in Translation is a collection of I.B.Rai’s most famous and loved stories 
translated in English edited by Anmole Prasad and Prem Poddar. The collection was released in 2009.  
150 
 
culture.161 In 2009 Madan Tamang leader of the Gorkha League was brutally assassinated in 
broad daylight. His assassin had attacked him with a khukuri, the weapon associated with the 
Gorkha and thus lead prominent hill scholars (like Bidhan Golay, Rajendra Dhakal) to wonder 
about the political as well as the symbolic implication of the assassination and the degree of 
embeddedness of the Gorkha identity.  
Apart from enhancing group collectivity, the image of the brave Gorkha also negates 
the feeling and the colonial representation of Nepalis as ‘coolies’. This highlights the 
importance of framing of grievances and issues by political elites. While almost all political 
leadership comes from the plantations which then reiterates and strengthens the Gorkha 
identity, the political aspiration of this leadership is limited. According to Vijay Prasad,162 
author and one of the leading GJM intelligentsia, this plays well into the hands of the Indian 
state which outsources regional problems to local ‘warlords’ who aspire for political and 
economic control of their personal fiefdoms. This was evident for over two decades during the 
rule of Subhash Ghising who took advantage of the change in the political structure that had 
emerged out of the regionalization of politics that switched power from the hands of the 
national parties to regional parties. 163 
The Gorkha thus becomes the representation of those who have been colonised and 
dominated and highlights the overlap of ethnicity with class. Although a colonial construct, the 
Gorkha has acquired a meaning that represents not only those engaged in the military but rather 
the entire Indian-Nepali nation. The Gorkha identity derives its importance as a base for the 
construction of a social history and the image of the khukuri wielding Gorkha is deemed more 
symbolic of a proud community rather than that of a subservient plantation worker. Maya Dahal 
(Mungpoo, 2010) reaffirms the bravery of the Gorkha, ‘We are brave. It is something we all 
know, we are born with this knowledge. Our sons from kaman–busty have been shedding their 
blood for the country by fighting in its wars but there is no respect for this blood.’ 
                                                          
161 Local rock band Mantra attained fame with songs like ‘Bir Gorkhali’ which celebrates the identification of the 
self as Gorkha, while the song, ‘Nepali ho’ by the Kathmandu based band 1974 A.D which stresses on the military 
achievements of the Nepali jat became an anthem in the hills. 
162 Excerpts of a joint interview with Prem Poddar, conducted on 30th December, 2010, Kalimpong, West Bengal. 
163 Rajesh Dhakal, Nepali scholar, interview conducted by the author on 30th December, 2010, Kalimpong, West 
Bengal. 
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Those ridden by poverty and lack of control become empowered through the brave and 
valiant Gorkha making it an essential tool in the politics of identity. However, the Gorkha has 
been undergoing changes and in its present incarnation, as promoted by the GJM, the Gorkha 
has adopted Gandhian measures to fight for Gorkhaland. A constant reminder of the ferocity 
of the Gorkhaland movement is the violent agitation of 1986 when Nepalis were up in arms 
against each other and then against the state. As Gautam Tamang164 (Mungpoo, 2010) says, 
‘We are brave but previously bravery meant to fight, kill or be killed. Now we are showing our 
bravery in different fields of life.’ Kamal Tamang elaborates this point of view, ‘Gorkha is not 
just a khukuri wielding soldier. In Assam there are the dairymen Gorkha, in Darjeeling there 
are tea workers who are Gorkhas. They are present in all fields and so to keep talking about 
Gorkhas as a martial race is nothing but stereotyping and used by people when it suits them. I 
don’t see myself as a Gorkha who is not afraid to die. I am scared to die.’ 
Bishnu Prasad Sharma (Bagrakot, 2010) is however more reserved in his opinion of the 
Gorkha, ‘we have been hearing about this (the bir Gorkha) since we were children, we are 
brave but we are weak, we do not have the education, strength and hence no morale. What birta 
(bravery) will the Gorkha show?’  
The contemporary understanding of the Gorkha has evolved over numerous 
generations, finally crystallising in the movement for a separate state, which can thus be read 
as a manifestation of the disempowerment of the people. In an ironic situation, outside of the 
hills, the word Gorkha is usually synonymous with stereotypes such as gate-keepers or 
watchmen (bahadur).  Representing ‘Birta (bravery) on the one hand and chowkidars 
(watchmen) on the other’ the Gorkha identity has nonetheless been used as a medium of 
representation and empowerment in the hills. The awareness of the larger social connotations 
of the word Gorkha can only come with experiences in the plains of mainland India which 
again only increases insecurities of the socio-political legitimacy of Indian-Nepalis. Thus in 
another complex turn, experiences of discrimination in mainland India reinforces the use of the 
term Gorkha as a means of claiming Indian citizenship. 
More than seventy percent of the population in the hills and the Duars is dependent 
directly or indirectly on the tea industry. This therefore raises the question of the growth of 
ethnicity rather than class as a basis for collective action. Considering the infiltration of the 
                                                          
164 Local resident of the Cinchona estate interviewed by the author on 4th January, 2011, Mungpoo, Darjeeling 
District, West Bengal. 
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CPI in the tea estates since the early 1940s, the existence of oppressive living and working 
conditions of the tea labourers should have resulted in a class based movement. Instead class 
action is completely eclipsed by an ethnic movement in the hills of Darjeeling despite the 
overlap between class and ethnicity.  In spite of a large work force in the tea gardens, economic 
underdevelopment and political disempowerment is voiced through the assertion of ethnic 
identity rather than class. Thus when popular politics necessitates the mobilisation of numbers 
and the political strength of any party is determined by its clout in the kamans (tea gardens), 
thereby becoming key sites of political contestation and rhetoric which reinforces ‘fossilised 
identities’ like that of the Gorkha (Golay, 2006).  
While for some ethnic prejudice and stories of ‘identity crisis’ might begin and end on 
these train rides, for most Nepalis living as minorities in different parts of the country, ethnicity 
has become a perennial source of insecurity. Thus, while in some contexts the Gorkha identity 
is used to negotiate with the state for better developmental policies, in a wider context it is 
aimed to resolve the larger questions of the insecurities over Indian citizenship. The Indo-Nepal 
Friendship Treaty165 and the flight of the non-tribal population from North-eastern India as well 
as the case of the Bhutanese Lhotsampas are all cited as examples of the fate of all the Nepalis 
in the future. While these concerns are well-founded to a certain extent, they have been 
politically manipulated and taken to the extreme. Amidst fears of ethnic backlash and social 
boycotts, the Nepalis in eastern Duars who are a minority group, were supportive of the 
movement for an ethnic homeland as they felt that this was the only way of ensuring their 
legitimacy to belong in India and that even if they were not a part of the proposed Gorkhaland, 
they would still be able to show that they belonged somewhere. 166 However for the Nepalis 
living in the Duars, their insecurities are not only related to eviction from their lands but also 
of cultural erosion through assimilation. As Khadga Bajay 167  (an eminent retired Nepali 
journalist from eastern Duars) said, ‘there are no Nepali medium schools, only Bengali and 
Hindi in spite of Nepali being the second state language. Nepali children are therefore forced 
to learn Hindi or Bengali and are gradually losing their language as well as their culture. 
Political backwardness has led to the lack of understanding the benefits of a smaller state which 
                                                          
165 Attached as Annexe 
166 Krishna Khadga, lcal entrepreneur and resident of Banarhat, interviewed by the author on 15th January, 
Banarhat, Jalpaiguri District, West Bengal. 
167 Interviewed by the author on 14th January, 2011, Banarhat, Jalpaiguri District, West Bengal 
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is linked to educational backwardness that is promoted by the state. Because the government 
and the elites want to maintain status quo they have promoted liquor and not education. It has 
become difficult to walk with our heads held high and organising cultural programmes has also 
become difficult. We do not get any holidays to celebrate Bhanu Jayanti and even wearing a 
Nepali topi has become difficult. While we are expected to know maachar-bhaat (fish rice, 
typical Bengali cuisine) but the Bengalis do not know our gundruk (dried radish leaves) or any 
other Nepali food. We do not need any conversions- we will all become Bengalis. I don’t need 
just a state, I need a homeland. I want Gorkhaland.’ 
Conclusion 
An embodiment of the grievances of the Indian-Nepali, the Gorkha identity has been 
accepted as representative of the majority of Indian-Nepalis spread across India and as the most 
effective way of negotiating with the state. The entrenchment of the Gorkha identity begins as 
a historical project which is accentuated by the political movement for Gorkhaland and thus in 
its present use it aims to serve three fundamental causes. First, apart from providing an ethnic 
identity, the Gorkha shields the insecurity of the Nepali community which has developed owing 
to generations of colonisation and disempowerment at the hands of not only the British but also 
under the (mis) administration of the Bengali state as well as Subhash Ghising who promoted 
two decades of underdevelopment and mis-governance. 168  
This situation has been accentuated further by the lack of growth and development of 
the redundant DGHC, which was unable to promote either infrastructural or human resource 
development. Bhaskar Golay169 points to the failure of the 19th century elites who did not 
encourage cultural modernisation that would have enabled the working class to effectively 
bridge the social gap between different classes. This has led to parochial frameworks of 
understanding themselves and thereby heightened the inferiority complex experienced and 
exhibited by Indian-Nepalis as equal participants in the society at large. Second, bravery and 
sacrifice in the battlefield is persistently highlighted by political elites as well as the general 
masses as one of the most important characteristics of the Gorkha. Valor, sacrifice and death 
                                                          
168 Rajesh Dhakal, Nepali scholar, interview conducted by the author on 30th December,2010, Kalimpong, West 
Bengal. 
169  Nepali scholar, lecturer at North Bengal University, interview conducted by the author, January 22nd, 2010, 
Siliguri, West Bengal.  
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for Mother India is celebrated and contributes to the display of patriotism and loyalty towards 
the Indian state170 in a bid to replace the negative image of the community as mercenaries and 
immigrant. 
Mobilizing the Gorkhas in Siliguri during a strike called by the GJM  
           
Finally, the Gorkha as an ethnic group with its own distinct cultural features performs 
the important act of ‘othering’ the community from the mainstream, dominant Bengali 
population, which in turn justifies the sense of ethnic discrimination experienced by the Nepalis 
                                                          
170 One of the most important poets to have emerged from Nepali literary scene is Agam Singh Giri who in his 
last poem Yuddha ra Yoddha (War and Warrior), describes the Nepali as a martial but maligned race. A part of 
his poem as reproduced in Indra Bahadur Rai’s essay on Indian Nepal Nationalism (1994:179-80) expresses Giri’s 
feeling towards the label of ‘mercenaries’ and the unjust treatment of Nepalis in India:  
‘O warrior 
Your son is yet to be born , 
He shall be then a part of your life, 
Allow him not to be wouded 
Spilling blood for others; 
Forbid him to sharpen his khukuri 
To fight other men’s battles, 
To add shie to others’ existence; 
History will only brand him a murderer, 
Let him not be accursed by all 
Or consigned to insults and injuries.  
We are in the midst of a war. 
We have fought and have somehow survived.  
There is a cry for fear in our heart.  
War, not understood,  
Is starkly visible in our eyes.’ 
155 
 
living in West Bengal. Ethnic politics revolving around the Gorkha is thus a combination of all 
these factors. 
Those disempowered by poverty and lack of control become empowered through the 
brave and valiant Gorkha making it an essential tool in the politics of identity. Choosing the 
Gorkha brings with it a history which is very specific to those Nepalis living in West Bengal. 
Yes, the Gorkha identity also caters to those Nepalis living outside but it is the economic and 
political discrimination that provides the basis for political mobilisation and the concomitant 
ethnic movement. The case of the Gorkha highlights the importance of political actors in 
framing ethnic grievances but at the same time emphasizes the impact of the wider political 
economy and history on the formation of an identity. Although the state becomes the target for 
political action, Gorkha and the grievances however are a product of a much older origin- 
imperialism. In comparison to the Nepal case study, political mobilisation around the Gorkha 
identity not only highlights how socio-economic grievances can take an ethnic form but that 
ethnicity itself is constantly undergoing a process of constant evolution. Contrasting the Nepal 
case which saw a range of political actors, the movement for Gorkhaland is maneuvered 
completely by a single party, the GJM which has made Gorkha identity the only identity 
available.  
This partially answers the question regarding the motivation to choose one identity over 
another because it would be a fallacy to disregard the agency of the people who do believe and 
support this identity. The discussion above highlights the historical and political motivations 
involved in the formation, relevance and use of this identity, which has now become a part of 
the social memory and history specifically of generations of Nepalis living in Darjeeling 
district. Darjeeling and east Nepal are similar cases with regard to their demand for 
development and a separate state based essentially on ethnic identity. This in effect links them 
to Sikkim, which is seen as the epitome of development, at least in the eastern Himalaya and a 
model which both these movements aspire towards.  
Like the case of the Limbus of eastern Nepal, the Nepalis of Darjeeling also perceive 
(may be well founded) their social and economic backwardness as a result of their ethnicity as 
well as the policies of the state which are biased against them. This has therefore led to a 
reconstruction of their identity and the reframing of their grievances within an ethnic 
framework that enables a platform for a vociferous demand for access and control over 
resources which the Gorkhas of Darjeeling claim as belonging to them. The case of the Gorkhas 
of Darjeeling highlight the connections between ethnicity, state and politics and how each 
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facilitate in the construction of the other which consequently contributes to a variation in the 
articulation of ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya. 
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Locating Sikkim  
                          
         
Source:grandadventuresindia.com 
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Chapter 5: Accessing ethnicity in Sikkim- the state, ethnic groups and the politics of 
recognition 
Introduction 
The myth of state formation in Sikkim emphasize the ‘blood-brotherhood’ of three 
different ethnic groups- Tibeto-Sikkimese or Bhutia (Lho pa), Lepcha (Mon pa) and Limbu 
(gTsong pa), locally referred to as 'Lho Men Tsong Sum'. Ethnic diversity has been a 
fundamental aspect of Sikkimese history. The monarchy and the elites belonged to the minority 
Bhutia and Lepcha groups who towards the latter half of the 19th century, ruled over a diverse 
amalgamation of ethnic groups from the neighbouring Himalayan kingdom of Gorkha. This 
ethnic diversity and the consequent demographic imbalance between the different groups 
reflected in the economic division of the society. Eventually as a result of internal171 and the 
external pressure exerted by India (keen to safeguard its frontiers after the humiliating defeat 
of the Sino-India border conflict of 1962) Sikkim joined the Indian Union on the 16th of May, 
1975.  
The boundaries of different ethnic groups are most visible when contrasted against each 
other.  In this context the Nepali ethnic group in Sikkim exists largely only in relation to the 
Bhutia and Lepcha communities and increasingly so only in a political context with the blurring 
of religious and cultural boundaries as more groups are adopting Buddhism and its related 
cultural practices akin to the Lepchas and Bhutias. Inter-ethnic differences and insecurities 
have most often been the stable foundation of all identity based politics. However this political 
tradition altered significantly after the General Elections of 1994. One of the most prominent 
outcomes of the General Elections, apart from the overthrow of the biggest political party, was 
the gradual dis-integration of the Nepali group, forcing a re-imagination of the identity of the 
Nepalis of Sikkim.  
Although not openly discussed in Sikkim, the history of Nepalis of Sikkim, which is 
fraught with stories of migration and economic subservience combined with the ambivalent, 
often precarious position of the Nepalis in other parts of India, forms the macro-habitus of the 
                                                          
171 The Kazis were the landed elite who dominated and controlled all commercial activities which not only 
challenged but also eventually led to the gradual atrophy of the power of the Chogyal. This situation was further 
aggravated by the political infighting between the pro-Chogyal and anti-Chogyal political parties that had emerged 
after devolution of power and the limited democracy that had been introduced by the Chogyal in 1953. 
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Nepalis of Sikkim. This macro-habitus is important in the positioning of the Sikkimese-Nepalis 
vis-a-vis Nepalis from Nepal and Darjeeling. At the same time it also influences the position 
of Sikkimese-Nepalis in Sikkimese society and politics.  
 
The politics around the Nepali identity in Sikkim is rooted in both economic as well as 
transcendental insecurities and the present chapter is an examination of the political processes 
that facilitate the choice of a particular form of political representation over another. The 
Sikkim case study shows how the state and its policies (mostly of affirmative action) increase 
the value of ethnicity by promoting it as a political resource that is essential to be a recipient 
of the patronage structure that has been institutionalisd by the state.  This chapter discusses the 
role of the state in the construction and maintenance of structures that promote ethnic identity 
as political identity, especially amongst those ethnic groups that combine to form the Nepali 
group. While confronted with multiple insecurities related to identity and economic sustenance, 
simple recognition as a Nepali does not have the same advantage as being a member of being 
a Scheduled Tribe, Most Backward Class or even Other Backward Class. This reduces the 
appeal of the general Nepali category over the other available categories thereby leading to a 
concerted effort to re-construct or re-invent an ethnic group in accordance to guidelines given 
by the state. Following the Darjeeling and Nepal case studies, the Sikkim case study also 
reveals the instrumental and politically constructed nature of the Nepali ethnic group and the 
use of ethnicity as a political resource.  
This final case study aims to analyse the revival and assertion of ethnic identity over 
the meta-identity of being a Nepali. Ethnic revivalism in Sikkim has strong parallels with that 
in Nepal but unlike in Nepal, the different ethnic groups (within the Nepali category) in Sikkim 
are not battling economic and political discrimination based on their ethnicity. Ethnic 
revivalism has become a safe, state sponsored mechanism through which to access the state 
and its resources. However, it also has to be admitted that ethnic revivalism goes beyond mere 
instrumental rationality, thereby complicating the motive for the reassertion of ethnic culture. 
What is important and interesting is the role played by the state in facilitating this process. The 
central argument of this chapter is that the instrumental use of ethnic identity has, to a very 
large extent, been controlled and guided by the state, affecting the choices and modes of ethnic 
representation. Not only has this led to identity flux but in the wider context of the thesis, the 
Sikkim case study contributes to our understanding of the intricacies of the process that lead to 
the assertion of ethnicity as political identity.  
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Of the different ethnic groups within the Nepali group, the majority have chosen 
specific group identities (like Rai, Limboo, Tamang etc) as a means of group identification and 
negotiation with the state. Thus, following the overarching research question, the aim of this 
chapter is also to analyse the attraction towards and assertion of ethnic affiliation over other 
forms of social and political associations.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. Section One will discuss the features of 
poverty, dependency and unemployment which make ethnic categories that coincide with 
socio-economic groupings more attractive. This section then ultimately focuses on how the 
participation of the masses contributes to ethnic politics. It also analyses how the lack of access 
to the state through conventional bureaucratic means has made the ethnic approach more 
viable. Like the Nepal case study this chapter also focuses on ethnic associations as 
intermediaries between the state and the rural masses and highlights their emerging role as 
political actors in Sikkim. Section Two will discuss the role of the state in the politicisiation 
of the Nepali ethnic group. It will look at the direct as well as the indirect ways in which the 
state has enabled the revivalism of ethnic culture. However, the state can only cater where there 
is a willing market. Thus in Sikkim socio-economic reservations and other schemes are highly 
attractive owing to the poverty and unemployment that exist in Sikkim but are masked by 
claims of development. The chapter finally concludes by analyzing the merit of ethnic 
revivalism in political negotiation with the state and how even though it may not bring 
economic benefit to all, it is nonetheless appreciated for the emotional support and a sense of 
collective ethnic heritage that it provides.  
 
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim, Soreng, 
Hee Pechrek village, Chumbung village in West Sikkim and Namchi in South Sikkim. 
Fieldwork in Sikkim was conducted over November and December, 2010.  
5.1 Historicizing ethnic politics in Sikkim 
After the abolition of the monarchy in Sikkim in 1975, two prominent figures have 
shaped the trajectory of development and institutionalised few remnants of the monarchy- 
authoritarian rule and the investment of power in the individual. Between 1979- 2012 there 
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have been only two, full-term Chief Ministers in the state,172 both of whom have enjoyed 
absolute majority in the State Legislative Assembly during their terms. Whilst promoting a 
sense of political stability (strikes and lockdowns are unheard of in Sikkim unlike neighbouring 
Darjeeling or Nepal), it has led to the concentration of power – economic and political- in the 
hands of a single person and a particular political party. While there is very little political 
contestation on the basis of political ideology, the 1994 General Elections marks the official 
endorsement of ethnic politics in Sikkim. However, this is not to assume that ethnicity had not 
been a factor in elections prior to 1994 and the consolidation of power by the Sikkim 
Democratic Front, the main challenger to the government led by Nar Bahadur Bhandari.  
As discussed in Chapter One, ethnicity has played an important role in the socio-
political history of Sikkim where traditionally, the local population had been divided into the 
land owning and the agriculturist classes which also corresponded to ethnic distinctions. 
Revenue collection in the kingdom of Sikkim was divided into 104 estates out of which sixty-
one were leased out to the Kazis and thikadars who were assigned to pay a fixed sum to the 
state. These Kazis and thikadars leased out these lands to peasants under different terms. The 
landlords enjoyed enormous magisterial power relating to civil and criminal matters. The 
amount of rent to be levied was fixed on ethnic lines and the Nepalis had to pay higher rent 
than the Lepchas and Bhutias. This system was abolished in 1956 by the Chogyal Tashi 
Namgyal (Chakrabarti, 2012:92,93). Socio-economic stratification of the society was 
expressed categorically through land and revenue laws. Nepalis were considered as non-
hereditary subjects in comparison to the Bhutias and Lepchas. This resulted from the Revenue 
Order no.1 of 1897 which is still enforced in Sikkim and prohibits the alienation/transfer of 
Bhutia-Lepcha land to other communities and gives the Bhutias access over Lepcha land (ibid: 
94).  
The Sikkim Subjects Regulation Act of 1961 was promulgated to define the criteria for 
recognition of the subjects of bonafide residents of Sikkim. This was also used to express 
distinction between the Lepcha-Bhutia and the Nepali communities (the Tsongs/Limboos were 
initially treated at par with the Bhutia-Lepcha subjects but were later coupled with the Nepalis 
in 1974). According to Gurung (2011:171), the Regulation was significant not only because it 
                                                          
172  Nar Bahadur Bhandari (1979-1994) and P.K.Chamling (1994-present). However, there were two other 
caretaker governments also. B.B Gurung was the Chief Minister for thirteen days in 1984 and Sanchaman Limboo 
was Chief Minister for six months in 1995 after the downfall of Bhandari.  
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categorically recognized the Lepchas, Bhutias and the Tsongs as the original inhabitants of 
Sikkim but this also confirmed the ‘outsider’ status of other groups.      Ethnicity has therefore 
been a crucial (albeit detrimental) in determining the social, economic and political status of 
the Nepalis in Sikkim.  
As discussed in earlier chapters, the Nepali category was composed of not only the 
different ethnic groups which had migrated to work as agriculturists but also the 
Limboo/Tsongs and the Magar ethnic groups, whose indigeniety to Sikkim is either obliterated 
from or at least not often highlighted in the history of Sikkim (Dorjee, 2012: 65).173 In the early 
1990s this socio-political dichotomy was complicated further by the gradual splintering of the 
Nepali group as the Limboos 174  and Tamangs became eligible for reservation as Other 
Backward Classes (OBC) under the recommendations of the Mandal Commission in 1994. The 
then government, led by N.B. Bhandari was apprehensive about the recognition of Limboo and 
Tamang groups as it heralded the disintegration of the Nepali group (Gurung, 2012:77). The 
denial of this reservation became one of the important bones of contention that helped swing 
the votes in the 1994 General Elections in favour of his opponent, P.K.Chamling.  
Vehemently against the recommendations of the Mandal Commission, Bhandari gained 
a reputation for evoking communal sentiments. In one of his infamous and therefore 
memorable speeches, he proclaimed, ‘when a fox is diseased he becomes mad and when a 
matwali is diseased, he becomes an OBC’ (Chaaya, 1998:13). Seeds of ethnic differentiation 
were thus sown by Bhandari himself whose public diatribes against different ethnic groups 
alienated the electorate.  Bhandari lost the vote of confidence in the State Assembly in 1994 
and the new government comprised all those who had defected to the new party headed by 
                                                          
173 Dorjee (2012:63) points that oral tradition and the inconsistent tradition of recording history has led to the 
complete reliance on colonial records for authentic, unbiased sources of history. He suggests a fresh enquiry of 
the accounts because ‘incomplete and unexplained perceptions of how things continue to influence decisions that 
impact the social life of communities to this day….While some communities might not have received universal 
recognition as ‘Sikkimese’, others have begun to believe the stereotypical colonial depictions painted about them.’ 
This critical stance and interrogation of common identities is especially important especially now when colonial 
stereotypes regarding race and ethnicity have found more political favour.  
174 The Limbus of Nepal call themselves Adivasi/Janajatis and claim indigenous rights over eastern Nepal, in 
Sikkim the same ethnic group is spelt as Limboo, considered as one of the indigenous groups of Sikkim and 
recognised as one of its STs.  
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Sanchaman Limboo. Immediately in June, 1994 the new government recommended the 
recognition of seven communities from among the ‘Sikkimese of Nepali origin’ for recognition 
as OBCs. Consequently Bhujel, Gurung, Limbu Magar, Rai, Sunwar and Tamang were 
declared as OBCs in Sikkim (Sinha et al, 2005:22). Those groups who were to constitute the 
OBCs of Sikkim represent the largest electoral population (forty percent) and thus by voting 
for a member of their ethnic community, they benefitted from being recognized as the OBCs 
at the state level (see Chakraborty, 2000).  After SDF’s victory in the 1994 election, which was 
so precariously dependent on the votes of those ethnic groups who now belong to the OBC and 
MBC category, reservation politics was inevitable in Sikkim. This change in political support 
from Bhandari to Chamling highlights the potency of ethnicity when used as a political 
resource. However, the potency of this resource was only realized when there was a chance for 
structural changes (in the form of a new government) and only when there was a real, material 
benefits attached to it which would then enable the formation of new patronage ties, leading to 
those material benefits.  
However, ethnic politics in Sikkim is neither simple nor straightforward and 
P.K.Chamling, although the architect of ethnic politics (among other things like hazardous 
hydroelectric dams and religious tourism) institutionalised ethnicity as a valid political 
resource, cannot be fully credited for ethnic revivalism and the concomitant politics around it. 
Although his government has been the catalyst as well as the medium through which ethnic 
politics has been legitimised, the lure of socio-economic categories and reservations like MBC 
or OBC also lies in the security that these identities provide to those groups who were either 
late entrants into Sikkim or their historic presence in Sikkim has not been acknowledged in the 
state sponsored construction of history.  
The pro-democracy movement of 1975 has been framed in Sikkimese political history 
as the rise of the Nepalis against the minority Bhutia-Lepcha nobility. Not only does this 
framing ignore other socio-economic causes of the movement (extractive state, exploitation of 
the agriculturists) as well as political opportunism on the part of other Bhutia-Lepcha elites 
(see Datta-Ray, 1984) but shifts the blame and the burden entirely on the Nepalis of Sikkim. 
While there may be many ways of portraying a certain historical event, the social impact of 
this ‘ethnic rising’ framework has led to a permanent scarring of the Nepali community. It has 
resulted in them always being on the defensive, fearful and apologetic for the downfall of the 
monarchy, thereby leading to a perennial sense of insecurity.  Also, because migration (most 
specifically of the non-Mongoloid, caste groups like Bahuns and Chettris into Sikkim took 
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place much later than compared to other areas (starting in the middle of 19th century), the fear 
of being labelled as ‘outsiders’ and ‘migrants’ is still a pressing fear heightened by the instances 
of expulsion of Nepalis living elsewhere. In this situation socio-economic categories like ST, 
MBC or OBC provides recognition and an alternate identity as Sikkimese,  these categories 
become a praman (proof) of being Sikkimese especially at a time when anti-Sikkimese 
sentiments are running high, as will be discussed later in the chapter.  Thus, while instrumental 
motives might be the primary driving force behind ethnic politics, transcendental benefits can 
also play a decisive role in the choice of a particular identity over another.  
 
The presence of the Bhutia-Lepcha community, the history of occupying a lower social position 
and the strength of a numerical majority have given shape to the Nepali identity in Sikkim 
thereby highlighting the socially constructed nature of this group. Political change has been 
one of the biggest precursors of the alteration in the internal dynamics of the Nepalis in Sikkim, 
owing to which the identity of this group can now be said to be in a flux. Whilst asserting the 
identity of a Sikkimese-Nepali vis-a-vis the Gorkha identity which is prevalent in neighbouring 
Darjeeling, the Nepalis in Sikkim are now facing the challenge of defining themselves within 
Sikkim. This identity flux amongst the Nepalis has also been brought about because of internal 
pressures that the Nepali ethnic groups in Sikkim were undergoing. A Nepali monthly 
magazine Chaaya (1998: 12-14) questions the rise of ethnic associations and points at the 
dominating role of Nepali culture-  
‘the Nepali jati in Sikkim has made no effort to preserve and develop the language, 
culture and tradition of the groups which come under the Nepali group. The circumstances so 
highlight the fact that the upliftment of the language, culture and tradition of other groups 
would have a positive impact on the Nepali group as a whole but this has been completely 
neglected. No effort has been made to promote and preserve ethnic culture of the different 
communities. Thus, these ethnic groups have been forced (badhya) to take the initiative and 
form associations. Therefore it is out of necessity that has led the deviation away from a mool/ 
main group and the assertion of exclusive rights.’  Thus internal, cultural factors can also be 
seen as a contributing factor that has made different ethnic groups claim (rather re-claim) their 
culture.  
While the hegemony of the Nepali language and Hindu traditions might be one of the 
factors that have resulted in ethnic politics, it is the policies of affirmative action and the 
material benefits provided by the state, which is the most important driving force in 
165 
 
determining the political identity of the people as well as electoral outcomes. For example, a 
comparison of the manifestoes of the SDF and Sikkim Pradesh Congress Committee prior to 
the 1999 General Elections shows that the primary agenda of the leading parties were 
reservation of seats for Nepalis, Tsongs and Sherpas in the State Assembly, inclusion of Chettri, 
Bahuns and Newar in the OBC category, inclusion of various MBC groups in the ST list and 
protection of Revenue Order No.1.175 This is a clear example of how ethnicity is viewed as a 
political resource not only by the political parties but also the people themselves because these 
issues would not have arisen had it not been raised by the people themselves.  Thus ethnic 
politics in Sikkim is a dynamic, two-way process where the people are not mere recipients of 
the policies and ideologies put forward by the political elites. They are, in effect, active creators 
of their own ethnic as well as political identity.  
However, a purely instrumental approach on the part of the state or of the ethnic groups 
themselves would be an insufficient justification for identity politics in Sikkim. The state 
engages in ethnic politics as it leads to a convenient creation of vote banks and is also a method 
for the equitable distribution of resources. On the other hand, reasons for accepting and 
supporting ethnic politics by the Sikkimese-Nepali can also range from gaining benefits 
through reservations to reviving and reliving their ethnic heritage. Thus, a more balanced 
approach to ethnic politics is required in order to understand it in its entirety.  
 
(ii) Socio-economic grievances, ethnic solutions-factors that necessitate the ethnic approach 
Highlighting the achievements of ‘Sikkim: Small Wonder’ (India Today, 2009), the article 
read: 
‘The metaphor for change in Sikkim couldn’t have a more telling example than the 
main street, the Mahatma Gandhi Marg Road in Gangtok. Once a thoroughfare chocked with 
vehicles and commercial activity, it is today a splendid, tiled promenade where tourists walk 
around listening to channelled music...Sikkim is being helped by the Government of Singapore 
on town development and a Swiss University on rural projects. Singapore’s urban nuances and 
Switzerland’s rustic impetus- these form the core of Sikkim’s vision’ (emphasis mine).  
                                                          
175 Sikkim Express, ‘SDF and SPCC(I)’S manifesto out’, September 4-10, 1999.  
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This excerpt not only reflects the truth of the developmental thrust in Sikkim but is also 
representative of how infrastructural growth in Gangtok and its conversion into a hybrid 
between Singapore and Switzerland obstructs a critical engagement with the socio-political 
situation of the state. This description of Sikkim (or rather Gangtok) shields the fact that in 
Sikkim more than 19.33 percent of the population live below the poverty line176 and 40.91 
percent of the population have a monthly income of less than Rs. 5000 (State Socio Economic 
Census [SSEC], 2006: 18, 20). Given that poverty in Sikkim is highly regionalised (highest in 
the western district followed by by north, south and finally east) 177 this has a negative impact 
on the rural poor. According to the Census of 2001, there are a total of 128, 843 households 
out of which 109, 955 or 85.3 percent are in rural areas. However it is the capital and other 
district towns that are the beneficiaries of most of the development as visible through the 
affluent lifestyle of the residents of Gangtok.  
According to the 2006 State Socio-Economic Census conducted by the Department of 
Economics, Statistics, Monitoring and Evaluation, Government of Sikkim (2006:183) a large 
section of the population- 16.80 percent- are dependent on cultivation as a means of earning 
their livelihood.178 Of the total 211, 211 workers in the state, 46.26 per cent are farmers thereby 
making Sikkim predominantly an agricultural economy. Although the agricultural sector has 
seen a rise in the total food grain production, since 2000-01 a large proportion of the production 
of major crops has either fallen or stagnated owing to not only the lower productivity of the 
                                                          
176 The State Socio-Economic Census 2006 has based its definition of categories like poverty line and below 
poverty line on a combination of methods like Income Perspective, Expenditure Perspective and Basic Needs 
Perspective. To measure the socio-economic status of a household, their assets, properties like land, income and 
household monthly expenditure were taken into account (SSEC, 2006:7). 
177 According to the SSEC (2006:21) the highest number of BPL households are in the western district (26.54 
percent), south (24.38 percent), north (18.65 percent) and east (13.45) percent. 
178 Table 6. Distribution of workers by nature of activity 
Activity Number of Persons 
Farmer 97714 
Agricultural wage labourer 8365 
Non-agricultural wage labourer 16851 
Regular Salaried State Government 29603 
Salaried Private Sector 11459 
Business  12538 
Self Employed 14934 
Source: SSEC(2006: 182) 
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soil but because of diversification of land use from subsistence to commercial agriculture, 
horticulture etc (Chakrabarti, 2010: 24; Khawas, 2010: 161).  
Thus, decline in the growth of agricultural production (both subsistence and 
commercial) has had a major impact on livelihoods as well as rural economy. Reminiscing the 
time when pork was Rs.7/kg, Yogesh Rai of Chumbung, 179  west Sikkim immediately 
associates inflation with the decline in the agricultural produce in his field. ‘I tell my children 
these things and they say that I am lying. There was a time when we used to grow so much 
maize that we could not even carry it but now no matter how much we try, no matter what new 
technologies we use, it is no good. The amount of maize we grow is only sufficient to feed the 
hens for a year. Production has decreased but the prices have reached the sky. We grow a little 
bit of ginger and oranges but if the madhesh ko chacha (uncle from the plains) does not send 
us food, we might face starvation.’ His father who is almost eighty years old adds in agreement, 
‘the land was sufficient for our livelihood, we grew everything we needed on it. The only thing 
we had to purchase was salt and after eating maize rice for months, eating rice was like a luxury; 
it was ‘sarkari khana’. Look round us right now, we have nothing. No matter how hard we try 
the land does not produce half as much as it did before. It is almost as if by magic that we are 
able to live. All the villagers are going on about their life as if by some magic. When you see 
us we dress and eat well but only we know what the real situation is. Agriculture has decreased 
tremendously and if there is a strike in Siliguri then there will be mayhem here. The only respite 
being that we don’t have to pay our rent.’  
Contrasting this situation of agricultural decline is another village in west Sikkim where 
the majority of the population have diversified their agricultural practice from subsistence to 
the commercial plantation of cardamom. Kamal Subba 180  talks about the prosperity that 
cardamom has brought to the village which has encouraged further diversification of land. 
However, this has increased the dependence on the government fair price shops for the 
provision of food and other supplies. 
 
                                                          
179 Agriculturist, interviewed by the author on 12th November, 2010, Chumbung, West Sikkim. 
180 Government employee and resident of Hee Gaon, interviewed by the author on 14th November, 2010, West 
Sikkim.  
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 BPL and APL rice at ‘madhesh ko chacha’s’ shop: price board at a local ration shop in West   
Sikkim   
                                              
 
Bhim Kanchan 181  is one of the farmers who has benefitted from the commercial 
plantation of cardamom. When asked if he was financially secure, he answered indirectly, ‘I 
cannot say that there is no money in this village. In some places people are sitting on stacks of 
money because the price of cardamom has gone up. However even those who do not grow 
cardamom in this village are doing quite alright....either one or more than one of their family 
members are working in the public sector.’ This was also confirmed by Sancha Limboo182who 
says that the economic condition of the people in the village has improved- ‘everybody does 
play with money’-but he also attributes the expansion of cardamom farming as one of the most 
important causes of the decline in the production of rice and other agricultural products. Apart 
from environmental factors like disease, pests, rainfall etc one of the crucial factors that has 
                                                          
181 Agriculturist and a resident of Hee Gaon, interviewed by the author on 14th November, 2010, West Sikkim.  
182 Agriculturist and a resident of Hee Gaon, interviewed by the author on 14th November, 2010, West Sikkim.  
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affected the agricultural sector overall has been the financial support and investment by the 
state. Considering sectoral and sub-sectoral plans, allocations for the first to the ninth plan, 
agriculture and its allied activities which are the mainstay of the people have received on an 
average twenty per cent of the total plan outlay, reaching as low as 13.6 percent in the eighth 
plan and 17.1 percent in the ninth plan (1998-2002). The direct implication of this being that 
the government invests less in the sector which has the potential to employ the maximum 
number of people (Sikkim Human Development Report, 2001).183  
‘Misssion- Poverty Free Sikkim 2013’ was launched in 2010 by the state government 
which aimed at the complete eradication of households living below the poverty line. Under 
this mandate the government has launched numerous programmes and facilities to the rural 
poor that target not only food insecurity but also livelihoods and rural infrastructure.  For 
example, the Department of Animal Husbandry caters to demands for free chicks for poultry 
farming, milching cows, loans for building yak sheds, piglets, polypipe, sickles etc which are 
distributed at a subsidised rate.  The Rural Development Department oversees projects like the 
Mukhya Mantri Awas Yojana Kutcha House (Chief Minister’s Rural Housing Mission) 
campaign, which is being implemented to provide pukka houses for over 6000 ‘identified 
people’. In Sikkim poverty has sought to be remedied through the provision of goods and 
services by the state thereby encouraging dependency. Lama (2001:38) whilst discussing what 
maybe be deemed a regional trend highlights the tendency amongst people to believe that 
‘development is government, government is development’. This leaves the onus of 
development primarily on the government making citizens believe that development is the 
prerogative of the government only and therefore enabling the state to weild an enormous 
amount of power over the people.  
Sikkim has a population of 600,000 people approximately (2011 Census) but in contrast 
to other north-eastern states with bigger territories and higher population, receives one of the 
largest shares of the central Annual Plan (Rs.1400 crores for 2011-2012).184 The 2009-10 
Report released by the Comptroller and Auditor General of Sikkim states that only 28.62 
                                                          
183 Human Development Report 2012 was under preparation during the time of writing and the statistics presented 
here are also used by the state government.  
 
184 ‘Northeast Echoes’, The Telegraph, 17/10/2011 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1111017/jsp/northeast/story_14623761.jsp (Accessed: 03/04/2012). 
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percent of the revenue receipts come from the state’s own resources (comprising taxes as well 
as non-taxes) whereas the share of Central transfers (comprising the state’s share in central 
taxes and duties and grants-in-aid)  from the Government of India comprised 71.38 percent. 
Given the lack of substantial industries or large scale export of agricultural goods, Sikkim’s 
economy is driven by the tertiary sector (trade, hotels and transport) contributing over sixty-
nine percent to the total Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP),185 while the primary sector 
contributes around twenty-five percent. Sikkim, along with Mizoram and Nagaland has per 
capita income higher than the other north-eastern states but much of the income generated in 
these states was from public administration (18.5 per cent in Sikkim compared to the national 
average of 6.3 percent). This emphasises the overwhelming dependency of the population on 
the government for generating income and lack of productive economic activity in the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy  
While the contribution of agriculture to the Gross State Domestic Product (from 48.7 
percent in 1980-81 to 18.81 in 2006-07) has been continuously declining, the dependency on 
agriculture for livelihood and sustenance has not. The state produces large quantities of maize 
but the staple diet in the hills is rice which therefore leads to the importation of food grains 
from outside the state. This situation is compounded by the increasing population. Although 
the number of live births is lower than the national average, the projected population of Sikkim 
is 700,000 people by the year 2016, which would further intensify food scarcity in the state.   
In order to meet the present demand for food, the state imports and distributes food and 
other essential items through its Public Distribution System (PDS). Under the Targeted PDS 
introduced in 1997, the government aims to provide rice at a highly subsidised rate to Below 
Poverty Line families (BPL)186-providing thirty-five kgs of rice at Rs. 4 per kilo every month. 
                                                          
185 GSDP refers to the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country or a state in a given 
period of time.  
186 According to the SSEC, 2006, the following are the criteria for assessing BPL status of the people of Sikkim. 
Thus households not to be considered for BPL are: 
Households having any member as government employees including work charge 
Households having muster roll member with any other member employed in other sector or trades 
Households having any member as government contractor of Class I and II 
Households having any member who has an income over Rs.3000 per month 
Households having Pucca structure 
Households having paddy or cardamom or orchards or floriculture land of 2.5 acres or above 
Households having barren or other lands over 5 acres 
Households having agriculture/horticulture/animal husbandry production of more than Rs. 60,000 per year, having 
more than six cattle 
Households having more than ten goats , sheep, yaks, buffalo, horses 
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Also under this scheme are over ten thousand beneficiaries receiving thirty-five kgs of rice free 
of cost, all expenses borne by the state (Chakrabarti, 2010:24). 
However in a contradiction of positions, development in Sikkim is usually criticised 
and praised simultaneously. While the dependency on central government funds is always 
pointed to as its weakness, connectivity, infrastructure, BPL facilities and other sarkari 
assistance are lauded in the same breath. Infrastructural development and connectivity that is 
visible in the rural areas of Sikkim, at best masks the poverty which is pre-dominant in the state 
owing to decline in agriculture, unemployment and the concomitant dependence on the state 
for the provision of the basic necessities.  
( iii) Experiences with the welfare state 
Nonetheless, experiences with the welfare state vary within Sikkim. When asked about 
the assistance that people received from the state some respondents praised the sarkar for the 
roads and connectivity but most of the answers were in the negative. As Pem Dorjee’s187 
mother says,’ who says the people of Sikkim are rich, the people of Sikkim are poor, they are 
not rich. We face hardship in everything, the roads are not good, we have money but we still 
face hardships. Schools are running without any Principal, the local teachers are loose (sic) and 
as a result the children are getting spoilt.’188 This therefore shows the level of dependency and 
expecations from the government ranges from the economic to the social. Poverty, decreasing 
agricultural returns has thus placed the state at the centre of the lives of the Sikkimese people 
who become embroiled in a vicious circle of dependency, which is then used for political 
mileage by political parties.  
                                                          
Households having TV, fridge, washing machines, vacuum cleaner, microwave, geyser, generator, inverter, 
computer, DVD, VCD, oven, rice cooker camera, telephone, mobile 
Households having more than one fan, more than one sofa, more than one almirah, more than two pressure cooker, 
more than one sewing machine 
Households sending their children to private schools 
 
187 Agriculturist and resident of Singling, West Sikkim, interviewed by the author on 18th Novemeber, 2010. 
 
188 The rural areas of Sikkim are better off compared to rural areas of Nepal and Darjeeling. Therefore I found 
this comment very interesting as it highlights the relative aspect of poverty as well as grievances.  
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The village of Singling in West Sikkim is predominantly Tamang in its ethnic 
composition and Hangu Bahadur (Singling, 2010) a fifth generation agriculturist was frank 
about the benefits that he received from the state:  
Q. What assistance do you get from the government? 
R. They gave us corrugated sheets, built toilets, gave LPG as well as pigs but the pigs died. 
Sarkar lay dindai cha, khandai cha/ the government is giving and we are eating.  
While Hangu Bahadur may have been a recipient of some of the benefits handed out by 
the state Binita Tamang (Singling, 2010) and her sons from the same village talk of the lack of 
assistance from the government, ‘we have been living here for generations and have always 
relied on kheti (agriculture) which is not always enough as we have to support two sons who 
live outside. We do not get any assistance from the government. During elections they 
distribute pigs, cows but only the smart and those who are associated with the Party’s women’s 
wing get it. People like us do not get it.’ This experience was also reiterated by Phul Maya 
Tamang189 who recounts how she was able to get some corrugated tin sheets as payment for 
her participation during pre-election rallies. Sharing his bitterness at the partiality of the 
government, Sancha Limboo (Hee Gaon, 2010) said, ‘people who were poor during the reign 
of the former CM have remained so. The poor should be given facilities and then only can they 
match the rich, but if only people at the top win the poor will always remain poor. They leave 
the distribution of various things to the political representative and thus only a few chosen 
people get it.’ Political party, elections and pigs were persistent themes that emerged from all 
the conversations, highlighting the fact that in rural Sikkim the only denominator that was 
useful was political connection.  
The system of personal re-distribution of public goods is further strengthened by the 
administrative structure or the Panchayat system which is also based on elections between 
different parties.190 However, the problems ailing the Panchayati Raj Institution in Sikkim are 
                                                          
189 Agriculturist interviewed by the author on 18th November, 2010, West Sikkim.  
190 Under the two tier system of democratic decentralization Sikkim is divided into four Zilla Parishads at the 
District level, which is also the Apex body followed by 163 Gram Panchayats at the village level. The Sikkim 
Panchayat Act, 1982 aimed at establishing the Panchayati Raj Institution (PRI) as an instrument of village level 
self-government and was instrumental in bringing adult franchise to the state as well as enabling the nomination 
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many as relayed by the Report on Village Development Action Plan for Sikkim (2009).191 
While the majority of the problems related to the absence of horizontal coordination, faulty 
vertical coordination, overlapping responsibilities, lack of transparency, the Indo-Swiss Report 
also highlighted the ‘design of the political institution’ as one of the major impediments. 
Problems accruing from personal favours, divergence of funding to projects that were not on 
the list or lack of respect towards the decision of the Gram Sabha were also listed by the Report. 
It raises concerns about the role of the MLAs at the Block level and the elected Zilla Panchayats 
at the District level. The failure of the political and/or of the elected representative to encourage 
greater participation as well as debate and discussions regarding the needs and policies is 
highlighted by Chettri (2008) also. He further discusses how the Gram Panchayats were usually 
participants only at the implementation level and had no say in the formulation of the schemes 
and were further confronted by public apathy. This situation is aggravated by the fact that the 
Gram Panchayats are solely dependent on the state government for all their projects. 
Repercussion of this dependency was further emphasized by the Report which states that since 
there is a lack of local revenue generation and no charges were collected for the services 
provided by the government, local services have no opportunity cost and thus without a tax 
counterpart, local residents have an illusion that these services are free. Thus, the Panchayats 
form an important link in the distribution chain, one which is controlled by the bureaucrats, 
who they themselves have no room to manoeuvre in the face of political pressure.    
 (vi) Unemployment and increasing insecurity 
Apart from poverty, the severity of unemployment is also quite intense both in the rural 
and the urban areas. According to the SSEC (2006: 14) 64.48 percent of the total population 
are under the age of 29. Thus what can otherwise be considered as a positive economic indicator 
has proven to have a destabilising effect on not only the economy but also the political situation 
in the state as rising unemployment as well as under employment has become the arsenal of 
opposition parties.  
Unemployment is compounded by the problem of the educated unemployed. Awarded 
the ‘Best in Primary Education among small states’ by a leading national magazine India Today 
                                                          
of the ST, SC and women to Gram Panchayat levels. Since 2006 Block Administrative Centres headed by the 
Block Development Officers have been created to reinforce decentralisation (Chettri, 2008). 
191  This Report titled, ‘Strengthening Gram Panchayat- Planning and Budgeting in Sikkim’ was prepared by the 
Indo-Swiss Mission to Sikkim with assistance from the Government of Sikkim.  
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in 2010, Sikkim has a high literacy rate (82.20 percent, Census 2011) and approximately twenty 
percent of the Annual Budget is dedicated to education.192 The state is thus inundated with well 
qualified unemployed or underemployed youth who are represented by the All Sikkim 
Educated Self-Employed and Unemployed Association. Although the major aim of this 
association is to articulate the grievances of the unemployed, in recent time it has also been at 
the forefront of ‘safeguarding the interest of the Sikkimese youth’ whose socio-economic rights 
are apparently being threatened by outsiders.193 When Sikkim joined the Indian Union in 1975, 
the ‘Old Laws’ of the kingdom were protected under Article 371F of the Indian Constitution 
which validates the use of a separate document called the Sikkim Subject Certificate as a means 
of identifying genuine Sikkimese citizens. Thus, along with proof of Indian citizenship, a 
Sikkim Subject Card or a Residential Certificate is essential in order to seek employment, 
purchase non Bhutia-Lepcha land or claim any other governmental benefits within Sikkim. 
Increasingly in Sikkim the ‘insider-outsider’, ‘sons of the soil’ arguments are finding voice and 
representation through numerous associations as well as individuals.   
The coming of hydro-electric plants as well as other private investments which have 
created employment avenues in Sikkim has intensified the stress on an authentic Sikkimese 
identity. These issues have also attracted the attention of All Sikkim Democratic Labour Front 
(ASDLF), a part of the ruling SDF party which is aimed at protecting the Sikkimese worker’s 
interest and to oppose the discrimination with regard to employment in the private sector.194 
Seeking to ensure the rights of the Sikkimese labourer, the ruling party through the ASDLF 
called a general strike in April 2011, where unlike in Darjeeling, protest in any form especially 
a strike is usually not common in Sikkim. As unemployment is becoming increasingly 
associated with migration of non-Sikkimese people, usurping local jobs and opportunities, the 
boundaries of Sikkimese identity is bound to be constricted and its definition more politicised. 
                                                          
192  Source: Sikkim Now!, 26/06/2012. 
 
193 In October 2010, the All Sikkim Educated Self-Employed Association submitted a memorandum to the state 
government urging them to start the ‘purification process’ of Sikkim Subject by which it meant to purge out those 
residents of Sikkim who held invalid or fake Sikkim Subject Certificates. Earlier in June, 31,180 individuals were 
reported as holding fake Sikkim Subject cards.   
Source: Sikkim Express, 26/10/2010.  
 
194 Source: Now, 30/03/2011. 
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Unemployment thus remains not only a socio-economic problem but also has political 
repercussions.   
Unemployment is also aggravated by the desire to be employed in the public sector. 
Although this sector employs only 5.09 percent of the total working population (SSEC, 
2006:183) the desire to work in the public sector is so great that very often the ratio of 
applicants to a limited number of government positions can be very high. While the Sikkim 
Subject Certificate acts as a systematic filter against non-Sikkimese candidates, the competition 
between those holding Sikkim Subject is also very intense. A stagnant agricultural sector 
combined with steadily declining industrial activity has severely limited employment 
opportunities outside the government. Public administration has by default become the most 
propelling force behind economic growth. This is a point which was also emphasised by the 
Chief Minister at the launch of the ‘Mission- Poverty Free Sikkim 2013’- ‘There is no dearth 
of employment opportunities in the state since a lot of people from outside the state earn their 
livelihoods by working here. The main cause for the so-called unemployment is the youth’s 
total dependence on government jobs only for their bread and butter instead of having respect 
for dignity of labour and opting for self-employment.’ 195 
Increasing unemployment, apart from the obvious economic impact has also had 
repercussion on the insecurity of the Nepali population in Sikkim. While on one hand there are 
tangible benefits to be had by belonging to one of the socio-economic categories, on the other, 
being bonafide ST, OBC or MBC also requires Sikkim Subject Certificate, which is therefore 
another way of establishing a legitimate Sikkimese identity.  Thus, economic as well as socio-
political insecurity plays right into the hands of political agents, who are supported by the state.  
Ethnic identity is not only related to tangible benefits but has also now become a proof of 
belonging, of being truly Sikkimese. The recent entry of private companies has also only 
benefitted unemployed youth of certain areas whilst the problems of those in villages like 
Chumbung and Singling have remained the same. However as Yogesh Rai (Chumbung, 2010) 
said, ‘the government has been throwing various schemes like a goli (football) but our brothers 
and sisters have to be able to catch it.’ In order to be able to catch this metaphoric goli there 
are two pre-requisites- political connection and/or money and in the absence of both, belonging 
                                                          
195 Source: Zeenews.com, 22/09/2010 
http://zeenews.india.com/news/north-east/chamling-launches-project-to-make-sikkim-poverty-free_656876.html 
(Accessed: 10/11/2011). 
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to the socio-economic categories of ST, SC, OBC and MBC but most preferably the ST 
category.  
Although based on the notion of decentralised bureaucracy, the distribution pattern of 
public goods is highly politicised because it is the political representative, either the MLA or 
the member of the Panchayat, who is finally responsible for the re-distribution of goods and 
services which is used to maintain allegiance to the party. In this context the emergence of 
official ethnic associations fulfils not only the cultural vacuum experienced by the sub-ethnic 
groups but can also be considered as an alternate mode of negotiation which dispenses with the 
need to follow the well trodden path of party politics. Headed by government officials, ethnic 
associations then become a medium through which different sections of the population can 
lobby with the government without incurring the wrath of the state. 
5.2(i) Accessing the state: the ethnic approach 
Based on the welfare model, the Sikkimese government has undertaken the role of the 
prime distributor of resources, services and opportunities, more aggressively after the 
abrogation of the monarchy in 1975 and the installation of a democratically elected 
government, which is responsible to the electorate. Post-1975 the total population was divided 
into Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and the General category. While the Bhutia and the 
Lepcha groups were automatically inducted into the ST category the remaining Nepali groups 
barring those who belonged to the SC category were categoried as General (like the Marwaris 
and Biharis who are considered as ‘outsiders’ in Sikim). One of the fundamental changes in 
this distribution of population and resources came post 1994 with the introduction of the OBC 
category, then the MBC196 and the Primitive category. This re-distribution system uses socio-
cultural factors as a guide to the rights and benefits of groups and individuals. Under this, the 
different socio-economic categories and the ethnic groups within these categories are:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
196 Sikkim Government Gazette Notification No.308 dated 17/09/2003. 
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Socio-economic category Ethnic Groups 
Primitive  Lepcha  
Scheduled Tribes197   Bhutia, Limboo, Tamang, Sherpa 
Most Backward Classes (created in 2003) Rai, Gurung, Magar, Bhujel, Mukhia, Dewan 
Other Backward Classes Bahun, Chettri, Newar 
Scheduled Castes Kami, Damai, Sarki 
Others 198 
 
 
These categories determine the degree and type of benefits that an ethnic group or an individual 
is entitled to. For example, although there are poverty alleviation and development schemes 
that all citizens falling below the poverty line can apply for (viz. financial assistance in building 
houses under the Chief Minister’s rural housing scheme) there are provisions within these 
schemes that make allowance for positive discrimination to certain socio-economic groups like 
the ST or the SC (Government of Sikkim, Social Welfare Department website)199 thereby 
enhancing their appeal over other categories.  
While it is difficult for the state to achieve equal distribution of resources, the situation 
has become even more difficult for those at the receiving end as increase in population, prices 
and aspirations had made eligibility for public goods more competitive.  With the decline in 
agricultural production and other allied industries (Khawas, 2012:190) rural areas, which are 
experiencing economic decline and increasing unemployment, are increasingly dependent on 
the government which implements schemes like the Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (Jawahar 
Rural Alleviation Programme) aimed at strengthening the village infrastructure through the 
                                                          
197 The parity system197 which had been established by Chogyal Tashi Namgyal in 1953 led to creation of the 
Bhutia-Lepcha seats in the State Council. However, parts of this system is still retained and in Sikkim the Bhutia-
Lepcha community, although it belongs to the ST category, still contests elections and has reservations under the 
Bhutia-Lepcha category (BL). This is an anomaly particular to Sikkim which is protected by Article 371F of the 
Indian Constitution197 and thus in the Sikkim State Assembly there is reservation of seats for the BL community 
but not for ST, much to the frustration of other ST groups like Limboos’ and Tamangs’.  
198 The category ‘Others’ refers to ‘plains people’ originating from various parts of the country and residing in 
Sikkim, who are still referred to as ‘Indians’ by the locals.  
 
199  Source: Social Welfare Department, Government of Sikkim 
http://southsikkim.nic.in/Department/Social%20Justice,%20Enpowerment%20&%20Welfare/welfare%20depart
mentprogram.htm (Accessed 09/01/2012). 
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creation of durable assets. The Welfare Division of the Sikkim Social Justice and 
Empowerment and Welfare Department is ‘entrusted with the responsibility of socio-economic 
and educational development of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes 
and Minority Communities. The division implements educational development schemes, such 
are pre-matric and post-matric scholarship schemes for SC/ST/OBC/MBC/Minority.200The 
Welfare Division is also guaranteed grants from the Consolidated Fund of India under Article 
275(1) of the Indian Constitution201 to meet the cost of schemes undertaken to ensure the 
welfare of STs. According to the Department of Social Welfare all revenue blocks with more 
than thirty per cent tribal population have been declared as Intensive Tribal Development 
Project which implies more investment in infrastructure and development than in a non-tribal 
block. Sikkim ST, SC and OBC Development Corporation Limited has also been set up in 
order to provide financial assistance to all backward sections of the society at a low interest 
rate.202  The special central assistance to tribals aims to bring about a more rapid economic 
development amongst the tribal groups and focuses on demand based income generation 
programmes. Activities under this include construction of green houses, distribution of milking 
cows, distribution of improved seeds and agricultural tools and equipment, training to 
farmers/agriculturists. The government also provides vocational training in tribal areas. These 
benefits also extend to the employment section where there are reservations as well as age and 
                                                          
200  Source:  Government of Sikkim, Welfare Division 
(http://www.neportal.org/northeastfiles/Sikkim/Economy/Annual_Plans/2001-02/35.asp (accessed 31/12/2012). 
 
201 Relevant excerpts from the Article are:  
(i) The grants are provided to the States on the basis of ST population percentage in the State to the total tribal 
population of the Country. 
(ii)The funds are released to the State Governments against specific projects for the welfare of Scheduled Tribes 
and strengthening of administration of tribal areas from the year 2000- 2001. A part of funds are also utilised to 
establish Eklavya Model residential Schools to provide quality education to ST students from class VI to XII. 
(iii) The grants are provided to the States on the basis of ST population percentage in the State to the total tribal 
population of the Country.  
Source: https://constitutionexplorer.stanford.edu/?q=singlenode/204 (Acessed 09/01/2013). Full version of the 
Article has been attached as Annexe.  
202 Source:  Government of Sikkim, Welfare Division 
(http://www.neportal.org/northeastfiles/Sikkim/Economy/Annual_Plans/2001-02/35.asp (Accessed 31/12/2012). 
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marks relaxation for the different categories the highest of which is the ST status203 and the 
pre- and post-matric scholarships are once again only open to ST/SC and OBC.  
This therefore shows that socio-economic incentives are embedded within these categories, 
making them at once attractive to the electorate and hence an important basis for the formation 
of a strong political base.  
Table 4. Percentage of reservation in employment according to ethnic category 
     
 
Scheduled      
    Tribe 
 
  
Scheduled      
   Caste 
 
Most 
Backward 
Class 
 
    
 Other Backwad     
     Classes 
         
 
General 
Category 
Percentage of total 
population 
    37.39    6.66 23.46      23.20       9.29            
Percentage of 
Reservation in education 
and employment 
     33     6 21        14        26 
Source: Notification no. 98, 15/11/2003 issued by the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and 
Training.  
Benefits of affirmative action are most apparent in the overall employment sector. Out of the 
total number of workers in the state, the highest number of workers are from the ST category 
followed by the OBC, MBC, Others and SC. Although instrumental to the meteoric rise of the 
                                                          
203   According to Notification no.103, 25/11/2003, issued by the Department of Personnel, Administrative 
Reforms and Training, different age limits were prescribed for different groups.  While ST and SC were allowed 
age relaxation of five years, MBC and OBC groups were given a relaxation of four years. For example in an 
advertisement for the post of Under Secretary had  different age bars as well as numbers of seats for the various  
socio-economic categories: 
Category Age  Number of 
seats  
Percentage of 
population 
ST(Limboo 
and Tamang) 
35 4 15.92 
SC 35 2 6.66 
BL 35 5 20.86 
MBC 34 5 23.46 
OBC 34 5 23.20 
Source: Sikkim Express, 22/10/2012; State Socio-Economic Census (2006:50). 
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SDF to political power204 the domination and consolidation of political power by a single party 
for the past seventeen years has lowered the dependency of the party on the matwalis of Sikkim 
for political success. Nonetheless, they still comprise the largest section of the electorate but 
are also the least represented in government services and/or educationally marginalised. For 
example, according to the State Socio-Economic Census of Sikkim (2005-06: 195), the Rai 
ethnic group is one of the largest ethnic groups in Sikkim, constituting 13.52 percent of the 
total population. However, only 10.98 per cent of the total Rai population is employed in the 
public sector as compared to the 18.28 per cent who are employed as agricultural wage 
labourers. This situation can be constrasted with that of the Bhutia ethnic group who like the 
Rais, constitute 13.08 per cent of the total population but represent 21.13 per cent of the public 
sector and only 9.25 per cent are engaged as agricultural wage labourers.  According to the 
Census, the position of the Limboo ethnic group was even worse. They represented 9.74 per 
cent of the total population of the state but only 6.70 per cent were employed in the public 
sector while 14.84 per cent of the Limboos were employed as agricultural wage labourers.  
 
 
 
                                                          
204According to the Election Commission Report quoted in the magazine Chaaya, in 1993 the ethnic composition 
of the Nepali category clearly highlights a large matwali group. This group benefited the most from the change in 
the government. 
Table 3: Nepali ethnic groups in Sikkim 1993 
Ethnic Group Total Number 
Newar 8487 
Bahun  18,265 
Chettri 23,489 
Limboo 18,208 
Rai 26,682 
Gurung 12,778 
Tamang 11, 319 
Magar 5,118 
Thami 51 
Mukhia 998 
Bhujel 1119 
Scheduled Caste 10,651 
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Table 5.Distribution of government employees according to different welfare categories  
Categories Scheduled 
Tribes 
Other 
Backward 
Classes 
Most 
Backward 
Class 
Others Scheduled 
Castes 
Percentage of 
workers 
37.22 23.69 23.58 9.17 6.34 
Fig.2 Source SSEC, 2006:183 205 
Employment in the public sector also follows a similar pattern as the largest number of 
persons employed as regular salaried workers belong to the Bhutia, Chettri, Bahun, Rai, 
Lepcha, Limboo, Gurung, Pradhan and Tamang ethnic groups. This therefore highlights that 
the highest benefit in terms of reservation comes through the ST category as this group has the 
highest representation in the public sector in terms of proportion to their population.  
Most of the Nepali sub-groups, on the other hand, belong to the MBC category and 
although there are specific benefits that come attached with these groups there are a few other 
problems with it- the first and the most fundamental problem with this category (MBC) is that 
it holds no value outside the state. This brings no added advantage to those aspiring to study or 
work in the public sector as they will still have to compete in the large national category of 
OBCs. Second, movement from the OBC to the MBC category has not brought significant 
economic benefits to the group as the concessions that they receive is less than the ST category; 
third, the number of groups in the MBC list is far more than those in the ST list and thus, the 
available pool of resources has to be divided amongst a larger number of people. Given these 
de-merits, the most important demand that has arisen in the present context is that of being 
included in the Scheduled Tribe list, which guarantees higher reservations, inside as well as 
outside the state.  
With the entrenchment of affirmative action, the connection between ethnic identity 
and politics is self evident. It represents a new form of patronage system where the state acts 
as the primary patron and ethnic groups, who are beneficiaries of affirmative action, are the 
clients. Thus, in contrast to Nepal and Darjeeling, it is this overarching incentive structure that 
is promoted by the state that has given ethnic politics in Sikkim its particular distinctive form.  
                                                          
205 All figures are quoted from the SSEC 2006 Report which is the latest available figures and that used by the 
state government in all its policy formulations.  
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(ii) Becoming Tribal  
It is clear that the ST category, the one wih most benefits attached to it has become the 
goal and aspiration of all the ethnic groups, the upper caste Chettri and Bahuns included. This 
aspiration has been made achievable on the part of ethnic groups by the national policy on 
tribal groups that necessitates the essentialization of culture. The criteria used to identify the 
STs show no appreciable break from the criteria defined by the 1931 Census Commissioner 
J.H.Hutton. It is still based on primitive characteristics, distinctive culture, geographical 
isolation, ‘shyness’ of contact with the community at large and ‘backwardness’ (Kapila, 2008: 
122). According to Sengupta (1988: 1004), the national discourse on tribal communities is still 
dominated by definitions and imaginations of head-hunting, primitive hunters and gatherers 
(also see van Schendel 2011).206 This imagery has also filtered into the imaginations and 
representations of ethnic groups in Sikkim. For example, in the Sikkimese context, an executive 
member of the Gurung Association described the Gurungs as ‘docile, shy, god-fearing and 
isolation liking.’207The description of the Khas ethnic group by Kharel and Basnet (2008:48-
49) is also constructed around characteristics expected by the national discourse. They write, 
‘In general the Khasas (Chhetri/Bahuns) are simple, obedient and hard working. They do not 
hesitate to undertake activity of any nature. Their traditional meditation (sic) is known as 
Jhankri. He worships sprits (sic) of all kinds… Few Chhetris and Matwali Chhetris worship 
the Mastha (tribal nature of God) alone and do not know or care about any Hindu deities or 
festivals.’ The ethnographic report submitted by the Gurung association to the Social Welfare 
Department describes them in a similar vein, ‘the Gurungs are economically backward, 
illiterate and an unsophisticated class of people who are liable to get easily deceived by shrewd 
and calculating people…’ This report even goes further to distance itself from any attachments 
                                                          
206 The description of the Bhujel ethnic group in the booklet, ‘Ethnography of the Bhujel hill tribe’ published by 
the Akhil Bharat Bhujel Sangh also highlights the general direction of ethnic revivalism- ‘the tribe consists of 
innocent people who are confined to themselves and hardly bother anything or anyone. They maintain a friendly 
and healthy relationship with others…Even though they have mediocre intelligence they are very humble and 
respectful to the elders. They are also very protective of the weak ones. They seem to be simple forest dwelling 
people and many of the common terms have to do with hunting, gathering and fishing. The religion and culture 
of these backward people (emphasis mine) are close to extinction and influences of other social groups have been 
encroaching on their way of life.’ However, to establish this cultural distinction the booklet elaborates numerous 
rituals (marriage, child naming ceremony, death rituals) which ironically are not only shared by other ethnic 
groups but also have strong resemblance to Hindu practices.  
207Executive member of the All Sikkim Gurung (Tamu) Associaton interviewed by the author on 10th Nov, 2010, 
Gangtok.  
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with Hinduism by decrying that Gurungs have often been described as ‘Backward Hindus’ 
which was bound to ‘lead to the extinction of Gurung religious beliefs, traditions, culture, and 
lifestyle and obliterate all distinctions between castes and tribes and as some selfish 
communities want to amalgamate them into the Brahmanic caste sytem' (Gurung et al, 2005:23, 
24).     
All of these reports and descriptions come from groups who practice or till very recently have 
practised Hindu customs and traditions. Thus, instead of different characteristics contributing 
to the creation of a ST list, it is the ST list itself which creates and maintains a historical image 
that in turn determines the criteria for enlistment as an ST (Xaxa, 1999).208 Not only are groups 
from very different social and political backgrounds identified as tribes 209  but their 
classification is also is riddled with generalisations. The attempt to create a cohesive tribal 
category subsumes different and often contradictory cultural characteristics under the same ST 
category. An ethnographic report commissioned by the state government and led by scholars 
like A.C.Sinha, T.B.Subba (2005: 80) concludes that foundations of Animism or Bonism and 
a super-structure of Hindu and Buddhist cultures were found in all the groups under the Kirata 
label. It continues,  
‘They were basically worshippers of ancestors, deities related to clans, 
household, land, forest, river, etc through the mediums of their own shamans and with 
the sacrifice of flowers, crops, birds and animals…..the essentially egalitarian, tribal 
communities having their own language, culture and traditions began to be known as 
Nepali caste Hindus, which was certainly a desirable identity for them for the past 
couple of centuries in view of the higher social status it accrued , but it is not longer 
(sic) an enabling identity in the wake of other peoples like the Lepcha and Bhutia 
receiving benefit of their tribal identity in terms of jobs and other constitutional 
protection.’   
                                                          
208 Apart from the STs there were also certain groups, considered as more marginalised amongst the tribals and 
were included in a new category called Primitive Tribal Groups and the criteria fixed for their identification was 
pre-agricultural level of technology, very low level of literacy and declining or stagnant population (Bijoy et al 
2010:15). 
 
 
184 
 
Thus, when high profile recommendations make direct allusions to the material benefit of being 
ST, not only does it encourage ethnic groups to aspire for ST status but at the same time, it also 
leads to the reification of the image of tribes as hunter, gatherers and animists. This makes 
these categories even more controversial as majority of the members of ethnic groups do not 
follow such lifestyles or religions which then weakens their argument of economic deprivation 
or backwardness as a result of cultural practices.  Nonetheless, this trend amongst the ethnic 
groups directs towards the active re-construction of the cultural symbols (language, rituals) in 
order to fit the image of a tribe that has been created by the central government, which views 
tribal groups from an essentialised, parochial and condescending perspective. Ethnic 
revivalism in Sikkim therefore represents the core elements of the thesis rather starkly. It shows 
that the Nepali ethnic group is constantly in the process of re-inventing itself as per its socio-
economic requirements thereby highlighting its dynamic, socially constructed nature. This re-
invention may be spurred on by (mostly) instrumental motives on the part of ethnic groups but 
has been facilitated entirely by the state which values ethnic identity for its political value (as 
a reliable vote bank). Assertion of a particular form of ethnic identity is therefore only a part 
of the larger political process which is based on the politics of re-distribution in which 
belonging to any socio-economic category other than the general Nepali category brings more 
political or economic benefits.  
(iii) Structures supporting ethnic politics 
 
The state (as represented by a particular political party) is the supplier of the benefits 
accruing from affirmative action and as a result is also the recipient of continued political 
support from the electorate. The state supports this incentive structure by giving benefits 
(ranging from reservations to milching cows) directly to different groups and indirectly through 
its support of ethnic association. Over the past ten years Sikkim has seen an unprecedented 
growth in the number of ethnic associations representing Nepali ethnic groups both big and 
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small.210 The state as a political agent has led to the creation of a social framework which is 
more conscious and receptive to ethnicity and its cultural markers than it has ever been before. 
This in effect has placed a degree of political agency in the hands of different ethnic 
associations which at one level implement governmental policies and on the other, probably 
the most important level formulate their agenda within the guidelines given by the state and 
use that to negotiate with it.  
While a few of the ethnic associations (Limboo, Rai, Gurung) existed prior to 1994, 
owing to the direct assistance of the government, the state has seen a prolific growth in the 
number of ethnic associations since the 1994 General Election (Gurung, 2010: 248-49). 
Highlighting the role of gaon-samaj (village community) in the role of cultural preservation, 
Arjun Tamang of (Soreng, 2010) says, ‘it is the duty of the community to preserve language 
and culture. The government is not going to do it for you. We have to start small associations 
in the villages and do it ourselves’. Even the Limboo Association started as a small club before 
it grew into one of the biggest Associations in Sikkim and highlights the fact that ethnic 
associations have been existed in small, non-formal forms in Sikkim. Increasing state support 
called for registration and other formalisation of these associations thereby necessitating the 
active participant of ethnic elites adept at Gangtok bureaucracy (at least relatively) and securing 
the maximum benefits for a particular ethnic group. 
Most ethnic associations usually originated as voluntary language schools in rented 
rooms and in spite of governmental support, they still have to be self-sufficient in many ways. 
By way of example the General Secretary of the Mukhia Association211 says that owing to the 
lack of a Mukhia communal bhavan (hall), dance practice for different cultural festivals still 
takes place on the Association President’s terrace. Financial and institutional support by the 
state is thus crucial for bigger projects like language and script development, cultural 
exhibitions in the state as well as outside. This link between politics and culture, especially at 
the local level is inevitable as explained by Rajesh Tamang, member of the Tamang 
                                                          
210 According to the Commission for Review of Environment and Social sector, Policies, Plans and Programmes 
(CRESP)Report (2008, Annexure F) eighteen ethnic associations submitted their memorandum and ethnographic 
report out of which fourteen of these ethnic groups belonged to the Nepali group. The ethnic groups are:  
Bhujel, Chhetri-Bahun, Damai, Tamang, Gurung (Tamu), Kami, Kirat Khambu Rai, Limboo, Mangar, Newar, 
Sannyassi, Sarki, Sunuwar and Thami.       
                                                         
211 Member of the Mukhia Association, Sikkim, interviewed by the author on 13th Dec, 2010, Gangtok, Sikkim. 
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Association in Soreng (Khadga Bazar, Soreng, 2010)212- ‘if we want to build anything or we 
require anything else for the community, then we have to hobnob around the MLA or the 
Minister, without whose help it cannot be done’. This point was also reiterated by a member 
of the Limboo Literary Assocation, K.Limboo213 who said that the Association had to ensure 
that ‘they remain in their (the state’s) good books’. This requirement to ‘hobnob’ and remain 
in the ‘good books’ of the area MLA or Minister shows that the form and content of ethnic 
identity is monitored by the state and ethnic associations have to act within that boundary. 
Thus, while ethnic identity might be a product of social construction, it is one that has been 
constructed under the watchful eye of the state.  
All ethnic associations function and negotiate within the framework that is set by the 
state and submitting memorandums, organising meetings and bureaucratic lobbying has 
emerged as the most effective ways of interacting with the state. Unlike in Nepal ethnic 
associations in Sikkim share a positive relation with the state, where there are official 
mechanisms like the Department of Culture and Tourism that promote as well as financially 
support ethnic diversity. In Sikkim ethnic associations do not have to negotiate with the state 
for recognition or socio-political space. It is rather a request for a share of the privileges that is 
being provided to other groups with similar cultural features. This is in contrast to the situation 
in Nepal where historical domination and discrimination has fostered a confrontational attitude 
towards the state. In Nepal ethnic associations are still not accepted as legitimate participants 
in the reconstruction of the country. They are viewed with suspicion and as competition to the 
traditional political pattern.214 Thus, the mode of appeal to the state also differs from that of 
appeasement in Sikkim to that of opposition to the state and its elites in Nepal. Most of the 
ethnic associations in Sikkim are elite and urban based as they are headed by civil servants who 
                                                          
212 Interviewed by the author on 13th November, 2010, Soreng, West Sikkim. 
213  Interviewed by the author on 16th November, 2010, Soreng, west Sikkim.  
214 For example, after the breakdown of the Constituent Assembly in July 2012, the Janajati leaders are 
weighing the option of forming a political party of their own. The two day conference organised by NEFIN 
declared that ‘since the existing parties in Nepal were Brahmanical, patriarchal and controlled by upper caste 
supremacists’, it was a historical necessity to set up an inclusive party based on principles of human rights, 
social justice, equality and equity, and ethnicity theory’. Although a representation of frustration with the 
political system such declarations by ethnic associations are considered as a source of potential threat to the 
established order. Source: The Hindu, 25/07/2012. 
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are aware of the various bureaucratic mechanisms needed to lobby effectively and cordially 
with the state. The increasing receptivity of the state highlighted through its socio-economic 
policies has led to a change in the demands of the established associations from that of socio-
economic benefits to political representation (as in the case of the Limboo and Tamang 
Associations) and the demand for the declaration of all MBC categories as ST. Effective 
lobbying by the ethnic elites, who are usually well placed within the governmental bureaucracy, 
has led to the state directing two separate commissions, the Sinha Commission in 2004 and the 
Burman Commission in 2009 in order to determine the statutory status of the ethnic entities in 
Sikkim. 
These demands for political reservations also highlight the transition of ethnic demands 
from socio-cultural to political demands expressed through the associations. 215  These 
developments also raise important questions regarding the Nepali ethnic group in Sikkim. 
While major ethnic associations like the Limboo, Gurung have already started disassociating 
themselves from the Nepali community and emphasizing more on the Sikkimese identity 
smaller groups are soon to follow suit. For example, on 16th February 2011, the Sukhim 
Yakthung Sapsok Songjumbo (Sikkim Limboo Literary Society) made an appeal to the Census 
Directorate to give careful consideration to the correct enumeration of Limboos in Sikkim. The 
memorandum handed by the association to Sikkim Express, a local daily stated, ‘it has been 
reported to our association that some of the staff of Census (sic) filled forms themselves in 
some of the columns and were reluctant to write Limboo, Yooma religion216 and Limboo 
language for the Limboo community of Sikkim. It has to be brought to your kind notice that 
we are not Nepali or Nepali citizen. We are Sikkimese Limboo strongly rooted with the land of 
Sikkim because we were here prior to the establishment of the Namgyal dynasty as religious 
king of Sikkim in 1642 (emphasis mine).’  Statements and declarations of indigenity by 
                                                          
215 For example, the Limboo-Tamang Joint Action Forum has been especially pertinent in promoting its demand 
for political reservation in the Legislative Assembly, placing memorandums to the Chief Minister but also to the 
President of India in 2008. This has been possible not only because of their combined strength but also because 
individually they are well organized associations with a network of members who are highly placed in the 
governmental bureaucratic network. While the primary demand of most of these associations relates to the 
attainment of Scheduled Tribe status, those who have already been declared as ST now aspire for the 
proportionate political representation in the state legislature. 
216  Yumaism is a Henotheist or Kathenotheist religion which believes in only a single goddesses Tagera 
Ningwaphuma, the creator, presever and sustainor of life. Yumaism believes in the ‘biogenesis theory of life’ 
wherein life is created only through life with the blessing of the goddess Tagera Ningwaphuma (Yuma). The 
mortal human beings have to survive with the judicious use of all lving and non-living objects that were created 
for his survival (Subba, 2011:150-51).  
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established ethnic associations therefore exert more pressure on other ethnic groups to 
emphasize their own unique culture as tribes and their belonging to Sikkim at the same time. 
The booklet ‘Ethnography of the Bhujel Hill Tribe’ published by the Akhil Bhujel Sangha of 
Sikkim is a case in example of an ethnic group who are introduced to the reader as one which 
has been living in Sikkim since time immemorial and comprise a linguistic minority. This is 
an important maneouver in staking a claim not only on a share of the material benefits but also 
on the social history of Sikkim as one of the ‘original’ people of Sikkim.  
Apart from the instrumental use of ethnicity to qualify for affirmative action, these associations 
also hold the key to the articulation of ethnicity for their own members. Members of ethnic 
groups, especially in urban areas rely almost completely on ethnic associations for the 
definition of a particular tradition or its cultural significance. Nepali has been the dominant 
language of communication in the hills217  and thus development of ethnic languages and 
literature was high on the priority list of ethnic associations. In 1995, the state government 
included Newari, Rai, Gurung, Mangar, Sherpa and Tamang languages as official languages of 
the state along with Nepali, Bhutia, Lepcha and Limboo. Not only is language and script 
essential for cultural preservation but it is also important for recognition as ST and therefore 
access to the benefits from the state.218  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
217 Hiltz (2003: 76) notes that in 1967 English was the official language in Sikkim where people spoke three 
distinct languages –Denjongke (a Sikkimese dialect of Tibetan), Lepcha and Nepali but in fact Nepali was the 
unofficial lingua franca. Bhutia and Nepali boarding school were started in 1889 and 1906 respectively and with 
the establishment of the Apatan Sahitya Parishad in 1947, language and literarure was fully developed making 
Nepali a lingua franca in Sikkim. The Government of Sikkim through the Sikkim Official Language Act, 1977 
recognized Nepali, Bhutia and Lepcha as the Official Languages of Sikkim on 17th October 1977 (Subba, 
2011:168, 171). 
218 For example, according to the ethnographic reports and memorandum submitted to the Burman Commission 
in 2008 those ethnic groups (Rai, Gurung, Sunuwar, Thami, Dewan, and Bhujel) who were aspiring for the ST 
status had to anwer specific questions pertaining to specific ethnic language and dialect.  
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Songs of love and life sung by local Limboo artists from west Sikkim 
 
        
     
A small survey219 conducted as a part of data collection at Soreng High School revealed 
the increasing receptivity towards ethnic languages.  Students were not shy to speak their 
languages and considered their ethnic languages rather than Nepali to be more useful in the 
future. Ravi Rai220 who conducts Rai language classes in his house explains that the motivation 
for his students which ranges from genuine interest to learn the language to seeing it as an asset 
for future employment prospects as language teachers. Once again the ethnic associations have 
been at the forefront of language revival. Based on the language survey conducted in 2005-06, 
Turin (2012:138) comments on the growing interest in their ethnic languages especially as a 
part of their school curriculum. Interestingly he points out,  
                                                          
219 A small language survey was conducted amongst students of Soreng High School, West Sikkim. Limboo and 
Tamang students from classes IX and X were selected for the survey. A questionnaire was distributed which had 
ten, simple multiple choice questions. A total of eighteen students participated in this survey.  
220  Active member of the Akhil Kirat Rai Sangh, interviewed by the author on 23rd November, 2010, Gangtok, 
Sikkim.  
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‘…we should not assume that the students who opt for these classes are actually being 
taught language in order to use it, or that they are being steeped in the performative skill that 
true competence entails. Rather, they are learning heritage, culture, history and ancestry 
through the prism of language. In fact, these students are learning ‘belonging’, because the 
utility of such languages to young Sikkimese are now as markers of belonging rather than 
vernaculars of daily use. It is precisely because these languages now have primarily emotional 
and symbolic value rather than strategic and practical importance that the Government of 
Sikkim can afford to teach them’. While the primary motive may be to learn ‘belonging’, 
learning an ethnic language improves chances of employment in government schools as 
language teachers.  Despite the diversity in the motives of the students, the government as well 
as the associations that are promoting ethnic languages, the trend of teaching and learning 
ethnic language is continuing unabated. Thus, apart from reservations, ethnicity can also 
enhance the life chances of individuals by promoting alternative forms of employment thereby 
raising its value as resource amongst people who are looking at different ways to access the 
state.  
 
Story of a bear in the Bantawa (Rai) language, published by the Human Resource Department, Government of 
Sikkim 
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(iv) Claiming agency 
Even if the state has facilitated ethnic politics by providing an overarching framework 
and institutional support, control over the cultural aspects of ethnicity and its usage resides in 
these ethnic associations which exert great control in bestowing recognition to some cultural 
elements over others and thus promoting their own approved form of ethnic identity. For 
example, the Rai ethnic group has over twenty-three different dialects out of which Bantawa 
was chosen as the official language by the Akhil Kirat Rai Sangh (AKRS) in 1996 and a script 
was developed by 1998.221  Bantawa is taught in all government schools and books, magazines 
are also published in this language. On 15th July 2012, the AKRS started a language school in 
east Sikkim with the aim of promoting the Bantawa amongst its Rai members.222 In another 
instance, on 18 July, 2012 the Sikkim Tamang Buddhist Association organised an International 
Tamang language and literature seminar where the members of the association refused the 
addition of new words from Tibetan grammar in the Tamying (Tamang dialect) but on the other 
hand, a total of 490 new Tamang words were listed that came up in the process of text book 
writing (Sikkim Express, 2012).223This therefore exemplifies the control exerted by ethnic 
associations over legitimate markers of ethnicity. Thus experiencing Rai-ness or Limboo-ness 
and understanding cultural items and their significance is controlled by ethnic associations, 
who with their ‘grass-root/village’ connections are considered the source of cultural 
authenticity. Ironically, these very ‘grass-root/village’ connections are reduced to mere 
recipients of the decisions taken by the ethnic associations which are based in urban areas.  
For example, the Bhujel Association which was formed in 1995 represents a total of 
3500 people and unlike the Limboo Association which was formed in 1972,  they are in their 
‘exploratory phase’. It is only very recently that they have been able to compile details about 
                                                          
221 Like the Limboos, the Rai ethnic group is also based on an oral transmission of knowledge and therefore lack 
any previously known script. The AKRS therefore adopted a script which had been derived from the Kirat script, 
and is very similar to the Limboo script (Rai, 2008:48).   
 
222 Source: Northeast Today 
 http://www.northeasttoday.in/our-states/sikkim/class-for-learning-rai-language-begins-in-sikkim/  (Accesed 
23/07/2012). 
 
223 Source: Sikkim Express, 18/08/2012  
http://www.sikkimexpress.com/archives/19%20July/page_2.jpg (Accessed 23/07/2012). 
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their language and culture.224 Likewise, the Mukhia Association represents a tiny fraction of 
the population (1200 persons), the majority of who live in rural areas and attribute the formation 
of their association to the government of Sikkim. As Bhim Mukhia 225 explains, ‘most of the 
people in the villages are very poor or are agriculturists, they cannot run an organisation and 
thus we have to take the responsibility.’ However with the onus of responsibility also comes 
that of expectations, a point reiterated by Deepak Bhujel (Gangotk, 2010), ‘we have handed 
over some responsibilities to our rural counter-parts but without us they cannot do it. They are 
down trodden, engaged in hand to mouth existence and they constantly expect the association 
to help them get jobs.’ This expectation from an ethnic kin was also related by Bhim Kancha 
(Hee Gaon, 2010) who narrated how a Subba bureaucrat from his village had helped ethnic 
members (afno manchay) from his village get government jobs.226Thus in a system which 
favours either the rich or the politically connected, it is ethnicity that has become one of the 
essential means to ensure the socio-economic aspirations of the common man and woman, to 
whom the benefits of the welfare state does not trickle down. Once again, this highlights the 
increasing association of ethnicity with material benefits but within the framework approved 
by the state.  
Emergence of ethnic politics can be understood against the background of two different 
trajectories of development; increasing relative poverty and the growth of the affluent class, 
standard of living, especially in the capital Gangtok. Thus in an environment where political 
connections and money are the pre-requisites to be participants in the welfare state that Sikkim 
claims to be, the creation of socio-economic categories and the concomitant rise of ethnic 
associations enable an alternate, albeit flawed attempt at negotiation with the state which has 
only worked to benefit a small section of the total population.  
Apart from political patronage which blocked access to public goods, most of the 
respondents had not heard or were unsure of their rights and benefits that came with the 
categories that they belonged to. They had heard of the schemes but were not sure of what these 
schemes were for sure or how they could avail it. Understanding ethnic culture and the 
                                                          
224 Member of the Akhil Bharat Bhujel Sangh (All India Bhujel Association), interviewed by the author on 10 th 
November, 2011. 
225 Executive member of the Mukhia Association, Sikkim. Interviewed by the author on 13th December, 2010, 
Gangtok, Sikkim. 
226 Limboo agriculturist interviewed by the author on 13th November, 2010, Hee Gaon, west Sikkim.  
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concomitant benefits has thus become restrictive as it is now dependent upon education as well 
as the exposure and the opportunity to use it. While questions of quotas baffled older men and 
women, Dawa Tamang227 a fifteen year old boy attending Soreng High School (West Sikkim) 
was more aware of Tamang culture (as promoted by the association) and the benefits of being 
an ST. Speaking almost non-stop, Dawa elaborated on his knowledge, ‘I first became aware of 
our dress at the Adivesan (General Convention) where I saw all the important people wearing 
the dress. I don’t have one but I know what it looks like and I borrowed one to wear during 
Bhasa Diwas (Language Day) celebrations in school.... I also learnt in school about the 
scholarships that we as ST have. As soon as the teachers hear from the Department, they let us 
know. I know that there is a ‘Golden Scholarship’ also and we need to show our marks, our 
domicile, income certificate etc to get it.’ Education therefore has become central in 
understanding as well as using the benefits given by the system. Thus when asked if people at 
the grass root understand the benefits of belonging to a certain category, Shweta Rai 228 herself 
a Panchayat member believes that even if one person from the family is educated they would 
be able to benefit from the system.  
Attainment of ST status has however not altered the economic status of the people. However 
this once again comes with a caveat as class plays a very important role, ‘class lay kasailai 
choday ko chaina (class has spared no one)229 and thus it is usually those who are already at a 
better position than those in the rural areas who are more able to reap the benefits of the system. 
When asked about the benefits of being a Scheduled Tribe, Arjun Tashi, an executive member 
of the Tamang Association in Soreng230 responded, ‘Whatever benefits they must be getting, it 
must be in Gangtok, we have heard you get this and that, low interest rates on your loans but 
we have not looked into it’. Illiterate or those living in the rural areas, removed from education 
and activities of the ethnic associations are thus unable to participate in this ethnic revival as 
they cannot contribute to the process of cultural production nor can they take advantage of the 
benefits. Despite these experiences, ethnic politics has become the norm and probably the only 
means of accessing the state in Sikkim. This process is based largely on the framework of 
                                                          
227 Interviewed by the author on 18th November, 2010, West Sikkim.  
228 Interviewed by the author on 12th November, 2010, West Sikkim. 
229  Retired Head Master of a local school interviewed by the author on 12th November, 2010, West Sikkim. 
230 Interviewed by the author on 12th Novmeber, 2010, West Sikkim.  
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redistributive politics that has been established by the state and ethnic associations (which are 
also supported by the state) are its primary agents. The state as well as ethnic groups themselves 
have recognized the value of ethnicity as a political resource that can be used as a negotiating 
tool. This in turn has informed and shaped the cultural imaginings and political demands of 
ethnic groups, thereby leading to an assertion of identity that is different from that in Nepal or 
Darjeeling.  
(v) Culture for culture’s sake 
As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, wholly instrumental motives cannot present 
a holistic picture of ethnic politics in Sikkim. Interaction with different communities in the hills 
of western Sikkim as well as with other respondents revealed a feeling of cultural erosion 
amongst them. Whilst discussing traditional Limboo dance, Shyam Limboo231 shared his sense 
of cultural loss: 
Q: Do people still perform the Dhan Nach?232R: People in my generation might know but the 
young ones don’t. Dherai harayo/ it has disappeared to a large extent but if we are forced we 
can get old people to come and dance.  
Q: Don’t the young ones want to learn how to dance? 
R: When they need to show in some cultural programmes or somewhere, they learn for two 
three days and they dance. It is not like the olden days, there is no time these days. We used to 
dance at almost every given any occasion but that system is not there anymore. 
Q: So did you also dance? 
R: Yes, I even travelled to the other side of the hill to dance but now that zamana /age, time is 
gone. These days they say disco, even in weddings they play this music and dance. There is no 
chance of performing the dhan-naach.  
                                                          
231 Limboo agriculturist, also worked part-time as a manual labourer, interviewed by the author on 13th 
November, 2010. 
232 Dhan Naach is a form of dance that is performed by both male and female Limbus usually during harvest time 
(as the name suggests) but is also performed during other festivals and inpromptu at fairs or gatherings.  
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This interaction helps us understand that the ongoing sub-ethnic cultural revivalism in 
Sikkim functions on two, seemingly inter-related levels. While on one level it may serve the 
purpose of securing reservations and benefits for the ethnic elites, on another level and for the 
majority of those living in rural areas, unable to access the benefits of affirmative, it fulfils the 
cultural vacuum created by a domineering, homogenous Nepali identity which stifled other 
sub-ethnic identities. Thus, for people like Shyam Limboo, the revival of Dhan Naach albeit 
performed on stage is still a welcome change than the prospect of it being completely extinct. 
Raj Rai (Chumbung, 2010) views this cultural revival as a much needed and positive 
development for the Rai community. ‘We did not celebrate the Rai festival Sakewa before; it 
is only after the present government came into power that we have started celebrating it. In this 
the Akhil Kirat Rai Sangh (AKRS) has played an important role as they have increased the jan 
chetna (public awareness) amongst the Rai community and has been successful in making 
Sakewa not a cultural festival but also as an exhibition of our jatiyeta (community) and thereby 
bringing all our people together.’ Bhim Kancha (Hee Gaon, 2010) whilst emphasizing the role 
of the village community in building a samuhik manghim (communal Limboo temple) also 
appreciates the efforts of the government , ‘at least the government has built a big Manghim in 
Martam and we are able to celebrate our festival Chasok Tongnam. The festival has been 
declared a state holiday and to be able to celebrate it is a matter of garv/pride.’ Very soon Hee 
Gaon will also be on the tourist/pilgrimage trail as the government has already started 
construction of a mega statue of one of the most revered Limboo educationist and philosopher 
Te-Ongsi Sirijunga Xin Thebe.233 
Declaration of ethnic festivals as state holidays is considered as a sign of importance 
and prestige amongst the various ethnic groups. While the festivals of larger ethnic groups like 
the Rai, Limboo, Gurung, Newars etc have been declared as State holidays, 234  smaller 
                                                          
233  Te-Ongsi Sirijunga Xin Thebe was a Limboo linguist from Limbuwan who spread the Limboo language and 
script amongst the Limboos of Sikkim and Nepal. According to local Limboo legends, his mission was considered 
dangerous by the Tibetan authority in Sikkim and was killed in 1741 at Martam, West Sikkim. Te-Ongsi/Teyongsi 
in Limboo means reincarnation and he is considered as the reincarnation of the Sirijonga, the Limboo king of 
Limbuwan (Gurung, 2011:128).  
234 Apart from National holidays declared by the Central Government and other previosuly declared state 
holidays (like Dasain, Diwali, Losar) Sikkim’s list of holidays extends to include new festivals like the Newar 
festival of Indrajatra, Limbu festival of Teyongsi Sirijunga Sawan Tongnam, the Magar festival of 
Barahimizong and Tamu Lochar, the festival of the Tamang ethnic group (Source: Alamanac of Sikkim 
published by Sikkim Government, 2013).  
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associations are yet to have their festivals declared as State holidays. This has led to not only 
the celebration of different festivals but also the (re)discovery of new ones. Here again, while 
cultural revivalism might fill in the traditional vacuum the role of the state is well recognized 
and lauded by even those who have not received any tangible benefits as such. Thus the state  
might work to preserve ethnic culture and tradition, it simulatenously also links them to ethnic 
politics by catering to their cultural needs and thereby increasing its positive image.  
In this context the cultural connection with Nepal is highly important as most ethnic 
groups either bring cultural performers and shamans from Nepal to show and teach ethnic 
members in Sikkim or the ethnic elites themselves travel to Nepal in order to establish 
connections with their cultural counterpart in Nepal 235  (Mukhia and Bhujel Associations, 
Gangtok 2010). Since the government provides a framework around which various groups have 
to define themselves (clothes, religion and rituals, food and kinship patterns), this has led to 
the essentialisation of culture, a process which has ironically restricted access and 
understanding of ethnic culture of those at the grassroots. Interaction with cultural elites in 
Gangtok usually revealed that various cultural aspects were unknown to even the ethnic elites 
of smaller associations. In the rural areas on the other hand, conversation on specific ethnic 
cultures and traditions in Limboo, Rai and Tamang villages (larger, well established groups) 
drew some hesitation and long silences. This can be attributed to the generations of inter-
mixing of cultures in the hills and the erosion of cultural traits especially of those groups who 
had migrated from neighbouring regions, thereby making pure, unadulterated cultural practices 
impossible. Interacting with Raj Rai (Chumbung, 2010) showed that there was a lack of 
knowledge regarding cultural features even amongst the older generation: 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
235 Member of the Mukhia Association, Sikkim, interviewed by the author on 13th Dec, 2010, Gangtok, Sikkim. 
This point was also reiterated by a member of the Bhujel Association, interviewed by the author on 10 th 
November, 2010. 
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Q: What is the Rai dress called? 
R: We don’t know..chaubandi maybe...it is modified fariya...I don’t know what it is called 
because of the sari which is worn these days. In the earlier days it was only fariya and 
chaubandi. Because of lack of awareness we don’t know. 236 
When the same question was asked to Hangu Bahadur Tamang (Singling, 2010) - ‘I 
have seen the dress but it has come out only recently. In the olden days it was only daura-
suruwal. The association has brought out the dress but I don’t have the dress. I have the Tamang 
topi (hat) though.’ Birmati Tamang (Singling, 2010) had never seen the Tamang dress till very 
recently much akin to Raj Rai (Chumbung, 2010)- the first time he had seen the Rai dress was 
at the Namchi Mahautsav,237 which he feels is a very positive initiative on the part of the state, 
‘Government is trying to preserve culture and these exhibitions are very good because it keeps 
our culture (jeudo–jaagdo) alive. We must have our own identity. I had never worn it myself 
as it is not used daily but I came to know of the dress during the Mahautsav.’ 
Learning to be Limboo: exhibits at the Limboo stall, Namchi Mahautsav             
                         
 
                                                          
236 Interviewed by the author on 12th November, 2010, West Sikkim.  
 
237 A state sponsored cultural extravaganza held at Namchi in South Sikkim. This event is held across three days 
with the aim of showcasing the ethnic diversity of Sikkim (or at least the material aspects of it).   
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Nonetheless, matwali ethnic elites have been criticised by the upper caste Chettri- 
Bahun community members for splitting the Nepali community as now it is only these two 
groups which are considered as Nepalis in Sikkim. This is quite ironic given that the book 
‘Khasas of Sikkim’ (Kharel and Basnett, 2008) published by Akhil Sikkim Chhetri Bahun 
Kalyan Sangh (All Sikkim Chhetri Bahun Welfare Association) describe the Khas as members 
of a different tribe consisting of two caste groups- the Bahun and Chettris belonging to the 
higher caste while other caste groups like Damai, Sarki, Kami, Majhi belonging to the lower 
caste. Thus, by re-defining their caste identity and controlling the membership to the group, 
fragmentation is as much an internal process that has been brought about by the very same 
ethnic groups that are resisting it externally. However interaction with one of the leading ethnic 
elites238 in Gangtok shed some light on their approach towards ethnic politics: 
Q: Do you sense that there is a fragmentation of the Nepali community? 
R: I don’t think there is a fragmentation as such. I run an association called the 
Association of Ethnic Communities. We have all these meetings. Why? Because everybody is 
interested in their culture and tradition....Other intellectuals also asked me whether we are 
going fifty years back, in the twenty-first century we are talking about chulo-dhungo/ stone 
hearth and other rituals but this is cultural revival. This cultural revival has led to interest in 
culture and brought about unification (of different ethnic members) which we never had, we 
never had an association of ethnic communities before.  
Although material benefits of these categories are mostly utilised by those who have 
money and political connection, it however does provide some respite to the ordinary man. 
Although they might be mere recipients of ethnic culture and its symbols handed down to them 
from Gangtok but ethnic revivalism nonetheless finds support because it restores a sense of 
lost tradition, which is inevitably linked to identity, individual as well as communal. Whether 
fragmentation, revival or both, the assertion of ethnic identity has had a serious repercussion 
on the social and political realm of the Sikkimese-Nepali. As different groups rise to claim their 
tribal status, the nuances and expression of ethnic identity will get further refined resulting in 
further institutionalization of ethnic categories as political categories.  
 
                                                          
238 Interviewed by the author on 28th January, 2011, Gangtok, Sikkim.  
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Conclusion 
In Sikkim ethnic identity has become the primary means through which to access the 
state and its resources. The Nepali ethnic identity is under re-construction in reponse to the 
changing political environment as well as demands of the people. The origin of the Nepali 
ethnic group lies in the political exigencies of a particular period in its history and hence, this 
contemporary reconstruction of the group can be understood as another attempt to mould itself 
in accordance to the needs of history. However, in the Sikkimese context this development has 
been facilitated by the state through the institutionalisation of dependency on it and creating 
very narrow modes of access. This in turn has led to the emphasis on harnassing the potential 
of ethnicity as a political resource in order to partake in the re-distribution of desired goods and 
services.  
The centrality of ethnic groups as dependable political bases also highlights an 
important aspect of state formation in the Himalayas. Highlighting Migdal’s ‘state in society’ 
approach, Sikkim presents an ideal representation of the importance of ethnicity for the 
sustenance of the state and the existing socio-political order. In this process, the state provides 
different incentives and motivations to the people to engage in ethnic politics, thereby changing 
the nature of the society overall. The emergence of ethnic association or the shift of demand 
from cultural to political rights highlights the unabated revival of ethnic cultures. However, 
whether it be initiated by the state or ethnic associations themselves, access and control over 
resources is seen as fundamental to the continued existence of culture.  
However the Sikkim case study also confirms that ethnic politics or the reasons why an 
ethnic group chooses the political assertion of one identity over another cannot be understood 
by focussing solely on the ethnic group in question. Ethnic groups in Sikkim are situated in a 
system which promotes dependency on the state. Rise in population and increasing cost of 
living with a lack of revenue generation avenues thus necessitates the turn towards ethnicity, 
the form and content of which is endorsed by the state and supported by the people who partake 
in it. Nonetheless, as discussed in the case study, the revival and celebration of ethnic culture 
is also welcomed for its transcendental benefits especially in an increasingly ‘Indian-izng’ 
environment through media as well as personal experiences in different parts of the country.  
In Sikkim there is no single image or a cultural reference that can now be used to 
distinguish the Nepalis from the other ethnic groups like Bhutia or Lepchas. Thus, in contrast 
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to Darjeeling, where cultural attributes have been utilised to create a single, homogenous 
identity, what is visible in Sikkim is the contrary. The Nepalis in Sikkim, unlike former times 
where there was a recognizable set of cultural markers as well a set of identifiable political 
aims, have chosen to emphasize different ethnic attributes thereby contributing to the variation 
in the political articulation of ethnicity in the eastern Himalaya. Once again, like the two cases 
of Darjeeling and Nepal, the Sikkim case study contributes to the overall aim of the thesis 
which is to highlight the important matrix of politics, economy as well as social norms and 
perceptions that have gone to re-mould the Nepalis as Gorkhas, Adivasi/Janajati or Scheduled 
Tribe and to situate their grievances, insecurities in a contemporary and relevant context. The 
Sikkim case study highlights the use of ethnicity as a political resource both by the state as well 
as the ethnic groups themselves. The case study also displays how over-arching structures that 
are supported by the state not only facilitate ethnic politics but also dictate its form to a certain 
extent. Thus, in keeping with the main theoretical and structural framework of the thesis, the 
Sikkim case study illustrates that not only is ethnicity a valued political resource but the form 
that this political process can and does takes varies according to the structures (political, 
economic and social) around it.  
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Part 3: Understanding and Analysing Ethnic politics 
Chapter 6: Analysis of the case studies 
Significant variation exists in the cultural and political articulation of the Nepali identity 
in Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal. This varies from differences in political actors and their 
engagement with the surrounding socio-political environment (in the three contexts) as well as 
on the account of different motivating factors which are a result of their habitus. The aim of 
this chapter is thus to consolidate, compare and analyse the various factors that bring about this 
diversity in ethnic politics. These differences also enable a comprehensive explanation of the 
following research questions: 
1. Under what conditions does an ethnic identity influence the political choice of groups and 
individuals? 
2. Why do these groups choose specific ethnic identities over other forms of identification and 
representation?  
This chapter seeks to analyse certain crucial, common aspects that emerge from the 
case studies which influence and encourage not only the assertion of ethnic identity from an 
array of other identities like class, gender but also a specific version of it in the place of the 
meta Nepali identity. In this section I contend that that the primary factor that affects this is a 
sense of ‘incentive’ and ‘dis-incentive’ which is attached to one identity over another. Political 
efficacy in granting better access to the resources controlled by the state emerges as one of the 
most important factor in guiding ethnic politics. While the instrumental factor is evident in all 
the three cases it is the ‘incentive’ or ‘dis-incentive’ structure established by the state that 
ultimately determines identity construction in the region, thereby highlighting the socially 
constructed nature of the Nepali ethnic group.  
All three cases are located in developing, democratic countries where the elected 
government, its bureaucratic mechanism and other extensions play an important role in 
determining the life chances of those who live within its territorial boundaries. However, in 
spite of the apparent similarities in geography, historical and cultural connections, the cases 
also present different factors that have promoted a variation in the articulation of ethnic politics 
as well as the attempt to establish new patronage links in order to access the resources held or 
controlled by the state.  
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For example, the role of the state is of vital importance in all three cases but the Sikkim 
case study highlights the immense involvement and capacity for social engineering that the 
Sikkimese state indulges in thereby facilitating ethnic politics in the state. On the other hand, 
politics revolving around the Gorkha identity highlights the impact of political and economic 
structures in which the Nepalis of Darjeeling District are located. Analysis of the Gorkha 
identity therefore reveals the role played by economic structures, both historical as well as 
contemporary, in the sustenance and manifestation of ethnic grievances while the case of 
Limbu politics in east Nepal shows the significance of certain moments, political opportunities 
and the change in external structures that facilitate ethnic politics. Ethnic identity is therefore 
seen as instrumental in the attainment of socio-economic goals for the Nepalis. The form and 
content of this ethnic identity is however determined by the incentive or dis-incentive structures 
that have been institutionalised by the state and thus, the flexibility of the Nepali ethnic group 
reveals that it is socially constructed in accordance to the needs of the ethnic groups in a 
particular period in time.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section One discusses the importance and 
entrenchment of the state as well as the influence it can have on the articulation of socio-
economic grievances. It also establishes how practices of bureaucratic and political clientalism 
have been institutionalized as a part of the state thereby reducing access to the state and its 
resources. In an ironic situation, the expansion of state activities has made the state more 
exclusive thereby restricting access to those who are not party to the new patronage system. In 
this situation ethnicity has emerged as an obvious resource which can be utilised to access and 
negotiate with the system. Thus while the tradition of expectations and rewards remain 
unchanged, it is only the actors and the environments in which they act that have changed. 
While Section One discusses the structures that have normalised ethnic politics, Section Two 
uses examples from the cases to extend the argument and seek out particular factors that have 
led to the use and variation in use of ethnicity as a political identity. This section isolates four 
different factors that influence the choice of groups and individuals to engage in identity 
politics as well as the particular form that it might take. The four factors are: 
1. Ideological framework guiding state-ethnic relations 
2. Political Opportunity Structure (POS) 
3. Elites and Grievances 
4. Framing and Participation 
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These factors however can only be utilised with a caveat. Although all four factors are 
important, they might not be present in all three cases in equal measure and a particular factor 
might be more prominent in one case than in another.  
 
Section One 
6.1 State and Ethnic Grievances 
 (i) The Developmental State 
The state is not an invisible, mysterious entity orchestrating the lives of its citizens from 
an abstract space. Rather, through its official representatives and policies it becomes a lived 
experience thereby lending dynamism to the study of its relation with other aspects of the 
society. States do not exist in isolation either but are embedded in international and regional 
socio-political systems which play a key role in the re-drawing of multiple lines between the 
state and its environment in accordance with the challenges that it faces (Jessop, 2007:7). In 
his seminal article, Politics as a vocation, Max Weber (1948: 77-78) described the state as an 
interpersonal relation between men, 
 ‘the state is a human community that successfully claims to the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force as normal within a given territory...politics means 
striving to influence the distribution of power, either amongst the states or among 
groups within a state... Thus the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation 
supported by the means of legitimating violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated 
must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be’.  
 
This description of the state not only gives it a rather subjective character but also situates it in 
the centre of power relations between groups and individuals. Thus, the power to manoeuvre 
between different groups is the power of the state. It derives its power from the functions that 
it provides for the people and it is from this functionality that the state derives the potential to 
exploit (Mann, 2003: 120). Although different states might be similar in their functions (re-
distribution of goods and services, security, infrastructure) they can take numerous forms. From 
a structural-functional perspective, states can be distinguished between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ on 
the basis of the ease of access to the political system i.e depending on the possibility of access 
to formal institutions like the legislature, bureaucracy, judiciary. This is however contingent 
on the function of its territorial centralization and the degree of separation of powers between 
the formal institutions (Kitschelt, 1986:58).  
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The conventional understanding of development or mainstream development has typically 
meant a strengthening of the material base of the state, mainly through industrialization or other 
business ventures. This implies that development can be equated with modernization which 
has a deterministic base (Hettne, 1993:128). The three case studies therefore show different 
aspects of the developmental state, which has been defined by Leftwich (1995:401) as ‘states 
whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to 
shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives whether by 
establishing and promoting the conditions and directions of economic growth or by organising 
it directly, or a varying combination of both.’ He further makes the valid point that the 
developmental state must be understood politically as developmental plans, institutions may 
be calculated to achieve the maximum wellbeing of the citizens but their objectives are usually 
political. This means that institutions may be regulated by rules, structure and formal 
interaction but they are filled with people whose ambitions, norms, behaviour and expectations 
have a serious impact on the potential of both the developmental projects of the state and the 
political longevity of political institutions. Fundamentally, political actors ranging from 
political parties to members of the civil society have always influenced the shape, thrust and 
pace of development, with political objectives (viz. maintaining vote banks, securing 
legitimacy)  usually prevailing over rational, economic decisions. For example, grants and 
concessions given to the newly formed GTA by the West Bengal government is simply a 
political investment rather than an economic one in order to maintain peace and douse demands 
for separation.239 
Some of these processes are inherent in ‘modern development’ and adaptation is the 
rational response (Hettne 1993: 131). This can be observed in the three cases where not only 
has the state widened its developmental and social welfare agenda but at the same time it has 
played a crucial role in the politicization of ethnic groups by making concessions and creating 
favourable conditions for a particular group to predominate over another or by making some 
cultural feature more valuable than others.  
                                                          
239 In 2011, immediately after Trinamool Congress’s historic victory in the West Bengal General Election, 
Mamata Banarjee, the new CM paid a visit to Darjeeling to quell the demands for Gorkhaland. While doling out 
a large economic relief package she said, ‘Darjeeling problem has been solved… only development is my magic 
formula. I believe in carrying out development work everywhere and I have promised the GJM leaders that our 
government will leave no stone unturned to develop the hills’. 
Source: The Economic Times 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-06-07/news/29629923_1_darjeeling-issue-darjeeling-
problem-gorkhaland (Accessed: 04/12/12). 
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Through the public re-distribution system, its commitment to the safety and welfare of 
its citizens, provision of infrastructure and development, the state plays an influential role in 
the lives of its citizens. As the prime distributor of economic and political benefits, the state 
can effectively create and manipulate insecurities and the power structure of the society. This 
also implies that in spite of cultural or historical similarities, the state building experience of 
every state will vary based on the redistribution strategies that it employs in accordance to the 
ethnic heterogeneity of the population (Brown, 1994). While there might be structural 
impediments that obstruct access to the state, the prevailing norms of behavior between people 
and the state plays a crucial role in framing expectations and approaches towards the state. In 
their description of the social systems in South Asia, especially in Hindu kingdoms, Phadnis 
and Ganguly (1989:61) remark, ‘Broadly stated, the unifying factor of such an order was its 
hierarchically structured social system along a moral code explicating mutual obligations and 
at the same time preserving plural identities therein. In due course, such pluralities did acquire 
their specificities and distinctness in various regions but without subverting the core of the 
social system (emphasis mine)’. Thus, elaborate systems of hierarchy and patronage have 
informed and constructed the worldview and everyday understandings of relations with those 
holding power and authority.  
Under modern democratic systems these relations have taken new forms and while the 
patrons might have changed, the clients remain the same certainly in the context of the three 
cases, whether they be the tea garden workers in Darjeeling, the Limbu agriculturist in east 
Nepal or the Gurung civil servant in Sikkim. Although traditional patrons still hold relevance 
in different fields, under the welfare regime the state is the new patron before whom everyone 
is a client and their position vis-a-vis the state has remained unaltered. In all the three cases the 
modern state has been founded on a relation of historical inequality between different groups 
of people who were distinguished not only on the basis of ethnic differences but also on their 
access to material wealth. This inequality, whether it originated in the feudal relations in 
Sikkim and Nepal or in the exploitative colonial capitalism in Darjeeling, has been deeply 
internalized by all sections of the society, Nepalis as well as others. This has led to the 
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institutionalization of historical inequalities and anxieties that have now gone to form the 
macro-habitus, which in turn are the bases of political movements.240  
Extensive fieldwork in the three areas helped me understand that ethnic politics cannot 
be understood only by analyzing the activities (or inactivity) of the state in relation to ethnic 
grievances, rather a holistic analysis has to acknowledge the interaction between different 
‘fields’. While the prominence of the ‘political field’ had not diminished, its boundaries had 
nonetheless been trespassed by the ‘cultural field’ in all three cases, which could be attributed 
to the importance of the emergence of a new set of political actors who had previously only 
belonged to the field of cultural reproduction. As discussed in the case studies, politics in the 
three areas needed to be legitimized by social actors who could authenticate and justify 
demands for cultural preservation, recognition, development and assistance by the state. Thus 
as ethnic politics becomes more dependent on material culture and symbolism, the need for 
political actors with social recognition within particular ethnic groups will increase, thereby 
highlighting a greater transference of social capital to economic and political capital. However, 
the increasing interaction of politics and culture has led to a higher social position of those 
individuals who hold important roles in the cultural field.  
Choices and motivations to act are deeply determined by the habitus or dispositions, 
which are the product of the social environment in which an ethnic group is located along with 
the influence of the wider, external political and economic structures around them. Thus, a 
broad over-view of state-ethnic relations in the three cases reveals two different trends. While 
a positive, symbiotic relation of mutual dependency exists between ethnic groups and the state 
in Sikkim, which channels ethnic issues/problems into packaged, pre-formulated solutions, a 
contrasting, uneasy and mostly antagonistic relation exists between the state and different 
ethnic groups in Nepal and Darjeeling. The nature of this relationship has an important impact 
on the way ethnicity is understood and expressed in public forums. This relationship not only 
defines the perceptions and expectations of all the actors involved but in the case of the eastern 
Himalayas, it even provides a fertile ground for the growth of identity based politics.  
At the risk of supposing that individuals and groups can choose which identity to make 
meaningful and that ethnic identities are thus a representation of these choices, this thesis 
makes two contentions. First, the choice of ethnicity as a political identity might be driven 
                                                          
240 I use the word ‘movements’ with caution here as all three cases are not equally representative of political 
movements which are generally understood as collective action with a specific purpose. While Darjeeling and 
Nepal do highlight these aspects quite prominently, it is rather diffused in Sikkim.  
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primarily by instrumental motives but non-instrumental, emotive motives may also be an 
important factor in the choice of a political identity. Second, these choices are rather a 
combination of numerous instrumental and impulsive factors, the boundaries of which are 
liminal and therefore intersecting. Thus, norms of political behaviour, the role of contacts and 
networks, what people expect to gain from engagement in politics, all these elements constitute 
the micro-foundations of political culture and set limits to what is achievable and types of 
developmental efforts can be planned and implemented (Rudd, 1999:237). 
Legitimacy is an important aspect of popular democracy which the state has to ensure 
in order to retain power as well as prevent social conflict. For example, plans to construct a 
hydro-power station in Rathong Chu in north Sikkim, one of the most sacred sites in Sikkim, 
was challenged by religious bodies in Sikkim, thereby leading to its withdrawal in a bid to 
maintain socio-political harmony and the legitimacy of the ruling government (Arora, 
2006:74). However, legitimacy can be contested and as the cases of Darjeeling and east Nepal 
highlight, historical experiences of discrimination or disparity are used to frame contemporary 
grievances. Poverty and socio-political backwardness are a legacy of the subservience and 
discrimination meted out to a particular ethnic group by the ruling strata of the society- whether 
they be the colonisers in Darjeeling or the Rana Prime Ministers in Nepal and it is this 
subservient position that is being challenged by ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya.  
However, realignments of the economy from either subsistence to commercial or from 
agricultural to industrial or service based also have an impact on access to social, political and 
economic institutions which in turn affects the way different groups interact with the state as 
well as with each other. Sikkim, Darjeeling and Nepal are all undergoing development (in terms 
of infrastructure, rise in living standard) at different speeds. Sikkim is inundated with hydro-
electric projects and generous financial aid from the central government which has led to 
manifold increase in the standard of living, consumerism and inflation. Darjeeling which is 
adjacent to Sikkim is undergoing grave socio-economic problems owing to the neo-colonial 
practices of not only the tea companies but the state itself (exhibited through the lack of 
investment in infrastructure or human resources) thereby encouraging a sense of relative 
deprivation. Thus in both Darjeeling and Sikkim pressure, responsibility and power are 
centralized in the state. Nepal, one of the poorest nations in the world, is emerging from a 
decade long insurgency which not only ravaged its feeble economy but also handicapped the 
(negligible) development efforts of the state. Although the state is dependent on donor aid for 
the majority of its developmental programmes, non-state actors have not been able to eclipse 
the role of the state. Dependency and expectations for equitable distribution of resources, 
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especially for non-tangible goods like reservations, equal opportunities, legal rights, national 
recognition cannot be ignored as they can only be ordained by the state. Although the, 
‘unrealistically optimistic expectations that characterizes the state as an agent of change and 
development’ (Evans, 1992: 141) might have subsided owing to the deficiencies and failure of 
state-led projects as well as the inclusion of non-state actors, whether it be the overpowering 
presence of the state in Sikkim or the stark absence of it in Darjeeling and East Nepal, the 
primacy of the state in the lives of its citizens cannot be underestimated.  
 
(ii) Bureaucratic and political clientalism 
It is these relations of expectations and delivery in the developmental state discussed 
above that have opened up spaces for political clientalism, defined by Lemarchand and Legg 
(1972:151) as ‘a more or less personalised, affective and reciprocal relationship between a set 
of actors commanding unequal relationships and mutually beneficial transactions. The greater 
the volume of transactions, the greater the diversity of political resources handled through 
clientalism’. Powell in (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972:155) describes clientalism as the ‘rural 
problem solving system’, a mechanism through which rural societies adapt themselves to socio-
political change and traditional patterns of behaviour. Governments directly intervene in the 
ethnic struggle by the way they distribute public works, education, employment and patronage. 
The influence of this new set of patrons is exemplified by an example given by one of the 
respondents from east Nepal who considers political elites as more influential than traditional 
elites (landowners, lineage elders). Bishal Limbu,241 a youth member of one of the Limbu 
regional parties in east Nepal, knew that subscribing to a political party was more useful than 
paying homage to the traditional patrons (like landlords or village heads) who were not 
‘politically connected’ and therefore less useful in the event he ran into trouble with the police 
or needed help with the local administration which is dominated by members of the upper caste 
group. This is similar to the situation in Darjeeling where the local residents are poorly 
represented in the state bureaucracy and thus have to resort to political patronage or the support 
of the local party member to endorse their demands. This is particularly so in the tea gardens 
where there is a proliferation of trade unions which are linked to local as well as national 
parties. Their success lies in their ability to exert pressure in the form of strikes in the hills or 
through political lobbying. In Sikkim political domination by the Sikkim Democratic Front has 
                                                          
241 Bishal Limbu was one of the key respondents during fieldwork and this comment emerged during one of our 
conversations in Ilam.  
209 
 
built a culture of political loyalty towards it. If in essence everyone is a party supporter then 
seeking patronage of just the party leaders become insufficient. Thus, while political patronage 
is of vital importance, single party domination has somehow nullified its effect, leading people 
to seek patronage of government officers and bureaucrats. Those without the patronage of the 
local MLA or a well-placed officer have their chances of attaining government employment or 
other subsidies from the government greatly reduced.  
Thus, patronage (through political, economic or moral support and closely associated 
with corruption) is one of the forms of everyday politics which has been normalized and 
accepted. While the modern state, following Weber, can be described as ‘legal-rational’ 
(political executive, permanent and professional structures to implement policies) the ethos of 
the ruling, modernizing elite dominating the political settlement may be more feudal than 
modern (Whaites, 2008: 5). The role played by the state and the wider-political economy 
therefore enables a generalisation of the ways in which people attempt to navigate the new 
economic and political structures, leading to the rapid development of two, often 
complementary phenomena- bureaucratic clientalism and party patronage.      
One of the most important extensions of the state is its bureaucracy through which the 
efficiency of a state can be monitored and measured to a certain extent.  This aids in the 
formation of attitudes and perceptions towards it and therefore the modes that ethnic groups 
choose to negotiate with. Weber (1948:224,228) bestows great importance upon bureaucracy 
in the efficient functioning of the state. He writes, 
‘Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy in contrast to 
self-government of homogenous units. This results from the characteristic principle of 
bureaucracy, the abstract regularity of the execution of authority. The process of 
bureaucratization in the state administration itself is a parallel phenomenon of 
democracy. The demos itself, in the sense of an inarticulate mass never governs larger 
associations but is rather governed and its existence only changes the way in which the 
executive leaders are selected and the measures of influence the demos or members 
from its midst are able to exert upon the content and direction of the administrative 
activities by supplementing what is called “public opinion”. Thus, democratization does 
not necessarily mean an increasingly active share of the governed in the authority of 
the social structure. This may be a result of democratization, but it is not necessarily 
the case. Bureaucracy is the means of carrying ‘community action’ over into rationally 
ordered “social action”. Therefore as an instrument of societalizing relations of power, 
bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument for the one who controls the 
bureaucratic apparatus.’ 
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Thus in a situation where the state is at the center of all policies and negotiations 
influencing the life chances of those living within a particular demarcated territory and its 
bureaucracy is its most important extension, then not only are executive members (who are 
also usually elected representatives) but also the bureaucrats themselves who can be seen as 
wielding influence and power in society. Thus, bureaucrats can also be deemed as ‘modernizing 
brokers’ where the bureaucrat, much like traditional patrons or political bosses, might have 
clients and constituencies who are the beneficiaries or recipients of public services. This system 
of bureaucratic ‘connection’ or patronage has become a fundamental impediment in the 
developmental process, often determining the life chances and opportunities of individuals and 
groups. Such a system is also known as ‘bureaucratic polity’ a political system in which power 
and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state, 
particularly the officer corps and the highest level of bureaucracy (Jackson, 1978:3 in Leftwich 
1995: 402). All three cases highlight the important role played by the bureaucracy in grant or 
denying access to the resources controlled by the state and is therefore an important institution 
that influences identity politics.  
Often complementing this system is political patronage (or party patronage). According 
to Weingrod (1968:383) the importance of party patronage increases with the expansion of the 
state in the society and as political parties themselves become more linked with state structures. 
Greater involvement with states structures is important because it is only with the capture of 
the state that the political parties will be able to deliver on their electoral promises (whilst at 
the same time being able to recoup their electoral investment through corruption).242  The 
expanding developmental state also implies new projects, organizations and other avenues 
which increase the scope for social as well as economic advancement of individuals and groups, 
which are often infiltrated by political actors. Explicitly visible in Sikkim, Darjeeling and 
Nepal, political patronage has a massive influence in controlling the delivery of public goods 
and services.  
Poverty shortens an individual’s time horizon and maximizes the effectiveness of short-
run material inducements and thus incentives, material or symbolic, become formidable 
                                                          
242 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2011) ranks countries/territories based on how 
corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. Their country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of 
public sector corruption of a scale of 0-10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 
means that a country is perceived as very clean.  According to this index, India scored 3.1 and is ranked 95 and 
Nepal scored 2.2, ranking 154 out of the 182 countries in which it conducted the survey. 
 Source: Transparency International  
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (Accessed: 09/10/2012). 
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weapons in building coalitions and/or social engineering (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972: 158). 
This helps breed ‘machine politics’ which was a type of political patronage system common in 
urban American cities in the 1920’s but has been effectively used by scholars like James Scott 
(1969) to study the political practices in developing polities. According to Scott (ibid: 1143) 
the ‘machine’ is not the disciplined, ideological party held together by class and common 
programs that arose in continental Europe, nor a charismatic party.  The machine is rather a 
non-ideological organization interested less in political principle than in securing and holding 
office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run and work for it. It relies on what 
it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands for. 
 This is almost the exact nature of political parties in the eastern Himalaya, where it is 
difficult to distinguish the agenda of one party from another whose main emphasis is on the 
capture of power. Even the emergence of regional parties in eastern Nepal, which is a relatively 
new phenomenon, the multiplicity of ethnic based parties with similar agenda (self-
determination, ethnic federalism) makes it hard to distinguish one from the other making 
explicit its instrumental characteristic. This increases the relevance of the argument that 
identity politics in the region is more focussed on seeking access rather than the destabilization 
of the established political system. In machine politics a party emphasizes those inducements 
which are appropriate to the loyalty pattern among its clientele and responding to its 
environment, the machine is skilled in both the political distribution of public works through 
‘pork-barrel’ legislation and in the dispensation of jobs and favours through more informal 
channels (ibid:1147). This is characteristic of ethnic politics in the three cases which highlights 
that the end of all political mobilization is the control, access or re-distribution of resources. 
Ethnic politics has also resulted in what is known as ‘ethnic branch stacking’ which refers to 
the practice of recruiting people of ethnic background, usually from particular ethnic groups, 
according to concentrations in the particular electorate and often from groups who are seen as 
traditional rivals of another factions stackees (Zapalla, 1998: 383) and without which, ethnic 
politics would not be possible. This is evident in all the three cases where political support and 
membership has been sought through the evocation of ethnic affilations, whether it be the 
Gorkhas, Limbus or as seen in the case of Sikkim, even a particular socio-economic category 
(like the OBC, ST, MBC).  
Political and bureaucratic clientalism has become an important part of the political, 
social and economic negotiation of groups, especially minority groups at a time where the 
width and scope of state activities have increased drastically. This developmental thrust is also 
characterized by decreasing access to it owing to the complex bureaucratic norms or simply 
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because of people’s lack of ‘connections’. Even political dissent or the expression of grievances 
can only be afforded by those who hold some sort of power or ‘connections’ without which 
there can be no hope for any fruitful resolution of the problem. This is again complicated by 
the widespread culture of impunity which is practised on the back of support lent by leading 
political parties. Impunity on a daily basis, a rampant phenomenon in South Asia, especially in 
politically unstable border regions, aggravates problems further. Impunity in all its forms has 
weakened the ability of the masses to engage in any negotiation with the state and expect a 
satisfactory and fair outcome.  The state has become more exclusive, limited to people with 
either political or bureaucratic connections which debar different groups of people from 
political participation, as evidenced in the case studies.  This has thus prompted the 
instrumental use of ethnicity as a means to gain access to the system.  
Ethnic politics in the eastern Himalaya is not aimed at destabilizing the institutional 
structures in place but rather in expanding its participation. In a reversal of roles aptly captured 
by Melluci (1989:80 in Pieterse and McAllister, 1996:32) it is the ethnic groups and not the 
state, as a functional administrative machinery, that have become extractive by using cultural 
rights as their political weapon to redress historical injustices. Past inequalities and grievances 
thus become an important component in securing rights and privileges for the future. While 
ethnicity itself can be considered an independent variable, ethnic politics is highly dependent 
on the approaches to it by the state and other political actors within that political environment. 
As is visible in Nepal, ethnic demands which were once considered antithetical and detrimental 
to the integrity and the core unity of a nation-state are now entertained as legitimate demands 
by the state (Hangen, 2007). The formation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council in 1988 can 
also be deemed as recognition of the Gorkha community by the West Bengal government and 
the establishment of DGHC a conciliatory move. One of the implications of this has been that 
now not only does the state accept ethnic groups but it also initiates and legitimises ethnic 
politics by the creation as well as recognition of other groups.243 
                                                          
243 While this is explicitly visible through the ethnic revivalism in the all the three cases, recognition by the state 
has also been strongly demanded by the Lepcha ethnic group who are recognized as indigenous to the eastern 
Himalayan region. The Lepchas of the Darjeeling Hills have been demanding the setting up of the Lepcha 
Development Council for the protection of their language and culture, adequate representation in the State 
Assembly and the Parliament and the incorporation of Lepcha language in the schools. This therefore highlights 
that mere social recognition of ethnic difference and boundaries has no concrete relevance for ethnic groups unless 
it is validated and supported by the state.  
 
Source: Darjeeling Times 
http://www.darjeelingtimes.com/main-news/entertainment/63-event-a-gossips/4605-lepchas-demand-lepcha-
development-council.html 
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As this section highlights there is an inverse relation between the increasing importance 
of the state and access to it. Thus, against this background the case studies show how the 
engagement of ethnic groups with politics is but an attempt to access that very system, to 
partake in the distribution of public goods and services and therefore be an active participant 
rather than passive recipients. The variation in the political articulation of ethnicity of the 
Nepalis of the eastern Himalaya is not simply a result of the geographical location of the 
Nepalis but rather an amalgamation of numerous factors which will be discussed in detail in 
the following section. 
 
6.2 External factors facilitating ethnic politics 
(i) Ideological framework guiding state-ethnic relations 
The state plays a central role not only in the determination of an identity but also in the 
degree of success of a particular ethnic group in achieving its goals. This relationship may seem 
to be a direct consequence of local/regional factors, but a closer inspection reveals the 
important role played by international or national discourses. The evolution of ethnic rights 
and standards has had an impact on the conduct of politics in South Asia. Given the increasing 
pace of globalization and the interconnectedness of economies and peoples, international 
organizations like the United Nations Organization can strongly influence the framework 
around which a country’s state-minority relations are organized. By creating incentives and 
structures it can influence whether an assimilatory or an accommodating244 model is to be 
adopted by the state and how ethnic groups can position themselves. The UN draws distinctions 
between different groups on the basis of their demands which could range from civil rights to 
equality, and from right of access to resources to self-determination. This functions as an 
important guideline for states when they formulate their domestic policies. They must concur 
with international norms but these norms must not conflict with their national agenda 
(Kymlicka, 2007). South Asian states with their diverse minority groups face complex issues 
in their definition of minorities as well as the application of legal safeguards for those 
minorities (Kingsbury, 1998).   
                                                          
244 An accomodatist approach entails some form of territorial autonomy combined with official language and 
customary rights, institutional pluralism and the integrative approach focuses on civil rights and non-
discrimination.  The former seeks to accommodate diversity through minority-specific institutions, while the 
latter seeks to integrate all citizens on a non-discriminatory basis into national institutions (Kymlicka, 2007: 1). 
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India and Nepal present an interesting contrast in the national approaches to minorities 
and their impact on ethnic groups. Minorities in India are officially classified on the basis of 
caste, tribal affiliation or religion. The application of the term ‘minority’ does not reflect the 
numerical status of the group so much as the claim that the groups in question suffer from some 
disadvantage in comparison to the rest (Bajpai, 2000: 1338). Officially, the concept of 
indigenous peoples 245 as adopted and used by the UN is seen as inapplicable in India as ‘all its 
peoples are indigenous’, having emerged from colonialism at the same time. The Indian state 
thus categorises its ethnic/indigenous minorities as Scheduled Tribes (ST) in order to 
accommodate and administer specific constitutional privileges, protections and benefits for 
those considered historically disadvantaged (Bijoy et al, 2010: 14). Thus, in Sikkim and 
Darjeeling the national discourse on ethnic/indigenous groups follows an integrationist 
approach. This has institutionalized affirmative action, which thus forms an important part of 
understanding the rights and benefits attached to an ethnic category, with the ST status being 
valued over all the other statuses. While pre-independence India had a basic framework of 
recognising ethnic diversity, in the erstwhile kingdom of Nepal it was only after the restoration 
of multi-party democracy in 1990-91 that the Nepali state made slight concessions towards 
different ethnic groups. Ethnic groups identify themselves as ‘Janajati’ which applies to 
peoples with a distinct language, culture, social structure, oral or written history and 
horizontally distributed territory in contrast to ‘caste’ groups (Gurung et al 2006: 1). The 
unitary, centralized state follows an accomodationist approach which has only aggravated 
socio-economic grievances further. The state as the prime distributor of resources has become 
the point of appeal for arbitration and appeasement and the labels of Scheduled Tribe (in India) 
or Adivasi/Janajati (in Nepal) 246  reflect efforts made by the state or the ethnic groups 
themselves to use ethnicity as a political resource and partake in the redistributive system. 
Thus, based on national guidelines either of accommodation (as in Nepal) or integration (in 
                                                          
245 Although there is no official definition of  Indigenous Peoples but according to the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues a modern understanding of the term based on certain key criteria like self-identification at the 
individual level, historical continuity with pre-colonial or pre-settler societies, strong link to territorial and 
surrounding natural resources, distinct language, cultures and beliefs, form non-dominant groups of society and 
resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and 
communities (Bijoy et al, 2011).  
 
246  According to respondents in Nepal Adivasi was understood as meaning indigenous while Janajati broadly 
meant ethnic groups. Thus in an ethnically demarcated Nepal, a particular ethnic group could be an Adivasi or 
indigenous in a particular area and a Janajati in another. For example, the Limbus would be Adivasis in the 
proposed Limbuwan and Janajati in neighbouring Khambuwan. 
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India), different stakeholders (ethnic associations, political parties, interest groups) mould their 
agendas and activities around the state.  
Relations between the state and ethnic groups in Sikkim can be deemed as positive 
based on the stark absence of political confrontation between the two, unlike in Darjeeling and 
east Nepal. In Sikkim multiple ethnic identities have flourished owing to the guidance and 
resources that have been provided by the state. Not only has the state helped in the 
establishment of newer ethnic associations, encouraged the development of language and 
literature but also tolerated, if not encouraged, lobbying with the state for ethnic rights, albeit 
within a framework accepted by it. The other two cases, however, represent antagonistic 
relations between the states and ethnic groups, which has led to an assertion of an identity 
which is either considered illegitimate (viz Gorkha, which is seen as a variation of Nepalese 
nationalism, threat of the creation of Greater Nepal) 247or the Limbu identity which is deemed 
as inferior to the upper caste groups (ritually, which translates to both social and economic 
status).Systemic ethnic discrimination is one of the most important grievances and therefore 
the strongest mobilizing factor in both Darjeeling and east Nepal. Whether promoted by the 
state or against it, the repertoire of contention remains the same but depending on the nature of 
relation between the state and those contesting against it, the mode of appeal and negotiation 
also differs, ranging from that of appeasement (of the ethnic groups by the state and vice versa) 
in Sikkim to that of opposition to the state and its elites (Parbatiya, high caste Hindus in Nepal 
and the Bengalis in Darjeeling) by ethnic groups and their associations. This leads to a variation 
in the political processes involved in mobilization of ethnic groups as well as the identity that 
is chosen to be made meaningful in a bid to access resources controlled by the state.  
 
(ii) Political Opportunity Structure 
According to Eisinger (1973:12) the political environment, which is a generic term used 
to refer to different aspects and elements of formal political structure, imposes certain 
constraints on or opens avenues for political activity. Thus, the manner in which groups in a 
political environment behave is not simply a function of the resources that they command but 
also of the openings, weak spots, barriers and resources of the political system itself. This 
                                                          
247 A hypothetical extension of the present boundaries of Nepal to areas which had been briefly occupied by 
Kingdom of Gorkha in the 17th century. See ‘Looking for Greater Nepal’, Himal South Asian, March 1993 for 
discussion on the geo-politics of Greater Nepal.  
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concept, also now known as Political Opportunity Structure (POS), has been defined by Sidney 
Tarrow (1998:18) as- 
‘the consistent-but not necessarily formal, permanent or national-dimensions of the 
political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective 
action. The concept of political opportunity emphasizes resources external to the group unlike 
money or power- that can be taken advantage of even by weak or disorganized 
challengers....the most salient changes in opportunity structure result from the opening up of 
access to power, from shifts in ruling alignments, from the availability of influential allies and 
from cleavages within and among elites.’  
Although widely used as an analytical framework in the study of social movements and 
political protests, POS provides only partial insights in the study of ethnic politics as it focuses 
more on collective action than on individuals or everyday forms of politics, which are so crucial 
to the understanding of identity based politics. While it is important to analyze the form and 
content of ethnic movements, it is also very important to understand the opportunity structures 
that propel these movements. Thus a comparison of the POS in the three cases contributes 
partially to our understanding of the variation in the political articulation of the Nepalis of the 
eastern Himalaya.  
In Nepal, political transition was been ushered by the Maoist insurgency, the demise of 
the monarchy and the promise of a new Constitution. All of these factors have contributed to 
making the assertion of an ethnic, rather than the state endorsed national identity, feasible and 
enabled the pursuit of economic, social and political equality. Although the agenda of major 
parties still dominates debates and discussions in the country, it is an achievement in itself that 
the ‘ethnic question’ is at least being discussed at the national level. While transitional politics 
might have provided a fertile ground for Limbu nationalism in Nepal, in Darjeeling, it is the 
change of leadership (from Subhash Ghising to Bimal Gurung), endorsements from national 
leaders (like Jaswant Singh) 248  and other homeland movements in India, especially the 
Telengana movement which have revived and strengthened the demand for Gorkhaland further. 
The stronger the movement, the deeper is the infiltration of identity. This has become the only 
effective vehicle of political action obliterating caste, class or gender as efficient bases of 
                                                          
248 The rationale behind electing Jaswant Singh (a veteran politician from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a 
national, right-wing party) from Darjeeling during the 2009 Lok Sabha elections was that of national exposure 
of the Gorkhaland cause. The BJP was also seen as more sympathetic towards demands of smaller states as the 
states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand had been formed under the BJP government (both in 2000). 
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collective political action. Thus, the Gorkhaland and the Limbuwan homeland movements have 
provided the necessary political motivation that has led to the spread and strengthening of the 
respective identities. This re-alignment of old political and institutional structures (as seen in 
Nepal) and the introduction of new political agents who have revitalized ethnic demands can 
thus be seen as encouraging the assertion of one identity over another. In Sikkim on the other 
hand, the change in the political sphere through the electoral victory of an ethnically disposed 
political party led to a change in attitude and aspirations of the majority of Nepalis of Sikkim. 
The SDF favoured socio-economic categories (OBC, MBC) as a means of social classification 
along with reservations and subsidies which were instrumental in increasing the appeal of 
ethnic distinction over the homogenous Nepali category. As the Indian state introduced more 
reservations and subsidies for various groups, especially the Scheduled Tribes, ethnic identity 
became more attractive as a platform from which to access the state. Because the state favored 
the ethnic diversity within the Nepali group it encouraged the active membership of senior 
bureaucrats in ethnic organizations, 249  which was previously frowned upon and deemed 
communal.  In Sikkim the most influential political opportunity structure has been the state 
apparatus itself which has not only made ethnicity a political choice but converted ethnic 
identity into socio-economic categories thereby increasing its instrumental value. Thus, where 
the structure of the government is potentially more responsive to an electorate by providing 
opportunities for formal representation for different segments of the population, the structure 
of opportunities is relatively open and vice versa.250 
The three case studies also show that the shift in the POS has not only legitimised 
ethnicity as a political resource but also diversified the means of political assertion, thereby 
expanding the democratic base. The past decade has witnessed a marked increase in the 
activities of those groups which previously remained either politically dormant (in Sikkim) or 
marginalized from political and economic domains (east Nepal and Darjeeling). Whilst 
                                                          
249 The Chief Minister of Sikkim gave a statement in July 2012 saying, ‘Government job is service to people. If 
any government employee wants to politics (sic) then they are free to resign from government service. I will 
approve the resignation without any delay’. This however also shows the narrow and rather convenient 
understanding of politics in the state.  
Source: Sikkim Express, 19th July, 2012 
 
250 Kanchan Chandra’s (2000) study on the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), a caste based political party in 
the Indian heartland of Uttar Pradesh is an excellent example of POS. In this case study the external decline of the 
Congress party, the ‘representational blockage’ of the low castes within the Congress party itself and the increase 
in an educated, articulate class who then sought alternate forms of political representation is linked to the rise of 
the BSP as well as Dalit politics in India.  
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discussing ethnic mobilization Varshney (2003:87) makes an argument that ethnic mobilization 
for political action might not be the same as ethnic co-ordination for social and economic 
activities owing to different motivations and alliances between different fields. This analytical 
distinction between motivation for political action and motivation for socio-economic 
movement is negated in the three case studies where ethnic movement is motivated by a 
combination of political, social and economic rationale. This is also indicative of the 
overlapping of issues as well as identities that an individual can lay claim to and shows that an 
ethnic identity is a product of not only the social but also the cultural and political environment 
in which it is located and thus is actively constructed by the individual.  
In the politics of ethnicity, various aspects of culture come to acquire great significance 
because shared beliefs, language, myths come to form what Swidler (1986: 273) calls a 
‘toolkit’. From this ‘toolkit’ groups and individuals may use different elements in varying 
combinations to solve different kinds of problems. This has an impact on the strategies of action 
or the persistent ways of ordering through time. According to Bourdieu (1977) cultural pattern 
provides the structure against which individuals can develop particular strategies, which in turn 
depends on habits, moods, sensibilities and views of the world. According to Hannerz 
(1969:186-88 in Swidler, 1986:277) culture is not a unified system that pushes actions in a 
consistent direction. Rather, it is a ‘repertoire’ from which actors select differing pieces for 
constructing lines of action. 
More importantly even if opportunities are objective and external to the actor, it is the 
actor’s desire together with his belief about the opportunities which explains his actions. Thus, 
the nature of perception of a particular situation or opportunity is crucial because the actor may 
not be aware of all the opportunities available or may overestimate some aspect of the available 
opportunities (Elster, 1989: 13 in Kriesi, 2004:68). In the three cases, the ideological 
orientation of the state along with the POS has enabled the Nepalis of the eastern Himalaya to 
use ethnicity as a viable resource for collective action. The different approaches towards ethnic 
minorities in India and Nepal and the available political structures have also led to differences 
in how the Nepalis located in these three areas approach or perceive their set of opportunities. 
Although these factors may not be wholly sufficient as an explanation of the political variation 
within the Nepalis, they nonetheless do contribute to a holistic understanding of it.  
 
6.2 (iii) Elites and Grievances 
In likeness to Spencer’s (2002: 94) study on Sri Lankan nationalism which highlights 
the problem with the use of the term ‘elites’, the three case studies also highlight the same 
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experience where ‘while the invocation of a clear group or stratum is probably deeply 
misleading, the kinds of cultural processes attributed to this group are real enough’. Shore 
(2002: 4) suggests that rather than using concepts and theories around the study of elites as 
fixed or tangible social science categories they should be treated as ‘heuristic devices’ and with 
caution and using qualifying adjectives to describe them. Ethnic politics in the eastern 
Himalaya complicates the understanding of elites. Here they do not conform to the typical 
notions of elites as exclusive groups, a social category by themselves but in fact ‘operate as 
agents in a process of democratic inclusion’ (Spencer, 2002: 94) and it is through their cultural 
capital that they are able to frame grievances, generate awareness and mobilise people.  
Individuals or groups can be termed as elites as long as they either use directly or are in a 
position to influence very strongly the exercise of political power (Bottomore, 1966: 11). In 
this thesis those who formally represent ethnic groups (whether it be ethnic associations, 
individuals, members of ethnic parties) or act on their behalf can be called elites to the extent 
that they are agents of negotiation with the state and guide or influence the socio-political 
agenda of the ethnic group.  
 
Nedelmann (1987:183) defines political mobilization as a three-fold development of a 
social relationship between the individual and the parties. It comprises the processes of interest 
formation, community building (affective dimension) and then employing means of action 
(instrumental dimension). Political mobilization is defined as the ‘actor’s attempt to influence 
the existing distribution of power and dichotomises elites into two categories- political parties 
and other established interest organizations on the one hand and the government or the state on 
the other hand. Following this dichotomy, mobilization can be said to be the development of 
processes of interaction between at least three types of actors- unorganized individuals, 
organized intermediary actors (or elites) and the state. While elites play an important role in 
defining the framework of grievances to the people as well as the state, discounting the agency 
of the average individual in these negotiations would be grossly limiting. Therefore, in order 
to understand the politics of contention it becomes important to balance the delicate relation 
between the elites, intellectuals and ordinary individuals.  
 
In Sikkim and Nepal patronage of the landed elite used to play an important role in the 
feudal society who often held multiple roles as tax collectors, arbitrators of legal and domestic 
cases etc. Nonetheless, changed socio-political circumstances have led to different expectations 
from elites who now command influence over different and often intersecting fields. For 
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example, a member of the village Panchayat could be a reputed shaman, a landlord and an 
active party member all at once or there could be different individuals influential only in 
specific fields and therefore with limited social capital. However, ethnic politics has brought 
to the fore those categories of people who were earlier considered as unlikely sources of power, 
influence or in other words, social capital of relevant value. This category of new elites, unlike 
traditional elites do not form a separate class which is then dependent on the masses for survival 
nor are they distinct from the people whose interests they represent. However in spite of this 
organic evolution of elites, there is the existence of hierarchies within these groups.  
Each case study provides a rich variation in the types of individuals who are involved 
in the construction as well as politicisation of ethnic identities. Ranging from rural vanguards 
in eastern hills, to politicians, ethnic activists and ethnic bureaucrats these individuals play an 
important role in the framing and articulation of ethnicity. However it might be useful to 
generalize them into three different categories- ethnic elites, bureaucratic elites and political 
elites. While almost all the categories function within their respective fields, it is usually a 
combination of elites that foster the articulation and manifestation of ethnicity. Their 
motivations are highly diverse, ranging from preservation of culture to reservation of seats in 
the legislature, from purely instrumental to simply cultural. It is imperative to evaluate the 
individuals and groups who are actively involved in politics. However, following Zald (1996: 
269), it is equally important to recognize the contribution of ‘moral entrepreneurs’- journalists’, 
ministers, community leaders, writers who attempt to define the issues, invent metaphors, 
attribute blame and define tactics. These moral entrepreneurs are, however, not present in equal 
measure in all the three cases which affects the framing as well as public discussion of ethnic 
grievances.  
In Nepal, assertion of the Limbu identity is being championed primarily by ethnic and 
political elites whose very emergence is a reaction against bureaucratic elitism which is 
ethnically biased and has saturated every institutional organ. The Limbuwan movement is 
spearheaded by the KYC whose members are also affiliated to national as well as regional 
parties and thus have an opportunity to present the case of the Limbus to upper caste party 
members who, more often than not, are regional party Presidents. Although their influence 
within the political parties might be questionable (given the party’s proverbial whip) but they 
have had some success in leading the national parties to acknowledge the ethnic issue, at least 
at the regional level. Limbu ethnic elites range from individuals like Ram Thebe, teacher at 
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Ilam multi-campus, an active member of the NGO INSEC,251 and Pradeep Limbu who is a 
lawyer in the local court, President of the KYC( at the time of fieldwork) to young members 
like Asha Tumbapo, social worker and spokesperson for women’s rights. These elites hold 
great cultural capital amongst the Limbu community and move effortlessly between different 
‘fields’, whether it be the political or the social. Their ethnicity is the primary resource that 
gives them socio-political efficacy as the Limbus rely on them not only to negotiate with the 
state on their behalf but also to make their own culture legible to them. Ethnic activists are 
influential mobilizing agents who through their activities as the member of the KYC have been 
fundamental in supporting the cause of not just the Limbus but of the indigenous community 
overall. The KYC been successful in framing the backwardness of the Limbu community as a 
result of state-led Hindu domination which has deprived (vanchit) them from all fruits of 
development. It has also succedded in the revival of Limbu culture and tradition through its 
emphasis on literature development, cultural performances, vernacular newspaper and local 
radio. This has led to an enhanced sense of cultural identity amongst the Limbu community. 
Simultaneously and almost by default, it has reminded` them of their economic and cultural 
subjugation under the Hindu monarchy. Since the KYC does not engage in electoral politics, 
this vacuum has been filled by the Limbuwan parties. These parties through their strikes, 
processions and sit-ins have been successful in displaying the political strength of the Limbu 
community and have given a public shape to the demand for Limbuwan. Transitional politics 
in Nepal has also enabled traditional party-based elites to reinvent themselves as champions of 
the ethnic cause which has also catapulted them to the negotiating table within national parties.  
The KYC along with the Limbuwan parties partake in an antagonistic relationship with the 
state and have therefore been successful in creating a discourse which reflects this.  
On the other side of the border in Darjeeling, the present political situation reveals an 
intense process of internalisation of the Gorkha’s valour and sacrifice primarily by the political 
elites comprising of grass root party members, academics and literary figures. These political 
elites ensure percolation of the arguments and imagery associated with the Gorkha to the 
community through the village samaj or the local community council who make political 
participation a social obligation. However, the form and shape taken by the Gorkha identity 
can be attributed not only to the party members who are at the forefront of political mobilization 
and therefore most visible but also to other individuals or moral entrepreneurs-writers, 
                                                          
251 Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) is a human rights organization in Nepal.  
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musicians, artists and journalists who work and sustain this identity on a regular basis. The 
construction of the Gorkha also calls upon the resources of the members of the local 
intelligentsia who are well versed not only in the history of the area but also in relevant law, 
especially constitutional law which is important for this particular juncture of the movement.  
As discussed in the case study, mobilisation of popular sentiments is situated outside of the 
urban area, most commonly in the tea and cinchona estates. Therefore, the role of local 
mobilisers like trade union, youth leaders and women activists in these areas cannot be 
disregarded as once again, they are the holders of much social capital and thus successful in 
reinforcing the debates and arguments of indifference and ethnic discrimination meted out by 
the West Bengal government towards the Gorkhas. While writers and other artists engage with 
the people on a creative level, it is the political elite, who are engaged in popularising this 
image to the other members of the society through fiery speeches and other ‘ethnicity-building’ 
activities like phul-pati and shobha yatra (cultural processions related to Hindu festivals of 
Dasain and Tihar). These processions are organised with the support of local clubs as a grand 
display of Gorkha culture in the hills as well as in Siliguri, an extremely contested site between 
the Nepalis/Gorkhas and the Bengalis. The Gorkhaland movement, like most ethnic 
movements, also utilised pre-existing identities which may be re-imagined and reintegrated in 
order to solidify the collective identity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Participation in the 
movement was compulsory during the initial stages of the movement (between 2007-2009) and 
recruitment was based on pre-existing social networks and self-interested ‘reputational 
concerns’, which makes solidarity a reasonable expectation (Chong, 1991, cited in Polletta and 
Jasper, 2001:290; Fireman and Gamson, 1979, cited in Polletta and Jasper, 2001:289). Thus, 
elites use different fields of influence in an attempt to influence desired outcomes. Grievances 
are framed not only in terms of discrimination but also by drawing comparisons with Sikkim, 
thereby moulding public opinion in the favour of a separate state which will ensure all round 
development as well as attain national recognition for all the Nepalis living in India. Thus, 
identity politics in Darjeeling is shaped by the combined efforts of the political leaders and 
other independent members of the society who promote a defensive, insecure Gorkha as the 
only means of achieving socio-political emancipation from the state of West Bengal. 
In comparison to Darjeeling and Nepal, Sikkim can be deemed as less active in terms 
of explicit, violent political turmoil against the state or even amongst ethnic groups. Political 
participation by the civil society is also negligent, emerging only when employment or other 
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benefits are being threatened by non-Sikkimese people.252 Legislative and executive strands of 
the state are also closely interlinked as every department is headed by an elected representative, 
irrespective of their prior experience, capability or understanding of the functions of the 
department they are heading. The assertion of ethnic identity is thus also neatly guided by the 
bureaucratic elites (who perform the twin roles of bureaucratic as well as ethnic elites) who in 
turn follow the format set out by the political elites. Ethnic issues are framed in a way palatable 
to the state which is then endorsed and explained to the ethnic members by the respective ethnic 
associations. Although ethnic associations have representatives from rural areas, increasing 
formalization of rules, practices and the emphasis on literacy has reduced them to mere 
bystanders. Ethnic members in the rural areas are either illiterate and therefore unable to 
understand the rules, regulations or even the benefits under a particular category or they lack 
the social confidence to plead their case. Situated in a familiar bureaucratic environment, ethnic 
elites are well assimilated in bureaucratic circles and can therefore understand the bureaucratic 
language and the rules governing ethnic rights. They can therefore articulate and lobby on 
ethnic issues with the state in a manner which is legible to bureaucrats but not to anyone outside 
it. In contrast to Darjeeling and Nepal, in Sikkim it is the framework of grievance articulation 
that is handed down by the state which is then used by the ethnic (who are also bureaucratic 
elites) to forge and mobilise ethnic sentiments. Thus their field of influence extends not only 
towards their own ethnic members but also outwards towards other members of the 
bureaucracy who control the resources that they are either entitled to or are seeking.  
These elites whose social capital is based on their position and access to the 
government, also constantly switch their field of influence between their ethnic members, 
mostly in the rural areas, and their colleagues in the government. However, this is not to 
disregard the efforts of the linguists and practitioners of culture, who have been working 
silently to uphold their respective languages and cultures even during times when there was 
little or no state support. Though they might not be executive members of ethnic associations, 
without linguists and cultural practitioners the urban, Gangtok-based ethnic associations would 
not be able to sustain and makes claims of cultural authenticity. Most of the ethnic associations 
                                                          
252 For example, in 2010 the state government tried to issue Residential Certificates to those residents who could 
establish that they were residents of Sikkim as on April 26, 1975 as well as to those who were regularised 
employees in the public sector. This led to mass outrage amongst the public and the formation of the Sikkim 
Subject Bachao Committee (Save the Sikkim Subject Committee) in order to stop the Bill which was seen as 
providing ‘outsiders’ easy access to the benefits given by the state. For more information see 
http://isikkim.com/sikkim-subject-bachao-committee-stages-a-dharna/ 
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are still at a nascent stage and the full impact of their long-term activities is yet to be assessed 
but the role of the ethnic/bureaucratic elite has been crucial in negotiations with the government 
as well as in framing issues of cultural preservation amongst ethnic members. Ethnic 
associations have been successful in revitalising interest in their own communities and 
articulating the need for cultural preservation to the state, a sentiment which emerged as 
common amongst urban as well as rural ethnic members.  
Elites are a crucial link in formulating opinions and articulating them in the most 
politically efficient manner. Although the elites in the three cases might be using similar 
cultural frameworks and understandings of Nepali culture, the agenda, motivation and overall 
aims of the elites leads to a difference in the political processes involved in the use and 
articulation of Nepali ethnicity.  
 
 
6.2 (iv) Framing and Participation 
According to Baud and Rutters (2005: 88), the term intellectuals’ which stood for the 
educated, urban vanguard has been increasingly been replaced in theory and practice by a wider 
understanding of intellectuals or knowledge specialists who can be found in all sectors of 
society and function as ‘framing specialists- people who develop, borrow, adapt and rework 
interpretive frames that promote collective action and define collective interest, identities, 
rights and claims’. This broadening of the concept is a response to the changing nature and 
practices of politics itself. For example, ethnic politics in Sikkim and Nepal necessitates the 
support of ethnic members from rural areas who are deemed as the custodians of authentic 
culture or the workers from the kaman without whose belief in the Gorkha, no political 
movement for Gorkhaland can ever hope to be successful. This broadening of political space 
makes political agents out of ordinary men and women.  
 While grievances or aspirations are necessary, they are not sufficient for the formation 
of identities and their eventual political mobilization. What is important in political 
mobilization is the framing of individual and isolated grievances in a way which appeals to 
those experiencing them and at the same time is comprehensible within a larger socio-economic 
framework. As Fumagalli (2007: 568) points out, in order for the frames to be understood and 
used by the people, they need to be familiar and hence build on familiar material as well as 
cognitive elements. Thus, whether it be the demand for reservations in Sikkim or a separate 
homeland for the Limbus or the Gorkha, these issues and demands have to be contextually 
framed in a manner which is appropriate to and can be understood by all. For example if the 
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demand for Gorkhaland was based entirely on class based discrimination then political outfits 
like the GJM would not be able to garner the support of the masses even within the tea estates 
as there is limited class consciousness on the basis of class amongst the workers in the estates 
owing to the historical focus on ethnicity rather than class. Combining economic deprivation 
with ethnic discrimination has widened the scope and appeal of Gorkhaland to members of all 
sections of society and not just the working class. Following Goffman (1974) ‘frame’ has been 
defined by Snow et al (1986: 464) as a schemata of interpretation that enables individuals to 
locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life spaces and the world at large. 
By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experiences and 
guide action, whether individual or collective. Zald (1996: 262) adds that frames are the 
specific metaphors, symbolic representations and cognitive cues used to render or cast events 
in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action.  
This plays a fundamental role in the three cases in the eastern Himalaya, where the 
framing of issues and events by different actors leads to the variation in the articulation of 
ethnicity. Local, regional and national frames inform the nature and conduct of everyday 
politics. Frames do not emerge naturally but are carefully constructed by leaders and elites in 
order to mobilize or demobilize a community. Frames operate at the interface between 
background structural factors and the contingent choices of elites, thereby emphasizing the 
nexus between frames and agents. Thus, for any situation there can be multiple frames that can 
be used to make it explicit or intelligible to the common masses or the same situation can be 
framed differently even by similar kinds of agents (Fumagalli, 2007:568).  
Walker (2001:88) emphasizes the social and cultural appropriateness of frames which 
can be attained only when all mediations between groups and the state are done by those who 
are ‘appropriately embedded actors’. His concept of ‘localism’ in the context of local Thai 
elections is a highly insightful example which reveals the power of local actors over grand 
theoretical narratives and ideologies in the construction of political opinion amongst the masses 
and the achievement of desired political outcomes. This element of localism lends variation to 
identity formation in the eastern Himalaya, where different issues and actors emerge as 
important in different locations. Framing of issues has been quite unidimensional in Sikkim 
and Darjeeling with either the ethnic associations or the political parties steering the 
construction of ethnic grievances and arguments. In east Nepal, the Limbuwan agenda shows 
framing by multiple agents, political parties and ethnic associations, who use the same ethnic 
grievance and cultural tools but differ in the way it is used. 
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 Ethnic identity is always created in the presence of the ethnic ‘other’ and in all three 
cases engagement with the ethnic other has been presented in an antagonistic manner. Books 
on Limbu history and mythology (mostly in Nepali) are an even mix between the bravery of 
the Limbus, treachery of the upper caste bahun and the eventual soshan (exploitation) by the 
state. The Gorkha is locked in a constant battle with the state for recognition and equality while 
the few books written on Sikkimese history have always reiterated the migrant background of 
the Nepalis and their eventual takeover of the Buddhist Himalayan kingdom. In Sikkim, 
framing of ethnic grievances has been done mostly by ethnic associations, who in spite of the 
difference in their cultural practices all seek the same remedies from the state, namely their 
declaration as STs, more reservations and political representation. Recent ethnographic reports 
written by ethnic associations represent ethnic groups as having ‘animistic, tribal features’ and 
the economic plight of the community is presented as a consequence of being a tribe rather 
than a result of poor governmental policies or representative of failed development. Thus, in 
all the three cases, poverty and social backwardness are framed as direct consequences of 
belonging to a particular ethnic group and therefore the key to economic emancipation of 
Nepali ethnic group lies in an approach which targets particular ethnic groups for development.  
In the context of framing, it is also important to take into consideration the audience in 
question. In Darjeeling and east Nepal, framing socio-economic problems as a consequence of 
ethnic discrimination is directed towards the large Nepali/Gorkha and Limbu populations 
respectively, the majority of who live in rural areas. They are targeted in order to build a solid 
political base which might ultimately translate into political mobilization and electoral votes. 
In Sikkim on the other hand, this framing of ethnic groups as deprived and marginalised is 
framed more for the use by the state than by the people. Here, the ‘marginalized, backward 
groups’ discourse is then used in the redistribution of goods and services and eventually for 
political mileage by the state.  Although in all the three cases poverty prevails irrespective of 
ethnic identity, an ethnic framing makes it easier for the people (who also appreciate the 
cultural revival brought on by identity politics), the elites and the government to comprehend 
and compartmentalise people.  
Another important aspect of framing is that which is the role played by the state, the 
media and those considered as the ethnic ‘other’, all of which greatly impact the formation of 
an identity. For example, the Gorkha identity is a rejection of the Gorkha’s portrayal as 
mercenaries and immigrants in popular discourse and most specifically in the vitriolic attacks 
by the anti- Gorkhaland agitators like the Bangla O Bangla Bhasha Bachao Committee (Save 
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the Bengali Bhasa Committee) 253  which are social organizations with a political agenda. 
Similarly in east Nepal, Limbu nationalism is based on the attempt to break the homogenous 
culture and identity that was promoted by the Nepali state at the cost of other sub-ethnic 
identities.  Another cultural tool that is prominent amongst stronger ethnic groups (i.e. those 
which are well organised, financially solvent and have a large membership) is the use of 
memories. The commercial reproduction (music videos, plays, Youtube videos) of folklore, 
past glories, sacrifice, contribution to nation building, indigeniety was evident in all the three 
areas. 
Elites, frames and POS are all factors, which lead to varied choices in the manifestation 
of ethnicity. These are, however, activities which are usually negotiated by leaders or other 
prominent members of the ethnic group. This raises pertinent questions regarding the agency 
of those Nepalis who are not directly involved in ethnic politics. The participation and 
motivation of those who are neither elites nor executive members of ethnic associations or 
political parties also form an important component of our understanding of ethnic politics. 
Although people’s agency might be restricted or limited, they are not bystanders to the political 
and economic changes around them. They can participate, criticize and are affected by political 
and economic changes in numerous ways. Thus people’s participation is one of the key 
variables that can help explain the difference in the choice of a particular ethnic identity as 
political identity. However, to assume that one ‘chooses’ one ethnic identity over another is 
problematic because what may be considered as a choice could actually just be an awakening 
or assertion of elements from the ‘habitus’. Also physical features, gender religion or the 
kinship system that one is born into forms an important component of the world view of groups 
and individuals.  
Agency is difficult to gauge even when ethnic identification has resulted in mass 
mobilization as seen in Darjeeling and east Nepal. Questions regarding agency of the common 
man/woman must begin with an interrogation of what agency might imply in the three cases. 
Agency might range from participation in ethnic movements and political parties to negotiation 
with the elites but in the context of the thesis, the agency to make a particular ethnic identity 
meaningful in the political as well as social realm is of primary importance. However, 
                                                          
253  Bangla Bhasa Bachao Committee claims to be an apolitical social organization based in Siliguri, in the 
foothills of Darjeeling District. They are opposed to the formation of Gorkhaland. Their primary claim being 
that Nepalis living in the Darjeeling District are not Indian nationals and that Darjeeling was ‘a predominant 
(sic) Bengali town even at the time of Independence’. 
Source: Offical blog of the Bangla Bhasa Society 
http://banglabanchao.wordpress.com/page/14/ (Accessed: 07/01/2013).  
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accepting this also requires an acknowledgment of the numerous hierarchies within an ethnic 
group which filter the agency of the actors so that by the time an individual’s choice is enacted, 
much of its original essence and intent is either lost or altered.  
An instrumental approach to understanding ethnic choice would suggest two aspects of 
ethnic participation- transactional and transcendental. The relationship between the two varies 
in different contexts but in most cases the transactional aspect (the context of who gets what 
and how) has to be shrouded under the transcendental (i.e. the promotion of values like religion, 
language, ethnic bonds) which constitutes the primary basis for identification and forms a 
persuasive basis for identification (Varshney, 2003; Mitra, 1992). While trying to unravel the 
question of ethnic politics, agency and choice it becomes comfortable and convenient to 
imagine that ethnicity is one of the rational choices that an individual or a group can make 
when having to make cost-effective choices. Rational Action Theory (RAT) assumes that all 
social actors decide their political participation on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation, 
participating only when participation costs are lower. The theory assumes that all human beings 
are rational, with a stable and consistent set of preferences and motivated in their everyday 
actions (Malesevic, 2002:195). Instrumentality is an important feature of ethnic politics in the 
eastern Himalaya and this argument can be extended to try and understand the different ethnic 
response to the state- why Nepalis in Sikkim find it beneficial to identify themselves as 
Limboo, Rai, Tamang while at the same time, Nepalis in Darjeeling use Gorkha as their means 
of identification. One of the fundamental problems with the RAT is that it  relegates cultural 
values, ideologies and beliefs as ‘second order reality’ because a human being is always homo 
economicus, the individual is in a permanent state of competition over limited resources, 
economic advantages, wealth, power or status (Malesevic, 2002). However the case studies 
indicate that while access and control over the re-distribution of resources (reservation, 
employment or even a separate state) is one of the main motivations for ethnic politics, the 
unrelenting demand for symbolic goods like language recognition, cultural preservation, 
citizenship, official recognition of festivals cannot be neglected. These symbolic goods cannot 
be deemed as less important than the material because it is these cultural items that form the 
basis of identity politics, which could then also used be used for effective negotiation with the 
state.  This instrumental characteristic of ethnic groups also needs to take into account that 
different individuals in a group might value different things; therefore, to frame ethnic demands 
as purely instrumental demands would be inadequate. The three case studies prove this point 
to a large extent. Contemporary Sikkimese politics is marked by the polarization between the 
minority but historically dominant Bhutia-Lepcha community and the majority Nepali 
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community as well as by divisions within the Nepali ethnic group itself. This comes especially 
at a time when identity as a Sikkimese has emerged as a moot point of contention. Along with 
supporting the discovery, exploitation and essentialisation of the tangible aspects of culture, 
socio-economic categories have altered the members of ethnic groups themselves who are  
given the opportunity to reconstruct their social history as being native to Sikkim as opposed 
to being referred to as migrants and coolies (Gurung 2010: 248-49). With each ethnic group 
undergoing a degree of new found interest in the reconstruction of their ‘original’ cultures, 
politics in Sikkim thus provides a greater sense of belonging and identification as Sikkimese 
even though it may not bring the desired economic outcome. 
 On the emotive issue of identity, the word Gorkha refers to all the Nepalis living in 
India; when used in a political context, it refers to all the people of the Darjeeling Hills, 
including the Lepchas, Tibetans, Marwaris and even Bengalis, while at the same time creating 
a distinction from the Sikkimese-Nepali. As the boundaries of the peoples the term is supposed 
to encompass have become more ambivalent, the political saliency of the term is heightened in 
the pursuit of federal statehood. Enactment of Nepali-ness through dress codes imposed by the 
political parties as well as the gaon-samaj (village community) performed the latent function 
of reviving and instilling a sense of ethnic pride in the community, which is evident in the 
currency the word Gorkha has gained amongst Indian-Nepalis all over India.  
Finally, in east Nepal, although assertion of the Limbu identity does not compete with 
the national identity of a Nepalese, it does make a breakaway from the cultural hegemony of 
the upper caste Hill groups. There is a prevailing sense of injustice and ethnic discrimination 
amongst the Limbus and thus to be able to openly assert and celebrate one’s culture ranks high 
in prominence along with the instrumental benefits that might come with ethnic federalism. 
Therefore, the importance of transcendental benefits of ethnic politics to different groups and 
individuals cannot be under-estimated.  
Guilliano (2000:296) makes a crucial point that individual political affiliation cannot 
be determined by ethnic affiliation as individuals might possess extremely strong ethnic 
identities and a sense of group belonging but this need not directly translate into political action. 
This is amply exemplified in all the three cases and most explicitly in the case of the Limbuwan 
movement, where the regional Limbuwan parties, despite stirring ethnic sentiments were not 
able to generate mass support from the Limbus who were either reluctant to switch their 
traditional affiliation with the national parties or were not convinced enough by the strength of 
the movement. Group preferences do not exist in some pre-made, latent form ready to be 
mobilized. Rather, it is important to analyse how support and confidence is acquired and how 
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the relationship between the voter, politicians and issues determines the use of ethnicity as a 
resource to ensure the maximum benefit for a particular ethnic group.  
 
Conclusion 
A survey of these four factors (ideological framework, POS, elites and grievances and 
framing) establishes that although seemingly simple, emotive and straightforward, ethnic 
politics is actually a process as well as an outcome of numerous, complex and often interrelated 
incentives and dis-incentives. The case studies from the eastern Himalaya, although diverse in 
their issues and actors, work to highlight that while the state and its instutionalised practices 
might form the over-arching structure that groups have to negotiate with, it is the presence of 
local, regional and international factors that ultimately determine the nature and content of 
ethnic grievances, actions and outcomes. The very same factors help establish that identity 
construction is a local process and thus despite cultural, historical and even ethnic similarities 
the political articulation and manifestation of ethnicity will ultimately be shaped by the social, 
political and economic exigencies that surround an ethnic group. 
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Conclusion 
(i) General Findings 
This thesis is based on the premise that ethnicity is an important component of the social 
as well as political identity of groups and individuals. The importance of ethnicity arises not 
only from its use as a means of demarcating and ordering social interaction but more so because 
of its value as a political resource. The validity of this claim comes from an interrogation of 
identity politics in the eastern Himalaya which focuses on the Nepalis who are geographically 
and historically connected but politically distinct from each other. This leads to a central 
hypothesis that the existence of intra-ethnic differences amongst the Nepalis living in Sikkim, 
Darjeeling and east Nepal is based not only on their location but because of a range of external 
factors that determine their course of action, agenda and outcomes. The case of Sikkim 
highlights the role played by the state in facilitating the political assertion of ethnic identity. 
The tea plantations and the Gorkha in Darjeeling are representative of the impact of historical 
colonisation and the stagnant development on contemporary Nepali society. Finally the case of 
east Nepal shows the influence of international regimes and political opportunities in 
precipitating ethnic grievances. Despite this diversity, Nepali ethnic politics in the three cases 
is framed around the instrumental use of ethnic identity by ethnic groups as well as the state in 
order to establish new ways of engaging in the politics of the re-distribution. This relationship 
is fashioned and influenced by the state (especially through its bureaucracy) as well as other 
external institutions and ultimately leads to a variation in ethnic politics as well as the assertion 
of ethnic idenitity amongst the Nepalis of Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal. Thus, by 
analysing the position of Nepalis located in three different political units, the thesis establishes 
that in spite of cultural and historical similarities the impact of external factors is so great that 
it leads to a substantial variation in the political assertion of ethnic identities, within the Nepali 
ethnic group.  
In this process of political empowerment these identities themselves undergo a re-
definition. As evidenced by the case studies, this re-definition has resulted in a fluid identity 
amongst those who identify or used to identify themselves as Nepalis, thereby highlighting the 
political and constructed nature of this group. This flux can be attributed to the very nature and 
composition of the Nepali ethnic group which acts as a meta-identity, subsuming different 
ethnic groups within liminal intra-ethnic boundaries. This permits the easy inclusion and 
exclusion of groups and the alteration of group boundaries, which in turn enables and 
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complicates ethnic politics.  Owing to the inherent flexibility of this meta-identity, groups and 
individuals can make one identity more meaningful than the other in response to their social, 
political and economic environment. For example, in a social context, a Limbu from Sikkim 
could either choose to emphasize his/her ethnic affiliation in a multi-ethnic environment or can 
choose to identify themselves as Sikkimese or Sikkimese-Nepali (which immediately 
establishes political, historical and even cultural differences) when interacting with Limbus 
from Darjeeling or Nepal. Political demarcation is evident even in the presence of strong ethnic 
affiliations and kinship relations. Nonetheless, these identities overlap to a large extent making 
a clear-cut distinction between the assertions of one identity over another rather difficult.  
The primary questions around which the research was conducted, analysed and 
presented were: 
1.  Under what conditions does ethnicity become a valued resource? 
2. Why do people choose one particular identity over another for the purpose of political 
expression? 
 
Nepalis are spread across different political units (from the Garhwal hills in the western 
Himalaya to Meghalaya and beyond in the east) and while a sense of cultural similarity, 
connection and empathy does exist, the case studies reveal that their political identities and 
actions are far from being mutually cohesive. The Nepali ethnic group conforms to the idea of 
a meta-identity which encompasses different ethnic groups but at the same time, it is also 
recognized as a political identity in relation to other dominant ethnic groups like the Bhutia and 
Lepchas in Sikkim and the Bengalis in Darjeeling. This is also visible in Nepal where the term 
‘Nepali’ may not have as wide a currency as in Sikkim or Darjeeling given that all citizens of 
Nepal are called Nepalis or Nepalese but there are specific material indicators of being a Nepali 
(for example the Nepali topi, the daura-suruwal, chaubandi [traditional blouse]) which 
distinguishes Nepalis from other Nepalese citizens like the Madheshis in the southern border 
who identify themselves as Nepalese citizens but do not subscribe to Nepali cultural markers. 
These markers are also used Nepalis living in Sikkim and Darjeeling from other ethnic groups.  
As a meta-identity with certain cultural markers that distinguish it from other ethnic 
groups, the Nepali ethnic group is a key example of an ‘imagined community’ which was 
brought into existence by the literati in Benares and Darjeeling. However, once this identity 
was brought to life, the Nepalis have charted their own course in different geographical 
locations leading distinct lifestyles, either oblivious or ambivalent to the condition of Nepalis 
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in other parts of the world.  For example, the economic and political plight of the Nepalis in 
Darjeeling has very little political impact on the Nepalis in Sikkim which is evident through 
their reluctance to support the Gorkhaland movement publicly. Thus, if ethnic groups are 
imagined communities, my thesis is an example of the development of a community 
subsequent to its initial period of consolidation. It shows how external strains, demands and 
incentives might change the nature and function of ethnic groups altogether or alternatively, 
may bring about collaboration with other groups in a bid to increase the political efficacy of 
ethnicity. This thesis contributes to the growing literature on ethnic politics in South Asia. By 
focussing on the politics of indigenous, tribal identities (instead of caste groups, which has 
remained a dominant theme) the thesis shows the constructed nature of this identity. The thesis 
thus highlights the flexibility of ethnic politics to encompass a variety of issues as bases for 
political action which however, have legitimacy and potency only during a particular period 
and in the presence of some political as well as emotive catalyst.  
The case of the Nepalis of Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal is a study of the political 
process as well as the rationale behind ethnic politics that eventually leads to the assertion of a 
specific ethnic identity. Although ethnicity might be considered to be a prominent aspect of 
everyday social interaction, my thesis has documented the growth, development and use of 
ethnic identity as a political identity.  
In the face of widespread economic disparities and political marginalization, the use of 
ethnic identity in place of class or political ideologies is a well-documented phenomenon in 
South Asia and beyond. Economic and political claims based on ethnic or cultural factors like 
caste, religion and language have been the focus of much academic attention in South Asia. 
Instrumental use of ethnicity is thus not unexpected but a consistent phenomenon in identity 
based politics. Whilst engaging with these popular conceptions and pre-conceptions regarding 
identity based politics, my thesis has used the example of the Nepali ethnic group to extend the 
instrumental rationale of ethnic politics and highlight the variety of motivations behind ethnic 
politics. The thesis goes beyond the mere acknowledgment of ethnic politics in the region and 
instead aims to understand the different factors that encourage and sustain identity based 
politics. By analysing the case of the Nepalis, it highlights the relationship between ethnicity 
and the various social, economic and political structures that might encourage ethnic claims as 
well as provide the necessary outlet for grievances which have otherwise been neglected by the 
state. By analysing the case of the Nepalis, my thesis highlights the impact of socio-economic 
disparities on ethnic groups brought about by increasing development and expansion of the 
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welfare state. It also draws attention to the response of ethnic groups, the cultural resources 
that are available to them and the external structures that facilitate those claims. While 
economic and political benefits are usually deemed to be the sole motivation behind ethnic 
politics, the case studies show that although tangible benefits may not be equally divided 
amongst ethnic groups, ethnic politics may still be valued for the non-tangible benefits that it 
might bring in the form of language development, heritage preservation etc.  
The thesis also makes an important contribution to the study of democracy in the South 
Asian context. The three cases show how ethnic politics can facilitate democracy further by 
widening the base through which people can contest the state and stake political claims. Rather 
than destabilising democracy, the three case studies show how ethnic politics provides an 
alternative path through which collective discontent can be channeled albeit within the 
democratic framework. The three cases show that ethnic politics has created space for a new 
layer of cultural elites and new forms of social capital that are politically relevant thereby 
promoting a more inclusive form of democracy.  The case studies also discuss the role played 
by bureaucracy in ethnic politics. This not only adds a new dimension through which ethnic 
politics can be analysed but by highlighting the ethnic nature of bureaucracy, as illustrated by 
the case studies, also makes an interesting contribution to the study of bureaucracies in general. 
This can also be used more specifically, in the context of political borderlands which can further 
our understanding of how the states operate and are localised on the periphery of the nation-
state. 
While all three case studies contribute to the wider understanding of ethnic politics in 
general, each case study also makes its own particular contribution to the understanding of the 
relation between ethnicity and the socio-political environment that leads to the use of ethnicity 
as a political resource. The Sikkim case study focuses clearly on the role of the state in enabling 
the growth and development of identity based politics through its re-distribution strategies. 
Ethnic politics in Sikkim is successful because of the participation of the people who want to 
partake in a negotiation with the state. My thesis establishes that, despite it being perceived as 
a political manoeuvre, the motive for ethnic politics is firmly grounded in the economics of re-
distribution.  While demands for a separate state and greater control over economic and 
political resources also remains at the heart of the Nepal case study, it also shows how the 
interaction between the state and ethnic group is often coloured by factors which go beyond 
the local or regional, to those which are international in their origin. The case study, therefore, 
highlights the impact of international discourse on local constructions of identity, the 
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emergence of new actors and the form of grievance articulation. Akin to the Nepal case study, 
demands for greater access to political and economic resources is inherent in the demand for 
Gorkhaland and for which the Gorkha identity has been continually revived. The Darjeeling 
case study is an interesting example of the implications of colonisation and the persistence of 
neo-colonisation in an economically weak state which accentuates an ethnic frame over other 
modes of collective action. All three case studies show different aspects of ethnicity, its 
malleability and the capacity for political action which is also a response to the state and other 
structures that enable or disable the politicization of ethnicity and determine its cultural 
symbols.  
In its exploration of the research questions, the thesis exhibits how the use of ethnic 
identity emerges under favourable conditions. It also examines the external factors that might 
lead to the preference of one identity over another. The thesis also highlights an important but 
often overlooked aspect of ethnic groups- intra ethnic boundaries. While inter-ethnic 
boundaries have been crucial in the construction as well as politics of identity, the present thesis 
shows how they are altered and manipulated. By taking a critical approach this thesis refuses 
ethnic groups the homogeneity that has been bestowed upon them by a large volume of 
literature and forces a deeper analysis of ethnic groups and ethnic politics itself. The case 
studies in the thesis go beyond the examination of simply local and cultural factors as sources 
of internal variation, thereby complicating our understanding of ethnic groups. It refers to the 
roles played by states and institutions (local, regional and international) in order to analyse how 
these contribute to differentiation within a single ethnic group.  
The case studies also show that it is not the mere existence of grievances that leads to 
the politicisation and eventual mobilisation of ethnicity but also the impetus and the favourable 
environment provided by external political structures. Following Brubaker (2001), I placed the 
Nepali ethnic group at the center of a social, political and economic matrix of a particular area. 
The primary aim was to study the impact of these factors on the ethnic group. However, the 
case studies revealed a dialectic interaction between the two variables (ethnic groups and 
external factors). As much as the external factors affected ethnicity, the reverse was also true. 
Thus, the response and adaptation of ethnic identity to different incentives and impediments 
show that the study of ethnic politics has to be multi-dimensional. The analysis of ethnic 
politics requires an understanding and interrogation of the social and the political structures in 
which it is embedded and focusing just on the ethnic group and/or the social structures around 
it provides an incomplete picture. Thus, as the case studies show, ethnic politics is a dynamic 
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process and the relationship between ethnicity and the social, economic and political structures 
needs to be studied rather than just the impact of one over another. Neglecting this would limit 
our understanding of the perceived homogeneity of the Gorkha, the contrasting heterogeneity 
of the Nepalis of Sikkim and the political resurgence of Limbu nationalism in eastern Nepal.  
The Nepali ethnic group also presents an interesting example of the evolution of an 
identity- its precarious position between being a contemporary necessity whilst also being 
understood and legitimised only through distinct markers from the past. For example, the 
Gorkha identity was born out of political and economic insecurity and the internalisation of a 
racist, colonial discourse rather than an apparent kinship bond or a common religion. 
Nonetheless, it still performs the function of an ethnic group by providing solidarity amongst 
members through the history of Gorkha as a martial race. The Gorkha’s valour and sacrifice 
provides myths of origin which then facilitate a common platform to coalesce around. While 
this shows the constant evolution and the socially reflexive nature of an ethnic identity, the 
very fact that the Gorkhaland movement then necessitated visible, tangible aspects of ‘Gorkha 
culture’ shows the importance of tradition and cultural symbols (which themselves might be a 
product of conscious construction by political actors) in gaining political legitimacy. 
Consequently, this thesis establishes that while ethnic identities can prove to be useful heuristic 
devices, they nonetheless have very material consequences affecting who gets what, when and 
how. Thus understanding ethnic politics necessitates a fine balance between cultural elements 
and their use in a given socio-political context. 
 
(ii) Contribution to Area Studies 
By studying Sikkim, Darjeeling and east Nepal my thesis makes a particular 
contribution to the literature pertaining to one of the most ill-researched areas in South Asia. 
Not only are these areas poorly researched, they have also been subjected to narrow, parochial 
frameworks that have limited the quantity and quality of research emerging from the region. 
This has important implications because of the limited, uni-dimensional vision that such 
research presents of the place and its people. Furthermore, these frameworks also become the 
basis for policy formulation, electoral propaganda and political opportunism. Owing to the 
large number of those groups who are considered as Nepalis and their dispersal across the 
Himalayan region, this ethnic group is also one that has traditionally been understood and 
analysed as a homogenous group despite its obvious diversity. My thesis thus makes a 
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contribution to a better understanding of the Nepalis and the political, social and economic 
situations with which they negotiate. Through this thesis I hope to have shed more light on the 
predicament of the Nepalis, especially Indian-Nepalis who are constantly battling the necessity 
to prove their right to live and belong in India despite their historical presence on the periphery 
of the Indian state for over a hundred years. By engaging with the historical contexts that led 
to the migration, settlement and finally the formation of the Nepali jati, first in India and then 
in Nepal, along with the discussion on the contemporary contexts that have led to the distinction 
between Nepalis, I have tried to establish the very important but overlooked distinction 
between the Nepalis living in India and Nepal.  
Each case study in this thesis also makes an important contribution to the literature of 
their respective areas. The analysis of the Gorkha identity provides a base for the interrogation 
of the state or the Gorkhaland movement, the case of the Limbuwan movement can be used to 
study the local impact of international discourses and the Sikkim case can be used to study the 
symbiotic relation between state and ethnic groups.  The case studies have focussed on 
particular periods in history to analyze the construction of identity which have been used by 
political actors. Most importantly the thesis has tried to engage in a critical and rigorous 
analysis of pre-defined identities and histories which have reified ethnic identity. One of the 
biggest limitations in the study of politics in the eastern Himalaya was the disjuncture between 
ethnic groups and the state, both of which are vital elements in a cohesive study of politics. 
This research has studied not only the relationship between ethnic groups and the state but also 
other factors that influence this relationship.  
 
Despite the focus on the cultural bases of ethnic politics, its construction and uses, I 
recognize and emphasize the role of the state in my thesis. Economic liberalization and 
technological advancement have introduced neo-liberal forces whilst, at the same time, 
increasing the presence and dominance of the state in the lives of its citizens. This can be 
attributed to the practice of a mixed economy in South Asia whereby the public sector remains 
the largest employer as well as the distributor of essential goods and services. The range of 
governmental influence has expanded beyond a concern with raising revenue and maintaining 
order as the need to direct, train and motivate labour has increased (Brown, 1994:1).  Also, the 
case of Nepal is an interesting example of a ‘strategic rentier state’ where there is a profound 
dependence on development aid, channelled through the state apparatus. Rentier states live 
largely off unearned incomes. The state is resourced with little organization or political effort 
on the part of the state apparatus and especially little effort in relation to their domestic 
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population (Moore, 2001 in Moore, 304:2004). This implies that even aid is channeled through 
the state or at the very least, has to meet the approval of the state. This increased role of the 
state directly or indirectly, has had a serious impact on the relationship between state and ethnic 
groups. Thus, along with discussing the response of ethnic groups, the thesis also examined 
different aspects of the developmental state which has facilitated ethnic politics. 
 
While the Sikkimese case reveals the manner in which the state has co-opted its ethnic 
groups, the Nepal and Darjeeling case studies reveal the antagonistic approach of the state 
towards them thereby giving shape and direction to ethnic politics and its concomitant 
movement. As evident in the Sikkim and Nepal case studies, international and national 
discourses have a direct impact on the articulation of ethnicity which is achieved through the 
state apparatus. The cases are an example of what may be deemed as an emerging trend in 
South Asian politics especially in relation to minority and/or disadvantaged groups. This trend 
is spurred on by the expansion of the welfare state of which affirmative action is an important 
part.  The thesis engages with the contemporary topic of affirmative action to show how vote 
bank politics has now acquired a formal structure and is safeguarded by the constitution as a 
legal right. The cases evidence that while ethnicity has been used for political purposes by the 
state (most specifically in Sikkim) ethnic movements in Darjeeling and east Nepal are also, to 
a very large extent, premised upon the promise of positive discrimination in the near future.  
The case studies also show that ethnicity has emerged as a powerful basis for political 
contestation which manifests itself through movements for ethnic homelands (Gorkhaland, 
Limbuwan) as well as other tangible markers of ethnicity which are recognized and endorsed 
by the state. Once again, one of the important characteristics that I have attempted to highlight 
is that unlike other homeland movements within South Asia or beyond, the demand for 
homelands either by the Gorkhas or the Limbus does not necessarily seek secession from the 
country of origin. Whether it is Gorkhaland or Limbuwan, these homelands are located within 
India and Nepal and they represent more of a demand for control over the state and/or greater 
access to the resources that are controlled by the state. Ethnic politics is thus enacted within a 
frame which is recognized by all the participants, very much akin to Bourdieu’s notion of the 
‘game’ where all the players are aware of the limitations and positions that are accepted in the 
game. Although political actors do go back and forth across a number of different fields, they 
all make claims within familiar and accepted frameworks, whether imposed by the state (in 
India) or international organisations (in Nepal). Thus, the three cases also show a variation in 
ethnic movements and the strategies of ethnic actors, at least in the South Asian context.  
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(iii) Limitations of the research 
One of the most significant limitations of this thesis is the lack of discussion of ethnic 
politics from the perspective of borderland studies, owing to time constraints in the field. The 
location of the three areas at the periphery of the nation-state has had a significant impact on 
their socio-political history as well as the formation of attitudes towards the nation itself. 
Sikkim’s strategic location as a geo-political frontier has brought great financial and 
infrastructural benefits to the state, while the socio-economic status of neigbouring Darjeeling 
has remained unchanged for generations. Bordering Darjeeling and Sikkim is eastern Nepal 
which shares greater cultural and linguistic affinity with Sikkim and Darjeeling than with 
Kathmandu. Relatively more prosperous compared with other districts in Nepal (owing to 
commercial production of tea, ginger and cardamom) and with close border connections with 
India, Ilam district may have benefitted economically from its location but its distance from 
the centre has resulted in a lack of political recognition by the state. Understanding the impact 
of the international as well as regional borders would have made a significant contribution to a 
holistic understanding of identity formation in the eastern Himalaya and the lack of it is an 
important limitation of this thesis.  
It is generally acknowledged that ethnicity is usually studied closely in the context of 
nations and nationalism. However the present thesis focused primarily on the processes of 
ethnic politics that facilitate a variation in political articulation within a single ethnic group 
which did not challenge notions of citizenship or the idea of a nation. Discussion on nations 
and nationalism would have added another layer of complexity to the arguments in the thesis 
but was not pursued in order to maintain the focus of the thesis on ethnic politics at the micro 
level. Although the case studies focused more on the demands for greater inclusiveness within 
the nation-state, the importance of a thorough discussion on nations and nationalism is 
recognized.  
Methodological limitation was posed by the incessant strikes in Darjeeling that 
hampered my mobility which eventually affected data collection. In Sikkim, primary data 
collection (interviews) was comparatively more difficult owing to the reluctance on the part of 
respondents in Gangtok to give me an interview or by the limited information that they parted 
with during our interaction. Also, most of my respondents were male (especially in  the rural 
areas) as most of the women were either shy, denied interviews on the basis that they had 
insufficient knowledge or would simply agree with the male members of the family. Most of 
the political leaders and executive heads of ethnic groups were male and thus, all interviews 
have an unintentional gender bias.   
240 
 
 
(iv) Future research 
This thesis paves the way for further research on the region on a variety of topics 
ranging from politics, area studies and development studies to gender and class relations. Given 
the diversity of activities in the eastern Himalayan region, the prospects and avenues for future 
research are immense. Accordingly, the present thesis provides a base from which to propel 
studies on different topics. The case studies discussed in this thesis would be particularly useful 
not only as a resource on that particular area but would also interest those engaged in a 
comparative study of ethnicity, political movements, and minority politics.  
Because of the multi-disciplinary approach of the thesis, it will find readership within 
disciplines ranging from politics and cultural studies to development studies. The primary focus 
of the research has been on recognizing and resolving the issue of political heterogeneity within 
an ethnic group. At the same time, the thesis throws open numerous questions which need to 
be analysed through further research. As mentioned before, the impact of borders and border 
politics in this geographically bound area is immense and thus provides scope to extend the 
study of borderlands further inland. Another important field of study that is often overlooked 
is gender. The present research acknowledges the dearth of research focusing on women in 
general as well as on gender relationships given that these relationships are now enacted in a 
rapidly changing socio-economic environment which is being spurred on by migration, 
development, globalization and changed family patterns.  
An important and interesting aspect that would benefit from further academic 
exploration is that of class and other relationship based on different modes of production. Both 
Ilam and Darjeeling are home to sprawling tea estates yet there has been no thorough 
interrogation of class based activities or the lack of it in these areas. Sikkim on the other hand 
has a burgeoning middle class which has rapidly embraced globalization and its concomitant 
consumerism. This opens avenues for further enquiry on the nature of this class and its 
importance in the wider social, political and economic matrix.  
The research also directs towards the enquiry of democracy itself. Political practices in 
these three areas highlight divergences in democratic practices which then have an impact on 
the agency as well as the outcome of elections, policies or other decisions that may affect the 
lives of the people. What qualifies as democracy in the region? Is digression from the principles 
of democratic practices a regional norm? What is the local interpretation of democracy and 
what factors affect or limit the choice of the people? Does democracy actually work for the 
greater good? How do democratic and religious values (which also have political connotations) 
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interact? These are a few of the questions that can further a critical analysis of democracy and 
its regional interpretations.  
Ethnic politics has changed the static understanding of the self as well as the other living 
in the region. The process is so rapid that it overwhelms even those who are in the midst of it. 
Because of its contemporary nature, there is much to study on the various forms that identity 
politics is taking and thus, there is still a great vacuum that needs to be filled by further research 
on ethnic politics in the eastern Himalayan borderland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexe 
(i) Interview schedule 
(a) Nepal 
1. Krishna Shrestha, Ilam- 22/07/ 2010 
2. Madhav Basnett, Ilam-02/08/2010 
3. Pradeep Limbu, Ilam-03/08/2010 
4. Bishal Limbu, Ilam-17/08/2010 
5. Bhardoj Gurung, Ilam-24/08/2010 
6. Kumar Sunwar, Ilam-28/08/2010 
7. Maila Limbu, Yangnam- 03/09/2010 
8. Yangnam Group Interview-04/09/2010 
9. Leela Jabegu, Phidim-04/09/2010 
10. Upendra Jabegu, Phidim-07/09/2010 
11. Deependra Kurumba, Phidim- 06/09/2010 
12. Keshav Raj Chemjong, Phidim-07/09/2010 
13. Gautam Jabegu, Phidim-09/09/2012 
14. Chok Magu Group Interview-10/09/2010 
15. Ram Sherma,Phidim-07/09/2010 
16. Angben Sherpa, Kathmandu-22/09/2010 
17. Arjun Limbu, Kathmandu-22/09/2010 
18. Bairangi Kaila, Kathmandu-25/09/2010 
19. Passang Limbu, Ilam-30/09/2010 
20. Maya Limbu, Ilam-30/09/2010 
21. Shekhar Yonzone, Ilam-30/09/2010 
 
 
 
(b) Darjeeling 
1. Kunga Tamang, Darjeeling-21/12/2010 
2. Happy Valley Tea Estate Union, Darjeeling-22/10/2010 
3. Sunil Rai, Darjeeling-24/12/2010 
4. Ringit Lepcha, Darjeeling- 26/12/2010 
5. Naren Chettri, Kalimpong-29/12/2010 
6. Rajesh Dhakal, Kalimpong-30/12/2010 
7. Vijay Prasad, Kalimpong-30/12/2010 
8. Rajesh Dhakal, Kalimpong-30/12/2010 
9. Maya Dhal, Mungpoo, Darjeeling-03/01/2011 
10. Ram Mukhia, Mungpoo, Darjeeling-04/01/2011 
11. Gautam Tamang, Mungpoo, Darjeeling- 04/01/2011 
12.  Nirmal Pakrin, Mungpoo, Darjeeling-04/01/2011 
  13. Sushil Moktan, Bagrakot- 12/01/2011 
  14. Vishnu Bhujel, Bagrakot-13/01/2011 
  15. Bishnu Prasad Sharma, Bagrakot-13/01/2011 
  16.  Mahesh Kumar Pradhan, Bagrakot-13/01/2011 
  17. Khadga Bajay, Bagrakot-14/01/2011 
  18. Krishna Khadga, Bagrakot-15/01/2011 
  19. Kishore Pradhan, Siliguri- 20/01/2011 
   20. BhaskarGolay, Siliguri-22/01/2011 
   21.I.B.Rai, Siliguri-21/01/2011 
   22. Kamal Tamang, New Delhi-13/02/2011 
        
 
(c) Sikkim 
1. Gurung Association Interview-10/11/2010 
2. Bhujel Association Interviews-13/12/2010 
3. Mukhia Association Interviews-13/12/2010 
4. Yogesh Rai, West Sikkim- 12/11/2010 
5. Raj Rai, West Sikkim-12/11/2010 
6. Shweta Rai, West Sikkim-12/11/2010 
7. Arjun Tashi, West Sikkim-11/11/2010 
8. Sancha Limboo, West Sikkim- 13/11/2010 
9. Shyam Limboo, West Sikkim-13/11/2010 
10. Kamal Subba, West Sikkim-14/11/2010 
11. Bhim Kancha, West Sikkim-14/11/2010 
12. K.Limboo, West Sikkim-16/11/2010 
13. Pem Dorjee’s Mother, West Sikkim-18/11/2010 
14. Binita Tamang, West Sikkim-18/11/2010 
15. Phul Maya Tamang, West Sikkim-18/11/2010 
16. Dawa Tamang, West Sikkim-18/11/2010 
17. Sharmila Tamang, West Sikkim-18/11/2010 
18. Hangu Bahadur, West Sikkim-19/11/2010 
19. Ravi Rai, Gangtok- 23/11/2010 
20. S.K.Rai, Gangtok-28/01/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the Government of 
India and the Government of Nepal 
Kathmandu,  
31 July 1950 
The Government of India and the Government of Nepal, recognising the ancient ties which 
have happily existed between the two countries; Desiring still further to strengthen and 
develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries; Have resolved 
therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, and have, for this 
purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, namely, 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
His EXCELLENCY SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH,  
Ambassador of India in Nepal. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL  
MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA,  
Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal,  
who having examined each other's credentials and found them good and in due form have 
agreed as follows:— 
Article 1 
There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the 
Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the 
complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other. 
Article 2 
The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or 
misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly 
relations subsisting between the two Governments. 
 
Article 3 
In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in Artiele 1 the two Governments 
agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives with such 
staff as is necessary for the due performance of their functions. The representatives and such 
of their s'taff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as 
are customarily granted by international law on a reciprocal basis: Provided that in no case 
shall these be less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having 
diplomatic relations with either Government. 
Article 4 
The two Governments agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and other 
consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places in each other's territory as 
may be agreed to. Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and consular agents shall be 
provided with exequaturs or other valid authorization of their appointment. Such exequatur or 
authorization is liable to be withdrawn by the country which issued it, if considered 
necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible. The persons 
mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions and 
immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other State. 
Article 5 
The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, 
ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The 
procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments 
acting in consultation. 
 
Article 6 
Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and 
Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to 
participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of 
concessions and contracts relating to such development. 
Article 7 
The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on reciprocal basis, to the nationals of 
one country in the territories o the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, 
ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges 
of a similar nature. 
Article 8 
So far as matters dealt with herein are concerned, this Treat: cancels all previous Treaties, 
agreements, and engagements entered into on behalf of India between the British 
Government and the Government of Nepal. 
Article 9 
This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both Governments. 
Article 10 
This Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's 
notice. 
DONE in duplicate at Kathmandu this 31st day of July 1950. 
(Signed )CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH 
For the Government of India.(Signed ) MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RAN,  
For the Government of Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Grants under Article 275 (1) of the Constitution of India 
Article 275(1) of the Constitution provides as follows:- 
 
Such sums as Parliament may by law provide shall be charged on the consolidated Fund of 
India in each year as grants-in-aid of the revenues of such States as Parliament may 
determine to be in need of assistance, and different sums may be fixed for different States: 
Provided that there shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India as grants-in-aid of the 
revenues of a State such capital and recurring sums as may be necessary to enable that State 
to meet the costs of such schemes of development as may be undertaken by the State with the 
approval of the Government of India for the purpose of promoting the welfare of Scheduled 
Tribes in that State or raising the level of administration of the Scheduled Areas therein to 
that of the administration of the rest of the areas of that State”. 
Funding Pattern: 
This is a Central Sector Scheme and 100% grants are provided to the States. 
Coverage: The scheme covers States namely Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh , Assam , 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, 
Orissa, Rajasthan , Sikkim , Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and West 
Bengal having Scheduled Tribe Population.. 
Features  
(i) The grants are provided to the States on the basis of ST population percentage in the State 
to the total tribal population of the Country. 
(ii)The funds are released to the State Governments against specific projects for the welfare 
of Scheduled Tribes and strengthening of administration of tribal areas from the year 2000- 
2001. A part of funds are also utilised to establish Eklavya Model residential Schools to 
provide quality education to ST students from class VI to XII. 
The Ministry of Tribal Affairs issued revised guidelines, in super session of the earlier 
circulars/ letters/ guidelines on the subject, under No.14011/ 9/ 2001-SG&C dated 2.7.2002 
for adoption during 10th Five Year Plan. 
 
Main Features of the Revised Guidelines dated 2.7.2002 
 The following are the main features of the revised guidelines issued by this Ministry on 
2.7.2002.  
(i) Grant under Article 275(1) is additionality to Normal Central Assistance to the State Plan. 
(ii) Adoption of the project approach and prior approval of the Ministry is necessary. 
(iii) The projects under the first proviso to Article 275(1) are part of the overall TSP and the 
Annual State Plans. 
(iv) Micro-plans for each ITDA/ MADA are to be prepared through multi-disciplinary teams. 
(v) Thrust areas are to be identified so that resources are better targeted rather than spreading 
too thin. 
(vi) Provision for utilization of 2% of the funds for project management   has    been made. 
(vii) Provision of expenditure upto 10% of the funds for maintenance and infrastructure with 
prior approval of the Ministry has also been made. 
(viii) Proportionate, at least 30% coverage of women is necessary. 
(ix) TSP Component of the Annual State Plan is to be put in a separate budget head under the 
administrative control of their respective Tribal Development Department. 
(x) Earmarking of 10% of funds out of the overall allocation under the first proviso to Article 
275(1) for innovative projects has been provided which will be sanctioned amongst only 
those States who provide TSP in the State Plan in proportion to the ST population of the State 
in a single budget head and then have spent at least 75% in previous three years on an 
average. 
Proposed Activities 
States can take up activities for strengthening the infrastructure in the sectors critical to 
enhancement of human development indices such as education, income generation, health 
irrigation, roads, bridges, forests, forests villages,  electrification, communication, rural 
marketing, agriculture, animal husbandry, food processing, processing of MFPs, human 
resource development in technical and vocational spheres, water harvesting, resettlement of 
displaced persons, tribal land management, sports promotion.Generation of community 
welfare assets like residential schools, Maintenance of schools,   Providing skilled teaching 
including in tribal language,  Nutritional support to needy: children, mothers and elderly 
people, Community Grain Storage,   Assured Drinking Water, and Other activities meant for 
welfare of Tribal population different from conventional development etc. 
Eklavya Model Residential School 
REVISED GUIDELINES FOR SETTING UP EKLAVYA MODEL RESIDENTIAL 
SCHOOLS  (June 2010) 
I. Introduction 
      
i)   In the context of the trend of establishing quality residential schools for the promotion of 
education in all areas and habitations in the country, the Eklavya Model Residential Schools 
(EMRS) for ST students take their place among the Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas, the 
Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalayas and the Kendriya Vidyalayas. 
ii)  Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS) are set up in States/UTs with grants under 
Article 275(1) of the Constitution of India.  
iii) States/UTs are free to apportion funds out of their Article 275 (1) Grants to   construct and 
run additional EMRS over the number sanctioned by the Ministry.  
iv)  The State Governments/UT Administration will ask for new EMRS after ensuring that all 
the existing EMRSs have been made functional. 
v)   The Ministry’s support to the States/ UTs for the EMRSs programme  and its expansion 
will be subject to the States/UTs ensuring high quality of management and running of the 
schools. Quality management indicates timely and smooth transition of funds allocated from 
the State Government/UT Administration to the management societies/schools; ensuring the 
recruitment of the desired number of teachers; ensuring the provision of medical facilities to 
staff and students; clean and hygienic surroundings and food for the children and providing a 
healthy, happy environment for the academic and overall development of the children. If the 
progress in the EMRSs is seen to be poor as a direct result of poor management and lack of 
adherence to standards the States/ UTs concerned would be unable to claim any more funds 
from the Ministry for this programme. 
II.  Objectives of EMRS 
The objective of EMRS is to provide quality middle and high level education to Scheduled 
Tribe (ST) students in remote areas, not only to enable them to avail of reservation in high 
and professional educational courses and as jobs in government and public and private 
sectors but also to have access to the best opportunities in education at par with the non ST 
population. This would be achieved by: 
a)    Comprehensive physical, mental and socially relevant development of all students 
enrolled in each and every EMRS. Students will be empowered to be     change agent, 
beginning in their school, in their homes, in their village and finally in a larger context. 
b)    Focus differentially on the educational support to be made available to those in 
Standards XI and XII, and those in standards VI to X, so that their distinctive needs can be 
met,  
c)    Support the annual running expenses in a manner that offers reasonable remuneration to 
the staff and upkeep of the facilities.  
d)    Support the construction of infrastructure that provides education,  physical, 
environmental and cultural needs of student life. 
III.Structure of EMRSs 
a)    Admission to these schools will be through selection/competition with suitable provision 
for preference to children belonging to Primitive Tribal Groups, first generation students, etc. 
b)    Sufficient land would be given by the State Government for the school, play grounds, 
hostels, residential quarters, etc., free of cost. 
c)    The number of seats for boys and girls will be equal. 
d)    In these schools, education will be entirely free.  
e)    Every class can have maximum 60 students preferably in 2 sections of 30 students each 
and the total sanctioned strength of the school will be 480 students. 
f)    At the Higher Secondary level (class XI & XII), there will be three sections per class for 
the three streams in Science, Commerce & Humanities. The maximum sanctioned strength of 
the each section may be 30 students. In case of short fall in a section, ST students from other 
schools may be admitted as per procedure mentioned at above para (a). 
IV. Management and Running of EMRS 
 i) The EMRSs may be affiliated either to the State or Central Boards of   Secondary 
Education as desired fit by the State Governments/UT Administration. 
ii) The norms and standards for a school class VI to class VIII in respect of the number of 
teachers to be appointed, as provided in the Schedule to the Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education Act 2009 shall be strictly followed. 
iii) Efforts may be made to recruit maximum no. of women teachers. At the time of 
recruitment, preference may be accorded to candidates whose spouses also qualify for 
selection as teachers. Women should be given preference for employment among the non-
teaching staff and in any case women be deployed in the posts of cook, helper and cleaner. 
iv) Each State Government/UT Administration would be solely responsible for the 
management   and effective functioning of the EMRSs. 
v) State Governments/UT Administration may opt for any feasible/ suitable mode of 
management whether by autonomous education societies; public-private partnership with 
reputed educational institutions; in arrangement with the State Department of Education or 
any other mode found suitable. 
vi) All State Governments/UT Administration are encouraged to set up a society/use an 
existing registered education society for the management of the EMRSs. Such a society will 
be eligible for accepting donations, contributions and grants from individuals and institutions, 
for the purposes of augmenting the infrastructure/ facilities/ educational resources of the 
schools in the interest of quality education. 
vii) A Management Committee may be constituted for each EMRSs which could include, 
among others, reputed local NGOs involved with education.  Help of such NGOs may be 
taken to organize socially relevant, development/ welfare extension programmes. 
viii) The tasks of school admissions, appointment of teachers, appointment of staff, personnel 
matters and day-to-day running of the schools would be handled entirely by the society 
chosen by the State Government/UT Administration and in the manner deemed most suitable. 
ix) The State Governments/UT Administration shall ensure and maintain the highest quality 
in the selection of teachers and staff for academic and extra-curricular excellence. 
x) The Government of India, Ministry of Tribal Affairs shall not accept any responsibility for 
the management of the School including student admission, staff recruitment, personnel 
policy / administration estate management etc. 
V.Building Design and Layout 
(i) The land allocation for each school should be 20 acres of which upto 3.5 acres may be 
used for the construction purposes. The remaining area must be maintained properly and a 
reasonable portion may be earmarked for sports/ games. 
(ii) The plan of the school must indicate a layout of the compound, including the kitchen, 
vegetable garden and plantation (fruits and nutritional trees like drumsticks (moringa/Sahjan), 
citrus) areas. States/UTs are encouraged to use fuel saving or renewable energy technologies 
in the school by availing of the schemes of the Ministry of New & Renewable Energy. 
(iii) The design of the EMRS must take certain essential components into account as well as 
local, environmental characteristics. A list of suggested essential components is at Annexure.  
(iv) The norms and standards of a school in respect of ‘Building’ as laid down in the 
Schedule to the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009, shall be 
strictly ensured. 
VI.  Costs & Budget 
 (i) Capital Cost (non-recurring) 
         The capital cost for the school complex, including hostels and staff quarters will now be 
Rs. 12.00 crore with a provision to go up to Rs.16.00 crore in hill areas, deserts and islands. 
Any escalation will have to be met by State Government/UT. 
(ii)    Recurring Cost 
         Recurring cost during the first year for schools would be @ Rs. 42000/- per child. This 
may be raised by 10% every second year to compensate for inflation etc.  
  
(iii)   For procurement of essential, non-recurring items like furniture/equipment including for 
the kitchen, dining, hostel, recreation, garden etc. @ Rs.10 lakh per school - will be allowed 
once in every 5 years, allowing for inflation. 
  
(iv) The annual budget for recurring expenditure shall be formulated and placed before the 
Management Committee for approval at the end of the each financial year for the next year. 
The rates for calculation of recurring costs may be based on the prevailing rates sanctioned 
for the Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya from time to time. 
(v) The amount under recurring cost, due to each functioning EMRS, would be released by 
the State/UT Government to the bank account of the EMRS. The bank account of each 
EMRS for this purpose may be opened jointly in the name of the Principal of the EMRS and 
any Member of the Management Committee who is also a Government official. 
 VII.Review and Monitoring 
  
(i) The progress of implementation of the scheme will be reviewed by the Union Ministry of 
Tribal Affairs through periodic reports from the State Government/ implementing agencies. 
(ii) The Ministry of Tribal Affairs will conduct review meetings during which States/UTs 
would be required to make presentations on the progress of their EMRSs. 
(iii) The guidelines for the use of the grants under Article 275 (1) provide for an amount up to 
2% of the total allocation to be used for administration of the programme. This would be 
applicable in case of EMRS. 
(iv) A centralized mechanism for the online monitoring of the EMRSs would be developed. 
Meanwhile States/UTs may strength their own systems/methods. 
The Government of India is free to make any modification in the aforesaid conditions in 
consultation with selected State Governments/ UTs whenever deemed necessary. 
B.   Special Central Assistance to Tribal Sub Plan 
The Special Central Assistance (SCA) is provided by the Ministry of tribal Affairs to the 
State Government as an additive to the State TSP. SCA is Primarily meant for family-
oriented income-generation schemes in sectors of agriculture, horticulture sericulture and 
animal husbandry cooperation. A part of SCA (not more than 30%) is also permitted to be 
used for development of infrastructure incidental to such income generating schemes. 
SCA is intended to be additive to State Plan efforts for tribal development and forms part of 
TSP strategy. The objective of the strategy is two folds:- 
Socio-economic development of STs 
Protection of trials against exploitation. of the above, SCA primarily funds schemes/projects 
for economic development of STs. 
The GOI guidelines broadly lay down the following norms:- 
SCA is primarily meant for income generating family oriented schemes and infrastructure 
incidental thereto (not more than 30% of the total outlay) Wherever a scheme is provided for 
any Central Sector/Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), SCA should not be utilised for the 
same. Rather, the allocations available under specific schemes can be availed of Major 
infrastructure development should be supplemented from the TSP flow, rather that being 
catered out SCA like roads, electrification etc. 
Schemes for funding demonstration units should not be financed out of SCA. Rather, the 
follow-up of demonstrations should be catered to looking to the Special disadvantages that 
the tribal funds themselves with.  
Tribal populace below povertyline should alone be supported with SCA financed activities. 
In any specific schematic projects financed by outside agencies, both national and 
international, normally a part of the outlay is proposed as State Government contribution. 
Such contribution should flow from normally State Plan and not out of SCA. 
Wherever State Government Organizations like Tribal Development Cooperative 
Corporations (TDCCs) or Forest Development Corporations (FDCs) are dealing with 
schemes related to tribal welfare and development, the equity based should not be financed 
out of SCA, without prior approval of the GOI. This will lead to better monitoring of the 
concerned activities.  
Specific sectors related to the Tribal need to be givers a fillip by special schemes in the areas 
like sericulture, horticulture, etc out of SCA. 
SCA is released to the States normally in three installments and the entire amounts expected 
to be made available by the end of third quarter. The releases would be subject to the 
performance by the State Governments and the utilization of previously released funds. 
Wherever conjunctional flow of funds can be ensured from other on going development 
programmes, this must be dovetailed so as to have a better spatial and demographic coverage. 
SCA is released for the economic development of the following :- 
Integrated Tribal Development Project (ITDP) area contiguous large area in which ST 
population is 50% or more out of a total population. 
Modified Area Development Approach (MADA) pockets identification of pockets containing 
50% or more of ST population out of a total population of 10000 and above. 
Clusters-identified pockets containing 50% or more ST Population out of a total population 
of 5000. 
Primitive Tribes-identified isolated communities among the STs charactarised by the low rate 
of population, pre-agricultural level of technology and extremely low levels of literacy (so far 
75 Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs) have been identified. 
Displaced tribal population outside (a),(b),(c) and (d) above. 
Assistance for Margin Money Loan Programme (MMLP) for Tribal Finance and 
Development Corporations in the States to implement MMLP. 
Special Projects-Specific Project proposals are also received  
and sanctioned.  
So far as the procedural aspect is concerned, the guidelines are as follows :- 
SCA should be allocated by the State Governments/UT Administrations to the ITDPs and no 
part of SCA should be released to any department at the State level, Transfer of funds to 
implementing departments/agencies if required should be done by the ITDP. to the 
corresponding officer of the implementing agency/line. 
ITDP should prepare 5 year/Annual Plans depending upon the local parameters. Activities of, 
non-plan nature should not be catered to from SCA. 
To fulfill the constitutional provisions, the schemes on which SCA is proposed to the utilized, 
should be specified in the annual TSPs of the States/UTs and administrative approval of the 
Government of India be obtained Financial sanctions however need not be obtained on a case 
by case basis. 
Norms for allocation of Special Assistance 
• Release of SCA would be entirely based on the utilization/ performance by the State 
Governments. 
• SCA funds earmarked by the Ministry to ITDPs should be released directly to the ITDP by 
the State Governments. 
• Transfer of funds to implementing departments/ agencies, if required, should be done by the 
ITDPs. 
• SCA is released for the economic development of the following: 
a) Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDPs) are generally contiguous large areas of the 
size of one or more Development Block in which the ST population is 50% or more of the 
total population. 
b)  Modified Area Development Approach (MADA):  These are identified pockets with a 
concentration of tribals 50% or more ST population within a total population of a minimum 
of 10,000 persons and above. 
c) Clusters:  These are identified pockets of tribal concentration containing 50% or more ST 
population within a total population of about 5,000 or more. 
d) Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs):  Identified isolated communities among the STs 
characterized by a low rate of population, a pre-agricultural level of technology and 
extremely low levels of literacy. 
e) Dispersed tribal population outside (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. 
Norms for Allocation for Special Central Assistance 
• The TSP component of various Departments/ Sectors under the State Plan should be put in a 
separate Budget Head of the Tribal Development Department of the State. 
• Of the total allocation under SCA to TSP, an amount of 10% is released to the States based 
upon a system of weighted criteria, listed below:  
a) Of the total allocation under SCA to TSP, an amount of 10% is released to the States based 
upon a system of weighted criteria, listed below:  
b) Adoption of the TSP approach in letter and spirit by ensuring that the entire TSP funds at 
least in equal proportion to the population of tribals in the State, are placed in one Budget 
Head under the administrative control of the Tribal Development Department of the State 
Government for more integrated and focused planning and implementation of projects/ 
schemes; 
c) Thereafter, at least on an average 75% of the approval Tribal Sub-Plan funds are actually 
utilized/ released to the implementing agencies in the previous three financial years through 
the budget head of the Tribal Development Department of the State; and d) Funds awarded, 
as incentives to the State, should be utilized only for employment and income  generating 
activities benefiting the tribals.• 90% of the total allocation under SCA is further allocated 
amongst the States on the basis of the share of the programmes under the broad strategy of 
the Tribal Sub Plan, namely, Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDPs), Modified Area 
Development Approach Pockets (MADA), Clusters and Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs) and 
is calculated in proportion to the Scheduled Tribe Population under each programme. 
Scheme for Assistance to State Tribal Development and Finance Corporations(STFDCs) 
This is a Centrally Sponsored scheme.STFDCs are functioning in States and UTs having 
sizeable Scheduled Tribes population. They are playing an extremely useful role in 
mobilization of finances for economic development of the Scheduled Tribes. They act as 
promoters and catalysts for generating credit from financial institutions, providing missing 
inputs by way of margin money loans and subsidy to the target group. STFDCs motivate ST 
families to undertake suitable economic development schemes. 
Objectives:  
1) Identification of eligible ST families and motivating them to undertake economic 
development schemes.  
2) Sponsoring those schemes to financial institutions for credit support. 
3) Providing financial assistance in form of margin money on low rate of interest and subsidy 
in order to reduce their repayment liability, and 
4) Providing necessary link/ tie up with other poverty alleviation programme. 
A person belonging to Scheduled Tribes living below the poverty line is eligible for 
assistance under this scheme from the State Scheduled Tribes Development 
Corporation.  Under the scheme, State Government/ UT Administration has to provide 51% 
share for the corporation – balance 49% is to be provided by the Ministry as a Central 
Government’s share. 
Development of Forest Village 
After the enactment of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 State Governments faced problems in 
taking up non-forestry developmental activities relating to infrastructure for improving socio-
economic conditions of people living in the villages located in the forest areas.  Consequent 
to the intervention of this Ministry, steps like stopping of illegal eviction of genuine tribal 
people living in the forests, allowing diversion of forest lands for providing the basic and 
essential developmental facilities to the tribal/forest villages etc have been achieved. 
This programme was launched during the 10th Plan as a one time measure with 
for  Integrated development of 2690 forest villages originally identified with about 2.5 lakh 
tribal families with a view to:    
I. to raise the Human Development Index (HDI) of the inhabitants of the Forest Villages  
II. Provide basic facilities and services like food, safe drinking water, health care, primary 
education, approach roads, other infrastructural facilities etc. 
Activities  
        Under the programme, infrastructure work relating to basic services and facilities viz. 
approach roads, healthcare, primary education, minor irrigation, rainwater harvesting, 
drinking water, sanitation, community halls, etc. and activities related to livelihood are taken 
up for implementation. 
Process of approval : The project proposals received from the States for the activities to be 
undertaken in the villages are scrutinized by the Ministry of Environment & Forests and put 
up for the consideration of the Project Appraisal Committee constituted for the purpose. Joint 
Secretary in the MTA acts as the chairperson of the Committee in the normal course.  As per 
recommendation of Project Appraisal Committee, the proposals are approved and funds 
released after getting the financial concurrence. 
Implementing Agency:  
Forest Development Agency (FDA) - forest division level, Joint Forest Management 
Committees (JFMCs) - village level, composed of all willing adult members of the village  
Funding pattern  
The funding is done under the programme of ‘Special Central Assistance to the Tribal Sub-
plan Fund flows from Ministry of Tribal Affairs to Department of Tribal Welfare/ Tribal 
Development of the States and then to the implementing agencies.  
Since forest villages are most backward and are located in forest   areas, they have not got 
benefits of development over the years.  To enable these settlements/forest villages to get the 
fruits of development, to begin with 100% financial assistance is provided under this special 
Programme.  As a first step, funding of proposals for each forest village has been generally 
given for Rs.15 lakh each.  Additional funding of Rs 15 lakh per village has been initiated in 
the second phase during 2006-07. 
Impact: Teams comprising of Director/ Dy. Secretary/ Under Secretary level officers of the 
Ministry had been deputed to various States during 2006-07 to get a first hand information on 
the progress of the activities undertaken in the forest villages for which funds were released 
by the Ministry. The reports received from the teams has been very encouraging and based on 
the same and other factors, extension of the programme by another at least two years has 
been done so that sufficient developmental activities take place in these villages, which are 
comparatively backward. 
 
 
 
(iv) REVENUE ORDER NO. I. 
With reference to Order dated the 2nd January 1897, it is hereby again notified to all  
Kazis, Thikadars and Mandals in Sikkim that no Bhutias and Lepchas are to be  
allowed-to sell, mortgage Or sub-let any of their land to any person “other than a Bhutia  
or a Lepcha without the express sanction of the Durbar or officers empowered by the,  
Darbar in their behalf whose order will be obtained by the landlord concerned. If any one  
disobeys he will be severely punished.  
 In this order the term ‘mortgage’ means mortgaging the whole or part of holding 
the Biyaz or masikata system and the term sub-let means sub-letting the whole or part of  
holding on the Pakhuria system.  
DEFINITION 
(1) ‘Biyaz’ mean mortgaging land to another person who enjoys the produce of  
the land as interest, so long at the principal loan remains unpaid.  
(2) ‘Masikata’ means mortgaging of fields to a creditor who enjoys the produce of the  
field as an annual installment towards the loan. ‘  
(3) ‘Pakhuria’ means sub-letting, where a rayot allows another new rayot to settle upon  
a portion of his own holding, generally receiving from him some rent in cash and  
some assistance in cultivating his own fields  
Gangtok,  
The 17thMay, 1917.  
C. A. Bell,  
 Superintendent,  
Sikkim St 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Acharya, Ram.C. 2012. “State Restructuring: Inserting Economic Agenda.” Available at: 
NepalNews.com,http://www.nepalnews.com/home/index.php/guest-column/18315-state-
restructuring-inserting-economic-agenda.html. 
Adhikari, Biraj. 2012. Sikkim: The Wounds of History. Siliguri: Biraj Adhikari. 
Adhikari, Damodar. 2007. “Reengineering of Local Governance in the Post-Conflict Situation in 
Nepal.” Contribution to Nepalese Studies 34 (2): 139–163. 
Aiyar, Shankkar. 2003. “India’ Socio-Economic Faultline- a Review.” In District-Level 
Deprivation in the New Millenium, edited by Bibek Debroy and Laveesh Bhandari. New 
Delhi: Konark Publisher. 
Amatya, Saphalya. 2004. Rana Rule in Nepal. New Delhi: Nirala Publications. 
Aneesh, A. 2010. “Bloody Language: Clashes and Construction of Linguistic Nationalism in 
India.” Sociological Forum 25 (1): 86–109. 
Arora, Vibha. 2006a. “Roots and Route of Secularism in Sikkim.” Economic and Political Weekly 
41 (38): 4063–4071. 
———. 2006b. “The Forest of Symbols Embodied in the Tholung Sacred Landscape of North 
Sikkim, India.” Conservation and Society 4 (1): 55–83. 
Arora, Vibha. 2007. “Unheard Voices of Protest in Sikkim.” Economic and Political Weekly 42 
(34): 3451–3454. 
 
Bagahi, S.B, and A.K Danda. 1982. “NE-BU-LA: A Movement for Regional Solidarity.” In Tribal 
Movements in India, edited by Suresh K Singh, 1:339–348. New Delhi: Manohar. 
Bajpai, Rochana. 2000. “Constituent Assembly Debates and Minority Rights.” Economic and 
Political Weekly 35 (21/22): 1837–1845. 
Balikci, Anna. 2008. Lamas, Shamans and Ancestors: Village Religion in Sikkim. Leiden: Brill. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Pranab Bardhan, Kaushik Basu, and Mrinal Chaudahri Dutta. 2002. “Strategy 
for Economic Reform in West Bengal.” Economic and Political Weekly 37 (41): 4203–4218. 
Banerji, Sumanta. 1986. “Gorkhaland Agitation-Cynical Politicking.” Economic and Political 
Weekly 21 (40): 1770–1721. 
Bangdel, Lainsingh. 1947. Muluk Bahira. Kathamandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 
Baral, Bhawani, and Kamal Tigela. 2008. Limbuanko Rajniti: Itihas, Bartaman Ra Bhavishya. 
Dharan: Book Club Prakashan. 
Baral, Lok Raj. 1995. “The 1994 Nepal Elections: Emerging Trends in Party Politics.” Asian 
Survey 35 (5): 426–440. 
Barth, Fredrik, ed. 1969. Ethnic Groups and  Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural 
Difference. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Baruah, Sanjib. 2007. “Postfrontier Blues: Towards a New Policy Framework for Northeast India”. 
East-West Center. 
Bates, Robert. 2006. “Ethnicity.” In The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, edited by 
David Alexander Clark, 167–173. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Baud, Michael, and Rosanne Rutters. 2005. Popular Intellectuals and Social Movements: Framing 
Protest in Asia, Africa and Latin America. International Review of Social History 
Supplements 12. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Benedikter, Thomas. 2009. “Gorkhaland: Autonomy Is No Longer the Issue.” Solving Ethnic 
Conflict Through Self Government: A Short Guide to Autonomy in South Asia and Europe. 
http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/institutes/imr/Documents/Deliverable_No_9_Update_Set_
educational_material.pdf. 
Benson, Rodney, and Erik Neveu. 2005. “Field Theory as a Work in Progress.” In Bourdieu and 
the Journalistic Field, edited by Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu, 1–27. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Bentley, Jenny. 2007. “Change and Cultural Revival in a Mountain Community of Sikkim.” 
Bulletin of Tibetology 43 (1-2): 59–79. 
Besky, Sarah. 2008. “Can a Plantation Be Fair? Paradoxes and Possibilities in Fair Trade 
Darjeeling Tea Certification.” Anthropology of Work Review 29 (1): 1–9. 
Bhattachan, K. B. 1995. “Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment: An Emerging Pluralism in Nepal.” 
In State Leadership and Politics in Nepal, edited by D Kumar, 124–147. Kathmandu: Centre 
for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS). 
Bhattachan, Krishna. 2008. Minorities and Indigenous Peoples of Nepal. Kathmandu: National 
Coalition Against Racial Discrimination. 
Bhattarai, Govinda Raj. 1988. Muglan. 3rd ed. Dhankuta: Rajeshvar Prakashan. 
Bhowmik, Sharit Kumar. 1980. “The Plantation as a Social System.” Economic and Poltical 
Weekly 15 (36): 1524–1527. 
———. 1996. “Tea Plantation Workers in West Bengal.” In Tea Plantation Labour in India, 
edited by Sharit Kumar Bhowmik, Virginius Xaxa, and M.A Kalam, 43–80. New Delhi: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Bijoy, C.R, Shankar Gopalakrishnan, and Shomona Khanna. 2010. India and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples; Constituional, Legislative and Administrative Provisions Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in India and Their Relation to International Law on 
Indigenous People. Thailand: Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact. 
Bomjan, D.S. 2008. Darjeeling-Dooars People and Place under Bengal’s Neo-Colonial Rule. 
Darjeeling: Bikash Jana Sahitya Kensra. 
Booth, Chelsea L. 2011. “These People Deprived of This Country: Language and the Politics of 
Belonging among Indians of Nepali Descent”. New Jersey: Rutger University. 
Bottomore, Tom. 1966. Elites and Society. 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. 1994. “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa.” World Politics 46 (4): 453–489. 
Brown, David. 1994. State and Ethnic Politics in South-East Asia. Politics in Asia Series. London: 
Routledge. 
Brown, T.Louise. 1996. The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal: A Political History. London: 
Routledge. 
Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. “Beyond ‘Identity.” Theory and Society (29): 1–
47. 
Bryman, Alan. 2004. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burghart, Richard. 1984. “The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in Nepal.” Journal of 
Asian Studies 44 (11): 101–125. 
Burghart, Richard. 1996. Conditions of Listening: Essays on Religion, History, and Politics in 
South Asia. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Caddell, Martha. 2007. “Education and Change: A Historical Perspective on Schooling, 
Dewvelopment and the Nepali NAtion-State.” In Education and Social Change in South Asia, 
edited by Kumar Krishna and Joachim Oesterheld, 251–284. New Delhi: Orient Longman. 
Campbell, John R, and Allan Rew, ed. 1999. Identity and Affect. London: Pluto Press. 
Caplan, Lionel. 1970. Land and Social Change in East Nepal. London: Routledge. 
———. 1975. Administration and Politics in a Nepalese Town: The Study of a District and Its 
Environs. London: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1991. “‘Bravest of the Brave’: Representations of ‘The Gurkha’ in British Military 
Writings.” Modern Asian Studies 25 (3): 571–97. 
Carter, Bob, and Steve Fenton. 2009. “Not Thinking Ethnicity: A Critique of the Ethnicity 
Paradigm in an Over-Ethnicised Sociology.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 40 
(1): 1–18. 
Cerulo, Karen A. 1997. “Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 23: 385–409. 
Chakaravarthi, K.R. 1994. “Government and Politics in Sikkim.” In Sikkim: Society, Polity, 
Economy, Environment, edited by Mahendra Lama, 92–113. New Delhi: Indus Publishing 
Company. 
Chakrabarti, Anjan. 2010. “A Critical Review of Agrarian Reforms in Sikkim.” Economic and 
Political Weekly XLV (5): 23–26. 
———. 2012. “From Share Tenancy to Agrarian Reform: Sikkim in Perspective.” In Politics, 
Society and Development: Insights from Sikkim, edited by Mohammad Yasin and Durga 
Chhetri, 87–99. New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications. 
Chakraborty, C. 2008. “The Gorkhaland Movement: An Enquiry into the Social Background of 
the Crisis: Contested Cultural Identity.” In Ethnicity, Movement and Social Structure, edited 
by R Bhadra and M Bhadra, 287–308. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. 
Chakraborty, Jyotirmoy. 2000. “Elections and Casteist Politics.” Economic and Political Weekly 
35 (43/44): 3805–3807. 
Chalmers, Rhoderick. 2003a. “The Quest for Ekrupata:Unity, Uniformity and the Dileanation of 
the Nepali Community in Darjeeling.” In The Nepalis in North-East India: A Community in 
Search of Indian Identity, edited by A. C Sinha and T.B Subba, 339–359. New Delhi: Indus 
Publishing House. 
———. 2003b. “We Nepalis’ Language, Literature and the Formation of a Nepali Public Sphere 
in India 1914-1940”. Ph.D Thesis, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London. 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2000. “The Transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The Decline of the 
Congress and the Rise of Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur.” The Journal of Asian Studies 
59 (1): 26–61. 
———. 2004. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2005. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.” Perspectives on Politics 3 (2): 235–252. 
Chatterjee, Pia. 2001. A Time for Tea: Women, Labor, and Post/Colonial Politics on an Indian 
Plantation. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Chattopadhyay, Paulami. 2008. “Gorkhaland Movement- An Anthropo-Historical Perspective.” In 
The Unrest Axle, edited by Gautam Kumar Bera, 183–210. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. 
Chemjong, Iman Singh. 1948. Kirat Itihas. Kahmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 
———. 2003. History and Culture of Kirat People. 4th ed. Kathmandu: Kirat Yakthung 
Chumlung. 
Chettri, Lil Bahadur. 1989. Basai. 15th ed. Kathamandu: Sajha Prakashan. 
Chettri, Uday. 1999. Nepali Sahityako Vikasma Sikkimka Sanghsanstha Haru Ko Yogdan. 
Gangtok: Sikkim Sahitya Parishad. 
Chhetri, H.P. 2008. Panchayati Raj System and Development Planning: The Case of Sikkim. 
Jaipur: Rawat Publications. 
Cohen, Anthony P. 1993. “Culture as Identity: An Anthropologist’s View.” New Literary History 
24 (1): 195=209. 
Comaroff, John L, and Jean Comaroff. 2009. Ethnicity, Inc. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cowan, Jane.K, Marie-Benedicte Dembour, and Richard Wilson. 2001. “Introduction.” In Culture 
and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, 1–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dafflon, Bernard. 2009. “Strengthening Gram Panchayat: Planning and Budgeting in Sikkim.” 
Village Development Action Plan for Sikkim. Indo-Swiss Mission to Sikkim. 
Dangal, Rameshwor. 2005. “Administrative Culture in Nepal: Does It Reflect the Dominant 
Socio-Cultural Values of Nepal”. Norway: University of Bergen. Available at: 
http://www.ub.uib.no/elpub/2005/h/701002/Masteroppgave.pdf. 
Das, B. 1983. The Sikkim Saga. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 
Dasgupta, Atis. 1999. “Ethnic Problems and Movements for Autonomy in Darjeeling.” Social 
Scientist 27 (11/12): 47–68. 
Dash, Arthur Jules. 1947. Bengal District Gazetteer. Alipore: Bengal Government Press. 
Datta, Tarit Kumar. 2010. “Advantages, Constraints and Key Success Factors in Establishing 
Origin and Tradition-Linked Quality Signs: The Case of Darjeeling Tea, India”. Indian 
Institute of Management, Kolkata: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. 
Available at: http://www.foodquality-origin.org/documents/DarjeelingTea.pdf. 
Datta-Ray, Sunanda.K. 1984. Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim. New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House 
De Sales, Anne. 2000. “The Kham Magar Country, Nepal: Between Ethnic Claims and Maoism.” 
European Bulletin of Himalayan Research (19): 41–71. 
Debroy, Bibek, and Laveesh Bhandari. 2003. District-Level Deprivation in the New Millenium. 
New Delhi: Konark Publishers. 
Dekens, Julie. 2005. “Livelihood Change and Resilience Building: A Village Study from the 
Darjeeling Hills, Eastern Himalaya, India.” M.A. Thesis, Canada: University of Manitoba. 
http://www.umanitoba.ca/institutes/natural_resources/canadaresearchchair/thesis/jdekens%20
masters%20thesis%202005.pdf. 
Dhakal, Rajendra. 2009. “The Urge to Belong: An Identity in Waiting.” In Indian Nepalis: Issues 
and Perspectives, edited by Tanka Bahadur Subba, A.C Sinha, G.S Nepal, and D.R Nepal, 
148–167. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. 
Dixit, Kanak Mani. 1997. “Bahadur = Kancha = Gorkha.” Himal Magazine. 
Dorjee, Pema Wangchuk. 2012. “Some Issues in the Early British Construction of Sikkimese 
History.” In Buddhist Himalaya: Studies in Religion, History and Culture, edited by Anna 
Balikci-Denjongpa and Alex McKay, 63–72. Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Tibetotology. 
Dutta, S. 1998. “Identities and the Indian State: An Overview.” Third World Quarterly 19 (3): 
411–434. 
Edingo, Dilli Bikram. 2007. “A Pragmatic Glimpse at Limbu Mundhum.” Contributions to 
Nepalese Studies 34 (2): 165–182. 
Eisinger, Peter. K. 1973. “Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities.” The American 
Political Science Review 67 (1): 11–28. 
Elster, Jon. 1989. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
English, Richard. 1982. “Gorkhali and Kiranti: Political Economy in the Eastern Hills of Nepal”. 
Ann Arbor: New School of Social Research. 
Enloe, Cynthia H. 1980. Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided States. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 1991. “Ethnicity versus Nationalism.” Journal of Peace Research 28 
(3): 263–278. 
Evans, Peter B. 1992. “The State as Problem and Solution.” In The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment, edited by Stephen Haggard and Robert R Kauffman, 139–181. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Farwell, Byron. 1984. The Gurkhas. London: Penguin Books. 
Fearon, James D. 1999. “Why Ethnic Politics and ‘Pork’ Tend to Go Together.” presented at the 
Ethnic Politics and Democratic Stability Conference, Chicago. 
        Available at: http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/Pork.pdf 
Fenton, Steve, and Stephen May. 1-20. “Ethnicity, Nation and ‘Race’: Connections and 
Disjunctures.” In Ethnonational Identities, edited by Steve Fenton and Stephen May. 
Houndmill: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political 
Science (4): 391–416. 
Fisher, F.J. 2001. Fluid Boundaries: Forming and Transforming Indentity in Nepal. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Fisher, W.F. 2009. “Nationalism and the Janajati.” Himal South Asian. 
http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/4228-nationalism-and-the-janajati.html. 
Fitzpatrick, Ian Carlos. 2011. Cardamom and Class: A Limbu Village and Its Extensions in East 
Nepal. Cinnabaries Series of Oriental Studies IV. Kathmandu: Vajra Publications. 
Fonning, A.R. 1987. Lepcha, My Vanishing Tribe. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. 
Forbes, Ann Armbrecht. 1999. “Mapping Power: Disputing Claims to Kipat Lands in Northeastern 
Nepal.” Amercian Ethnologist 26 (1): 114–138. 
Fujikura, Tatsuro. 2003. “The Role of Collective Imagination in the Maoist Conflict in Nepal.” 
Himalaya 23 (1): 21–30. 
Fumagalli, Matteo. 2007. “Framing Ethnic Minority Mobilisation in Central Asia: The Case of 
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.” Europe-Asia Studies 59 (4): 567–590. 
Gaenszle, Martin. 2002. “Contesting the ‘Great’ Traditios: Remakings of the Kiranti Past.” In A 
Place in the World: New Local Historiogrpahies from Africa and South Asia, edited by Axel 
Harneit-Sievers, 331–346. Leiden: Brill. 
Gaige, Frederick. 1975. Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Ganguly, Rajat. 2005. “Poverty, Malgovernance and Ethnopolitcal Mobilization: Gorkha 
Nationalism and the Gorkha Agitation in India.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11 (Winter): 
467–502. 
Ganguly-Scarse, Scarse. 1999. “A Bitter Pill or Sweet Nectar? Contradictory Attitudes of Salaried 
Workers to Economic Liberalization in India.” Development and Society 28 (2): 259–283. 
Gellner, David. 2007. “From Group Rights to Individual Rights and Back-Nepalese Struggle 
overCulture and Equality.” In Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, edited by 
Jane.K Cowan, Marie-Benedict Dembour, and Richard Wilson, 177–201. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gerth, H.H, and C.W Mills, ed. 1948. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxon: Routledge. 
Giuliano, Elise. 2000. “Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self-Determination? Identity 
and Preference Formation in Tatarstan’s Nationalist Mobilization.” Comparative Politics 32 
(3): 295–316. 
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P Moynihan. 1975. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Goffman, Irving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Golay, Bidhan. 2006. “Rethinking Gorkha Identity: Outside the Imperium of Discourse, 
Hegemony and History.” Peace and Democracy in South Asia 2 (1/2): 23–49. 
Gray, David E. 2004. Doing Research in the Real World. 1st ed. London: Sage. 
Griffiths, Percival. 1967. The History of the Indian Tea Industry. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. 
Guha Roy, Samir. 2003. “Demographic Patterns and Migration in West Bengal”. Background 
Reports and Studies Commissioned by the WBHDR. West Bengal Human Development 
Report. 
Guibernau, Monsterrat, and John Rex, ed. 1997. The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, 
Multiculturalism and Migration. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Guneratne, Arjun. 2002. Many Tongues, One People: The Making of Tharu Identity in Nepal. 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Gupta, Akhil. 2006. “Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics and 
the Imagined State.” In The Anthropology of the State, edited by Aradhna Sharma and Akhil 
Gupta, 211–242. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Gupta, Ranajit Das. 1986. “From Peasants and Tribesmen to Plantation Workers: Colonial 
Capitalism, Reproduction Labour Power and Proletarianisation in North East India, 1850s to 
1947.” Economic and Political Weekly 22 (4): 2–10. 
———. 1992. “Plantation Labour in Colonial India.” In Plantations, Proletarians and Peasants in 
Colonial Asia, edited by Valentine E Daniel, Henry Bernstein, and Tom Brass, Plantations, 
Proletarians and Peasants in Colonial Asia. London: Frank Cass. 
Gupta, Ranjan. 1975. “Sikkim: The Merger with India.” Asian Survey 15 (9): 786–798. 
Gurung, Harka. 1997. “State and Society in Nepal.” In Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu 
Kingdom, edited by David Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton. Amsterdam: 
Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Gurung, Harka, Yogendra Gurung, and Chabil Lal Chidi. 2006. Nepal Atlas of Ethnic and Caste 
Groups. Kathmandu: National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities. 
Gurung, Sushil. 2010. Sikkim: Ethnicity and Political Dynamics, A Triadic Perspective. New 
Delhi: Kunal Books. 
Hacchethu, Krishna. 2003. “Democracy and Nationalism-Interface between State and Ethnicity in 
Nepal.” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 30 (2): 217–252. 
———. 2008. “The Second Transformation of Nepali Political Parties.” In Nepal: New Frontiers 
of Restructuring of State, edited by Lok Raj Baral, 125–143. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
———. 2009. State Building in Nepal: Creating a Functional State. Kathmandu: Enabling State 
Programme. 
Hacking, Ian. 2006. “Making Up People.” London Review of Books 28 (16): 23–26. 
Hangen, Susan. 2007. “Creating a ‘New Nepal’: The Ethnic Dimension”. East-West Center, 
Washington D.C. 
        Available at:  http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/creating-%E2%80%9Cnew-
nepal%E2%80%9D-ethnic-dimension. 
———. 2010. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal. Special Nepal Edition. Oxon: Routledge. 
Hannerz, Ulf. 1969. Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Harvey, Frank P. 2000. “Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: 
Opportunities and Constraints for Theory and Policy.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 
32 (1): 37–65. 
Hettne, Bjorn. 1993. “Ethnicity and Development- An Elusive Relationship.” Contemporary South 
Asia 2 (2): 123–149. 
Hiltz, Jackie. 2003. “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s.” Bulletin 
of Tibetology 39: 67–83. 
———. 2011. “I May Be Branded as Communal but Look at Things from My Angle’: Palden 
Thondup Namgyal and the Preservation of the Bhutia-Lepcha Ethos in the Buddhist Kingdom 
of Sikkim.” In Buddhist Himalaya: Studies in Religion, History and Culture, Proceedings of 
the Golden Jubilee Conference of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, edited by Anna 
Balicki-Denjongpa and Alex McKay, 113–126. Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Technology. 
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Horowitz, Donald L. 2009. “Cultural Movements and Ethnic Change.” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Social and Political Science 433 (1): 6–18. 
Hussain, Imdad. 2003. “Soldiers and Settlers: The Recruitment of the Gorkhas.” In The Nepalis in 
Northeast India, edited by A. C. Sinha and T.B. Subba, 124–147. New Delhi: Indus 
Publishing Company. 
Hutt, Michael. 1988. Nepali, a National Language and Its Literature. New Delhi and London: 
Sterling Publishers. 
———. 1991. Himalayan Voices: An Introduction to Modern Nepali Literature. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
———. 1997a. “Being Nepali without Nepal: Reflections on a South Asian Diaspora.” In 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom, edited by David Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-
Czarnecka, and John Whelpton, 101–144. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
———. 1997b. Modern Literary Nepali: An Introductory Reader. New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 1998. “Going to Mugalan: Nepali Literary Representations of Migration to India and 
Bhutan.” South Asia Research 18 (2): 195–214. 
———. 2003. Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and the Flight of Refugees from 
Bhutan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. , ed. 2004. Himalayan “People’s War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion. Bloomington: Indian 
University Press. 
———. 2005. “The Bhutanese Refugees: Between Verification, Repatriation and Royal 
Realpolitik.” Peace and Democracy in South Asia 1 (1): 44–56. 
Isaacs, Harold R. 1975. “Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe.” In Ethnicity: Theory and 
Experiences, edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P Moynihan, 29–52. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
J, Nagel, and Olzak S. 1982. “Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the 
Competition Model.” Social Problems 30 (2): 127–143. 
Jamil, Ishtiaq, and Rameshwor Dangal. 2009. “The State of Bureaucratic Representativeness and 
Administrative Culture in Nepal.” Contemporary South Asia 17 (2): 193–211. 
Janmal, H. 2009. “Water Woes.” Talk Sikkim. 
Jenkins, Richard. 1997. Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations. 1st ed. London: Sage. 
Jessop, Bob. 2007. State Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Joireman, Sandra F. 2003. Nationalism and Political Identity. London: Continuum. 
Jones, Rex L. 1976. “Sanskritization in Eastern Nepal.” Ethnology 15 (1): 63–75. 
Joseph, Mathew C. 1999. Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan. New Delhi: Nirala Publications. 
Joshi, Bhuvan Lal, and Leo E Rose. 1966. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of 
Political Acculturation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Junn, Jane. 2006. “When Does Ethnicity Have Political Consequences?” In Transforming Politics, 
Transforming America: The Political and Civic Incorporation of Immigrants in the United 
States, edited by Taeku Lee, S.Karthick Ramakrishnana, and Ricardo Ramirez, 33–48. 
Charlottsberg: University of Virginia Press. 
Kaboolian, Linda. 1998. “The New Public Management: Challenging the Boundaries of the 
Management vs. Administration Debate.” Public Administration Review 58 (3): 189–193. 
Kapila, Kirti. 2008. “The Measure of a Tribe: The Cultural Politics of Constitutional 
Reclassification in North India.” Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute 14: 117–134. 
Kazi, Jigme N. 2009. Sikkim for Sikkimese: Distinct Identity within the Union. Gangtok: Hill 
Media Publications. 
Kharel, M.P, and Lovendra Basnet. 2008. The Khasas of Sikkim. Gangtok: Akhil Sikkim Chhettri 
Bahun Kalyan Sangh. 
Khawas,Vimal. 2006. “Socio-Economic Conditions of Resident Tea Garden Labourers in 
Darjeeling Hills-a Pilot Study”. Council for Social Development. 
———. 2007. “Status of Tea Garden Labourers in Eastern Himalaya: A Case of Darjeeling Tea 
Industry”. Mountain Forum India. http://www.mtnforum.org/sites/default/files/pub/749.pdf. 
———. 2010. “Reflection on Climate Change Leaders from the Himalayas: Livelihoods and 
Peoples Perceptions”. New Delhi: Leadership for Environment and Development-India. 
http://www.leadindia.org/beta/gallery/Livelihoods_Peoples_Perception.pdf. 
———. 2012. “Agriculture in the Sikkim Himalayas: A Geographical Note.” In Politics, Society 
and Development: Insights from Sikkim, edited by Mohammad Yasin and Durga Chhetri, 
187–202. New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications. 
Kingsbury, Benedict. 1998. “‘Indigenous Peoples’ in International Law:  A Constructivist 
Approach to the Asian Controversy.” The American Journal of International Law 92 (3): 
414–457. 
Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protests: Anti-Nuclear 
Movement in Four Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 16 (1): 57–85. 
Kohli, Atul. 1997. “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of 
Self-Determination Movements in India.” The Journal of Asian Studies 56 (2): 325–344. 
Kollmair, Michael, Siddhi Manandhar, Bhim Subedi, and Susan Thieme. 2006. “New Figures for 
Old Stories: Migration and Remittances in Nepal.” Migration Letters 3 (2): 151–160. 
Kriesie, Hanspeter. 2004. “Political Context and Opportunity.” In The Blackwell Companion to 
Social Movements, 67–90. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Kumar, D. 2008. “Obstacle to Local Leadership and Democracy in Nepal.” In Local Democracy in 
South Asia: Microprocesses Iof Democratization in Nepal and Its Neighbours, edited by 
David Gellner and K Hachhethu, 25–44. Los Angeles: Sage. 
———. 2010. Electoral Violence and Volatility in Nepal. Kathmandu: Vajra. 
Kymlicka, Will. 2007. “The Internationalization of Minority Rights.” International Journal of 
Constituional Law 6 (1): 1–32. 
Lacina, Bethany. 2009. “The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India: Local Ethnic 
Autocracy and the Rule of Law.” Asian Survey 49 (6) (November/December): 998–1020. 
Lama, Basant. 2008. The Story of Darjeeling: The Land of the Indian Gorkha. Kurseong: Nilima 
Yonzone Lama Publications. 
Lama, Mahendra P. 2001. “Sikkim Human Development Report”. New Delhi: Government of 
Sikkim. http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_pdf/shdr_sikkim01.pdf. 
———. 2002. “Rethinking Existing Paradigms:Public Intellectuals in Action.” Asia Leadership 
Fellow Program 2001. International House of Japan and Japan Foundation Asia Center. 
Lama, Mahendra.P, ed. 1994. Sikkim: Society, Polity, Economy, Environment. New Delhi: Indus 
Publishing Company. 
Laswell, H.D. 1927. “The Theory of Political Propoganda.” American Political Science Review 21 
(3): 627–631. 
Lawoti, Mahendra. Forthcoming. “Dynamics of Mobilization: Varied Trajectories of Dalit, 
Indigneous Nationalities and Madhesi Movements.” In Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in 
Nepal, edited by Mahendra Lawoti and Susan Hangen, 413–445. London: Routledge. 
———. , ed. 2007. Contentious Politics and Democratization in Nepal. New Delhi: Sage. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, M. 2004. “Ethnic Demands within Maoism: Questions of Magar Territorial 
Autonomy, Nationality and Class.” In The Himalayan People’s War, edited by Michael Hutt, 
112–135. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, M, and Pascale Dollfus, ed. 2003. Ethnic Revival and Religious Turmoil: 
Identities and Representations in the Himalayas. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Leftwich, Adrian. 1995. “Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State.” 
Journal of Development Studies 31 (3): 400–427. 
Lelyveld, David.1993. “Colonial Knowledge and the Fate of Hindustani.” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 35 (4): 665. 
Lemarchand, Rene, and Keith Legg. 1972. “Political Clientalism and Development: A Preliminary 
Analysis.” Comparative Politics 4 (2): 149–178. 
Ling, Trevor. 1985. “Max Weber and the Relation of Religious to Social Change: Some 
Considerations from Nepal and Sikkim.” In Max Weber in Asian Studies, edited by Andreas 
Buss, 115–128. Leiden: Brill. 
Little, Kerry. 2008. “Lepcha Narratives Of Thier Threathened Sacred Landscapes.” Transforming 
Cultures eJournal 3 (1): 227–255. 
Lohani, Mohan. P. 1973. The Monarchy in Nepal: An Indispensible Political Institution. 
Kathmandu: Ministry of Communications: Government of Nepal. 
Madsen, Stig Toft, Kenneth Bo Nielsen, and Uwe Skoda. 2011. Trysts with Democracy: Political 
Practice in South Asia. London: Anthem Press. 
Malagodi, Mara. 2007. “The Rejection of the Minority Approach in the 1990 Constituion Making 
Expereince” presented at the Constitutionalism and Diversity in Nepal, Kathmandu. 
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/midea/pdf/Mara.pdf. 
Malesevic, Sinisa. 2002. “Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Ethnic Relations: A 
Critique.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25 (2): 193–212. 
Mann, Michael. 2003. “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results.” 
In State/Space: A Reader, edited by Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon 
Macleod, 53–64. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
McDuie-Ra, Duncan. 2011. “The Dilemmas of pro-Development Actors: Viewing State-ethnic 
Minority Relations and Intra-Ethnic Dynamics through Contentious Development Projects’.” 
Asian Ethnicity 12 (1): 77–100. 
Metcalf, Barbara D, and Thomas R Metcalf. 2006. A Concise History of Modern India. Second. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Michaels, Axel. 1997. “The King and the Cow.” In Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu 
Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal, edited by David Gellner, Joanna 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton, 79–100. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Michelutti, Lucia. 2004. “‘We (Yadavs) Are a Caste of Politicians’: Caste and Modern Politics in 
a North Indian Town.” Contributions to Indian Sociology 38 (1-2): 43–71. 
Middleton, Townsend. 2011. “Across the Interface of State Ethnography: Rethinking Ethnology 
and Its Subjects in Multicultural India.” American Ethnologist 38 (2): 249–266. 
———. 2013. “States of Difference: Refiguring Ethnicity and Its ‘crisis’ at India’s Borders.” 
Political Geography 35: 14–24. 
Migdal, Joel. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Constitute and Transform 
Each Other. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mishra, Chaitanya. 2007. Essays on the Sociology of Nepal. Kathmandu: FinePrint Books. 
Mitra, Manojit. 1986. “A Poet Is Disowned.” The Independent.  
Mitra, Subrata K. 1991. “Room to Maneuver in the Middle: Local Elites, Political Action and the 
State in India.” World Politics 43 (3): 390–413. 
———. 1992. Power, Protest and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in 
India. London: Routledge. 
———. 1995. “The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Sub-National Movements of South 
Asia in a Comparative Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science 25 (1): 57–77. 
Moktan, R. 2004. Sikkim-Darjeeling Compendium of Documents. Darjeeling: R.Moktan. 
Moore, Mick. 2004. “Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing 
Countries.” International Political Science Review 25 (3): 297–319. 
Mosse, David. 1999. “Responding to Subordination: Identity and Change among South Indian 
Untouchables Castes.” In Identity and Affect: Experiences of Identity in a Globalizing World, 
edited by John R Campbell and Allan Rew, 64–104. London: Pluto Press. 
Mukhim, Patricia. 2011. “Northeast Echoes.” The Telegraph, October 17. 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1111017/jsp/northeast/story_14623761.jsp. 
Mullard, Saul. 2011. Opening the Hidden Land: State Formation and the Construction of 
Sikkimese History. Leiden: Brill. 
Nagel, Joan. 1995. “American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity.” 
American Sociological Review 60 (6): 947–965. 
Nagel, Joan and Olzak S. 1982. “Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the 
Competition Model.” Social Problems 30 (2): 127–143. 
 
Nair, A. 1985. “Ethnicity, Identity and Integration.” In Multi-Ethnicity and National Integration, 
edited by A Pant and S.K Gupta, 100–115. Allahabad: Vohra Publishers and Distributors. 
Nakane, Chie. 1966. “A Plural Society in Sikkim: A Study of the Interrelations of Lepchas, 
Bhotias and Nepalis.” In Caste and Kin in Nepal, India and Ceylon: Anthropological Studies 
in Hindu-Buddhist Contact Zones., edited by Christopher Von Furer-Haimendorf, 213–263. 
Bombay: Asia Publishing House. 
Nath, Lopita. 2005. “Migrants in Flight: Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement of Nepalis in 
Northeast India.” Peace and Democracy in South Asia 1 (1): 56–72. 
Nedelmann, Birgitta. 1987. “Individuals and Parties: Changes in the Process of Political 
Mobilization.” European Sociological Review 3 (3): 181–202. 
Nielsen, Francois. 1985. “Towards a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies.” American 
Sociological Review 50 (2): 133–149. 
O’Maley, L.S.S. 1907. Darjeeling District Gazetteer. 1st ed. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Book 
Depot. 
Onta, P. 1996. “The Politics of Bravery: A History of Nepali Nationalism”. University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Onta, Pratyoush. 2006. “The Growth of the Adivasi Janajati Movement in Nepal after 1990: The 
Non-Political Institutional Agents.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 11 (2): 303–354. 
Orsini, Francesca. 1999. “What Did They Mean by ‘Public’? Language, Literature and the Politics 
of Nationalism.” Economic and Political Weekly 34 (7): 409–416. 
Pandey, Madhav Raj. 1973. “How Jung Bahadur Established  Rana Rule in Nepal.” Contributions 
to Nepalese Studies 1 (1): 50–63. 
Parajuli, Kabita. 2006, January-February. “The Long, Long Lhotshampa Exile.” Himal Magazine. 
http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1631-the-long-long-lhotshampa-
exile.html. 
Parenti, M. 1967. “Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification.” The American 
Political Science Review 61 (3): 717–726. 
Pemble, John. 2009. “Forgetting and Remembering Britain’s Gurkha War.” Asian Affairs 40 (3): 
361–376. 
Pfaff-Czarnecka. 1991. “State and Community:Changing Relations of Production after the 
Unification of Nepal.” In Early State Economies, edited by Henri.J.M Claessen and Pieter 
van de Velde. Vol. 8. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna. 1997. “Vestiges and Visions: Cultural Change in the Process of Nation-
Building in Nepal.” In Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom, edited by David 
Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton, 419–470. Amsterdam: Harwood 
Academic Publishers. 
Phadnis, Urmila. 1980. “Ethnic Dimension of Sikkimese Politics: The 1979 Elections.” Asian 
Survey 20 (12): 1236–1252. 
Phadnis, Urmila, and Rajat Ganguly. 1989. Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia. 1st ed. 
New Delhi: Sage. 
Pieterse, Jan Neverdeen, and Patrick McAllister. 1996. “Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnic 
Discourse.” In The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power, edited by 
Patrick Wilmsen, 25–44. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Pigg, Stacey Leigh. 1993. “Inventing Social Categories Through Place: Social Representations and 
Development in Nepal.” Comparative Studies in History and Society 34 (3): 491–513. 
Poddar, Prem, and Anmole Prasad, ed. 2009. Gorkhas Imagined: Indra Bahadur Rai in 
Translation. Kalimpong: Mukti Prakashan. 
Polletta, Francesca, and James. M Jasper. 2001. “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” 
Annual Review of Sociology 27: 283–305. 
Postone, Moishe, Edward LiPuma, and Craig Calhoun. 1993. “Introduction.” In Bourdieu: Critical 
Perspectives, edited by Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone, 1–13. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Poudyal, Madhab Prasad. 1984. Public Administration and Nation-Building in Nepal. New Delhi: 
NBO Publishers’ Distributors. 
Pradhan, Kumar. 1984. A History of Nepali Literature. Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. 
———. 1991. The Gorkha Conquests: The Process and Consequences of the Unification of Nepal 
with Particular Reference to Eastern Nepal. Calcutta: Oxford University Press. 
Pradhan, Rajendra. 2002. “Ethnicity, Caste and a Pluralist Society.” In State of Nepal, edited by 
Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandran, 1–22. Kathmandu: Himal Books. 
Rai, Indra Bahadur. 1994. “Indian Nepali Nationalism and Nepali Poetry.” Journal of South Asian 
Literature 29 (1): 149–154. 
Rai, Joel. .“Sikkim: Small Wonder.” Times of India. 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sikkim+small+wonder/1/62350.html. 
Rai, Shiva Kumar. 2008. Kirat Khambu Rais of Sikkim and Eastern Himalayas. Gangtok, Sikkim: 
Shivika Enterprise. 
Ram, M. Kodanda. 2007. “Movement for Telangan State: Struggle for Autonomy.” Economic and 
Political Weekly 42 (2): 13–19. 
Reay, Diane. 2004. “‘It’s All Becoming a Habitus’: Beyond the Habitual Use of Habitus in 
Educational Research.” British Journal of Sociology of Education 25 (4): 431–444. 
Reed-Danahay, Deborah. 2005. Locating Bourdieu. Bloomington: Indiana Press University. 
Regmi, M.C. 1984. The State and Economic Surplus: Production, Trade and Resource 
Mobilization in the Early 19th Century. Varanasi: Nath Publishing House. 
“Report on the Evaluation Study on the Hill Area Development Programme in Assam and West 
Bengal.” 2010. New Delhi: Planning Commission. 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/peoreport/peoevalu/rep_hill0709.pdf. 
Riaz, Ali, and Subho Basu. Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Roosens, Eugeen E. 1989. Creating Ethnicity- The Process of Ethnogenesis. Newbury Park: Sage. 
Rose, Leo E. 1971. Nepal: Strategy for Survival. Berkley: University of California Press. 
———. 1978. “Modernizing a Traditional Administrative System: Sikkim 1890-1973.” In 
Himalayan Anthropology: The Indo-Tibetan Interface., edited by F J Fisher, 205–226. Hague: 
Mouton. 
Royce, A.Peterson. 1982. Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Ruane, Joseph, and Jennifer Todd. 2004. “The Roots of Intense Ethnic Conflict May In Fact Not 
Be Ethnic; Categories, Communities and Path Dependence.” European Journal of Sociology 
45 (2): 1–22. 
Rudd, Arid Engelsen. 1999. “Embedded Bengal: The Case for Politics.” Forum for Development 
Studies 2: 235–259. 
Rudolph, Joseph. 2006. Politics and Ethnicity. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sagant, Phillipe. 1996. The Dozing Shaman: The Limbus of Eastern Nepal. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Samanta, Amiya K. 2003. Gorkhaland Movement: A Study in Ethnic Separatism. New Delhi: 
A.P.H Publishing. 
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. “Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A 
Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1).” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (3): 259–282. 
Sarkar, R.L, and Mahendra Lama, ed. 1986. Tea Plantation Workers in the Eastern Himalayas- a 
Study on Wages, Employment and Living Standards. Delhi: Atma Ram and Sons. 
Sarkar, Swatahsiddha. 2008. “Dress, Difference and Dissent in the Darjeeling Hills.” South Asian 
Citizen’s Web. http://www.sacw.net/article442.html. 
Schlemmer, Gregoire. 2003. “New Past for the Sake of a Better Future: Re-Inventing the History 
of the Kiranti in East Nepal.” European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 25/26: 119–144. 
———. 2010. “Rai,Khambu, Subba, Kirat Etc.: Ethnic Labels or Political and Land Tenure 
Categories? Logics of Identification of an Ensemble of Population in Nepal.” In Interethnic 
Dynamics in Asia. Ethnonyms, Considering the Other Though Ethnonyms, Territories and 
Rituals, edited by Christan Culas and Francois Robinne, 42–60. Routledge Contemporary 
Asia Series. London: Routledge. 
Scott, James. 1969. “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change.” American Political 
Science Association 63 (4): 1142–1158. 
Seddon, David, Jagganth Adhikari, and Ganesh Gurung. 2002. “Foreign Labour Migration and the 
Remittance Economy of Nepal.” Critical Asian Studies: 19–40. 
Sengupta, Nirmal. 1988. “Reappraising Tribal Movements II- Legitimisation and Spread.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 23 (20): 1003–1005. 
Shah, Saubhagya. 2002. “From Evil State to Civil Society.” In State of Nepal, edited by Kanak 
Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandran. Lalitpur: Himal Books. 
Sharma, Khemraj. 1997. Socio-Economic Life of Cinchona Plantation Workers in India. 
Dibrugarh: N.L.Publishers. 
Sharma, Kishore. 2006. “The Political Economy of Civil War in Nepal.” World Development 34 
(7): 1237–1253. 
Sharma, Pitamber. 2008. Unraveling the Mosaic: Spatial Aspects of Ethnicity in Nepal. Lalitpur, 
Nepal: Himal Books. 
Sharma, Raj Prayag. 1997. “Nation-Building, Multi-Ethnicity and the HIndu State.” In 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom, edited by David Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-
Czarnecka, and John Whelpton, 471–494. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Shimray, U A. 2004. “Socio-Politcal Unrest in the Region Called North-East India.” Economic 
and Political Weekly 39 (42): 4637–4643. 
Shneiderman, Sara. 2009. “Ethnic (P)reservation: Comparing Thangmi Ethnic Activism in Nepal 
and India.” In Ethnic Activism and Civil Society in South Asia, edited by David Gellner, 115–
141. London: Sage. 
Shneiderman, Sara, and Townsend Middleton. 2008. “Reservations, Federalism and the Politics of 
Recognition in Nepal.” Economic and Political Weekly 43 (19): 39–45. 
Shneiderman, Sara, and Mark Turin. 2006. “Seeking the Tribe: Ethnopolitics in Darjeeling and 
Sikkim.” Himal South Asian. 
Shore, Cris. 2002. “Introduction: Towards an Anthropology of Elites.” In Elite Cultures: 
Anthropological Perspectives, edited by Cris Shore and Stephen Nugent, 1–21. London: 
Routledge. 
Shrestha, Bal Gopal. 2005. “Ritual and Identity in the Diaspora: The Newars of Sikkim.” Bulletin 
of Tibetology 41 (1): 21–54. 
Shrestha, Celayne Heaton, and Ramesh Adhikari. 2011. “NGOization and de-NGOization of 
Public Action in Nepal: The Role of Organizational Culture in Civil Society Politicality.” 
Journal of Civil Society 7 (1): 41–61. 
Shresthova, Sangita. 2010. “Under India’s Big Umbrella? Bollywood Dance in Nepal.” South 
Asian Popular Culture 3 (8): 309–323. 
Sinha, A. C. 2008. “Lhotshampa, Madhesi, Nepamul: The Deprived of Bhutan, Nepal and India.” 
Himal South Asian.   http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1023-lhotshampa-
madhesi-nepamul-   the-deprived-of-bhutan-nepal-and-india.html. 
Sinha, A. C, G.P Singh, S.R Mondal, and T.B Subba. 2005. “Ethnographic Report on Selected 
Communities of Sikkim”. Submitted to the Government of Sikkim. 
Sinha, A. C. 2006. “Search for Kirat Identity: Trends of De-Sanskritization Among the Nepamul 
Sikkimese.” Peace and Democracy in South Asia 2 (1 and 2): 1–22. 
———. 2009. “The Politics of Identity Formation in Sikkim. Dialogue.” Dialouge 10 (4). 
Sinha, A.C. 2007. “The Indians of Nepal Origin and Security of North-East India.” In The Nepalis 
in Northeast India: A Community in Search of an Indian Identity, edited by T.B. Subba and A. 
C. Sinha, 360–377. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company. 
Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Snow, David, E. Burke Rochford, Steven Worden, and Robert Benford. 1986. “Framing 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” American 
Sociological Review 51 (4): 464–481. 
Song, Miri. 2003. Choosing Ethnic Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Spencer, Jonathan. 2007. Anthropology, Politics and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Srinivas, M.N. 1952. Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Stack, John F. 1986. “Ethnic Mobilization in World Politics: The Primordial Perspective.” In The 
Primordial Challenge:Ethnicity in the Contemporary World, edited by John F Stack, 1–12. 
New York: Greenwood Press. 
Stiller, Ludwig. 1976. The Silent Cry- the People of Nepal, 1816-1839. Kathamandu: Sahayogi 
Prakashan. 
Subba, Dilendra, and Sirjana Subba. 2003. “Learning in Our Own Language: Kirat Yakthung 
Chumlung Develop a Limbu Literacy Programme in Nepal.” ASPBAE Indigenous Adult 
Education Case Study Series. Mumbai, India: Asian South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education 
(ASPBAE). 
Subba, J.R. 2011. History, Culture and Customs of Sikkim. Second. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing 
House. 
Subba, T.B. 1999. Politics of Culture: A Study of Three Kirata Communities in the Eastern 
HImalayas. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. 
———. 2002. “Nepal and the Indian Nepalis.” In State of Nepal, edited by Kanak Mani Dixit and 
Shastri Ramachandran, 119–136. Kathamandu: Himal Books. 
———. 2003. “Being a Nepali in North-East India: Predicament of a ‘Privileged Nation.’” In The 
Nepalis in North-East India: A Community in Search of Indian Identity, edited by T.B Subba 
and A.C Sinha. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company. 
Subba, T.B, A.C Sinha, G.S Nepal, and D.R Nepal, ed. 2009a. Indian Nepalis: Issues and 
Perspectives. Concept Publishing Company: New Delhi. 
Subba, T.B. 1989. “Sociological Consequences of Tourism in Darjeeling.” In Impact of Tourism 
on Mountain Environment, edited by S.C Singh, 305–314. Meerut: Research India 
Publications. 
———. 1992. Ethnicity, State and Development: A Case Study of the Gorkhaland Movement in 
Darjeeling. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 
Swartz, David. 1997. Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago. 
Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review 
52 (1): 273–286. 
Tabar, Paul, Greg Noble, and Scott Poynting. 2003. “The Rise and Falter of Ethnic Politics in 
Australia: The Case of Lebanese Community Leadership.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 24 
(3): 267–287. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Thapa, Deepak. 2002. “The Maobadi of Nepal.” In The State of Nepal, edited by Kanak Mani 
Dixit and Shastri Ramachandran, 77–99. Kathmandu: Himal Books. 
“The Post-Colonial State in Asia- Dialectics of Politics and Culture.” 
Theobald, Robin. 1982. “Patrimonialism.” World Politics 34 (4): 548–559. 
Thieme, Susan, Michael Kollmair, and Ulrich Muller-Boker. 2003. “Labour Migration from Far 
West Nepal to Delhi, India.” European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 24 (Spring): 82–89. 
Tilouine-Lecomte, Marie, and David Gellner. 2004. “Regicide and Maoist Revolutionary Warfare 
in Nepal: Modern Incarnations of a Warrior Kingdom.” Anthropology Today 20 (1): 13–19. 
Tirkey, Prem Lal. 2005. “Tea Plantations in Darjeeling District, India: Geo-Ecological and Socio-
Economic Impacts in Post-Independence Period”. Ph.D Thesis, University of Manitoba. 
Tiwari, Bishwa Nath. 2008. “Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict in Nepal.” Himalaya 28 
(1-2): 33–48. 
Toffin, Gerard. 2006. “The Politics of Hinduism and Secularism in Nepal.” In Studies in Nepali 
History and Society, edited by P Onta, Mark Liechty, Siera Tamang, and Tatsuro Fujikura, 
11:219–239. 2. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Tucci, Giuseppe. 1956. Preliminary Report on Two Scientific Expeditions in Nepal. Materials for 
the Study of Nepalese History and Culture 1. Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed 
Estremo Oriente. 
Turin, Mark. 2011. “Results from the Linguistic Survey of Sikkim: Mother Tongues in Education.” 
In Buddhist Himalaya: Studies in Religion, History and Culture, edited by Anna Balikci-
Denjongpa and Alex McKay, 127–142. Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Tibetology. 
Turner, Ralph Lilley. 1926. A Comparative and Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali Language. 
London: K.Paul, Trench, Trubner. A Comparative and Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali 
Language. 
van Schendel, Willem. 2011. “The Dangers of Belonging: Tribes, Indigenous Peoples and 
Homelands in South Asia.” In The Politics of Belonging in India: Becoming Adivasi, edited 
by Daniel.J. Rycroft and Sangeeta Dasgupta. Oxon: Routledge. 
Vandenhelsken, Melanie. 2011. “The Enactment of Tribal Unity at the Periphery of India: The 
Political Role of a New Form of the Panglhabsol Buddhist Ritual in Sikkim.” European 
Bulletin of Himalayan Research 38 (Spring-Summer): 83–118. 
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2003. “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Rationality.” Perspectives on 
Politics. 
Wagle, Dinesh. 2010. “Dakhar Still.” Himal Maazine. 
http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/226-dakhar-still.html. 
Walker, Andrew. 2001. “The ‘Karen Consensus’, Ethnic Politics and  Resource-Use Legitimacy in 
Northern Thailand.” Asian Ethnicity 2 (2): 145–162. 
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkley: 
University of California Press. 
Weeks, Jeferey. 1990. “The Value of Difference.” In Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, 
edited by Jonathan Rutherford, 88–100. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Weingrod, Alex. 1968. “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties.” Comparative Studies in History 
and Society 10 (4): 377–400. 
Whaites, Alan. 2008. “States in Development: Understanding State-Building”. DFID Working 
Paper.  
Whelpton, John. 1991. Kings, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Rise of Jang 
Bahadur Rana. New Delhi: Manohar. 
———. 1997. “Political Identity in Nepal: State, Nation and Community.” In Nationalism and 
Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom, edited by David Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John 
Whelpton. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
———. 2005. A History of Nepal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wimmer, Andreas. 2008. “The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel 
Process Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 113 (4): 970–1022. 
Wright, Susan. 1998. “The ‘Politicization’ of Culture.” Anthropology Today 14 (1): 7–15. 
Xaxa, Virginius. 1985. “Colonial Capitalism and Underdevelopment of North Bengal.” Economic 
and Political Weekly 20 (39): 1659–1665. 
———. 1999. “Tribes as Indigenous People of India.” Economic and Political Weekly 34 (51): 
3589–3595. 
Zald, Mayer N. 1996. “Culture, Ideology and Strategic Framing.” In Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, 
edited by Dough McAdam, John D McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald, 161–174. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Zappala, Gianni. 1998a.“Clientalism, Political Culture and Ethnic Politics in Australia.” 
Australian Journal of Political Science 33 (3): 381–397. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Magazine, newspapers and reports: 
1998. “Sikkimay Nepali Ki NBC Ra OBC.” Chaaya. 
 
2001. Lama, Mahendra P. “Sikkim Human Development Report”. New Delhi: Government of 
Sikkim. http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_pdf/shdr_sikkim01.pdf. 
 
2004. “West Bengal Human Development Report.” United Nations Development Project. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/asiathepacific/india/name,3275,en.html. 
2006. Department of Economics, Statisttics, Monitoring and Evaluation. 2006. State Socio-
Economic Census. Gangtok, Sikkim: Government of Sikkim. 
2010. “Report on the Evaluation Study on the Hill Area Development Programme in Assam and 
West Bengal.” New Delhi: Planning Commission. 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/peoreport/peoevalu/rep_hill0709.pdf. 
2011. “Sikkim for Gorkhaland: The Ultimate and Permanent Solution.” Talk Sikkim. 4(4):12-15 
2011. “Clashes between Political Party Youth Wings Have Decreased but YCL and UML Youth 
Force Continue to Seek Financial Gain.” Kathmandu: Carter Center. 
 
 
 
 
 
